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Short Paper assignments must follow these formatting guidelines: SINGLE SPACING with a blank line to separate your paragraphs. Provide a subheading in BOLD for each paragraph on a separate line that characterizes the content of that paragraph. There would be at least 4-5 separated paragraphs in your paper. Use 12-point Times New Roman font, one-inch margins, with discipline-appropriate citations. Word length requirement: 600-800 words.

Based on the text (pages 313-339 and 367-388) and the article, Perception and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A Survey of Offenders, answer the following:

Economic sanctions have been criticized because they are perceived to be unfair to poor defendants, to have no effect on wealthy defendants, and to be unenforceable because offenders cannot be imprisoned for nonpayment of debt. Nevertheless, for three reasons their use is likely to increase. Discuss these three reasons for this policy. Do you agree or disagree with the use of economic sanctions? Explain your answer.

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Volume 70 Number 3 26 FEDERAL PROBATION and Pereto Sacios A Suve Paym en c f f R. Barry Ruback, Pennsylvania State University Stacy N. Hoskins, Pennsylvania State University Alison C. Cares, Central Connecticut State University Ben Feldmeyer, Pennsylvania State University ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE been criticized because they are perceived to be unfair to poor defendants, to have no effect on wealthy defendants, and to be unenforceable because offenders cannot be imprisoned for nonpayment of debt (Ruback & Bergstrom, 2006). Nevertheless, for three reasons their use is likely to increase. First, because the costs of criminal justice operations are high, offenders are now expected to pay at least part of those costs. Second, concern for victims has increased, so that restitution is likely to be awarded more frequently. Third, there are increasing pressures for intermediate sanctions, because of the high cost of incarceration, questions regarding whether incarceration is effective in deterring future crime, and the need to limit prison space to the most serious offenders. Despite these three pressures for increasing the number and amount of economic sanctions imposed on offenders, the reality is that large proportions of these sanctions are not paid. Collection rates for restitution are around 50 percent (Cohen, 1995). At the federal level, there is more than $35 billion in unpaid fines (Mendoza & Sullivan, 2006). The usual assumption is that nonpayment is the result of offenders not having sufficient means to pay the sanctions. Aside from inability to pay, however, there are three alternative explanations for high rates of nonpayment: lack of understanding of the sanctions, disagreement with the rationale " for the sanctions, and belief that the sanctions are unfairly applied. To explore these three rationales, we surveyed sentenced offenders in two Pennsylvania counties. The Use of Economic Sanctions Nationally, fines are imposed in 25 percent of all state felony convictions: 23 percent of violent offense convictions, 24 percent of property offense convictions, and 27 percent of drug offense convictions (Durose & Langan, 2004). Restitution is imposed in 12 percent of all felony convictions: 11 percent of violent offense convictions, 21 percent of property offense convictions, and 6 percent of drug offense convictions. Offenders generally perceive economic sanctions to be severe. McClelland and Alpert (1985) and Apospori and Alpert (1993) found that recent arrestees believed a $5,000 fine was about as severe as spending a year in jail, a $1,000 fine was about half as severe, and a $500 fine was about one-quarter as severe. Similarly, Spelman (1995) found that 128 offenders in Texas believed a $1,000 fine was about as severe as one year of regular probation, and a $5,000 fine was about as severe as two years of regular probation. Almost half (46 percent) of the sample believed a $5,000 fine was more severe than three months in county jail, primarily because they had few legitimate sources of income. Spelman also found that the perceived difficulty of paying economic sanctions depended on the type of offender and the amount of the sanction, such that property offenders viewed large fines as very severe, whereas drug and vi)lent offenders did not. Despite believing that economic sanctions are severe, offenders seem to believe that they can pay the ordered amounts. Pctersilia and Deschenes (1994) found that their sample of Minnesota inmates believed that the chances of paying a $100 fine would be close to 80 percent, and the chances of paying victim restitution or paying a $500 fine would be close to 70 percent. Interestinily, for all three conditions correctional staff said the chances of inmates' completing the condition was significantly lower (less than 50 percent for the last two conditions). Additionally, both inmates and correctional staff rated the chances of paying a $20/week supervision fee at around 50 percent. Nonpayment of Economic Sanctions Even though many offenders believe they can pay their ordered economic sanctions, only about half of economic sanctions are paid. One possible explanation for this finding is the inability to pay. Three possibilities relate to a lack of motivation to