Cheat sheet for Article Dissections
This “cheat sheet” is designed to jog your memory and provide you with some
“key” words that articles might use. It is NOT exhaustive by any means. You
might need to refer back to your notes, the book and the overheads to make sure
that you are capturing the correct terminology.
Measures - if you get stuck, remember to diagram cause and effect. This should
help clarify what is an independent and dependent variable.
• Independent Variable: sex, race, age, party id, prior record
• Dependent Variable: recidivism (measured differently, choose one: arrest,
conviction, re-incarceration)
• Control Variable (optional, but try): often demographics
Data Collection – what technique the researcher used to get the
observation/data.
• Surveys (face-to-face; telephone; web; mail)
• Official Records
o Secondary data analysis (i.e., U.S. Census 2000)
• Content Analysis: books, songs
• Social Artifacts
Research Design – most likely, this is unlisted. You will need to categorize the
research design based on the explanation provided in the methodology. It may
be helpful to “draw out” the research design, using the X, O, R notation.
• Quasiexperimental
• Classical Experimental: Latin Squares, Solomon, four group
Sampling – this is where the observations came from, the source of the data.
• Probability: simple random, systematic random, cluster
• Nonprobability: convenience, judgmental, snowball, quota
• Must have “n=”
• What types of people were included: all republicans, only women,
Data Analysis: does not matter how data was collected, only matters in statistics
and analysis
• Univariate: Frequencies
o X, medians, modes, standard deviation
• Bivariate: chi square, comparisons of means, T-tests, degrees of freedom
o Two variables; article on springboard is bivariate
• Multivariate: regression
o Usually is explicitly said; “we used a ____ regression…”
Name:
Article Dissection
Author:
Title:
Journal Citation:
1. Quantitative or Qualitative
2. Research Question
3. Qualitative: What is the purpose of this study?
Quantitative: Hypothesis:
4. Qualitative: Main variables of interest or what are the primary issues they focus
on? What are the main sections of the article? What core concepts do they study
and how do they define them?
Quantitative: Measurement of Variables:
a. Independent Variable(s)
b. Dependent Variable(s)
5. Quantitative Only: Research Design:
6. Quantitative Only: Sampling:
7. Data Collection:
8. Qualitative: Summary of the findings:
Quantitative: Data Analysis:
9. Author’s Conclusions:
535239
research-article2014
APRXXX10.1177/1532673X14535239American Politics ResearchCasellas and Wallace
Article
The Role of Race,
Ethnicity, and
Party on Attitudes
Toward Descriptive
Representation
American Politics Research
2015, Vol. 43(1) 144–169
© The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X14535239
apr.sagepub.com
Jason P. Casellas1 and Sophia J. Wallace2
Abstract
Using original survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election
Survey (CCES), we examine variation in racial and ethnic group and partisan
attitudes toward legislators and representation. Respondents were asked
about their views on descriptive representation, its importance for their
own elected official, and whether it was important to have more descriptive
representatives in general. Using respondents’ personal characteristics such
as education, partisanship, race, ethnicity, income, and race and ethnicity
of their House of Representatives member, we analyze the impact of these
variables on attitudes toward representation. We find that Latino and
Black respondents place a high level of importance on having descriptive
representatives in their own districts in addition to articulating a high
degree of importance to having more representatives from their respective
group. However, Latino Republicans place less importance on descriptive
representation overall than Latino non-Republican respondents. Non-Latino
Republicans also place importance on more legislators of their same race or
ethnicity. The findings have implications for democratic governance as the
demographics of the United States rapidly changes.
1University
2Rutgers
of Houston, TX, USA
University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jason P. Casellas, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Houston,
447 Phillip Guthrie Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204, USA.
Email: jcasellas@uh.edu
Casellas and Wallace
145
Keywords
representation, race, ethnicity, partisanship
Introduction
Political scientists have thought about representation in a variety of ways.
Descriptive representation occurs when a member of a legislature shares the
same race, ethnicity, or gender as an individual whereas substantive representation refers to the actions of the legislator on behalf of constituents
(Mansbridge, 1999; Pitkin, 1967). The purpose of a representative is to act as
a liaison between individuals and institutions within government. Members
must navigate the legislative process while advocating on their constituents’
behalf in addition to cultivating constituencies that will support them in reelection (Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974). This article embraces the role of the
representative to explicitly examine minority group attitudes toward representation and how they may differ from the White majority population. This
angle of representation is important given the history of discrimination,
exclusion, and under-representation of minorities in the political process. In
the 113th Congress, 67% of the total number of voting members in the House
and Senate are White men, whereas only 8% are African American and 6%
are Latino. Compared with their national populations of 37%, 12%, and 16%,
respectively, White men appear to be vastly overrepresented in Congress,
while racial and ethnic minorities are considerably under-represented.
The subject of this article is especially pressing given the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Shelby County v. Holder in June 2013 narrowly holding that Section
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Section 4(b) prescribes a
formula used to determine which jurisdictions are covered under Section 5 of
the Act. While the Court did not explicitly strike down Section 5 and its preclearance requirement by the Justice Department or the DC Circuit Court of
Appeals, there can be no Section 5 without Section 4(b). Congress must
rewrite the coverage formula in compliance with Shelby for preclearance to
return to the states with a prior history of disenfranchisement. This ruling has
alarmed voting rights activists who have been successful in litigating illegal
redistricting plans in many Southern states that violated the rights of minority
voters. Given that many minority officeholders gained office in the redistricting rounds following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act often via majority–minority districts, this article gives us a strong sense of how people feel
about these minority officeholders and the value of having representatives
who look like them.
This research seeks to understand how constituents assess the amount and
importance of descriptive representation. An investigation of public attitudes
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American Politics Research 43(1)
toward their representatives and their respective behavior, as we explain here,
enhances our understanding of the impact of representation on feelings of
inequality and political efficacy among minority groups as well as perceptions of group identity and commonality in interests. These questions are all
the more important as the number of minority legislators increases in ways
that were once unimaginable. Because of the Voting Rights Act and its subsequent reauthorizations, more minorities have been able to win elections in
legislative districts across the United States, and how constituents assess the
importance of minority group representation matters in important ways.
Our study expands on the scholarship that explores minority group representation by directly examining attitudes toward representation. The literature has demonstrated that the benefits of descriptive representation are
extensive, including increased trust in Members of Congress (MCs) by constituents (Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Tate, 2003), higher likelihood to participate in voting by constituents (Barreto, Segura, & Woods, 2004), and
increased legislative responsiveness of legislators (Haynie, 2003). Little is
known, however, about the extent to which Latinos or African Americans
care about representation, whether descriptive representation is important to
them, or what types of behaviors matter to constituents (for notable exceptions, see Gay, 2002; Schildkraut, 2013; Tate, 2003; Wallace, 2014). From a
theoretical standpoint, it is important to examine both Black and Latino attitudes for several reasons. We include White respondents so that we can compare Whites as the majority group with the two largest racial and ethnic
groups: African Americans and Latinos. Attitudes of the majority group may
substantially differ from the minority groups; thus, it is critical to understand
areas of overlap and areas of divergence. Our research follows from earlier
work investigating descriptive representation and minority group interests by
asking three primary research questions:
1.
2.
3.
Do attitudes toward representation vary across racial and ethnic
groups?
How does the race or ethnicity of legislators affect attitudes toward
legislators and representation?
How does party mediate the effects of race and ethnicity on attitudes
about representation?
Theory and Hypotheses
Scholars have examined representation by dividing the concept into three
categories. Descriptive representation occurs when someone who shares the
same race, ethnicity, or gender represents constituents. Substantive
Casellas and Wallace
147
representation occurs when constituents’ policy preferences are represented,
regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender. Symbolic representation occurs when
someone of the same race, ethnicity, or gender is the representative, but without the substantive component (Pitkin, 1967). Existing research on race and
representation largely finds that representatives who share racial and ethnic
traits offer greater substantive representation to members of the same group
(Canon, 1999; Hero & Tolbert, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999). However, it remains
unclear whether constituents are more favorable because the representative is
of the same race or ethnic group, or because the representative appears to be
more effectively representing their interests. In particular, it is difficult to
determine the degree to which members of racial and ethnic minority groups
prioritize descriptive representation as opposed to substantive representation
absent quality survey research.
Considerable debate exists in the literature over the value of descriptive
representation—that people are best served by legislators who share similar
attributes to them, such as race, ethnicity, or gender (Dovi, 2002; Mansbridge,
1999). Pitkin (1967) raised questions of whether this type of representation
leads to better outcomes for members of minority groups. In essence, how
important is descriptive representation to people? We do not yet fully know
the answers to these questions across a broad range of racial and ethnic
groups, and this article is among the first to systematically assess these
questions.
