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Please write a summary of the article that I upload it.

-The article should have the same dependent variable as your term paper. It does not need to have the same independent variable(s) or cases.

- The article should be Describe, as precisely as possible, of the following in different paragraphs:

  • the research question?
  • the hypothesis: is the guess of the research.
  • the key independent variables
  • the dependent variable wish will be the citizenship by right of blood or by right of the soil
  • the units of observation
  • the findings: summary of the research.

For the dependent variable discussion, describe, as precisely as possible, the following:

  • the precise definition of the dependent variable – this will be the dependent variable of your term paper and of the article you are summarizing
  • the way the author operationalizes the variable
  • a complete explanation of one example, from the article, of one of the cases (or observations) the author uses and how the author described the state of the dependent variable for that case

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The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and Institutional Determinants Author(s): Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi Source: The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 53, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 95-136 Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/600080 Accessed: 11-03-2018 06:53 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms The University of Chicago Law School, The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Law & Economics This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and Institutional Determinants Graziella Bertocchi Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia Chiara Strozzi Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia Abstract We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median-voter model of the determination of citizenship laws. Next we test the implications of the model on a new set of data on citizenship laws across countries. We show that citizenship laws respond to economic and institutional determinants endogenously. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli regime tend to restrict their legislation, whereas countries with a jus sanguinis regime resist innovation. The welfare burden does not prove to be an obstacle to jus soli legislation, but demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, whereas instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual effect. 1. Introduction Every country of the world has established a complex system of rules that govern the attribution of citizenship. As a consequence of the increasing pressure of international migration, citizenship laws have moved to center stage on policy agendas because citizenship laws not only affect the design of immigration policy For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank the editor, Dennis W. Carlton; an anonymous referee; and J.-P. Azam, G. Barlevy, D. J. DeVoretz, D. Fiaschi, N. Gennaioli, A. M. Mayda, D. Mitra, L. Rocco, and K. Tatsiramos. We also thank the discussants and participants at the 2003 North American summer meetings of the Econometric Society; the William Davidson Institute–Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) conference on Transition Economics; the Conference on Economic Growth and Distribution; the CEPR conference on Understanding Productivity Differences across Sectors, Firms and Countries; the 2004 Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro conference; the 2004 Economic Growth and Innovation in Multicultural Environments conference; the 2005 European Society for Population Economics conference; the CEPR conference on Institutions, Policies, and Economic Growth; the CEPR conference The Long-Run Growth and Development of the World Economy; the 2005 winter meeting of the Econometric Society; the second Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Annual Migration Meeting; the fourth Europaeum Economic Workshop; the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche workshop on International Economics and Development; and seminars in Paris, Padua, Toulouse, Milan, Bologna, IZA, and Berlin. Financial support from the Italian University Ministry and the European Commission is gratefully acknowledged. [Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 53 (February 2010)] 䉷 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2010/5301-0004$10.00 95 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 96 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS but also interact with the workings of labor markets, affect welfare programs, and influence demographic trends. Citizenship is the legal institution that designates full membership in a state and the associated rights and duties. It provides benefits such as the right to vote, better employment opportunities, the ability to travel without restrictions, legal protection in case of criminal charges, and the possibility of obtaining a visa for a relative. There are also costs to citizenship, such as the military draft, renunciation of one’s original citizenship, and the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs that may be required for naturalization and for recognition at the age of majority. Examples of the latter costs are language and culture tests, waiting periods, and a commitment to avoid activities leading to disqualification. There are several ways to acquire citizenship: at birth, by naturalization, and by marriage. The regulation of citizenship at birth, which determines citizenship acquisition by second-generation immigrants, is rooted in the well-defined bodies of common and civil law. The former traditionally applies the jus soli principle, according to which citizenship is attributed by birthplace: this implies that the child of an immigrant is a citizen as long as he is born in the country of immigration. The latter applies the jus sanguinis principle, which attributes citizenship by descent, so that a child inherits citizenship from his parents, independent of where he is born. Despite being rooted in these principles, during the twentieth century—and especially after World War II—citizenship laws in many countries have gone through a process of continuous adaptation in conjunction with decolonization, the collapse of the socialist system, and the mounting pressure of international migration. In the present article we investigate, from a political economy perspective, the determinants and evolution of citizenship laws in the postwar period. To pursue this goal, we assemble a new data set that codifies citizenship laws across countries, with a specific focus on the provisions that regulate access to citizenship at birth. The data set is then used to study the dynamic adaptation of these laws by relating the observed patterns to a number of potential determinants, including economic factors and other political and cultural factors that have been found to be relevant in related research on institutions. Modern sociopolitical theories have advanced several hypotheses concerning the determinants of the dynamics of citizenship laws, on the basis of case studies and nonquantitative cross-country comparisons. The legal tradition established in a given country is generally believed to exert a persistent effect on current legislation. The relevance of migration has also been investigated. In particular, pressure from a large stock of migrants is perceived to be a factor that shapes the attitude of a country toward citizenship policy. On the one hand, migration could encourage legislation that allows granting automatic citizenship to all newborns. On the other, it might also encourage restrictions of automatic citizenship in countries where it was originally applied. According to some sociopolitical theories, the combination of these forces tends to induce convergence toward a mix of jus soli and jus sanguinis provisions (that is, a mixed regime) This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 97 for countries coming from different legal traditions (Weil 2001). For Europe, Bauböck et al. (2006) instead stress the presence of divergent trends that lean toward liberalization in some countries and toward restriction of access to citizenship in others. The influence of other economic forces is also recognized. Because citizenship rights determine the ability to enjoy welfare benefits, the shaping of nationality laws has been associated with the nature of the welfare state, with a large government representing a potential obstacle to the retention of jus soli (Joppke 1998). This argument, however, has to be weighed against the potential gain resulting from the acquisition of relatively young new citizens by countries with expensive pension systems and in the midst of a demographic crisis. Political factors have also been found to be relevant. The presence of a consolidated democracy is expected to lead to the adoption of jus soli, which is viewed as treating aliens more equally. Stabilization of state borders should reduce the pressure to preserve a national identity through jus sanguinis. Finally, an additional factor that has been the subject of debate is the influence of national character and culture. The theory advanced by Brubaker (1992) focuses on France and Germany as having antagonistic kinds of nationhood, the former more assimilationist and the latter more ethnocentric, which induce definitions of citizenship. In this article, we formalize the aforementioned hypotheses in a simple medianvoter model that guides our empirical investigation by generating testable implications and offering an interpretation of the resulting evidence. The model is based on the assumption that the laws regulating the acquisition of citizenship can be viewed as the outcome of a decision problem faced by a native median voter, in a context where citizenship confers the right to vote on policy. In making this decision, the native median voter takes into account the associated benefits and costs, which depend on the share of migrants in the population and the other factors suggested by the literature. The model indicates that the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous effect on the decision to grant citizenship and voting rights to migrants because, for the native median voter, it increases the loss of letting migrants vote but also increases the cost associated with their exclusion. Moreover, the decision of natives can be positively influenced when migrants have relatively high income levels, the welfare state is small, the native population is relatively old, and there is a high level of democracy, a stable national border, and an inclusive national culture. We test the aforementioned empirical implications and find that, in the postwar period, citizenship laws responded to economic and institutional factors endogenously and systematically through a slow but steady process of adaptation. Overall, our results suggest that migration moves national legislation in the direction of jus sanguinis, not jus soli. In particular, when we take into account the legal tradition governing citizenship, we find that countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. On the other hand, the effect of migration has been negligible in countries with jus sanguinis regimes. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 98 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS convergence toward a mixed regime, because migration tends to induce restrictions but not extensions. Other economic factors also matter. Although the welfare burden does not prove to be an obstacle for jus soli legislation, demographic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes. Turning to institutional factors, we find that a high degree of democracy is significantly associated with jus soli legislation, whereas border instability—in particular, after decolonization—decreases its likelihood. Cultural characteristics determined by religion and ethic fractionalization are not found to play a significant role. Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 reviews the historical and legal background of the issues that we address. Section 4 presents our model of determination of citizenship laws. Section 5 describes our data on citizenship laws around the world. Section 6 empirically investigates the determinants of current citizenship laws and presents our main results and a set of robustness checks. Section 7 develops an alternative empirical strategy that highlights the determinants of change in citizenship laws. Section 8 provides conclusions and indicates directions for future research. Appendix A presents information about the data used. Appendix B provides additional tables. 2. Related Literature Our work is related to several branches of the economic literature. First, this article adds to research on international migration and migration policy. Timmer and Williamson (1998), Hatton and Williamson (2006), and Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) empirically analyze immigration policies enacted at the end of the nineteenth century during the mass migration era, and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006) estimate the attitudes of voters toward immigration in the postwar period. The political economy of migration is modeled by, among others, Benhabib (1996), Gradstein and Schiff (2006), and DeVoretz (2006). More specifically, the role of citizenship policy is discussed by DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2006), who investigate the economic costs and benefits derived from citizenship; by Pritchett (2006), who evaluates citizenship policy within a broader discussion of labor mobility and immigration policies; and by Chiswick and Miller (2009), who evaluate the determinants of the decision to naturalize. Because our theory emphasizes that citizenship rights imply the right to vote, our work is also related to Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) and Dolmas and Huffman (2004), who compare the effect of migration on the welfare state with or without voting rights for the migrants. However, they do not examine the determinants of these alternative regimes. On the other hand, the issue of franchise extension has recently received considerable attention within the literature, with contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bertocchi and Spagat (2001), but with a focus on the conflict between rich and poor, whereas Bertocchi (2007) concentrates on the conflict between men and women. Viewed more broadly, our work contributes to research that focuses on the historical determinants of institutions. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) highlight This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 99 the relevance of wealth inequality and political factors in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions develop over time. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) contribute to the understanding of how institutions evolve by using historical variables as instruments for contemporary measures of the quality of institutions. This article also relates to the comparative legal approach initiated by La Porta et al. (1998). The basic premise of this research line is the recognition that laws in different countries are adopted or transplanted from a few legal traditions and that the resulting legislative bodies reflect both the influence of legal origin and the subsequent revision specific to individual countries. Balas et al. (2009) specifically analyze the evolution of an index of formalism of legal procedure. We add to this stream by focusing on the determinants of the dynamic adaptation of nationality rules. Finally, work by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) on the optimal determination of the size of nations, and thus of state borders, is also relevant to our approach, both because country size in this literature is the same as population size and is potentially influenced by migration and by the legal status of immigrants and because borders play an important role in the determination of citizenship rules. 3. Citizenship Laws in Historical Perspective Citizenship policy can be viewed as part of broader migration policy. However, contrary to other migration policy measures, such as quotas and visa requirements, that are typically adjusted to the business cycle and to current government orientation, reforms of citizenship laws tend to be the outcome of long-term processes of adaptation that often involve constitutional amendments. In eighteenth-century Europe, jus soli was the dominant criterion, in accordance with feudal traditions that linked people to the lord who held the land where they were born. The French Revolution broke with this heritage and, in the Civil Code of 1804, reintroduced the ancient Roman custom of jus sanguinis. Continental modern citizenship law was subsequently built on these premises. During the nineteenth century, the jus sanguinis principle was adopted throughout Europe and then transplanted to its colonies. In imitation, Japan also adopted jus sanguinis during this phase. On the other hand, the British preserved their jus soli tradition and spread it through their own colonies, starting with the United States, where it was later encoded in the U.S. Constitution. By the end of the nineteenth century, the process of nation-state formation and the associated codification efforts were completed in continental Europe. At the same time, the revolutionary period was over in countries that had been subject to earlier colonization, and nineteenth-century colonization had extended the process of transplantation of legal tradition to the rest of the world. Therefore, most countries had established specific provisions for the acquisition of citizenship within a relatively well developed legal system, with jus soli being the norm in This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 100 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS common-law countries and jus sanguinis regulating citizenship law in most civil law countries, with important exceptions. For instance, civil law Latin America had embraced jus soli early, whereas civil law France, with its colonies, had by then already moved toward a mixed regime. However, the next century witnessed a continuous transformation of citizenship laws across the world. Mentioned below are some specific cases, drawn mostly from Joppke (1998), Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2000, 2001), and Brubaker (1992). 3.1. The United States Jus soli was encoded in the U.S. Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868, with the specific purpose of protecting the birthrights of black slaves. Given its history as a country of immigrants and its generally positive attitude toward economic liberalism, the United States has an approach that is still remarkably consistent with its original attitude in all aspects, ranging from immigration policy to naturalization requirements. Debate about possible restrictions arose recently but never led to actual change.2 In particular, in the 1980s, jus soli came under attack regarding its applicability to the children of illegal immigrants. A relatively young and thin welfare state contributes to the fiscal sustainability of jus soli in this country.3 3.2. Australia Current citizenship law in Australia differs considerably from that in the United States, despite the nations’ common origin as countries of immigration. Jus soli had also been introduced in Australia by the colonists. In the postwar period, the country went through numerous legislative and administrative reforms. Jus soli survived until 1986. Since that time, to acquire citizenship, a person born in Australia must have at least one parent who is either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident. 3.3. Latin America In the face of a civil law tradition transplanted by European powers, Latin America has followed a rather peculiar pattern. At independence, most of the incipient states chose jus soli regimes as a way to break with the colonial political order and to prevent the metropoles from making legitimate claims on citizens born in the new countries. Jus soli was encoded in the constitution of Brazil in 1824, in that of Venezuela in 1830, and in that of Argentina in 1853. Therefore, most countries in Latin America already had a jus soli regime before the 2 In his analysis of Mexican immigration, Huntington (2004) criticizes current nationality regulations on the grounds that they represent a devaluation of citizenship. Pritchett (2006) discusses the possible advantages of guest-worker programs that do not contemplate citizenship, from the perspective of poor countries. 3 The relative thickness of the concept of citizenship, if compared with residency, is a related, potentially relevant consideration: in the United States, for instance, citizenship is relatively thin in the sense that it confers few additional benefits over residency. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 101 nineteenth-century waves of immigration began. Jus soli is still the prevalent rule in the area, although it no longer attracts immigrants. Mexico is a special case in that jus soli was adopted in the 1814 constitution but then was abandoned in 1836, only to return to stay with a constitutional amendment in 1937. 3.4. The United Kingdom British nationality law has been deeply affected by the imperial experience. Because of its colonial history, until World War II the concept of nationality in the United Kingdom was particularly extensive because all subjects of the British Empire had equal access to British citizenship simply by establishing residence in the United Kingdom. The British Nationality Act of 1848 created the status of “citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies” for people with a close connection to the United Kingdom and its colonies. After a postwar wave of colonial immigration, this open-door policy was progressively restricted, although special status is still attributed to citizens of the British Commonwealth. Since the 1980s, redefinitions of national citizenship have been effectively used as a form of selective immigration policy. The 1984 British Nationality Act restricts jus soli by establishing that a child born in the United Kingdom qualifies for British citizenship only if at least one parent is a British citizen or resident. 3.5. France The emergence of the nation-state in continental Europe was the main factor that shaped citizenship law in this area. The revolutionary experience was particularly important for France, where jus sanguinis was first introduced with the Civil Code of 1804 and was maintained for the entire course of the nineteenth century, even though, early on, military considerations introduced elements of jus soli. To ensure that children born to immigrants in France would be subject to the draft, double jus soli became automatic in 1889, making the experience of this country a unique one. After World War II, large-scale immigration, especially from North Africa, raised concerns regarding assimilation. Citizenship issues and the rights of immigrants became the subjects of heated debate in French politics. In 1993, President Jacques Chirac introduced to the legislation a restrictive revision that required a formal citizenship request from secondgeneration immigrants. With the Left regaining political power in 1997, however, this restriction was revised considerably, with citizenship automatically assigned at age 18 to immigrants’ children born in France who had neither requested nor declined it. France is frequently compared with Germany. Brubaker (2002) influentially argues that the different paths followed by these countries have been shaped by cultural difference, with France following its tradition as an assimilationist nation and Germany focusing on its ethnic identity. 