pay: offenders may nct want to pay the ordered amounts because thcy do not understand the purpose of the sa:-ictions; they disagree with the reasons given for paying the sanctions; or they believe the amounts ordered and the procedures used to determine those amounts are unfair. This research was supported by grants from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency to the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. The points of view expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Pennsylvania Cimmission on Crime and Delinquency or the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. December 2006 December 2006 PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 27 PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 27 Inability to pay. Lack of resources is some flexibility in terms of payment schedprobably the most important reason that ules for fines and restitution (Alexander, offenders do not pay economic sanctions. Montgomery, Hamilton, Dutton, Griswold, For example, a survey of federal probation- Russell, Salo, & Muse, 1998). Thus, offenders ers found that about a third reported that may be treated inequitably and may feel that the sanction resulted in a significant hard- their sanctions are unfair. ship, and slightly more than a tenth said the Hypotheses sanction resulted in a severe deprivation. However, slightly more than half said that We expected most offenders in our survey the sanction did not present any specific to express difficulty in paying the economic hardship (Allen & Treger, 1994). sanctions they owe. Therefore, we expected Lack of understanding. Supreme Court nonpayment to be related to an inability to decisions since Miranda have indicated that make the payments (i.e., low income). Addibefore offenders can be convicted of a crime, tionally, we expected non-payment to be they must understand the nature of the pro- related to the three factors that would reduce ceedings against them so they can contriboffenders' motivation to pay the sanctions: ute to their defense. After being convicted, lack of understanding, disagreement with however, offenders have fewer rights, and the the rationale for the sanctions, and percepsystem places less emphasis on the offender's tion that the sanctions are unfairly applied. understanding. However, it may be that Method offenders are more motivated to pay sanctions when they understand what they are We surveyed offenders in two Pennsylvania paying for. Moreover, understanding that counties about the economic sanctions they their payments go to victims has implica- were ordered to pay, their understanding tions for rehabilitation, in that restitution is and perceptions of the sentencing process likely to be effective only if offenders under- (especially with regard to economic sancstand that they are taking responsibility and tions), and their judgments about the fairmaking reparations for their wrongdoing ness and impact of economic sanctions. (Outlaw & Ruback, 1999). Disagreement with the purpose of the Description of the Survey sanctions. A second possible rationale for The self-report survey, which was mailed nonpayment is that offenders disagree with to the offenders, was divided into four secthe purposes of the sanctions and there- tions and included 41 questions. The first fore choose not to pay. Allen and Treger section asked questions about the respon(1994) interviewed 82 probationers in the dent's offense and punishment, in terms of Northern District of Illinois about fines and incarceration and probation. The second restitution. Probationers believed fines and section asked offenders about the economic restitution primarily served the goal of pun- sanctions imposed in their cases, including ishment, followed by the goal of justice. They the amounts for costs, fees, fines, and resdid not believe these sanctions served the titution and the payments they had made. goal of either deterrence or rehabilitation. This section also asked how well offenders Despite this pattern, however, perceptions understood how the various amounts of of the purpose of sanctions were not related economic sanctions were determined. The to payment. third section asked offenders about their Perception that the sanctions are unfair. case, including their perceived responsibility Research suggests that individuals care for the crime and their judgments about the about both the outcomes they receive (dis- amounts of the economic sanctions in their tributive fairness) and the process by which case and the procedures used to determine those outcomes were reached (procedural those amounts. Additionally, the survey fairness). Thus, a third possible rationale included a 22-item scale assessing offenders' for nonpayment is that offenders believe understanding of different punishment goals economic sanctions are unfair because the as they applied to their case (e.g., just desamounts are too high or the procedures used erts, revenge, recognition of victim status, to determine the amounts are unfair. There deterrence of the offender, rehabilitation, is some research to support this notion. For general deterrence, positive general prevenexample, probation officers typically have tion, victim security, and societal security). For this scale, offenders were asked to read a series of statements beginning, "It was important that I should be punished" and to indicate the importance of each