On the other hand, the actual mechanisms whereby co-ethnic representatives behave differently remain largely undetermined, but include shared
group consciousness, linked fate, and electoral incentives (Casellas, 2010;
Gamble, 2007; Minta, 2011). This is partially due to the dearth of research on
the attitudes of minority constituents toward both descriptive and substantive
representation. Examining the preferences of individuals has the potential, in
turn, to provide a micro-level approach for understanding the motives and
behavior of legislators. Several studies using survey data argue that having
ethnic or racial representatives from one’s own group generates a number of
tangible benefits for constituents, such as greater feelings of self-efficacy and
trust in government (Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Sanchez & Morin, 2011), as
well as higher rates of political participation (Barreto, 2007; Gay, 2002).
Relying on aggregate district-level data, Tate (2003) similarly finds that
Black constituents tend to evaluate Black representatives more positively
than White representatives.
We analyze both Latino and Black attitudes toward representation for several reasons. It is particularly important to include both African Americans
and Latinos because of the historical landscape of disenfranchisement and
under-representation of minority groups in the United States. Even with the
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American Politics Research 43(1)
protections of the Voting Rights Act and its subsequent amendments, African
Americans and Latinos remain significantly under-represented in the U.S.
Congress. For example, as of the 2010 Census, Latinos now comprise 16% of
the national population and approximately 50.5 million people; however,
there are only 24 Latino MCs in the House of Representatives as of 2012. As
a proportion of the House, Latino MCs constitute 6% of the total number of
seats and would need to increase to 70 Latino MCs to reach parity with their
national population. The scholarly literature has devoted considerable attention to Black representation and increasingly Latino representation as well
(Casellas, 2010; Lublin, 1997; Swain, 1993).
In addition, given some potential overlap in group interests between
African Americans and Latinos, we believe it is critical to assess the issues
and areas in which the groups view issues similarly. Finally, for a significant
portion of the history of the United States, African Americans were the largest racial or ethnic minority group; however, Latinos now occupy this position. Latinos are a rapidly growing minority group and are increasingly
getting elected to legislative bodies. For all of these reasons, we study White,
Latino, and African American attitudes toward representation.
We hypothesize that minority respondents value descriptive representation at greater levels than non-minority respondents, all else equal. Because
of the history of discrimination against African Americans and Latinos, these
two groups will place particular value on the presence of co-ethnic representatives (Gay, 2002). The key mechanism for this value is trust. Minorities will
place greater degrees of trust in co-ethnic representatives, and will thus value
descriptive representation more than non-minorities (Tate, 2003). Why might
this be? As previous research has shown, African Americans in particular
have developed a sense of linked fate, largely because of the external threat
of racism and discrimination from society as a whole (Dawson, 1994). For
Latinos, the literature on ethnic group consciousness is less developed, but
thus far studies have demonstrated that Latino constituents also possess a
group consciousness in certain ways distinct from African American linked
fate (Casellas, 2010; Sanchez, 2006). The process of earning the trust of constituents is more difficult for White representatives representing minority
communities because of this history (Walton & Smith, 2011). This is not to
say that some White representatives have not earned this trust, nor are incapable of representing minorities (Canon, 1999). We should also not assume
that co-ethnic voters will choose unqualified candidates solely on the basis of
their shared demographics. Manzano and Sanchez (2010), for example, find
that Latino voters are sophisticated and care about candidate quality, and
Dovi (2002) makes the case that not just any minority will do.
In addition, the ability to speak the same language yields increases in levels of comfort with co-ethnic representatives. Preferences for co-ethnic
Casellas and Wallace
149
representation can also be contingent on acculturation levels and levels of
linked fate (Schildkraut, 2013), as well as experiences with discrimination
and strength of Latino identity (Wallace, 2014). Moreover, Latinos and
African Americans may also be more inclined to support representatives of
their group because they observe members of that group acting on the basis
of the group above and beyond district context. For example, Minta (2011)
argues that minorities might see MCs engaging in “strategic group uplift” by
representing them above and beyond their own districts. Similarly,
Mansbridge (2003) proposes the notion of surrogate representation where
members may serve group interests or policy interests beyond the geographical confines of their district. Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) exhibits this through
his efforts on immigration reform and Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) on behalf
of Black farmers even though his district in Detroit has no farming economy.
While the electoral connection is no doubt present for minority legislators,
scholarly evidence also suggests that such legislators also behave in ways
that enhance collective representation of their ethnic or racial group (e.g.,
Casellas, 2010; Grose, 2011; Minta, 2011; Tate, 2003). Minorities sense this
and are therefore more likely to feel a need for more representatives to maximize effective representation. Our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1; Co-Ethnic Support Hypothesis): Latinos and African
Americans will be more inclined to say that having a co-ethnic representative is important and will feel a need for more descriptive
representation.1
As Bobo and Gilliam (1990) have argued, the presence of minority officeholders can also empower minorities such that participation increases when
minorities see other minorities in positions of power. Bowler and Segura
(2012) note, “The claim that co-ethnic representation results in empowerment to a community is still uncertain” (p. 180). However, while we do not
directly test empowerment in this article, it may play a role in minority group
members’ desire to have more representatives like them.
In particular, our inclusion of data on respondents’ legislators’ racial and
ethnic characteristics is critical because the literature demonstrates that we
might expect differences in perceptions of representation based on the race or
ethnicity of the legislator (Tate, 2003). People living in such districts might
have different views of descriptive representation than others. We expect that
minority group members will have greater degrees of trust in descriptive representatives and feelings of empowerment from electing co-ethnic candidates
(Sanchez & Morin, 2011). Barreto et al. (2004) have demonstrated the importance of district context in influencing political behavior of Latino
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American Politics Research 43(1)
respondents; thus, the context may also influence political attitudes toward
representation. How people of different races and ethnicities view representation matters in a democracy. Members of racial and ethnic minorities might
have different opinions of representation based not only on their representatives, but also on their perceptions of the overall conditions of their group.
Our second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (H2; District Context Hypothesis): Individuals in districts
represented by Latinos and African Americans are more likely to value
descriptive representatives and the importance of more co-ethnic
representatives.
Partisanship is also an important consideration for views on descriptive
representation. Scholars have demonstrated the fortitude of the effect of
political party on determining vote choice and influencing political attitudes
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Miller & Shanks, 1996). In
this sense, political party is a strong feature of identity and we should expect
it would influence attitudes on representation. However, the race and ethnicity of individuals can also be a salient and even dominant political identity
(Barreto, 2010; Dawson, 1994; McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas,
2010). For people who are members of a racial or ethnic minority group,
which political identity is the most important and how do these overlapping
identities complicate their political attitudes toward representation?
Most Latinos, with the exception of Cubans, have been supporters of the
Democratic Party (Alvarez & García Bedolla, 2003) and the split across
political party identification among Latinos has typically been 2-to-1 in favor
of the Democratic Party. Notwithstanding recent efforts to appeal to the
Latino vote by some Republicans, such as George W. Bush, President Obama
won 67% of the Latino vote in the 2008 election against John McCain, and an
even larger 71% of the Latino vote in the 2012 election against Mitt Romney.
Some Republicans, however, have thought that Latinos were Republicans
and didn’t know it yet, in the words of Ronald Reagan. That is, their patriotic
views on the military and social conservatism made them natural Republicans,
although de la Garza and Cortina (2007) dispute this contention. In recent
years, some Republicans, especially in California in the mid-1990s, advocated tough immigration measures, which were seen in the eyes of many
Latinos as overly harsh. This has affected the party brand image, such that
since 1999, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, only about 25% of Latinos
identify as Republican.
This analysis examines how cross-cutting cleavages of race and ethnicity
and political party influence attitudes toward representation. In contrast to
Casellas and Wallace
151
Latinos, African Americans have consistently identified with the Democratic
Party (Walton & Smith, 2011), thus making it difficult in this analysis to
examine Black Republicans. However, the same is not true for Latino
Republicans.
Hypothesis 3 (H3; Latino Republican Hypothesis): Latino Republicans
are less likely to value co-ethnic representation and are less likely to place
importance on more Latino descriptive representation.
We theorize that Latino Republicans are less likely to be invested in Latino
descriptive representation because most Latino elected officials are
Democrats. Given the divergence in political views of Democrat and
Republican representatives, Latino Republicans may feel they get better substantive representation from Republican legislators even if they do not share
the same race or ethnicity as the representative. Especially under these circumstances, because policy preferences matter more than co-ethnic identity,
partisanship may trump ethnicity (Michelson, 2005).
Data
To examine racial and ethnic group attitudes toward representation and legislators, we fielded a survey instrument on the Cooperative Congressional
Election Survey (CCES). The CCES is conducted every 2 years and 2012
was the most recent presidential election. CCES uses the survey research
firm, YouGov/Polimetrix, to field both the common content and individual
teams modules of 1,000 adult respondents. Our module was in the field in the
2 weeks after the November 6, 2012, election. It was conducted over the
Internet and uses a matched random sample. This involves collecting a random sample drawn from the target population and then identifying one or
more members from the opt-in panel that are matched to a member of the
target population, to created the matched sample (Ansolabehere & Schaffner,
2012).