3.6. Germany The single most relevant event in the history of German citizenship law is certainly the fall of the Berlin Wall, which paved the way for the achievement This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 102 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS of stable national borders. Before that event, the massive immigration of guest workers in the postwar period—mostly from Turkey but also from southern Europe—had started to put under strong pressure, albeit without success, the original Wilhelminian citizenship law of 1913, which established strong jus sanguinis ties with German emigrants overseas. With the foundation of the German Democratic Republic and the consolidation of the Eastern Block, Germany found itself in the paradoxical situation of having a large population of disenfranchised foreigners born on its own soil and, at the same time, millions of ethnic Germans living behind the Iron Curtain. Achieving border stability was a decisive factor in moving Germany toward the long-delayed adoption of jus soli elements. A first step in this direction was the Foreigner Law of 1990, which changed naturalization from a discretionary exception to the rule. A major overhaul of the legislation, after intense political struggle, was finally approved in 1999. Jus soli is now the norm in Germany (with the minor requirement that one parent has lived in the country for 8 years). Other factors that may have delayed the introduction of jus soli in Germany are, as mentioned in the introduction, the strong ethnic character of German national identity and the thick nature of the German welfare state. The latter factor may have played a role in shaping the evolution of citizenship policies in several other European countries, and especially in Scandinavian countries, where jus sanguinis was functional when there were large emigration flows in the past but which have recently adapted to the quickly changing conditions, especially in Sweden, where immigration rates are high. As documented by Weil (2001), restricted forms of double jus soli are now applied de facto in the vast majority of European countries, which recently adapted their legislation to the globalization of international migration and its increasing effect on Europe. In particular, in the European Union, with the exception of Austria, Greece, and Luxembourg, access to citizenship by second and third generations is facilitated. 3.7. Decolonization Postwar decolonization had a major influence on citizenship rules applied around the world—not only through an indirect effect on the metropolitan countries previously examined. The vast majority of African colonies that were subject to civil law countries practicing jus sanguinis stuck to this principle after attaining independence. On the other hand, many former British and Portuguese colonies rejected the jus soli tradition and switched to an often strongly ethnically tinged version of jus sanguinis. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the 1961 constitution established that citizenship is transmitted only by descent and only to children whose father and a grandfather were Sierra Leoneans of African-Negro descent. In situations in which instability was pushed to an extreme degree because of the newness and the arbitrary borders of these countries and was compounded by deep ethnic division, jus sanguinis tended to prevail as a way to control more easily the formation of national entities. At the same time, however, the associated exclusive notion of ethnic and tribal identity caused This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 103 enormous problems in countries where colonial rule had left shaky democratic institutions. To the present time, ethnic conflict lies at the roots of the chronic manipulation of citizenship rules in favor of one ethnic group over others. In an effort to exclude Rwandan immigrants, the 1964 Congolese constitution recognized citizenship only for persons whose parents were members of one of the tribes established within the territory by 1908. In 1981, Mobutu signed a new law on nationality that required an ancestral connection to the population residing in the territory as far back as 1885. Marginalization and de facto statelessness of significant strata of the population are unavoidable outcomes of these policies. 3.8. The Disintegration of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics Another major wave of citizenship law codification followed the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The area had been sealed against international migration; however, as for all empires, there had been considerable internal migration. The Soviet Union occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940. During the following decades, millions of Russians were encouraged to settle in Latvia and Estonia (less so in Lithuania) to Russify them. Today, sizable stateless, Russian-speaking minorities are still present. After independence, the new citizenship laws of the three states reflected this heritage with an emphasis on jus sanguinis as the basis for acquiring citizenship. The hostile attitude toward ethnic Russians was especially strong in Latvia, whereas Lithuania, which was less affected by Soviet immigration policy, had a more open approach. The issue for these states was how to balance a need to reconstitute their national identity around an ethnic model and a commitment to democratic values with respect to the rights of minorities. Estonian and Latvian laws were sharply criticized by international organizations on the grounds of human rights. In anticipation of integration into the European Union, the Baltic states indeed addressed these recommendations in more recent legislation, whereas discriminatory policies persist in most other countries in the area. In contrast, the salient fact in shaping the Russian Federation’s current citizenship policy is the perception that many of its citizens are outside its borders, spread around the former regions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Again, the perception of being a country of emigrants is pushing to maintain jus sanguinis as the main principle, even though small concessions to jus soli have been made. 4. The Model This section develops a simple theoretical model that formalizes the hypotheses that a widely interdisciplinary literature has advanced with respect to the determinants of citizenship laws. The aim of the model is also to generate testable implications that can guide our interpretation of the empirical evidence. We can view the laws regulating citizenship acquisition as the outcome of the decision problem faced by the median voter in a context where citizenship confers This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 104 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS the right to vote on policy. A native voter, when deciding whether to grant citizenship, and thus the right to vote, to migrants is driven by the benefits and costs associated with this decision. A few warnings are in order before we present the details of the model. First, although in practice acquisition of citizenship implies a set of rights larger than the right to vote, and also implies some duties, our focus on the right to vote as the main benefit is easily justified because political rights can be viewed as an instrument through which migrants can achieve broader political, economic, and social goals. Second, although the model concentrates on voting on a specific policy—namely, a redistributive tax scheme that finances a public good—the same approach can be extended to consider alternative agendas. Finally, in our 1-period framework, the distinction between different ways of acquiring citizenship becomes irrelevant; therefore, the predictions of the model can be applied to laws concerning both citizenship at birth and naturalization. We consider an economy in which a population of mass P consists of natives with mass N and migrants with mass M, where M ⫹ N p P and M ! N. Migrants are poorer than natives because they are relatively unskilled, so y N 1 y 1 y M, where y N and y M denote average incomes for natives and migrants, respectively, and y p (N/P) y N ⫹ (M/P) y M denotes the economy-wide average income. We also assume that the income distribution is skewed to the right for each group— namely, median income is lower than average income for both natives and migrants and thus for the economy as a whole. Both natives and migrants derive utility from consumption of a private good, c i, and a public good, g, according to the equation u i p c i ⫹ lg, (1) where l is a positive preference parameter. Both groups pay taxes in accordance with a proportional income tax rate t such that 0 ! t ! 1 . Tax revenues are used by the government to finance the public good according to the balanced budget constraint g p ty ⫺ t2 y, 2 (2) where the second term denotes tax collection costs. The tax rate is set by political choice under majority voting, as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Each enfranchised individual casts a vote on the tax rate. Assume initially that only natives are citizens and therefore allowed to vote. Assume also that society bears a cost k for the exclusion of migrants from citizenship. This cost increases with the share of migrants in the population, reflecting the possibility that their disenfranchisement can lead to social unrest and even violence. The cost is also affected by factors that determine the degree of inclusiveness of This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 105 the country’s culture as captured, for instance, by a jus soli tradition, according to kpK⫹h M , P (3) where K denotes the degree of cultural inclusiveness and h 1 0. The cost enters the individual budget constraint as follows: c i ≤ (1 ⫺ t)y i ⫺ k, (4) i where y denotes individual income. Equivalently, k could directly enter the utility function. The expression for the indirect utility function of a native voter with income y Ni is given by ( ) v Ni p (1 ⫺ t)y Ni ⫺ k ⫹ l t ⫺ t2 y, 2 (5) which is single peaked with respect to the tax rate. We can therefore apply the median-voter theorem, according to which the equilibrium tax rate is the preferred tax rate of the native median voter with income y N *, according to t N* p 1 ⫺ 1 y N* . l y (6) The level of the tax rate increases with the intensity of the preference for public goods and with inequality, which is measured by the ratio of natives’ median income over the economy-wide average income, because migrants also pay taxes. Note that, under our assumptions about income distribution, it is not necessarily the case that (y N */y) ! 