statement for why they should be punished. Statements included such items as "to even out the wrong that I had done," "to bring satisfaction to the victim," and "to stop me from further offenses." Responses were coded "very important," "somewhat important," "not very important," or "not important." Of the 22 items on the scale, 18 came from a study by Orth (2003). We added 4 items to increase the number of goals assessed (moral outrage, treatment, education, restitution to the victim). The fourth section asked for offenders' opinions about economic sanctions in general, including their perception of the burden that payment placed on them and other offenders. The final section asked about the offender's background, including gender, race, age, marital status, education, and socioeconomic status.' Sampling In the summer of 2005, we worked with probation personnel in two Pennsylvania counties to obtain a list of all offenders sentenced in 2003. Using cases from 2003 ensured that offenders who were surveyed had had at least a year to pay economic sanctions. Additionally, 2003 cases were recent enough that offenders should have been able to remember the details of their cases and could more easily be tracked down by mail. After obtaining the two samples, we mailed offenders packets containing a cover letter from the probation office, two consent forms, a survey, and a one-dollar incentive. Participants were promised that their participation and responses would remain confidential and would not be shared with their probation officers or other criminal justice personnel. After returning the com- SAfter designing the survey instrument, we obtained from the local probation office the names of two offenders willing to participate in cognitive interviews. The cognitive interviews proceeded in two stages. First, the offenders completed the self-report survey. Second, we discussed each of the survey questions with the offenders. The purpose of the cognitive interviews was to help us identify questions that were difficult to understand or that did not accurately reflect what we intended. We then modified the survey to reflect any changes suggested by the offenders. The offenders were paid $25 for their participation in the cognitive interviews. Volume 70 Number 3 28 FEDERAL PROBATION Volume 70 Number 3 28 FEDERAL PROBATION We received completed surveys from 122 offenders, for a response rate of 15 percent (122/833).' A key reason for the low response rate is that offenders, unless imprisoned, often do not complete surveys. Also, compared to the rest of the country, survey response rates are lower in the Northeast and especially in Pennsylvania (Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, & Tourangeau, 2004). The sample of respondents consisted primarily of offenders who were male (61 percent) and white (93 percent) and who ranged in age from 20 to 67 (M = 34.1, Mdn = 33). In terms of marital status, 39 percent had never been married, 41 percent were married or living with someone, and 20 percent were divorced. Regarding education, 25 percent had not completed high school, 28 percent had graduated from high school, 38 percent had at least some college or advanced technical training, 5 percent had a college degree, and 4 percent had some graduate training. Of the sample, 30 percent were employed full time, 13 percent were employed part time, 20 percent were unemployed, 21 percent were disabled, and the remainder included students, retirees, homemakers, and occasional workers. In terms of income, 80 percent reported annual incomes less than $20,000. Only 7 percent reported incomes greater than $30,000. Most respondents were convicted of DUI/ traffic offenses (39 percent), followed by drug offenses (24 percent), property offenses (24 percent), personal offenses (9 percent), and other offenses (which consisted of firearms violations, gambling, fleeing from police, and false ID; 3%).4 Two individuals did not complete this item about their conviction offense. In subsequent analyses, we excluded "other offenses," because there were so few cases and because they did not form a cohesive category. In terms of punishment, 5 percent had been sentenced to state prison, 38 percent to county prison, and 71 percent to probation (multiple sentences were possible). The most common of the remaining sentences listed were house arrest (5 percent), parole (6 percent), and loss of license (2 percent). The two counties were chosen because we had worked with them on a previous study examining the imposition and payment of economic sanctions. In one county, our sample of 405 adult offenders sentenced in 2000 was 78% male, 90% white, with an average age of 31.5 (Mdn = 29.1), and with 11.7 years of education (Mdn = 12.0). The offenses they were convicted of were 27% property, 17% personal, 16% drugs, 24% traffic/DUI, and 16% other. In terms of sentence received, 4% were incarcerated in state prison, 21% were incarcerated in county jail, and 51% received probation. In the other county, our sample of 394 adult offenders sentenced in 2000 was 80% male, 88% white, with an average age of 33.2 (Mdn = 31.5), and with 12.0 years of education (Mdn = 12.0). The offenses they were convicted of were 21% property, 17% personal, 15% drug, 39% traffic/DUI, and 8% other. In terms of sentence received, 3% were incarcerated in state prison, 28% were incarcerated in county prison, and 51% received probation. Thus, our sample of respondents for calendar year 2003 is representative. 