A report by the American Association of Public Opinion Research
(AAPOR) in 2010 evaluated online panels by examining prior studies. The
report expressed some caution about the use of opt-in panels; however, it
conceded that very little research has directly compared the modes.
Subsequently, Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) sought to directly compare
survey modes as well as offer critiques of the report. They argued that the
AAPOR report relied on studies prior to the rise of cellular phones and the
widespread use of the Internet in addition to relying on only a few studies
within their report that directly compared modes. In Ansolabehere and
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American Politics Research 43(1)
Schaffner’s study, they directly compare opt-in Internet, telephone, and mail
survey modes using identical survey questionnaires by fielding a new study
in 2010 designed with this purpose in mind. Their results indicate that the
three modes produced very similar results. One exception is the level of political information respondents in opt-in models demonstrate; however, they
indicate this is due to the sample frame being an Internet population, not the
opt-in nature of the survey per se. What is key about their study and our
analysis is that the opt-in sample they use utilizes the same research firm
YouGov/Polimetrix and thus the same sampling technique (matched random
sampling) as in our data.
Compared with other instruments such as the American National Election
Survey (ANES) and the National Election Study (NES), the CCES appears to
over-represent the number of voters and highly educated respondents (Bafumi
& Herron, 2010). In our analysis, the sample is comprised of mostly registered voters with 92.5% of respondents indicating they are registered.
However, when comparing the CCES with other commonly used instruments
in an analysis of vote choice and political preferences, Jacobson (2007) finds
no significant differences in outcomes between the samples. In our analysis,
the over-representation of voters in the sample does not pose a significant
theoretical problem as the focus of our study is on representation and attitudes toward elected officials. In fact, it may be the case that having a voter
heavy or higher than average educated sample may result in under-estimating
the salience of race and ethnicity on attitudes toward representation because
higher educated respondents and voters may be more likely to value substantive representation over descriptive representation. In other words, they may
be more likely to have political information about how legislators behave,
and not place as much value on sharing the same race or ethnicity as the legislator compared with how the member might actually behave.
In our module, respondents were given the choice to conduct the survey
instrument in Spanish or in English. It contained six substantive questions on
representation to assess feelings of desire and satisfaction with current levels
for descriptive and substantive representation, perceptions of interests of
racial and ethnic groups, desire to live in districts with people of the same
race or ethnicity, and willingness to contact their representative. The broader
module sought to understand constituent views of representation across a
host of issues including relevant public policies, race and ethnicity, legislative behavior, and trust in government. The survey also collected additional
items for each respondent including partisan affiliation, income, education,
geographical location, federal elected legislative representatives, and race
and ethnicity, as well as various common content questions asked of all
respondents on the CCES.
Casellas and Wallace
153
This article focuses on two survey items designed to assess whether
descriptive representation is important to respondents in their own district,
and whether they perceive a need for more descriptive representation in general. In this study, we are particularly focused on how these attitudes vary
across racial and ethnic groups, the extent to which the race or ethnicity of the
legislator affects respondents’ views, and the role of partisanship in mediating any racial or ethnic effects on views. The specific wording of the two
questions and answer choices in this article are as follows:
1.
2.
How important is it to you that your elected representative is of the
same race or ethnicity as you? (Very Important/Somewhat Important/
Not Important At All/Don’t Know)
How important is it that more legislators of your race or ethnicity are
elected to the state legislature or Congress? (Very Important/
Somewhat Important/Not Important At All/Don’t Know)
The sample2 contained 694 Whites, 117 African Americans, and 153
Latinos.3 Given the small number of respondents in racial and ethnic groups
who are not White, Latino, or Black, we focus our analysis on these three
groups.4 One potential critique of our data concerns the sample size of the
racial and ethnic minority groups. While we concede that the sample size is
too small to examine some complexities of in-group variation, we are able to
identify meaningful differences across racial and ethnic groups in addition to
examining the intersection of partisanship and being Latino. Our statistical
models reveal significant differences across racial and ethnic groups and the
standard errors in relation to the coefficients are not large. Rather than introduce bias in favor of our theoretical expectations, the small sample size actually makes it more difficult to produce statistically significant findings.
Moreover, studies utilizing the CCES individual modules and other survey
instruments with comparable sample sizes of racial and ethnic minority
groups have also been able to make similar distinctions in their analyses
(McClain et al., 2006; Rocha, Tolbert, Bowen, & Clark, 2010).
Models
We conducted ordered logistic regression5 due to the ordinal nature of the
dependent variables (Long, 1997). The first dependent variable concerns personal attitudes toward descriptive representation and whether it is important
in the respondent’s own district. The variable is called “Descriptive
Representation Own Elected Official.” Models 1 and 2 show the results of the
ordered logistic regressions on this dependent variable. The only difference
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American Politics Research 43(1)
between the two models is the inclusion of an interaction term in Model 2 for
Latino × Republicans. The second dependent variable we call “More General
Descriptive Representation.” Again, Models 3 and 4 are identical with the
exception of the inclusion of the Latino × Republican interaction term in
Model 4. In all models, we include the same set of background covariates.6
The first set of covariates concern specific individual attributes of respondents. To examine racial and ethnic group differences, we include a dummy
variable to indicate whether a respondent is Black or Latino. To explore gender differences, we also include a dummy variable for whether a respondent
is female. To explore differences by age, the models use a continuous measure of age. To assess the potential influence of party, we created a dummy
variable for party. We were particularly interested in whether Republican
respondents would differ from Democratic respondents. The interaction term
for Latino Republicans examines whether they are a substantively different
group. Due to potential conditional relationships between party and race and
ethnicity, such as Latinos who identify as Republican, this variable is critical
to the analysis. It was created using a 7-point party ID scale and included
respondents who selected a Republican identification. To explore differences
in respondents of varying educational levels we also include an education
variable. Education is on a 6-point scale from 0 to 5 (no high school, high
school graduate, some college, two-year degree, four-year degree, postgraduate education). 0 represents no high school and 5 represents postgraduate education. To examine the role of socioeconomic factors, we also
include a variable on the reported income of the respondent’s household.
To contextualize the attitudes of respondents and legislative context, we
supplemented the survey data set with the collection of data regarding racial
and ethnic characteristics of the respondent’s legislator. We include a dummy
variable for whether their U.S. House member (MC) is Latino. We also
include a dummy variable for whether the MC is Black. Table 1 below displays the descriptive statistics for our covariates. Latino, Black, Female,
Republican, Latino MC, and Black MC are dichotomous. Income and
Education are both categorical variables and Age is continuous.7 We now turn
to the analysis of the results and discussion of the implications of the
findings.
Results and Discussion
The statistical results provide strong evidence for the role of race, ethnicity,
and party on attitudes toward descriptive representation. Before examining
the results of the statistical models, it is useful to turn to a brief examination
of various cross tabulations to examine differences in attitudes. For example,
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Casellas and Wallace
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Independent Variables.
Variable
Latino
Black
Male
Republican
Education
Age
Income
Latino MC
Black MC
Observation
M
SD
Minimum
Maximum
1,000
1,000
1,000
966
1,000
1,000
882
1,000
1,000
0.15
0.12
0.49
0.40
2.62
52.98
2.87
0.06
0.08
0.36
0.32
0.50
0.49
1.51
16.24
2.49
0.23
0.28
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
5
88
8
1
1
Note. MC = Member of Congress.
Table 2. Support for More Legislators of Same Racial/Ethnic Group.
Very important
Somewhat important
Not at all important
Black
Latino
White
23%
41%
36%
18%
35%
47%
4%
12%
84%
when examining the question regarding support for a greater number of legislators from the same race or ethnicity of the respondents, Blacks and Latinos
find it very important while a very small fraction of White respondents feel
the same need.8 Table 2 below indicates the breakdown of respondent answers
by racial and ethnic group. When examining respondents who feel it is important to some degree, only 16% of Whites feel it is important compared with
53% of Latinos and 64% of Black respondents. These data reveal a significant difference in racial and ethnic group attitudes toward the importance
placed on more descriptive representatives. Two possible interpretations of
the results are that Whites either do not value descriptive representation, or
largely feel they already have enough, while Latino and Black respondents
may feel a strong need for more representation.
One noteworthy difference is the disjuncture between respondents’ support for more representatives of their racial and ethnic groups overall, and
respondents’ answers when asked directly about the importance of the race/
ethnicity of their own representative. The results for the latter question are
below in Table 3. Across all three racial and ethnic groups, a sizable majority
of people indicate that it is not important at all. While there are still differences across racial and ethnic groups, it is remarkable that so few respondents
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American Politics Research 43(1)
Table 3. Support for Own Legislator to be of Same Racial/Ethnic Group.
Very important
Somewhat important
Not at all important
Black
Latino
White
9%
20%
71%
6%
22%
72%
3%
7%
90%
from racial and ethnic minority groups find it very important. The results to
this question are surprising given the results in Table 2, which indicated
strong support for more descriptive representatives in general.