1, which implies that the tax rate is going to be positive only if (y N */y) ! l. The native median voter could avoid cost k by granting citizenship to the migrants and thus accepting the tax rate that would prevail under universal enfranchisement, which is given by t* p 1 ⫺ 1 y* l y , (7) where y* is the economy-wide median income. Because y N * 1 y* , it follows that t N * ! t*—that is, the tax rate chosen by the native median voter is lower than the tax that applies under universal suffrage. In particular, given our assumptions about income distribution, the latter is certainly positive. The difference between t N * and t* increases with the income gap between natives and migrants and with the share of migrants in the population. The native median voter faces a simple set of costs and benefits when considering the decision to grant citizenship. If migrants cannot vote, the native median voter has to face cost k but can enjoy a smaller tax. If migrants vote, This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 106 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS the native median voter has to pay more taxes, but k is avoided. It follows that the native median voter decides to grant citizenship to migrants if and only if ( (1 ⫺ t N *)y N * ⫺ k ⫹ l t N * ⫺ t N* 2 2 ) ( y ≤ (1 ⫺ t*)y N * ⫹ l t* ⫺ ) t*2 2 y, (8) where, following equation (5), we find on the left-hand side his indirect utility function when migrants cannot vote and on the right-hand side his indirect utility function when migrants can vote. Both the disenfranchisement cost and the fiscal gain associated with the no-franchise status quo increase with the share of migrants in the population. In addition, the fiscal gain also increases with the income gap between natives and migrants, whereas the cost increases with the degree of inclusiveness K of the country’s culture. Even if the model is static, we can think of its dynamic implications in terms of a sequence of repeated decisions. If, after a sequence of stationary decisions, the economy is shocked by an increase in the migrant share because of a large inflow, the median voter will respond, taking into consideration all the channels involved, and this may result in an adaptation of the regulation. Note that a given stock of migrants has a stronger effect on countries with relatively small native populations because it is the share of migrants in the population that matters. The predictions obtained from the model to date indicate that a decision to extend citizenship and associated voting rights is facilitated by a smaller income gap between natives and migrants and by a larger degree of inclusiveness in the country’s culture. If we interpret a jus sanguinis tradition as demonstrating a low degree of inclusiveness and, thus, a low cost of exclusion, it follows that jus sanguinis countries will be more reluctant to change. Finally, the effect of an increase in the share of migrants is potentially ambiguous because a higher share increases both the cost and the fiscal gain of disenfranchisement, generating a trade-off. The net effect depends on which factor is stronger. Although the present formulation of the model is designed to establish conditions for the extension of citizenship rights to migrants, it can also encompass restriction. When the status quo is a jus soli regulation or, equivalently, a particularly generous naturalization policy, migrants who are already in the country and have thus become citizens are simply considered to be natives themselves. Together with ethnic natives, they decide whether to restrict the current regulation, taking into account the incoming waves of immigrants and following the simple logic previously illustrated. The basic model can be extended to consider several other potentially relevant factors. First, the influence of the size of government on citizenship laws can be captured by assuming that different countries exhibit different preference parameters toward government. Thus, having a relatively large government, as captured by l, could make an open citizenship policy more costly by increasing This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 107 the tax differential. Empirically, we should therefore expect the size of government to have a negative effect on the degree of inclusiveness in citizenship laws. Second, demographic aspects can be considered by assuming that a younger average age for migrants implies a larger ability to contribute to the welfare state at any given level of income. Although our 1-period model cannot explicitly reflect these aspects, we can interpret our tax as a lifelong contribution that is higher for a migrant. This should facilitate the decision to grant migrants citizenship and implies that countries with relatively old native populations should be particularly sensitive to these considerations and thus display a more open attitude. Third, the level of democracy can influence the outcome because it implies a constraint on the political rights of the natives, which can be modeled with an income franchise requirement. If only rich natives are allowed to vote, the associated tax rate will be higher than otherwise, thus amplifying the tax cost that follows the decision to allow migrants to vote. The testable implication is that the decision to grant citizenship is positively influenced by the domestic level of democracy. Fourth, border instability can be captured in a version of the model in which the size of the native population, and thus the population share of migrants, is subject to uncertainty. Indeed, when the national border is unstable, the main problem is to establish who can be considered a native. Under standard riskaversion behavior, introducing a random component into the model should affect the voting decision by reducing the tax rate. In summary, the share of migrants has a potentially ambiguous effect on the decision of the natives to extend citizenship and voting rights to migrants because, for the native median voter, it increases the tax disadvantage of letting migrants vote while increasing the cost associated with their exclusion. Moreover, we expect that the natives’ decision will be positively influenced by an inclusive national culture, a relatively high income level for migrants, a small welfare state, a relatively old native population, a high level of democracy, stable national borders, and a large native population. 5. The Data: Citizenship Laws of the World We compile a data set of postwar citizenship laws across the countries of the world. The principal source for the information that we codify is U.S. Office of Personnel Management (2001), a directory that provides synopses of citizenship laws currently in force in 190 countries. The sources for the directory are embassies, the Library of Congress, and the U.S. Department of State. We supplement this information with Central Intelligence Agency (2002), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2003), and the survey in Weil (2001). The principal focus of our codification is acquisition of citizenship at birth, but we also collect information about naturalization requirements. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 108 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS 5.1. Citizenship at Birth We attribute to each country an appropriate code for citizenship laws in 2001, in 1975, and at the beginning of the postwar period. We use 1948 as the starting point although there were nearly no reforms in citizenship laws during the first half of the century, so most of the legislation in place in 1948 had been developed much earlier.4 As in the analysis of legal origins in La Porta et al. (1998), we treat as predetermined the specific legal provisions regulating access to citizenship in 1948, at least relative to the subsequent developments that are the focus of the present investigation. Indeed, although the nineteenth century witnessed a first wave of adaptation of citizenship legislation from either the civil law tradition or the common-law tradition, there was no further evolution in the subsequent half-century, despite major historical events such as World War I. By coding citizenship laws in 1975, we divide the postwar period into two subperiods of equal length. In our classification, we focus on the presence of jus soli elements in the legislation of a country. This approach is justified by our primary interest in the potential effect of citizenship laws on immigrants rather than emigrants. We divide countries into three groups for 1948, 1975, and 2001: countries subject to jus sanguinis without any jus soli elements (group 1), those that apply a mixed regime (group 2), and those subject to full jus soli (group 3). A mixed regime includes elements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis regimes.5 Our data set includes those 162 countries for which we were able to collect information on both original and current citizenship laws and for which postwar migration data were available.6 The differential patterns of evolution of citizenship laws in 1948, 1975, and 2001 are summarized by the transition matrices in Tables 1–3, which reveal considerable variation both across countries and over time. Tables 1 and 2 show that, in 1948, jus soli was the rule in approximately 47 percent (76 of 162) of the countries, whereas jus sanguinis dominated in 41 percent (67 of 162 countries), and the mixed regime was adopted in the remaining 12 percent (19 of 162 countries). Among the countries that were under a jus soli regime in 1948 were the United States, Canada, all the Oceanian countries, most of Latin America, the British and Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Portugal. In 1948, jus sanguinis predominated in most of Europe, including its eastern part. As explained in Section 3, France was unique in its early choice of a mixed regime. Because we treat colonial territories as being subject to the regime of the metropolitan countries until independence, the group with the mixed regime in 1948 includes France and its colonies. 4 By treating 1948 as the initial year, we include the postwar decolonization period, with the exception of the Middle East, which gained independence from the British and French administration in 1943–48. 5 For details on our classification criteria, see Section A1. 6 For details on migration data, see Section A3. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 109 Table 1 Evolution of Citizenship Laws: Transition Matrix, 1948 versus 2001 Citizenship Laws in 2001 Citizenship Laws in 1948 Jus sanguinis Mixed Jus soli Total Jus Sanguinis Mixed Jus Soli Total 46 11 31 88 20 6 9 35 1 2 36 39 67 19 76 162 Table 2 Evolution of Citizenship Laws: Transition Matrix, 1948 versus 1975 Citizenship Laws in 1975 Citizenship Laws in 1948 Jus sanguinis Mixed Jus soli Total Jus Sanguinis Mixed Jus Soli Total 63 10 28 101 3 7 1 11 1 2 47 50 67 19 76 162 Table 3 Evolution of Citizenship Laws: Transition Matrix, 1975 versus 2001 Citizenship Laws in 2001 Citizenship Laws in 1975 Jus sanguinis Mixed Jus soli Total Jus Sanguinis Mixed Jus Soli Total 81 2 5 88 20 9 6 35 0 0 39 39 101 11 50 162 By 1975, 31 percent (50 of 162) of the countries had jus soli, 62 percent (101 countries) had jus sanguinis, and 7 percent (11 countries) had mixed regimes. The main event justifying this evolution is decolonization, with many former colonies switching to jus sanguinis from jus soli when the United Kingdom and Portugal were the metropolitan countries and from the mixed regime in the case of France (see Section 3). As of 2001, 24 percent (39 of 162) of the countries had jus soli, 54 percent (88 countries) jus sanguinis, and 22 percent (35 countries) mixed regimes (see Table 3). It has mostly been the adaptation of the legislation of many European countries, relaxing pure jus sanguinis in favor of a mixed regime, that explains the pattern observed for the second subperiod. Among the countries that still adhered to the jus soli principle in 2001 were the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland (the latter, however, recently introduced restrictions to jus soli with a June 2004 referendum). The United Kingdom and Australia, on the contrary, no longer adhere to jus soli and have adopted a mixed regime. Overall, jus sanguinis is currently the most common regime, with 69 percent of the countries in Africa, 83 percent of those in Asia, This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 110 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS and 41 percent (down from 88 percent) of those in Europe. The growing group of countries in which a mix of provisions is applied is particularly well represented in Europe, where 56 percent of European countries, including the United Kingdom, which formerly had a jus soli regime. On the other hand, jus soli predominates in the Americas, where it is followed by 89 percent of the countries in Latin America and by all of North America (namely, the United States and Canada). The matrices present three different patterns of transitional dynamics: stability, switch, and convergence. Stable countries lie along the diagonal. Looking at Table 1, we see that a large fraction (28 percent, or 46 of 162 countries) started and ended as jus sanguinis countries. In other words, 69 percent (46 of 67) of the countries that originally followed jus sanguinis principles have continued to do so. By contrast, 22 percent (36 of 162 countries) steadily follow jus soli principles: this means that only 47 percent (36 of 76) of the countries that originally followed jus soli principles did not change their policies. Off the diagonal, there is a sizable proportion of countries (19 percent, or 31 of 162) that switched from jus soli to jus sanguinis by completely eliminating birthplace as