3 We received 78 completed surveys from one county and 44 completed surveys from the other county. We mailed 501 surveys to offenders in the first county, 64 of which were returned as undeliverable. We also received letters from family members that 2 additional offenders had died. Thus, the response rate was 18% (78/435). We mailed 508 surveys to offenders in the second county, 110 of which were returned as undeliverable. Thus, the response rate was 11% (44/398). Two surveys were returned because the inmates were in prison and prison rules prohibited them from completing the survey. (e.g., personal more serious than property). pleted survey and signed consent form, each respondent received an additional $10.2 Results Participants 2 Of the respondents, 72 percent said they had been shown a sheet that indicated the total costs and fees they owed, and 50 percent said they had been given a sheet to k(!ep that indicated the specific costs and fe2s they owed. Of the respondents who received a sanction sheet, most rated on a 7-point scale that having been given a sheet was very important (M = 5.70; Mdn = 7). An ac.ditional 39 percent of individuals who had not been given a sheet indicated on a 7-point scale that they would have liked to have been given a sheet listing the specific amounts they owed (M = 5.90; Mdn =7). Economic Hardship The primary purpose of this study was to dctermine the reasons for nonpayment of economic sanctions. We used four measures of the extent to which economic sanctions posed a hardship to respondents: a) their reported difficulty in making their monthly pqyments, b) their responses to two questions about whether paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders' ability to successfully complete probation or parole ar[d to provide for their families, c) their expectations about paying off their ordered economic sanctions, and d) two behavioral Economic Sanctions Imposed indicators of hardship: whether they had missed any payments and whether their In terms of economic sanctions, 23 percent of offenders had been ordered to pay jail fees, monthly payments had been reduced. We asked respondents to indicate on a 59 percent to pay court costs, 48 percent to pay supervision fees, 28 percent to pay other 7-point scale how difficult it is for them to make their monthly payments. Respondents costs and fees, 59 percent to pay fines, and 24 percent to pay restitution. Overall, 65 percent indicated that it was difficult, with 66 perof respondents said they had been ordered to cent of the sample answering above the midpay some type of economic sanction, with the point of 4 (M = 5.14; Mdn = 6.0). As would be total amounts ranging from $101 to $25,000 expected, difficulty in making payments was (M = $2,848; Mdn = $1,400). An additional n(gatively related to income, r(117) = -. 28, 34 percent of respondents said they did not p < .01, and positively related to the total know the total amount they owed. Although araount of economic sanctions owed (for this crime and prior crimes), r(105) = .18, p < .07. 71 percent of all respondents said they were However, difficulty in making payments was ordered to make monthly payments that not related to monthly payments for other ranged from $1 to $2,000 (M = $104; Mdn = $68), 22 percent of respondents said they expenses, r(118) = -. 06, n.s., or to the numdid not know what their ordered monthly bfr of dependents, r(112) = .05, n.s. Also consistent with expectations, difpayments were. ficulty in making monthly payments was positively related to respondents' beliefs that 4 The respondents had been convicted of burglary poying economic sanctions interferes with (7%), theft (20%), robbery (2%), assault (8%), drug offenders successfully completing probation possession (20%), drug selling (12%), DUI (36%), traffic offenses (10%), and other (21%), most of or parole, r(113) = .26, p < .01, and that which were property (8%) or drug offenses (4%). paying economic sanctions interferes with The percentages total more than 100 because offenders being able to provide for their famindividuals could be convicted of more than one ilies, r(115) = .16, p < .10. That is, offenders offense (range = 1-4; M = 1.4; Mdn = 1, Mode = 1). When a respondent listed more than one con- who had more difficulty making monthly viction offense, we coded the most serious crime poyments were also more likely to say that December 2006 December 2006 PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TABLE 1. Other Monthly Payments Due Type of Payment Child support Rent/mortgage Food Car payments Insurance Utilities Credit card bills Health care Other 29 PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 29 % Who Pay 11 47 45 16 31 43 17 12 17 Mean Monthly Payment ($) 33.42 228.29 172.31 51.00 112.48 113.06 200.20 10.20 28.24 making payments interferes with their ability to successfully complete probation or parole and to provide for their families. A list of the monthly obligations offenders reported, together with the mean amount owed, is presented in Table 1. In terms of objective measures of difficulty in making payments, we found that 53 offenders (43 percent) said they had missed making a payment of some kind at least once, 13 offenders (11 percent) had had their monthly payments reduced, and 2 offenders (2 percent) had been allowed by the