One potential explanation for the results in Table 3 is that members of
minority groups do not necessarily believe that more descriptive representation would lead to more substantive representation in line with Swain (1993).
Recall that Swain makes the argument that substantive representation is what
really matters, and often White Democrats will represent Blacks just as well.
For Latinos, voter attitudes about descriptive representation are conditioned
on national origin (Sanchez & Morin, 2011). For example, Mexican
Americans might value Mexican American legislators over Puerto Rican legislators. However, another possible explanation is that in the aggregate, racial
and ethnic respondents are aware that there are few racial and ethnic minorities in legislatures, and thus believe that it is important for their numbers to
grow overall. It may also be the case that individuals doubt the benefit of
simply having their own elected officials as descriptive representatives rather
than a sizeable group that may be able to wield more political influence.
Inclusion of secondary data in the statistical models on district demographics,
such as the racial and ethnic background of representatives and individual
respondent characteristics, will help shed light on the factors that influence
attitudes.
The results of the ordered logistic analyses for both dependent variables
are presented in Table 4 below. There are two dependent variables and two
models for each variable. One dependent variable measures the importance
one places on one’s own elected official being of the same race or ethnicity
and the second dependent variable measures support for more descriptive
representatives in general. The only difference between the models is the
second model for each variable (Models 2 and 4) that include an interaction
term to examine the role of Latino Republicans.
Race and Ethnicity of Respondents
As we hypothesized in H1, Blacks and Latinos place greater importance on
ensuring that the elected officials they elect are of the same race or ethnicity,
157
Casellas and Wallace
Table 4. Attitudes Toward Descriptive Representation.
(1)
(2)
Descriptive representation own elected
official
Latino
Black
Female
Republican
Education
Age
Income
Latino U.S. MC
Black U.S. MC
Latino × Republican
Cutpoint #1
Cutpoint #2
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood
χ2
1.012** (0.279)
1.018** (0.309)
0.239 (0.212)
0.165 (0.236)
−0.0730 (0.0781)
−0.0155* (0.00699)
−0.0755 (0.0491)
0.236 (0.392)
0.635* (0.318)
1.187* (0.473)
2.684** (0.495)
788
.075
−376.3
60.96
1.581** (0.337)
1.229** (0.324)
0.240 (0.213)
0.576* (0.274)
−0.0786 (0.0791)
−0.0150* (0.00705)
−0.0596 (0.0497)
0.218 (0.400)
0.651* (0.321)
−1.871** (0.645)
1.460** (0.494)
2.975** (0.516)
788
.087
−371.3
71.01
(3)
(4)
More general descriptive
representation
1.596** (0.246)
2.136** (0.264)
0.187 (0.177)
0.122 (0.197)
−0.0312 (0.0654)
0.00314 (0.00617)
−0.0423 (0.0408)
0.466 (0.330)
0.123 (0.317)
1.810** (0.429)
3.407** (0.448)
770
.106
−503.0
119.3
2.171** (0.300)
2.333** (0.276)
0.199 (0.179)
0.499* (0.227)
−0.0341 (0.0660)
0.00353 (0.00623)
−0.0236 (0.0414)
0.485 (0.335)
0.164 (0.321)
−1.648** (0.488)
2.085** (0.446)
3.707** (0.466)
770
.117
−496.9
131.4
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. MC = Member of Congress.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
which is demonstrated in the results from Models 1 and 2. The coefficients
for Black and Latino are significant with a p value of .01. Similarly, respondents who have a Black representative are also more likely to value descriptive representation. This is true even controlling for partisanship and a host of
other control variables that often diminish the role of race and ethnicity of
respondents. These findings suggest that Blacks and Latinos place value on
representatives who look like them.9 This is important because they may perceive a lack of representation by the current political arrangements, and
believe that more elected officials of their same race or ethnicity would yield
greater degrees of substantive representation.
Our second dependent variable of interest asks how important it is that
more legislators of the same race or ethnicity as the respondent are elected to
legislatures and Congress. This question is different from the previous one in
that it tries to ascertain how important it is to individuals that more descriptive representatives are elected. Do Latinos and Blacks feel that it is important to see greater numbers of legislators from their own group? Our results
in Models 3 and 4 provide strong support that the race and ethnicity of the
respondent is significant. Blacks and Latinos indicate strong support for more
members of their race and ethnicity within legislatures. Both variables are
significant across the two models with p values at the .01 level. Similar to the
158
American Politics Research 43(1)
previous set of models, it is critical to recognize that this effect holds in
Models 3 and 4 despite controlling for partisanship, gender, income, and
many other background variables. One explanation for this result is that the
total number of Latino and Black elected officials at the national level is low
and people may recognize the numbers are still small.
Latino Republicans
In part, this article seeks to examine the intersection of ethnicity and partisanship. This is particularly important because in recent years, more Latino
Republicans have been elected to state legislatures and Congress. While
these Latino Republicans were elected with the support of conservative
Whites and a smaller proportion of Latinos, it is nevertheless important for
the study of descriptive representation. Will the likes of Ted Cruz and Marco
Rubio in positions of power lead to more support of descriptive representation among Latino Republicans? Do Latino Republicans care if their legislators are Latinos? In Model 2, which includes an interaction term for Latino
Republicans, the variable is significant at the .05 significance level. However,
unlike the results for Latino in Models 1 and 2, the direction of the coefficient
for Latino Republican is in the opposite direction. In other words, Latino
Republicans are less likely to believe descriptive representation is important.
This finding suggests that partisanship is a stronger political identity than
ethnicity alone for Latino Republicans. Latino Republicans may be satisfied
with their representatives who are often White and Republican because of
their shared partisanship. This finding should be investigated in future studies
given the changing demographics of the electorate as well as the growth of
Latino Republicans in legislatures.
The results from our second dependent variable in Model 4 (support for
more descriptive representation) reinforce our findings on the intersection of
ethnicity and partisanship observed in Model 2. Model 4 examines whether
Latino Republicans place importance on more Latinos in legislatures with the
inclusion of an interaction term for Latino Republicans. The results for this
question are quite remarkable and warrant additional consideration. Latino
Republicans are actually less likely to feel that it is important that more
Latinos are elected to legislatures. This result is significant at the .01 level
and negative. This finding suggests that Latino Republicans are quite distinct
from their Latino Democratic counterparts. Latino Republicans may assume
that more Latinos in legislatures might mean more Democrats, as most
Latinos in legislatures are Democrats. They value substantive representation
over descriptive representation because their White representatives are more
supportive of their partisan interests. This may change over time as more
Casellas and Wallace
159
Latino Republicans make their way to elective offices; however, in the 2012
elections, several Latino Republican MCs lost their seats.
Republicans
Another key variable of interest in this study is the role of partisanship, in
particular its effects when it is disentangled from race or ethnicity. In Model
2, which includes the Latino Republican interaction term, Republican is also
significant and in a positive direction indicating that non-Latino Republicans
also place importance on having descriptive representatives in their own districts. This essentially means White Republicans as there are only six Black
Republican respondents in the sample. Similar to Model 2, Model 4 shows
that Republicans also feel that it is important that more legislators of their
race or ethnicity are elected to legislatures. This finding is also significant at
the .05 level. The findings taken together are suggestive of something not
typically discussed in the literature. The results suggest that White Republicans
feel that it is very important to have representatives from their own racial and
group and have more legislators like them elected to legislative institutions.
While White Republicans are hardly under-represented in Washington, it
makes sense that such voters would want more representation of their interests rather than less. As noted with the personal need for more descriptive
representation, perhaps White Republicans are more racially conscious given
the increasing diversity of their surroundings, especially in the South,
although see Hero (2000) for a view of how the interaction of White ethnics,
minorities, and Anglos have distinct effects on state policies. The growth of
minorities in their communities and legislatures might be seen as off-putting
to White Republicans for a host of different reasons. In addition, White
Republicans may also have a heightened sense of racial identity, especially in
areas with growing numbers of minorities. For example, Giles and Hertz
(1994) found that White attitudes about Blacks and partisanship were conditioned by surrounding context. White Republicans may therefore perceive
racial threat especially from the growing Latino population and fear that their
political power is diminishing. While scholars typically discuss descriptive
representation in terms of racial and ethnic groups that have been marginalized and under-represented, these findings indicate that White respondents
are also capable of valuing descriptive representation for their group and
themselves.