a criterion: most of them, as mentioned, are former African colonies of the United Kingdom and Portugal that made this radical choice at independence. Looking at the two subperiods, we see that most of these switches occurred between 1948 and 1975. Finally, there is evidence of a process of convergence to a mix of jus soli and jus sanguinis, which affects 18 percent of the countries (29 of 162, of which 20 converged from jus sanguinis by adding jus soli elements, whereas nine converged from jus soli by restricting it), and evidence that it intensified between 1975 and 2001. In Tables 4–6 we present additional information on the evolution of citizenship laws. Here we report changes in the laws. During 1948–2001, a total of 74 countries (46 percent) experienced a change in the laws. Of these countries, 51 changed to jus sanguinis and 23 to jus soli; 45 changes occurred in the first subperiod and 33 in the second.7 In particular, in the first subperiod, the majority of the countries that experienced a change (29, or 64 percent) were originally jus soli. As mentioned, this pattern is determined largely by the behavior of former colonies. In the second subperiod (Table 6), the majority of the countries that experienced a change (20, or 61 percent) were originally jus sanguinis, with most adopting more open legislation. The above discussion suggests a relevant role for border stability. To investigate this issue, we introduce a set of dummies that capture a country’s history of border changes. In particular, we distinguish three causes of border instability: decolonization, the Berlin Wall, and other border changes.8 If we compare the transitional dynamics of the full sample with those of the countries that did not 7 8 A few countries experienced more than one change. Section A2 describes how the three border change dummies are constructed. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 111 Table 4 Changes in Citizenship Laws, 1948 to 2001 Citizenship Laws in 2001 Citizenship Laws in 1948 Jus sanguinis Mixed Jus soli Total No Change Toward Jus Sanguinis Toward Jus Soli Total 46 6 36 88 0 11 40 51 21 2 0 23 67 19 76 162 Table 5 Changes in Citizenship Laws, 1948 to 1975 Citizenship Laws in 1975 Citizenship Laws in 1948 Jus sanguinis Mixed Jus soli Total No Change Toward Jus Sanguinis Toward Jus Soli Total 63 7 47 117 0 10 29 39 4 2 0 6 67 19 76 162 Table 6 Changes in Citizenship Laws, 1975 to 2001 Citizenship Laws in 2001 Citizenship Laws in 1975 Jus sanguinis Mixed Jus soli Total No Change Toward Jus Sanguinis Toward Jus Soli Total 81 9 39 129 0 2 11 13 20 0 0 20 101 11 50 162 experience a border change, we count for the latter a much smaller proportion of switches from jus soli to jus sanguinis. This pattern confirms the relevance of border changes, especially those caused by decolonization. Summary statistics for our data set of citizenship laws are reported in Table 7. The correlation between citizenship laws in 1948 and 2001 is .42, which points to some persistence, as confirmed by the even higher correlations noted between the 1948 and 1975 laws (.60) and the 1975 and 2001 laws (.81). 5.2. Citizenship by Naturalization and the Citizenship Policy Index Naturalization policies are also relevant to the issues at hand. Indeed, facilitation of naturalization for immigrant parents may represent a substitute mechanism for conferring citizenship on children born in jus sanguinis countries. In addition, the general attitude revealed by a country’s regulation of citizenship at birth may be reflected in its naturalization laws, with countries with jus soli regimes traditionally making naturalization much easier, at least for resident aliens. In jus sanguinis countries, naturalization requirements again tend to be This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 112 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS Table 7 Citizenship Laws Data Set: Summary Statistics Citizenship laws in 2001 Citizenship laws in 1975 Citizenship laws in 1948 Changes in citizenship laws, 1948 to 1975 Changes in citizenship laws, 1975 to 2001 Changes in citizenship laws, 1948 to 2001 Naturalization in 2001 Citizenship policy index in 2001 Observations Mean SD Min Max 162 162 162 162 162 162 142 142 1.698 1.685 2.056 .043 ⫺.204 ⫺.173 2.458 .415 .835 .916 .941 .451 .488 .655 .920 .299 1 1 1 ⫺1 ⫺1 ⫺1 1 0 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 correlated with the provisions introduced for citizenship at birth. Basic rules for naturalization may include a period of residence, renunciation of other citizenship, familiarity with the language and customs of the country, and availability of adequate means of support. We code naturalization only for 2001 on the basis of the available information for 142 of our 162 countries. We classify countries on the basis of the number of years of residence required for naturalization by constructing four classes (114 years, 6–14 years, 5 years, and X4 years).9 In our data set, 62 countries (44 percent) require 5 years of residence, which can be considered a relatively open attitude, whereas 46 percent require more time, and only 10 percent are more open. We then combine the information that we collected on citizenship at birth and naturalization within a single measure, although data on naturalization are available only for the year 2001 and for a subset of countries. We construct an index of citizenship policy defined on a 0–1 interval. To construct the index, we treat citizenship laws in 2001 as an ordinal variable by associating jus soli elements with lower number of years of residence required for naturalization. The corrected Cronbach’s a of the indicator is .54, which can be explained by the fact that the correlation between citizenship laws and naturalization is only .37. Alternative ways to define naturalization classes yield similar conclusions.10 Table 7 also reports summary statistics for naturalization and the citizenship policy index.11 6. Determinants of Citizenship Laws 6.1. Empirical Specification In bringing our theoretical model to the data, to investigate the determinants of the evolution of citizenship laws in the postwar period, we select the following 9 We do not consider naturalization by marriage because it is heavily dependent on family law. Dual-citizenship provisions constitute another potentially relevant aspect of citizenship policy, but we do not use this variable because of limited information. 11 For European countries only, the British Council has compiled an index of civic citizenship and inclusion (British Council Brussels 2005); Bauböck et al. (2006) collect statistics on the acquisition of nationality. 10 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 113 variables. The dependent variable is Current Citizenship Laws, which is categorical and can take three values: 1 if the country has a jus sanguinis regime, 2 if the country has a mixed regime, and 3 if the country has a jus soli regime. Among regressors, we employ measures of migration, the size of government, and the age structure of the population, although we cannot gauge the effect of the income gap between natives and migrants because of a lack of data. We interpret the presence of a jus soli tradition as an indicator of the degree of inclusiveness of the national culture. To control for other cultural characteristics, we also consider religion and ethnic diversity. Border stability is measured by our border change dummies. We also control for countries with particularly small populations. We use a multinomial logit specification to achieve maximum generality. In fact, this choice does not impose any ex ante ordering among the three regimes— for example, an ordering by increasing inclusiveness toward immigrants, with jus soli being associated with maximal inclusiveness and jus sanguinis with minimal inclusiveness. Moreover, in principle, those regressors that affect the probability of being a jus soli country may not always have the opposite effect on the probability of being a jus sanguinis country or may not have any effect at all (and vice versa). (Further discussion on this point is presented in Section 6.3.) We use a panel sample that includes information on two cross sections of 162 countries: the first cross section refers to the 1950–75 subperiod, and the second cross section refers to the 1976–2000 subperiod. In the full specification that we present, the multinomial logit model that we run has the form L it p a ⫹ bM it ⫹ cSit ⫹ dM itSit ⫹ eTt ⫹ Z it f ⫹ ␧it, (9) with i p 1, . . . , 162 and t p 1, 2, where t p 1 denotes the 1950–75 subperiod and t p 2 denotes the 1976–2000 subperiod.12 In specification (9), L it denotes citizenship laws in country i at the end of period t, a is a constant term, M it is migration stock as a percentage of the population in country i at the beginning of period t, Sit is a dummy for the presence of jus sanguinis in country i at the beginning of each subperiod, M itSit is the interaction between the previous two variables, Tt is a period dummy, Z it is a vector of additional explanatory variables, and ␧it is an error term.13 The set of explanatory variables Z it can be divided into two groups. The first group includes dummies capturing the geopolitical position of a country. Within this group, we consider the border change dummies and dummies for Latin American, southern European, and small countries. The second group of explanatory variables includes the size of government as a share of the gross 12 For comparison purposes, we also run multinomial logit models for two types of more parsimonious specifications. 13 In particular, Li1 and Li2 are citizenship laws in country i in 1975 and 2001, respectively, Mi1 is migration stock in country i in 1960, Mi2 is migration stock in country i in 1980, Si1 p 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in 1948, Si2 p 1 if country i has jus sanguinis in 1975, T1 p 0, and T2 p 1. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 114 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS Table 8 Summary Statistics Current Citizenship Laws Changes in Citizenship Laws Jus Sanguinis Origin Civil Law Migration Stock Net Migration Flow Decolonization Berlin Wall Other Border Changes Latin America Southern Europe Small Country Sub-Saharan Africa British or Portuguese Colony Socialist Oil Political Rights Catholic Share Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Government Consumption Share of Young Log GDP Per Capita Gini Index Observations Mean SD Min Max 324 324 324 324 300 318 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 276 324 272 263 324 263 155 1.691 ⫺.080 .519 .673 5.646 ⫺.116 .250 .052 .022 .173 .043 .160 .265 .333 .173 .086 3.730 31.535 .349 19.617 34.54 7.488 40.425 .875 .485 .500 .470 9.713 8.551 .434 .223 .146 .379 .204 .368 .442 .472 .379 .281 2.040 35.572 .299 11.342 3.47 1.249 9.966 1 ⫺1 0 0 .011 ⫺47.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2.492 27.01 4.979 20.495 3 1 1 1 70.673 63.35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 97.3 .890 72.233 53.36 10.060 63.180 Note. The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries. The reference period is 1950–2000. The first cross section includes the 1950–75 subperiod, and the second cross section includes the 1976–2000 subperiod. GDP p gross domestic product. domestic product, the share of young people in the population, proxies for cultural characteristics such as religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and a measure of democracy. Appendix A presents information on the definitions and sources of our variables. Table 8 presents their summary statistics. We can now suggest a number of specific hypotheses, consistent with the model previously outlined, regarding the potential role of the aforementioned factors, starting with the variables that we consider to be focal to our analysis— namely, immigration and legal tradition. Throughout the remainder of this article, we organize our comments in terms of the effects of each of our regressors on the probability of adopting either a mixed regime or a jus soli regime instead of a jus sanguinis regime. This organization follows the specification of our multinomial logit estimates, where we consider jus sanguinis to be the reference category. Migration (M it) is measured by the stock of migrants as a percentage of the population at the beginning of each subperiod. For the first subperiod, the available data refer to the stock in 1960,14 whereas for the second subperiod they 14 Earlier data are not available. See Section A3. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 115 refer to the stock in 1980. By considering the migrant stock near the beginning of each period, we avoid any potential endogeneity problem of migration with respect to citizenship laws, because it is unlikely that stocks evaluated at the beginning of the period can be affected by subsequent changes in citizenship laws.15 A positive coefficient for the mixed regime would indicate that high rates of migration incline countries toward it rather than toward jus sanguinis, with a similar interpretation for the jus soli regime. A crucial control in our regressions, as previously discussed, is legal tradition in the matter of citizenship. We measure it with a dummy for countries that apply jus sanguinis at the beginning of each subperiod (Sit). We select this dummy because jus sanguinis is the most persistent of the three regimes, which thus suggests a particularly significant role for this initial legislation. A negative value for the coefficient of the dummy for a mixed and jus soli regime would imply that jus sanguinis countries are less likely to end up in the mixed and jus soli groups, thus confirming the persistence of the original laws. The interaction between the jus sanguinis dummy and migration should reveal additional information: if positive, its coefficients would indicate that jus sanguinis countries facing large migration tend to add jus soli elements. In particular, a positive coefficient for the mixed regime would suggest convergence toward the intermediate group. On the other hand, the coefficients of the interaction could also turn out to be negative because, in the presence of a large stock of migrants, the reaction of natives could be conservative. To assess the total effect of migration on jus sanguinis countries, we also need to take into account the coefficients of the interaction. Turning to our geopolitical dummies, if border stability really counts as a prerequisite for the introduction of automatic birthrights for immigrants, as suggested by some of the political theories mentioned in Section 1, we should expect negative signs for the coefficients for our border change dummies. We introduce the Latin America dummy to capture the peculiarity of this region’s experience. As explained in Section 3, most of Latin America adopted jus soli long before our sample period, so its current regimes are not determined by postwar developments and, in particular, by its postwar migration experience. If indeed the behavior of Latin America differs significantly from the rest of the sample in being associated with a higher probability of adopting jus soli, it should exhibit a positive coefficient for this kind of legislation. For southern Europe, we should expect a positive coefficient for the mixed regime because these countries experienced quickly increasing migration during the second subperiod, with most of the revision of the legislation toward mixed regimes occurring in the past 15 years or so. Finally, because migration data reveal that countries with 15 Even taking into account the anticipation of future changes in citizenship laws in making migration decisions, the endogeneity of our migration measure is ruled out by the fact that such changes were extremely rare during the first half of the twentieth century. The potential endogeneity of migration is further addressed in Section 6.3.1, where alternative measures of migration are introduced. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 116 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS small populations tend to have large and erratic migration figures, with a disproportionately small effect on their legislation, we should expect negative signs for the coefficients of this dummy. The size of government is meant to proxy for the nature of the welfare state: if a thicker, more expensive, and more redistributive structure represents an obstacle to automatically granting citizenship to the children of relatively poor immigrants, we should find negative coefficients. On the other hand, if young immigrants offer a solution to domestic demographic imbalances, we should find that countries with a higher share of young people in the population are less prone to adopt jus soli elements, thus resulting in negative coefficients. In an effort to capture additional dimensions of cultural differences, other than legal tradition, we include the share of Catholics in the total population and an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The establishment of a consolidated democracy—measured by Political Rights—should exert a positive effect on the probability of jus soli legislation, even though hostility toward the assimilation of outsiders may persist for a protracted period even in a democratic country. Pairwise correlations among our dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 9. Current Citizenship Laws, the dependent variable, is highly correlated with initial citizenship laws, as identified by Jus Sanguinis Origin (⫺.64), whereas its correlation with Civil Law is much lower (⫺.15). Citizenship laws are also significantly correlated with Migration Stock, Small Country, Political Rights, Catholic Share, and Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization. Pairwise correlations between all our independent variables are not reported, for reasons of brevity, and can be summarized as follows. Jus Sanguinis Origin is negatively correlated with Decolonization (⫺.31) and Latin America (⫺.43). The Latin America dummy is positively associated with Catholic Share (.52). Levels of political rights tend to be low in countries with high ethnolinguistic fractionalization (⫺.36). The share of young individuals in a population is positively associated with migration stocks (.35). Overall, these stylized facts are in line with previous research and economic intuition. It is also clear that several of our independent variables are closely interrelated and that it may be difficult to disentangle their specific effects on the evolution of citizenship laws. 6.2. Results The results of our multinomial logit models are in Table 10, which presents three different specifications. Multinomial logit (1) is the core specification and includes only the core variables—Migration Stock and Jus Sanguinis Origin plus the period dummy. Multinomial logit (2) is an expanded specification that adds to specification (1) the dummies that we discussed above. Finally, multinomial logit (3) is our full specification, which adds to specification (2) the other potentially relevant economic and institutional regressors. Jus sanguinis is the reference category. Hence, the results in Table 10 report the effect of the explanatory This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 117 Table 9 Pairwise Correlations among Dependent and Independent Variables Variables Migration Stock Net Migration Flow Jus Sanguinis Origin Civil Law Decolonization Berlin Wall Other Border Changes Latin America Southern Europe Small Country Sub-Saharan Africa British or Portuguese Colony Socialist Oil Political Rights Catholic Share Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Government Consumption Share of Young Log GDP Per Capita Gini Index Current Citizenship Laws Change in Citizenship Laws ⫺.12* ⫺.11⫹ ⫺.64** ⫺.15** ⫺.09 ⫺.08 ⫺.07 .60** ⫺.05 .14* ⫺.12* .02 ⫺.25** ⫺.13* .29** .39** ⫺.10⫹ ⫺.03 ⫺.03 .05 .22** ⫺.12* ⫺.06 .48** .33** ⫺.42** .24** ⫺.02 .04 .10⫹ ⫺.12* ⫺.19** ⫺.26** .14* ⫺.06 .18** .10⫹ ⫺.20** .06 ⫺.20** .34** ⫺.24** Note. The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries. The reference period is 1950–2000. The first cross section includes the 1950–1975 subperiod, and the second cross section includes the 1976–2000 subperiod. GDP p gross domestic product. ⫹ P ! .10. * P ! .05. ** P ! .01. variable on the probability of choosing either the mixed or the jus soli regime relative to the jus sanguinis regime. Starting with specification (1), we find that the core variables are all significant. In particular, Migration Stock and Jus Sanguinis Origin display negative coefficients for both the mixed and jus soli regimes, whereas both coefficients are positive for Period. This means that large migration and a jus sanguinis origin decrease the probability of adopting mixed or jus soli legislation, rather than jus sanguinis, and that the probability of adopting mixed or jus soli legislation increases in the second subperiod. In specification (2), which includes the dummies, Jus Sanguinis Origin still exerts a negative effect on the probability of adopting a mixed or jus soli regime, whereas Migration Stock remains significantly negative only for the probability of adopting a mixed regime. The period dummy is significantly positive only for the probability of a mixed regime. As expected, Decolonization displays two negative coefficients; in other words, having experienced a border change related to decolonization negatively affects the probability of adopting either a mixed or a jus soli regime. The southern Europe dummy has a positive coefficient for the mixed regime, confirming that the regimes of southern European countries This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Table 10 Determinants of Citizenship Laws: Multinomial Logit Estimates Specification (1) (N p 300) Mixed Migration Stock Jus Sanguinis Origin Period Decolonization Southern Europe Latin America Small Country Jus Soli Specification (2) (N p 300) Mixed Jus Soli Government Consumption Share of Young Catholic Share Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Political Rights Log likelihood Maximum-likelihood R2 McFadden’s R2 McFadden’s adjusted R2 Cragg and Uhler’s R2 Count R2 Adjusted count R2 Mixed Jus Soli ⫺.051⫹ ⫺.055** ⫺.054⫹ ⫺.032 ⫺.167* ⫺.045 (⫺1.86) (⫺2.81) (⫺1.79) (⫺1.61) (⫺2.30) (⫺1.53) ⫺2.044** ⫺6.048** ⫺2.712** ⫺6.117** ⫺4.568** ⫺7.59** (⫺4.39) (⫺5.43) (⫺4.99) (⫺4.90) (⫺5.24) (⫺4.38) 1.887** 1.193** 1.409* ⫺.272 2.385** .211 (4.28) (3.02) (2.28) (⫺.47) (2.65) (.27) ⫺1.296⫹ ⫺2.211** ⫺.084 ⫺1.523 (⫺1.87) (⫺3.41) (⫺.09) (⫺1.55) ⫹ 1.224* ⫺.153 1.234 1.187 (2.03) (⫺.14) (1.69) (.87) ⫺.799 2.866** ⫺.621 4.495** (⫺.70) (3.73) (⫺.51) (2.93) ⫺.804 .415 ⫺2.566⫹ .523 (⫺1.23) (.69) (⫺1.88) (.64) Jus Sanguinis Origin # Migration Stock Constant Specification (3) (N p 224) ⫺1.092** (⫺2.73) ⫺195.77 .45 .32 .29 .53 .71 .32 .626* (2.48) ⫺.024 (⫺.03) ⫺155.94 .58 .46 .4 .68 .81 .55 1.353* (2.43) .156⫹ (1.81) .035 (1.07) ⫺.193⫹ (⫺1.75) .012 (1.46) .084⫹ (1.75) .063** (2.68) ⫺.397* (⫺2.43) .01 (.70) .023 (.02) .548** (2.84) 3.716 (1.05) ⫺95.24 .68 .57 .44 .79 .83 .64 1.277 (1.02) .426* (2.46) 11.165* (2.09) Note. Jus sanguinis is the reference category. The reference period is 1950–2000. Robust z-statistics clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ⫹ P ! .10. * P ! .05. ** P ! .01. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 119 have a higher probability of becoming mixed. The Latin America dummy has a positive coefficient for jus soli because countries in this region have a higher probability of adopting this regime. The dummy for small countries is not significant. Finally, in specification (3), the effects of migration, a jus sanguinis origin, and the period dummy are confirmed.16 The interaction term between Migration Stock and Jus Sanguinis Origin is significant and positive for both the mixed and jus soli regimes, uncovering a tendency for countries with a jus sanguinis origin that experience large migration to add jus soli elements. However, the strength of this tendency is questioned by the fact that, if one evaluates the coefficients of Migration Stock and the interaction together, the total effect of migration becomes negligible. In this extended version, the coefficient for Decolonization loses significance. The role of the Latin America and southern Europe dummies is confirmed, whereas Small Country now has a negative effect on the probability of adopting a mixed regime. The size of government has a positive and significant coefficient for the probability of adopting a jus soli regime, whereas Share of Young exerts a negative effect, which supports the hypothesis that countries with relatively old populations are more likely to choose mixed and jus soli regimes. Catholic Share and Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization are both insignificant, and a high degree of democracy positively affects the probability of adopting either a mixed or a jus soli regime.17 For specification (3), inspection of the marginal coefficients in Table 11 confirms that migration increases the probability of jus sanguinis and decreases that of a mixed regime and that the interaction between jus sanguinis and migration is negative, consistent with the positive coefficients for jus soli and a mixed regime in Table 10.18 Moreover, the marginal effect of Decolonization reveals that this regressor retains a significantly negative influence on the probability of jus soli. The marginal effects also allow us to quantify the effect of our regressors. In particular, having experienced a decolonization border change decreases the probability of being a jus soli country by approximately 14 percent, whereas an increase in migration of 1 percentage point increases the probability of being a jus sanguinis country by approximately 2.5 percent and decreases the probability of having a mixed regime by 2.3 percent. In addition, an increase in migration of 1 percentage point for a jus sanguinis country decreases the probability of being jus sanguinis by approximately 2.7 percent, in combination with the 2.5 percent increase due to the direct effect of migration. We also consider additional covariates that have often been found to be significant in related research on the determinants of institutions. Quantitative and 16 For specifications (1) and (2), we obtain the same results using a balanced sample composed of the 224 countries that constitute the reference sample for estimation of our full specification. 17 For all three specifications, we verified that our results are not driven by outliers. 18 The estimated marginal effects are calculated by holding the independent variables at their means. For dichotomous independent variables, the marginal effect is the change from zero to one, holding all other variables at their means. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 120 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS Table 11 Determinants of Citizenship Laws: Marginal Effects (Multinomial Logit, Full Specification) Migration Stock Jus Sanguinis Origin Period Decolonization Southern Europe Latin America Small Country Jus Sanguinis Origin # Migration Stock Government Consumption Share of Young Catholic Share Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Political Rights Jus Sanguinis Mixed Jus Soli .025* (2.49) .875** (18.7) ⫺.303⫹ (⫺1.95) .123 (.80) ⫺.291 (⫺1.51) ⫺.611** (⫺4.15) .088 (.59) ⫺.027* (⫺2.36) ⫺.010* (⫺1.98) .061** (2.65) ⫺.002 (⫺1.29) ⫺.124 (⫺.56) ⫺.107** (⫺3.50) ⫺.023* (⫺2.09) ⫺.193* (⫺2.56) .336** (2.86) .016 (.13) .170 (1.03) ⫺.194** (⫺2.85) ⫺.203** (⫺3.16) .021 (1.50) .004 (.76) ⫺.018 (⫺1.18) .001 (1.14) ⫺.028 (⫺.16) .069** (2.61) ⫺.001 (⫺.34) ⫺.681** (⫺7.92) ⫺.034 (⫺.44) ⫺.139⫹ (⫺1.77) .121 (.51) .805** (5.75) .114 (.86) .006 (.92) .007* (2.01) ⫺.043* (⫺2.15) .001 (.50) .152 (.96) .037⫹ (1.90) Note. The marginal effects shown above denote the multinomial logit estimates of our full specification (specification [3]) in Table 10). The reference period is 1950–2000. Robust z-statistics clustered at the country level are in parentheses. N p 224. ⫹ P ! .10. * P ! .05. ** P ! .01. qualitative development indicators, such as income per capita and inequality, could reveal whether a richer, more equal country is more prone to adopting jus soli elements. However, both per capita gross domestic product and the Gini index of inequality tend to be associated with migration and with democracy and fractionalization; therefore, they are unlikely to add independent explanatory power to a regression. In fact, they fail to add any further significance to the previous results. Moreover, a dummy for oil countries could account for the fact that most of them have been experiencing huge immigration, which has had no effect on their still very restrictive legislation (often based on Islamic family law). A dummy for socialist countries might work as an alternative to our Berlin Wall dummy.19 However, we cannot include the socialist, oil, Berlin Wall, and other border change dummies in the regressions because the countries 19 The correlation between the Berlin Wall dummy and socialist country dummy is .48. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 121 identified by them do not exhibit enough variability with respect to the dependent variable.20 Overall, our results indicate that migration, the original laws, and our geopolitical dummies exert a significant effect on current citizenship laws and that other factors, such as government size, demographics, and democracy, also contribute to their determination. In particular, we show that legal tradition tends to affect the current legislation persistently, even though the process of transplantation can be discontinuous in the case of former colonies. In addition, legal tradition interacts in a complex fashion with the way countries react to migration. Overall, our results suggest that migration inclines national legislations in the direction of jus sanguinis, not jus soli. However, this correlation conceals a more complex pattern, which is revealed once the interaction between migration and legal tradition concerning citizenship is considered. Countries with a jus soli origin react to increasing migration by adding jus sanguinis elements. But countries with a jus sanguinis origin that have experienced more immigration tend to add jus soli provisions so that, on balance, in jus sanguinis countries the effect of migration turns out to be negligible. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mix of provisions suggested by some political theories (see Section 1) because liberal countries tend to restrict legislation while restrictive countries tend to resist innovation. The presence of countervailing forces highlighted by the model is therefore confirmed by our findings. Contrary to the implications of the model, the welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for jus soli legislation. However, this could be because many of the countries with extended welfare systems may favor immigration because of their demographic crises. Indeed, as predicted by the model, demographic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli regimes. Moreover, the effect that we observe for the size of government could be explained by the fact that it proxies for European-style, relatively open social democracies. Finally, the evidence confirms that a higher degree of democracy is associated with more jus soli elements, whereas cultural traits captured by religious affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization appear to be irrelevant. In sum, our empirical findings match the theoretical insights of the model and provide a deeper understanding of the forces shaping citizenship laws, in particular as far as the effect of migration is concerned. 6.3. Robustness In this section, we present a number of alternatives to our benchmark regressions to investigate whether they are robust to different specifications, samples, and estimation techniques. 20 For example, countries affected by the Berlin Wall always adopted jus sanguinis. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 122 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS 6.3.1. Alternative Specifications We experiment with our multinomial logit specifications by using alternative covariates. First, we replace our measure of migration with a range of alternative measures. As outlined above, our migration measure was chosen to minimize potential endogeneity bias. When we replace our migration stocks with average migration flows (computed with reference to each subperiod),21 the coefficients for migration are insignificant in all three specifications, which could suggest that migration flows are endogenous with respect to citizenship laws. Additional tests involve alternative measures of migration stocks.22 In Table B1, specification (1) is the full specification with the average migration stocks for 1960–70 and 1980–90. Some differences emerge in the coefficients for migration and the interaction of migration with jus sanguinis, with the latter losing significance. Because, in the postwar period, migration has been highly regulated by policy in most receiving countries, and because citizenship laws can be viewed as part of migration policy, the simultaneous determination of citizenship laws and migration represents a concern when we enter within-period data on migration instead of beginning-of-period data. In summary, our beginning-of-period migration stocks prove to be the most adequate measures of the role of migration.23 Because jus sanguinis and jus soli are, in principle, closely associated with the civil and common-law systems, respectively, the influence of legal tradition can also be analyzed through a dummy for the presence of a civil law tradition.24 If the coefficients of the two alternative dummies are the same, one could conclude that our detailed codification of the original citizenship laws does not add much to what we can already learn from the broader legal tradition of a country.25 When we replace Jus Sanguinis Origin with Civil Law (Table B1, specification [2]), the latter turns out to be substantially less significant and reduces the significance of most other regressors, which suggests that civil law is a much weaker predictor of current citizenship laws than original citizenship laws. We also replace our decolonization dummy with a dummy for British or Portuguese colonies (identifying those countries that were characterized by jus soli legislation during the colonial period) and with the sub-Saharan Africa dummy,26 but both have insignificant coefficients. When we replace the southern Europe dummy with migration flows—because the quickly increasing immigration in the second subperiod determines the peculiar behavior of this region—we find that its 21 Migration stocks and flows have a correlation of .45. As possible alternatives for the first and the second subperiods, we select 1970 and 1990, respectively, and the 1960–70 and 1980–90 averages, respectively. 23 We also experiment with a specification using the migrant stock in 1960 for both subperiods. Results from this instrumented specification are similar to those presented in Table 10. 24 The dummy is equal to one if a country belongs to a civil law tradition and to zero if a country belongs to a common-law tradition. The correlation between civil law and jus sanguinis is .35. 25 The correlation between the two dummies is .35. 26 Decolonization is significantly correlated with British or Portuguese Colony (.30) and SubSaharan Africa (.31). 22 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 123 coefficient is insignificant, possibly because flows are multicollinear with respect to stocks and endogenous with respect to the dependent variable. 