Race or Ethnicity of Legislator
In H2, regarding the role of minority MCs, we expected the race or ethnicity
of the legislator to play a significant role in influencing attitudes. The results
160
American Politics Research 43(1)
of the statistical analysis do not indicate consistent effects of either Latino
MC or Black MC across the models.10 Latino MC is not significant in any of
the models. Black MC is significant and the .05 level in Models 1 and 2
assessing support for descriptive representation of one’s own elected officials, but not in Models 3 and 4 assessing support for more descriptive representatives. Looking at the raw survey data, people living in districts with
Black MCs are more likely to express a personal desire for more descriptive
representation, yet this variable was not statistically significant in the models
analyzing the importance for more descriptive representation in general
(Models 3 and 4). This finding might be attributed to the fact that African
Americans living in majority Black districts with Black representatives are
very satisfied with the representation they are receiving from their Black
MCs, but do not sense a need for more descriptive representation in general
because they are already content. In short, people living in districts with
Black MCs are more likely to place importance on descriptive representation
for their own elected officials. One possible explanation for the differential
results for Black MCs is that Blacks in these districts may have a higher level
of linked fate and may place a higher level of importance on their own representative being of the same racial group as a result.
The non-findings for Latino MC may indicate that Latino MCs have less
visibility to respondents and thus consequently less effect on their attitudes
toward representation. Black constituents may be able to point to relatively
famous Black elected officials who have served in office for many years,
such as Maxine Waters (D-California) or John Conyers (D-Michigan). The
same cannot be said for Latino MCs due to their shorter tenure and population within Congress. This may help explain some of the differences in these
findings between the effects of Black MC and Latino MC.
Turning toward covariates other than the race of the ethnicity of the
respondent and party, many of the variables in the models do not have a significant effect on the attitudes toward representation. We do not find significant effects for education or gender in any of the models, nor do we find
consistent effects for income or age. The findings of the statistical analyses
indicate the strong role of race and ethnicity in attitudes on representation in
addition to the role of party under certain conditions.
Substantive Effects
Using Clarify,11 we estimate the substantive effects of the explanatory variables on the two dependent variables of interest. We do this because of the
inherent difficulties in interpreting coefficients in ordered logit models. We
now turn to a discussion of the substantive effects displayed in Figures 1 and
2 and Table 5. The values report the difference in probability a respondent
161
Casellas and Wallace
Latino*
0.03 [0.01, 0.07]
Black *
0.03 [0.01, 0.07]
Female*
0.01 [-0.00, 0.02]
Republican*
0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]
-0.01 [-0.03, 0.01]
Education
-0.02 [-0.05, -0.00]
Age
-0.01 [-0.03, 0.00]
Income
0.01 [-0.01, 0.03]
Latino U.S. MC*
Black U.S. MC*
0.02 [0.00, 0.05]
-.05
0
.05
.1
First differences for continuous variables represent a change from min to max value.
Variables with a * are dichotmous - FD is a change from 0 to 1.
Figure 1. Substantive effects for descriptive representation own elected official
for “very important” answer choice.
Note. MC = Member of Congress, FD = First differences.
Latino*
0.11 [0.06, 0.17]
Black *
0.18 [0.12, 0.27]
Female*
0.01 [-0.01, 0.02]
Republican*
0.00 [-0.01, 0.02]
Education
-0.00 [-0.03, 0.02]
Age
0.01 [-0.02, 0.03]
Income
-0.01 [-0.03, 0.01]
Latino U.S. MC*
0.02 [-0.01, 0.06]
Black U.S. MC*
0.01 [-0.01, 0.03]
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
First differences for continuous variables represent a change from min to max value.
Variables with a * are dichotmous - FD is a change from 0 to 1.
Figure 2. Substantive effects for more descriptive representation for very
important answer choice.
Note. MC = Member of Congress, FD = First differences.
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American Politics Research 43(1)
Table 5. Impact of Race and Partisanship on Probability Believe Descriptive
Representation Is Very Important.
Race and partisanship
combination
Latino = 0; Republican = 0
Latino = 1; Republican = 0
Latino = 0; Republican = 1
Latino = 1 Republican = 1
Descriptive representation
own elected official
More general descriptive
representation
0.016
0.072
0.028
0.024
0.025
0.186
0.041
0.071
will answer the highest value on a survey item if the value of a given variable
is changed from its minimum to its maximum, while holding all other variables constant. For continuous variables, the estimate shows the first difference as a result of moving from the minimum to maximum values for each
variable. For dichotomous variables, the first difference represents a change
from 0 to 1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are indicated by the
lines in the figures and in brackets.
Figure 1 depicts the results for answering very important for the first
dependent variable: importance of descriptive representation of own elected
official. Here we see that for Blacks and Latinos, the probability of answering
very important results in a 3-point increase. These may not appear significant, but when compared with the baseline, such groups are significantly
more likely to say that having legislators from their own group is very important to them.
The substantive effects of the explanatory variables on desire for more
descriptive representatives in general are displayed in Figure 2. The results
are similar in direction to Figure 1 in many ways. However, the size of the
effects of race and ethnicity variables is considerably larger. Latinos are 11
percentage points more likely to answer very important to this question, and
an even stronger effect of an increase 18 percentage points for Blacks. These
results show that the two largest minority groups are strong supporters of
increased descriptive representation in legislatures even controlling for other
socioeconomic characteristics. No other variable has such an impact either in
the negative or positive direction than race or ethnicity.
Table 5 takes a closer look at the interaction term of Latino Republican to
examine how party and race and ethnicity affect the probability of answering
very important for the two dependent variables of interest. The first column
lists whether the respondent was Latino or non-Latino and Republican or
non-Republican.12 The coding for these two dichotomous variables was
Latino = 1 if the respondent is Latino; 0 otherwise. Republican = 1 if the
Casellas and Wallace
163
respondent is Republican; 0 otherwise. Non-Latino Democrats are 1.6% and
2.5% more likely to respond very important for the two dependent variables.
Latino Democrats, on the other hand, are 7.2% more likely to say that it is
very important that their representative is Latino, and 18.6% more likely to
say that it is very important that more Latinos are elected to legislatures. This
demonstrates a strong effect of ethnicity when holding party constant.
When comparing Republican respondents, there is little difference
between Latinos and non-Latinos on the first question concerning overall
importance of descriptive representation with 2.8% versus 2.4% effect on
answer choice. Non-Latino Republicans are 4.1% more likely to value more
descriptive representation which is a larger effect than Non-Latino Democrats.
This finding resonates with the discussion above regarding how White
Republicans value more representatives of their same race in legislatures and
Congress. When comparing Latino and non-Latino Republicans on the second dependent variable of need for more descriptive representatives in general, the effect of Latino Republican is almost twice the size of non-Latino
Republicans with 7.1% compared with 4.1%. These results, while not as
strong in intensity as the results for Black and Latino non-Republican respondents, still demonstrate the powerful role of ethnicity. For Latino Republicans,
partisanship mediates their support for descriptive representation; however,
ethnicity clearly still plays a role in increasing their support.
Conclusion
Scholars have not fully investigated minority groups’ attitudes toward legislators. This research augments our understanding of minority group attitudes
and evaluations of legislators by examining Black, White, and Latino attitudes in the same analysis. Very little scholarly work has attempted to ascertain how minority group members feel about descriptive representation
compared with Whites. By focusing on individual attitudes, this article builds
on existing scholarly research examining the costs and benefits of representatives possessing different demographic traits. We hypothesized that minority
respondents value descriptive representation in unique ways because of a history of exclusion and discrimination. This expectation is based on a body of
research showing the role of linked fate in political consciousness and the
importance of trust that flows from co-ethnic shared experiences. This study
has confirmed our theoretical expectation that Latinos and Blacks do care
about having representatives of their race or ethnicity and want more members from their own group. However, we also find that Whites place value on
descriptive representation. White Republicans are slightly more likely to
desire more legislative members of their own race compared with White
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American Politics Research 43(1)
Democrats. Somewhat surprisingly, Republicans overall express a personal
desire for descriptive representation and feel they need more of it.
For Latinos, being Republican reduces support for descriptive representation overall and the need for more representatives, although Latino
Republicans generally want more of their own in legislatures. Other studies
have shown that Black Republicans are also less supportive of descriptive
representation, possibly for similar reasons—that more Black representation
implies more Democratic representation. For Latinos, demographic changes
have led to greater spatial dispersion across congressional districts, and it will
become critical to understand both their engagement with representatives and
evaluation of MCs. In addition, the rise of more Latino elected officials who
are Republican may ultimately change the views of Latino Republicans
toward descriptive representation.
Attitudes about descriptive representation are strongly influenced by race
and ethnicity, even when controlling for other socioeconomic variables,
including partisanship. Latinos and Blacks feel strongly that descriptive representation is important and that more co-ethnic legislators are important.
Our research demonstrates the effect of being Latino or Black is stronger on
support for having more general descriptive representatives than one’s own
elected officials. This could be in part explained by recognition that a critical
mass of descriptive representatives is necessary to wield political influence
and translate descriptive representation into substantive representation. Up
until now, very little research has explored how Whites feel about descriptive
representation. Our analysis sheds light on this unexplored area by finding
that White Republicans value descriptive representation and want to see more
of their own in legislative positions. This finding should be explored in further research, as most of the research on descriptive representation and its
importance focuses exclusively on minorities.
This research also has important implications given the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Shelby County v. Holder in 2013. After 1990, numerous
majority−minority districts were created by state legislatures especially in the
South. This led to a growth in the number of African American and Latino
MCs in the 1990s and 2000s. Now that states will not be subject to preclearance, the implications for minority representation are in question. Whether
Congress decides to revisit Section 4(b) remains unclear, but the future of
preclearance is at stake, given that Section 5 relies on formulas established by
Section 4(b). Even the Court admitted that the Voting Rights Act had been
successful in one of its goals of making it easier for minorities to elect their
candidates of choice often via majority–minority districts. We know that
minorities value descriptive representation at levels exceeding that of Whites;
however, the elimination of preclearance might jeopardize the ability of
Casellas and Wallace
165
minorities to elect candidates of choice in areas with a history of racial discrimination. If this happens, then more people of color might feel even more
unrepresented by their representatives, posing additional challenges for representative democracy.
Authors’ Note
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2013 Annual Meetings of the
American Political Science Association, Western Political Science Association,
Midwest Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association, and
the University of Houston Department of Political Science.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the editor, anonymous reviewers, Christian Grose,
Monika McDermott, Chris Stout, and Geoff Wallace for their helpful comments and
suggestions. The authors thank all participants for their feedback.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: This project received financial support
from the Irma Rangel Public Policy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin.
Notes
1. We use the term “co-ethnic” to refer to legislators of the same race or ethnicity.
This is standard in the literature (Barreto, 2010; Manzano & Sanchez, 2010).
2. In the analysis we present here, the sample is not weighted. When the main models in Table 4 are run with sampling weights, the results are not substantively
different.
3. We are unfortunately not able to control for the national origin group among
Latino respondents due to data limitations of the Cooperative Congressional
Election Survey (CCES) not including this question on the common content.
One can reasonably assume that most of the sample is likely Mexican American
in origin given that Latinos who identify as Mexican comprise 65% of the overall
Latino population (U.S. Census, 2010). However, without a specific question
asking respondents about their national origin, we are unable to make distinctions between such groups.
4. We only include Black, White, and Latino respondents. Respondents who marked
Asian, Native American, Mixed, or Other were excluded from the sample due to
166
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
American Politics Research 43(1)
the very small sample size in each group. The results of the statistical results do
not change with the inclusion of respondents from these groups.
All models were run in Stata 12.
While there may be some concerns of multicollinearity given the nature of our
variables, specification tests reveal the variance inflation factor (VIF) of any of
the variables in any models never exceeds a value of 1.7. This value is considerably below the standard norm of below 10 and under the more stringent level of
4 (O’Brien, 2007).
Future work could benefit from a longer survey instrument with a larger sample
size of Black and Latino respondents, as well as increasing the number of questions related to other important concepts, such as linked fate, national origin
groups, and experiences with discrimination. In addition, the inclusion of state
legislative district information could be useful; however, the CCES does not contain enough geographic information to create these measures. Given data limitations in the CCES, we are unable to incorporate these variables in this analysis,
but these would be fruitful in future research.
We often speak of descriptive representation with respect to marginalized groups
because generally speaking they are under-represented. Whites are descriptively
and substantively well represented across the United States. The novelty of our
approach is that we survey Whites in addition to minorities to compare attitudes
about representation. Our results are important because they suggest that Whites
also care about descriptive representation.
For Latinos represented by Latino Members of Congress (MCs), they were more
likely to rate both having a member of the same ethnicity (14% versus 5%)
and the need for more representative from that group as important (21% versus
13%) compared with Latinos who were not currently served by a Latino MC.
For African American respondents who were represented by a Black MC they
were slightly more likely to choose the category somewhat important instead of
not important on both questions compared with Black respondents who were
not represented by a Black representative; however, there were not large differences on selecting answer choice important. In additional statistical models on
importance of descriptive representative in one’s own district, the inclusion of an
interaction term between race or ethnicity of respondents and race or ethnicity of
legislator from the same group did not change the statistical results in the main
models, nor were the interaction terms significant. In the second set of models on
more descriptive representation in general, Latino MC × Latino respondent is not
significant and Black MC × Black respondent is significant at the .10 level; however, the coefficient is negative. A closer examination of the substantive effects
on this dependent variable, comparing Latino and Black respondents represented
by an MC from their own group with those who do not have an MC from the
same group, indicates there are no statistical differences between the probability
of answer choice among Black respondents. Latino respondents who are represented by a Latino MC are 8 percentage points more likely to answer “somewhat
important” to have more descriptive representatives and 12 percentage points
Casellas and Wallace
167
more likely to answer “very important.”
10. We considered including a variable for majority–minority districts in addition
to Latino and Black MC. However, there is a lot of overlap between these variables. In this Congress, Latinos MCs, with the exception of three members, all
represent majority–minority districts. Similarly, among Black MCs, only three
do not represent majority–minority districts. Thus, the level of multicollinearity
between these two variables is too high to be included in the analysis.
11. All simulations performed using Clarify software—see King, Tomz, and
Whittenberg (2000).
12. The predicted probabilities were generated with all other continuous variables
held constant at their means, and dichotomous variables at their medians. Given
the sample composition, this means that the variable for Black respondent was
set to zero.
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Author Biographies
Jason P. Casellas is an associate professor of political science at the University of
Houston. His research focuses on legislative politics, Latino politics, and state and
local politics.
Sophia J. Wallace is an assistant professor of political science at Rutgers University,
New Brunswick. Her research examines representation, legislative behavior, Latino
politics, immigration policy, and social movements.
Journal of Park and Recreation Administration
Fall 2017
112
Volume 35, Number 3
pp. 112–121
https://doi.org/10.18666/JPRA-2017-V35-I3-7768
The Politics of U.S. National Park
Unit Creation: The Influence of
Electoral Competition, Political
Control, and Presidential Election
Years
Tiffany Espinosa
Jerry J. Vaske
Maureen P. Donnelly
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Conservation invokes a range of policy issues
including questions of economics, recreation, public good, stewardship, and
governance obligations. When U.S. legislators consider creating new National
Park units, interrelated policy issues influence decisions about whether to
support or oppose a new site. In this article, we explored the influence of
electoral competition, political party in control, and presidential election year
on the number of new National Park units created between 1934 and 2014.
Electoral competition theory hypothesizes that as the congressional majority
margin decreases (gets more competitive), politicians act in more strategic
and less partisan ways. In this analysis, high electoral competition occurred
if the party in power had less than a 55% majority; low electoral competition
was defined as a 55% or more majority. Three conditions of political control
were also examined: (a) Democrats controlled the Presidency and the House,
(b) Republicans controlled the Presidency and the House, and (c) shared party
control (one party controlled the Presidency and the other party controlled
the House). The effect that presidential election years had on the number of
new park units created was also considered. Results indicated that more park
units were created during periods of low electoral competition (M = 5.00) than
high electoral competition (M = 2.04), F (1, 79) = 7.24, p = .009, η = .084
(Hypothesis 1). In addition, there was evidence of partisanship (Hypothesis 2).
When Democrats controlled both the Presidency and the House, 5.55 new park
units were created annually. When political control was shared, 3.34 park units
were created per year, and when Republicans were in control only one park unit
on average was created annually, F (2, 78) = 3.54, p = .034, η = .289. More park
units were created in presidential election years (M = 5.02), than nonpresidential
election years (M = 2.06), F (1, 74) = 2.32, p = .024, η = .259 (Hypothesis
3). There was no evidence of interaction effects among the variables (contrary
to Hypothesis 4). This research contributes to the existing literature on the
development and growth of the National Park System by analyzing the role of
113
electoral competition, political control, and presidential election years as they
effect the creation of new National Park units.
KEYWORDS: Electoral competition, legislative behavior, national parks,
presidential elections, strategic voting
AUTHORS: Tiffany Espinosa is the executive director of Graduate and
Professional Education at Mount Holyoke College, tespinos@mtholyoke.edu.
Jerry J. Vaske is a professor in the Department of Human Dimensions of Natural
Resources at Colorado State University. Maureen P. Donnelly is an associate
professor in the Department of Human Dimensions of Natural Resources at
Colorado State University.
Introduction
Politicians in a democracy represent their constituents and make policy decisions
that are in the best interests of the electorate. Democracy, however, allows for diverse
policy positions to be debated and negotiated. In the realm of natural resources, land use
conservation invokes a range of policy issues including questions related to economics,
recreation, public good, stewardship, and governance obligations. When U.S. legislators
consider creating new National Park units, interrelated policy issues influence decisions
about whether to support or oppose a new site.
The designation of a new National Park unit is a political process wherein legislators
consider the best and highest use for the resource. Politicians carefully navigate among
stakeholders with different priorities and sometimes opposing viewpoints on land use and
the proper role of government. For proponents of smaller government and fiscal austerity,
the long-term financial obligation accompanying the creation of federally protected areas
may not be attractive. Free-market advocates are concerned that federal protection will
inhibit opportunities for development and will lead to economically inefficient land use.