6.3.2. Alternative Estimation Techniques Alternative estimation techniques broadly confirm the same results shown in Table 10. In particular, an (unreported) alternative multinomial probit model delivers the same qualitative results. We also run ordered logit regressions in which current citizenship laws are explicitly treated as an ordinal variable, which we assume here to be ordered by increasing inclusiveness—namely, we assume that jus sanguinis corresponds to minimal inclusiveness and jus soli to maximal inclusiveness. These results are presented in Tables B2 and B3. Our previous conclusions are confirmed, with Migration Stock and Jus Sanguinis Origin exerting a negative effect on the adoption of jus soli.27 6.3.3. Alternative Sample Criteria We also run multinomial logit regressions on a cross-sectional sample composed of country averages over the 1950–2000 period.28 The results for this cross section reveal a much lower level of significance for several covariates, in particular for migration and its interaction with the initial laws.29 The same finding applies to alternative variants with a cross section over each subperiod (1950–75 or 1976–2000). For the same cross section, an alternative ordered logit regression also achieves much weaker results than in our panel,30 whereas ordinary least squares regressions using our citizenship policy index in 2001 and an indexed version of 2001 citizenship laws as alternative dependent variables both have insignificant coefficients for migration (see Table B4).31 This may be because a single cross section of countries includes less information than our panel. 7. An Alternative Approach: The Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws In this section, we study the evolution of citizenship laws with an alternative approach that is able to provide additional insights. Although specification (9) focuses on current citizenship laws as the dependent variable, we develop an 27 For all specifications, we run a test for the parallel regression assumption. The test is an approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories. In all cases, the test provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated. Our multinomial logit specification is hence superior to an ordered logit specification. 28 Here the dependent variable is citizenship laws in 2001; Migration Stock refers to 1960, and Jus Sanguinis Origin in 1948 is the initial law. 29 We also experiment with migration stocks in 1970 and 1980 and with average migration flows, with similar results. 30 We apply Cook’s distance method to the results to show that they are not driven by outliers. 31 The same qualitative results are found in an unreported regression with naturalization in 2001 as a dependent variable. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 124 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS alternative specification designed to identify more specifically the determinants of a change in laws. 7.1. Empirical Specification In the alternative specification, the dependent variable is categorical and can take three values: ⫺1 if the country changes its laws toward jus sanguinis, 0 if no change occurs, and 1 if the country changes its laws toward jus soli. For our panel, we run a multinomial logit model of the following form for its full specification: Vit p a ⫹ bM it ⫹ gTt ⫹ Z it d ⫹ hit, (10) where a is a constant term and hit is an error term. The vector Z it contains all the variables previously described, except for those that present zero-cell problems—namely, Jus Sanguinis Origin, its interaction with Migration Stock, and Latin America. Pairwise correlations among our new dependent variable, changes in citizenship laws, and the independent variables are presented in Table 9, showing that migration is again negatively correlated with the dependent variable. 7.2. Results Regression results for the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 12, where the reference category is no change. Hence, the results represent the influence of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing either restriction toward jus sanguinis or expansion toward jus soli. Migration has a positive effect on the probability of restriction and a nonsignificant effect on the probability of expansion. The period dummy indicates that the second subperiod witnesses an increase in the probability of expanding. Decolonization and Southern Europe exert a positive effect on change in both directions, more significantly so for restriction for the case of Decolonization, whereas the opposite holds for Southern Europe. The negative coefficient for restriction confirms that the size of government actually prevents it, whereas, again, the presence of a relatively young population provokes resistance to extension, meaning that countries with a relatively old population are more likely to liberalize their legislation. Ethnic diversity emerges as a significant factor of change toward jus sanguinis. Table 13 reports the marginal coefficients for the regressions in Table 12 and confirms the restrictive effect of migration emerging from Table 12.32 Moreover, the implications of Table 13 are in line with those of Table 11, which reports the marginal effects for the multinomial logit specification. For instance, in Table 11, Decolonization exerts a significantly negative effect on the probability of having jus soli legislation, which is consistent with the fact that, in Table 13, it emerges as a factor that facilitates change toward jus sanguinis. As for specification (9), we perform a full set of robustness checks for specification (10). The Gini index once again fails to add any significance, whereas 32 The estimated marginal effects are calculated as explained in footnote 18. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 125 Table 12 Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws: Multinomial Logit Estimates Toward Jus Sanguinis Migration Stock Period Decolonization Southern Europe Small Country Government Consumption Share of Young Catholic Share Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Political Rights Constant Log likelihood Maximum-likelihood R2 McFadden’s R2 McFadden’s adjusted R2 Cragg and Uhler’s R2 Count R2 Adjusted count R2 ⫹ .039 (1.90) .652 (.65) 2.898** (2.82) 2.2⫹ (1.94) ⫺.341 (.50) ⫺.05⫹ (1.95) .02 (.15) ⫺.006 (.70) 1.981* (2.23) .104 (.84) ⫺4.364 (.96) ⫺107.58 .33 .3 .15 .45 .81 .16 Toward Jus Soli ⫺.006 (.12) 1.736⫹ (1.73) 2.058⫹ (1.68) 2.155** (3.44) ⫺.593 (.60) .032 (1.12) ⫺.493** (2.82) .001 (.12) 2.508 (1.52) .234 (1.08) 9.771* (2.04) Note. The reference category is no change in citizenship laws. The reference period is 1950–2000. Robust z-statistics clustered at the country level are in parentheses. N p 224. ⫹ P ! .10. * P ! .05. ** P ! .01. per capita gross domestic product has a significant effect on expansion. Alternative measures of migration confirm an irrelevant effect on change in the laws. When we replace Decolonization with British or Portuguese Colony, the alternative dummy is again significant because of the removal of the Latin America dummy, which comprises several former Portuguese colonies. The dummy for sub-Saharan Africa is not significant when used instead of Decolonization. Overall, these results complement those of Section 6 because they highlight which factors induced the observed evolution of the legislation for each possible direction of change. In particular, migration is confirmed as a factor that favors restriction. This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 126 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS Table 13 Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws: Marginal Effects (Multinomial Logit) Migration Stock Period Decolonization Southern Europe Small Country Government Consumption Share of Young Catholic Share Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Political Rights Toward Jus Sanguinis No Change Toward Jus Soli .003* (2.01) .044 (.58) .374* (2.00) .299 (1.10) ⫺.022 (⫺.53) ⫺.004* (⫺2.02) .003 (.29) ⫺.000 (⫺.71) .145* (2.12) .007 (.75) ⫺.003 (⫺1.26) ⫺.102 (⫺1.31) ⫺.442* (⫺2.42) ⫺.415* (⫺2.33) .038 (.74) .003 (1.27) .013 (1.18) .000 (.60) ⫺.223** (⫺2.39) ⫺.015 (⫺1.10) ⫺.000 (⫺.19) .058* (2.05) .069 (1.16) .116 (1.06) ⫺.015 (⫺.65) .001 (1.28) ⫺.016** (⫺2.74) .000 (.19) .077⫹ (1.89) .007 (1.12) Note. The marginal effects presented are the multinomial logit estimates shown in Table 8. The reference period is 1950–2000. Robust z-statistics clustered at the country level are in parentheses. N p 224. ⫹ P ! .10. * P ! .05. ** P ! .01. 8. Conclusion We studied the theoretical and empirical determinants of the legal institution of citizenship in the postwar period using a new set of data that we compiled. We developed a simple median-voter model in which natives grant citizenship rights to migrants after taking into account the associated benefits and costs. The model predicts that migration has a potentially ambiguous effect on the legislation and that this effect is also influenced by cultural factors, including the degree of inclusiveness in a country as reflected by its original citizenship legislation. In bringing the model to the data, we found that citizenship laws indeed respond endogenously and systematically to a number of economic and institutional factors. Our investigation reveals that migration has an overall negative effect on liberalization of citizenship legislation and adoption of jus soli elements. Moreover, a country’s legal tradition affects the way that it responds to migration. In particular, jus soli countries react to increasing migration through restriction, whereas the effect of migration is negligible in jus sanguinis countries. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of convergence toward a mixed regime that includes both jus soli and jus sanguinis elements. Border instability emerges as a decisive factor in shaping citizenship laws, particularly in connection with decolonization, reflecting discontinuities This content downloaded from 198.91.32.141 on Sun, 11 Mar 2018 06:53:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Evolution of Citizenship 127 for the transplantation of legal institutions. Countries with larger welfare systems, older populations, and more extensive political rights tend to be associated with more diffused elements of jus soli. More generally, a clear implication of our investigation is that institutions should not be presumed to be exogenous, because they do adapt to both economic and noneconomic factors. The endogeneity of institutions to economic factors represents a challenge for research aimed at demonstrating that institutions are crucial determinants of economic performances. By showing that citizenship laws are shaped not only by the broader legal origins but also by other institutions, such as the internal system of political rights and the international system of relations as reflected by state borders, we also establish that different institutions are interrelated. This finding represents another challenge for further research on the formation of legal rules and the effect of institutions on economic outcomes. Citizenship laws are still changing. Further research will study the future evolution of citizenship policy by using projections of international migration patterns in combination with available predictions about the future course of democratization and border changes. Finally, citizenship laws can be viewed as a link within a legal system between the public and the private spheres of influence. Many issues that fall within the former sphere of influence—such as commercial law, labor regulation, and government activities—have already been investigated. Our methodology can be extended to the study of other evolving bodies of law such as family law, rules of inheritance, and women’s rights. Appendix A Data A1. Citizenship-at-Birth Classification Group 1: Countries with a Jus Sanguinis Regime In this group, we include countries where citizenship is passed to a child on the basis of at least one of his or her parents being a citizen of that country, regardless of the actual country of birth of the child, and where citizenship is not granted as a result of birth within the country. In the application of jus sanguinis, countries may differ with regard to some factors—for example, the right of the father versus the right of the mother to transmit citizenship by descent, the requirement of citizenship for one or both parents, and the relevance of the parents’ marital status. Most of these factors depend on the interaction between local family law and citizenship law. A common exception to the general principle of jus sanguinis is automat...
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