For advocates of conservation and social investment, a new National Park unit represents
an opportunity to stimulate economic growth and create social goods by maintaining an
area’s aesthetic and cultural values. All of this happens in the context of dynamic national
priorities that relate to both domestic and foreign concerns. By examining trends over time,
it is possible to identify political party preferences for conservation.
Understanding legislative behavior patterns can inform and guide natural resource
actions. Information on factors that influence legislative decision-making can help
managers develop better strategies for long-term planning. This article contributes to
the existing literature on the National Park System by analyzing the role of electoral
competition, political party control, and presidential election year on the creation of new
national park units.
Background: The Designation of U.S. National Park Units
The designation of a new National Park unit can occur through Congressional
legislative action or through presidential proclamation (under the power granted by the
Antiquities Act of 1906). As of January 13, 2017, there were a total of 417 National Park
units; 330 designated by Congress and 87 designated through presidential decree (National
Park Service, 2017).
Sites proposed for Congressional review go through an evaluation process. The
process starts when an individual or group makes a proposal to a National Park Service
(NPS) regional office. The NPS reviews the proposal, hears public testimony, and conducts
a feasibility analysis to determine if the area has national significance. When an area is
under consideration for National Park status, the following are taken into consideration
(as listed in Additional Areas for National Park System, 16 U.S. C. § 1a–5): (a) the rarity
114
and integrity of the resources; (b) threats to those resources; (c) the number of similar
resources already protected in the National Park System or in other public or private
ownership; (d) the public use potential; (e) the interpretive and educational potential; (f)
costs associated with the acquisition, development, and operation of the proposed park;
(g) the socioeconomic impacts of any designation; (h) the level of local and general public
support; and (i) whether long-term resource protection and visitor use can be ensured.
Each year the NPS compiles a report of possible new sites and sends it to Congress
where committees consider the implications for public and private use. Multiple
Congressional committees review the report, including the House Committee on Natural
Resources, the House Committee on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Energy &
Natural Resources, and the Senate Subcommittee on National Parks. Congress can ask
the Secretary of the Interior for recommendations and hold hearings to help evaluate the
proposals. If Congress supports federal protection for an area, legislation authorizing the
site is passed.
In 1906, Congress passed the American Antiquities Act, which authorizes the
president to protect sites and objects of historic or scientific interest by designating them as
national monuments (National Park System, n.d.). Sites originally designated as national
monuments by the president may later be redesignated as a National Park unit through
Congress. In the history of the National Park System, 152 national monuments have been
created, 11 have subsequently been abolished, and 55 have been redesignated by Congress
as other types of park units (National Park Service, 2016).
This article examines how the number of new National Park units created each year is
influenced by (a) electoral competition (i.e., the proportion of the House of Representatives
the majority party enjoys), (b) political party in control of the Presidency and the House
of Representatives, and (c) presidential election year (a time of increased voter attention).
All types of National Park units were included in the analysis (e.g., national parks, national
monuments, national lakeshores).
Electoral Competition
Electoral competition is an adaptation of rational choice theory (Hotelling, 1929) and
is defined as the level of competition between the majority political party and the minority
party based on the margin of support held by the majority. When inter-party competition
is low (i.e., one party has a wide majority of votes), there is less incentive for the majority
party to incorporate other ideological positions into decision-making, and more partisanship
is evident. As the majority margin narrows, and voters are split closer to 50/50 between the
parties, inter-party competition is considered high. Electoral competition theory predicts
that in high competition contexts, politicians will vote more strategically (and less along
party lines) to garner the broadest support among voters to protect political power and the
likelihood of re-election (Barrilleux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002; Coughlin & Nitzan, 1981;
Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993; Hotelling, 1929; Key, 1949; Kousser, Lewis, & Masket,
2007; Krasa & Polborn, 2010).
Electoral competition scholars agree that heightened competition increases strategic
behavior, but disagree about the strategies politicians will use. Focusing on Southern
Democrats, for example, Key (1949) suggested that as competition increases, politicians
propose more liberal policies, which will be supported by the greatest number of people (see
also Barrilleux et al., 2002). Downs (1957) theorized that increased electoral competition
causes politicians to behave in a more centrist (i.e., middle-of-the-road) manner. Lockard
(1959) applied electoral competition theory to politics in New England, and examined
competition between parties and within parties (e.g., factions within a single party). Results
indicated that increased electoral competition led to more strategic behavior and a higher
level of accountability for politicians in both contexts. Others have examined the role of
special interests (Grossman & Helpman, 1996) and ideological adaptation in response
to voter demands and political conditions (Kousser, Lewis, & Masket, 2007) that may
influence electoral competition.
115
Political Control
Three conditions of political control include: (a) Democrats controlling the presidency
and the House, (b) Republicans controlling the presidency and the House, and (c) shared
control (one party controlling the presidency and the other party controlling the House)
are also examined in this article. The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009,
for example, illustrates how decision-making can be influenced by political control. This
piece of legislation was a conglomeration of 159 separate bills. After the 2008 election,
Democrats took back a majority in both the Senate (by a 58% margin) and the House of
Representatives (by a 53% margin), and won the presidential election. The Omnibus bill
was proposed on January 7, 2009. Although the legislation drew strong partisan support
from Democrats and opposition from Republicans, the bill finally passed both the House
and the Senate and was signed into law by President Obama on March 30, 2009 (Nasaw,
2009). Passage of this bill would not likely have happened unless both Congress and the
Presidency were under the control of a single party.
Presidential Election Year
Presidential election year is included in this article for two reasons. First, the
increased media attention during a presidential election year results in higher visibility and
higher stakes for both parties. The parties have a platform for highlighting their proposed
legislative behavior. Second, election years may signal a potential shift in power between
the Democrats and Republicans. The party in power may act while they are still in power.
Objectives
The number of new U.S. National Park units created annually was analyzed based on
electoral competition, political party in control, and whether or not it was a presidential
election year. A total of 328 National Park units were created between 1934 and 2014. We
examined (a) two conditions of electoral competition (high < 55% margin in the House,
and low > 55% margin in the House), (b) three political control conditions (Democratic
control, Republican control, and shared control where one party controls the House and the
other controls the presidency), and (c) whether or not it was a presidential election year. We
tested the following hypotheses:
H1 Level of electoral competition will affect the number of parks created
annually.
H2 Political party in control will affect the number of parks created annually.
H3 Presidential election year will affect the average number of parks created
annually.
H4 Electoral competition, political party control and presidential election year
will interact to affect the number of parks created annually.
Methods
Data for this article were obtained from public records, including the Office of the
Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives (n.d.), the National Park Service (Mackintosh,
2005; National Park Service, 1986, 2016), and the National Parks and Conservation
Association (Liguori, 2014). The total population of 328 National Park units created (either
through Congress or Presidential decree) between 1934 and 2014 were included. The year
1934 was chosen as the start date for the data set, because prior to 1934 other agencies,
including the Department of Agriculture and the War Department, also administered
park sites. It was not until 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt signed legislation
that significantly reorganized federally owned sites that the modern National Park System
came into being. To maintain a common definition of a National Park unit, the postreorganization definitions and timeframe were used.
116
Two levels of government, the presidency and the House of Representatives, were
examined. The House of Representatives was chosen as the congressional body of interest
because (a) representatives are elected every two years, (b) their terms are not staggered,
(c) it was possible to determine the effect of presidential elections, since all House members
are up for election in presidential election years, as well as in the midterm elections, (d)
they are chosen based on a single-choice plurality voting system (i.e., the winner is the
person with the most votes; a majority of the votes is not necessary); and (e) the number
of seats in the House of Representatives for each state is determined based on population.
Because members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years and the
number of Representatives is based on population, the political mix and level of electoral
competition in the House of Representatives is a better reflection of national politics than
the political mix and level of electoral competition in the Senate. During the 20th century,
members of the House of Representatives had an average tenure of nine years of service,
and an average of 80% to 90% of the House members sought re-election (Glassman &
Wilhelm, 2015, pp. 3–5). Given these conditions, House Representatives were expected to
exhibit legislative behaviors to maximize their chances of re-election. Over the time period
studied, Democrats were the majority party in the House of Representatives 79% of the
time. The House majority varied from 51% to 79%, with an average margin of 59%.
Variables Measured
Independent variables. There were three independent variables: electoral
competition, political party in control, and presidential election year. Electoral competition
was a dichotomous variable with the delineation point set at a 55% majority. High
competition occurred when the ruling party had less than a 55% majority; low competition
occurred when the ruling party had greater than a 55% majority. This cut point was based
on two factors: the existing distribution in the data set, and the fact that a simple majority
of 50% can decide many legislative matters. There was high electoral competition in 32%
of the years examined.
The second independent variable was political party in control. We examined three
conditions of political control: (a) Democrats controlled the presidency and the House, (b)
Republicans controlled the presidency and the House, and (c) shared control (one party
controlled the presidency and the other party controlled the House). Ancillary analyses
indicated that there was no significant difference (F (1, 39) = .729, p = .398) in the number
of parks created annually whether the shared party control had a Democratic president
and Republican House versus a Republican president and Democratic House. The two
conditions were thus combined into one category. For 40 of the 81 years included in this
article, a single party controlled both the presidency and the House (n = 33 for Democrats,
n = 7 for Republicans). The shared control condition included 28 years where there was
a Republican president and Democratic House, and 13 years when it was a Democratic
president and a Republican House. During the shared control years, the investigators
assumed both parties experienced political pressure to pursue their own party agenda, as
well as pressure to work effectively with the opposing party that held power in the other
branch of government (either the legislative or the executive branch).
The third independent variable was whether it was a presidential election year.
Presidential election years were used instead of Congressional election years because of
the increased voter engagement that occurs during a presidential election year. Among the
eligible voters during the period of study, an average of 58% of voters participated during
presidential elections, as compared to 42% during the midterm elections (United States
Election Project, 2014). There were 18 presidential election years in the data set.
Dependent variable. The dependent variable was the total number of National Park
units designated each year from 1934 to 2014. All types of park units (e.g., historic sites,
parks, preserves, memorials, lakeshores) and both those created by Congress and the
President were included in the analysis. The number of parks created in a given year ranged
from 0 to 33, averaging four (SD = 4.8). In nearly one third of the years studied, either no
117
parks were created (n = 13) or one park was created (n = 13). In 80% of the sample there
were five or fewer parks created in a given year.
Analysis Strategy
Analysis of variance was used to examine each hypothesis: electoral competition
level (Hypothesis 1), political party in control, (Hypothesis 2), and presidential election
year (Hypothesis 3). A three-way ANOVA examined the interaction effects among
electoral competition, political party in control, and presidential election year (Hypothesis
4). Bonferroni post hoc tests were used to compare the categories for the political party in
control variable. Eta (η) was used to determine the strength of the relationships (the effect
size). The cut points used for η were: minimal = .1, typical =.243, and substantial = .371
(Vaske, 2008, p. 108).
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the level of electoral competition would affect the average
number of parks created annually. Results supported the hypothesis. The average number
of parks created during conditions of low electoral competition was 5.00, while in high
electoral competition years the mean was 2.04, F (1, 79) = 7.24, p = .009, η = .084 (Table
1). This suggests that as electoral competition increases, legislators act more conservatively
and create fewer parks.
The data provided further insights for the Hypothesis 1 results. There were no years
in which Republicans had low electoral competition; the greatest margin they held over the
time period studied was 53%. The low competition condition was reasonably split between
shared party control (n = 26) and Democratic control (n = 29), but the Democrats controlled
the House an overwhelming majority of that time (n = 51) compared to Republican control
of the House (n = 4). In this case, low competition might reasonably be associated with a
Democratically controlled House. During years of high electoral competition, Democrats
were in control four years, Republicans were in control seven years, and a shared control
condition
existed for
remaining
15 years.
In these
data,
Democrats controlled the
THE POLITICS
OFthe
U.S.
NATIONAL
PARK
UNIT
CREATION
House for 10 years compared to the 16 years that Republicans controlled the House. These
results suggest that during a low competition condition, where Democrats overwhelmingly
controlled
Table 1 the House, significantly more National Park units were created than when
competition was high and control of the House was more heterogeneous.
Table 1
NumberofofParks
Parks
Created
Annually
by Electoral
Competition
Number
Created
Annually
by Electoral
Competition
Number of Parks Created Annually1
Electoral Competition2
Mean
Standard
Deviation
N
Low
5.00
5.45
55
High
2.04
1.84
26
1. F (1, 79) = 7.24, p = .009, η = .084.
2. High electoral competition defined as when the majority party has a 55% or less majority.
Hypothesis 2 predicted political party control would influence the number of new
park units created each year (Table 2). When Democrats controlled both the presidency and
the House, an average of 5.55 new park units were created annually. When control of the
presidency and House was shared, 3.34 park units were created per year, and only one park
Table
unit
on 2
average was created each year when Republicans were in control, F (2, 78) = 3.54,
p = .034, η = .289. The effect size was between “typical” and “substantial” (Vaske, 2008,
Number of Parks Created Annually by Political Party in Power
Number of Parks Created Annually1
Standard
2
Electoral Competition2
Electoral
Competition2
Low
Number of Parks
Created Annually
Standard
Mean
Deviation
N
Standard
Mean
Deviation
N
5.00
5.45
55
Low
High
5.00
2.04
5.45
1.84
55
26
High
2.04
1.84
26
118
1. F (1, 79) = 7.24, p = .009, η = .084.
2. High electoral competition defined as when the majority party has a 55% or less majority.
1. F (1, 79) = 7.24, p = .009, η = .084.
p.2. 108).
The
post hoc
test indicated
there
was athestatistically
significant
difference
between
High
electoral
competition
defined
as when
majority party
has a 55%
or less majority.
the Democrat versus Republican controlled years (p = .026), and the Democrat controlled
years versus the shared control years (p = .046). There was no statistically significant
difference between the Republican controlled years and the shared control years (p = .252).
These findings support Hypothesis 2 that political power control influences new National
Park unit creation.
Table 2
Table 2
Table 2
Numberofof
Parks
Created
Annually
by Political
Party
in Power
Number
Parks
Created
Annually
by Political
Party in
Power
Number of Parks Created Annually by Political Party in Power
Number of Parks Created Annually1
Political Party in Power
Political
DemocratParty in Power
Number of Parks
Created Annually1
Standard
Mean
Deviation
N
Standard
a
Mean
Deviation
N
5.55
6.24
33
Democrat
Shared Control
5.55ba
3.34
6.24
3.31
33
41
Shared
Control
Republican
b
3.31
1.22
41
7
3.34
1.14
b
1.
Model: F (2, 78) = 3.54, p = .034, 1.14
η = .289,
significant
Republican
1.22 at the p < .05
7 level.
Means with different subscripts are significant at p < .05 based on LSD method.
1. Model: F (2, 78) = 3.54, p = .034, η = .289, significant at the p < .05 level.
Means with different subscripts are significant at p < .05 based on LSD method.
Hypothesis 3 predicted there would be a relationship between presidential election
years and the creation of new park units (Table 3). The hypothesis was supported; more
park units were created in presidential election years (M = 5.02), than nonpresidential
election years (M = 2.06). The difference was statistically significant (F (1, 74) = 2.32, p =
Tablewith
3 a typical effect strength (η = .259) (Vaske, 2008, p. 108).
.024),
Table 3
Number of Parks Created Annually by Presidential Election Year
Table 3
Numberofof
Parks
Created
Annually
by Presidential
Year
Number
Parks
Created
Annually
by Presidential
ElectionElection
Year
Number of Parks Created Annually1
Election Year
Election
Year
No
No
Yes
Number of Parks
Created Annually1
Standard
Mean
Deviation
N
Standard
Mean
Deviation
N
2.60
4.13
58
2.60
5.06
4.13
3.23
58
18
1.
YesF (1, 74) = 5.32, p = .024, η = .259.5.06
3.23
18
1. F (1, 74) = 5.32, p = .024, η = .259.
Hypothesis 4 examined potential interaction effects among the variables of electoral
competition, political party in control, and whether or not it was a presidential election
year. Based on the results from Hypothesis 2, two levels of political party—Republican
control and shared control—were combined since there was no significant difference found
between the two groups. In this 2 x 2 x 2 model, there was no evidence of interaction effects
(either 2-way or 3-way) between the variables. The only statistically significant effects
were the main effects of electoral competition (F (1, 73) = 7.36, p = .008, η = .303) and
presidential election year (F (1, 73) = 4.25, p = .043, η = .235). The main effect of political
party control was not statistically significant, although as identified in Hypothesis 1, there
were political party control dynamics underlying the electoral competition variable.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that electoral competition (Hypothesis 1), political party
in control (Hypothesis 2), and presidential election year (Hypothesis 3) influenced the
THE POLITICS OF U.S. NATIONAL PARK UNIT CREATION
22
119
Table 4
Table
4
Number ofofParks
Created
Annually
by Party
Control,
Presidentialand
Number
Parks
Created
Annually
byinParty
in Electoral
Control,Competition
Electoral and
Competition
Election Year Election Year
Presidential
President and House Party
Democrats in control of both
Presidency and House
Republicans in control of either
the Presidency and/or House 2
Electoral
Competition
Low
Presidential
Election
Year
No
Yes
Number of Parks Created Annually1
Mean
5.21
10.00
Standard
Deviation
6.75
3.08
N
24
5
High
No
Yes
1.00
3.00
1.41
0.00
2
2
Low
No
Yes
2.67
6.50
2.74
4.60
18
8
High
No
Yes
1.76
3.00
1.85
2.12
17
5
1. Model: F (7, 73) = 2.952, p = .009, η = .470.
The only statistically significant effects in the model were the electoral competition main effect (F (1, 73) =
7.36, p = .008, ...
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