court to stop payments. However, consistent with Petersilia and Deschenes (1994), who found that about 70 percent of their sample of offenders said that they would pay all of the restitution they owed, we found that 103 of our respondents (80 percent) said they expected to pay all of the money they owed. Understanding of Economic Sanctions Respondents were asked to indicate on 7point scales how well they understood how the amounts of five economic sanctions (court costs, supervision fees, other costs and fees, fines, and restitution) were determined. In general, respondents did not understand how the amounts were determined, in that the mean responses for all five items were below 4, the midpoint of the scale. These responses were analyzed using a 4 Between (Type of Crime) X 5 Within (Type of Economic Sanction) repeated measures analysis of variance. This analysis revealed a significant effect for type of economic sanction, F(4, 416) = 15.34, p < .001. A posthoc Newman-Keuls test of the means (p < .05) indicated that restitution (M = 4.03) was understood better than all of the other economic sanctions, which did not differ significantly from each other (court costs: M = 2.83; supervision fees: M = 2.81; other costs and fees: M = 2.80; fines: M = 3.01). There was also a significant Type of Crime X Type of Economic Sanction interaction, F(12, 416) = 2.19, p < .05. A post-hoc test indicated that property offenders understood the determination of restitution significantly more than the four other types of economic sanctions. Personal, drug, and DUI/traffic offenders indicated that they understood the determination of all five economic sanctions at a fairly low level. The relatively low levels of understanding of the five specific sanctions can be better understood in light of two other questions pertaining to the understanding of sentencing. In response to a question asking how well they understood how criminal sentences are set in Pennsylvania, offenders' responses were fairly uniform across the scale, and the average was at the midpoint (M = 4.04; Mdn = 4). There were no differences in terms of crime committed (F < 1). Similarly, respondents were asked how well they understood where their payments go. The average response was well below the midpoint (M = 2.97; Mdn = 2), and there was no significant difference as a function of crime committed (F < 1). Overall, then, offend- ers indicated they somewhat understood sentencing in general and the setting of restitution amounts, but they did not understand how other economic sanctions were determined or where their payments went. Purposes of Punishment A factor analysis, using a Varimax rotation, of the 22 items regarding punishment goals extracted four factors, all of which had eigenvalues greater than one. The rotated factors accounted for 67 percent of the variance in the responses for these items. We assigned each of the 22 items to the factor on which it loaded highest and then averaged the scores across the items for each of the four scales. Factor 1, justice, consisted of 8 items (V = .90). Factor 2, Deterrence,consisted of 5 items (V = .91). Factor 3, Concern for Victims, consisted of 5 items (V = .85). Factor 4, Rehabilitation,consisted of 4 items (V = .80). A listing of the items by factor is presented in Table 2. A 4 Between (Type of Crime) X 4 Within (Punishment Goals) repeated measures analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for punishment goals, F(3,288) = 1.8.73, TABLE 2. Extracted Factors and Punishment Goals Loading on Each Factor Name It was important that I should be punished... justice to even out the wrong that I had done to make amends for my guilt to uphold the important values in society to show that crime does not pay to help me understand our legal system to stop others from committing similar offenses to make it clear that my act was wrong so that I know that crime does not go unpunished Deterrence so that society does not have to fear me for now so that I am not a danger to others so that the victim does not have to fear me for now so that the victim can live in safety so that people are not frustrated with the legal system Concern for Victims to make it clear publicly that I did wrong to the victim to bring satisfaction to the victim to make it clear that society is on the side of the victim to make me suffer, as the victim suffered by my action to reimburse the victim for the losses he or she suffered Rehabilitation to treat my drug, alcohol, or mental health problems to allow for my rehabilitation to provide me with education or work skills to stop me from further offenses Factor Loading .77 .73 .73 .63 .62 .60 .59 .56 .83 .81 .72 66 55 75 69 67 66 52 79 69 65 62 Volume 70 Number 3 Volume 70 Number 3 30 FEDERAL PROBATION 30 FEDERAL PROBATION p < .001. Justice (M = 3.02) and Rehabilita- by fines (M = 2.64), court costs (M = 2.64), tion (M = 2.98), which did not differ signifi- and supervision fees (M = 2.61), which were cantly from each other, were endorsed more not significantly different from one another than Deterrence (M = 2.55) and Concernfor according to a post-hoc Newman-Keuls test (p < .05). Other costs and fees (M = 2.43) Victims (M = 2.48), which also did not differ judged to be the least fair economic were significantly from each other, according to a sanction. post-hoc Newman-Keuls test (p < .05). There was also a significant Type of Crime Comparing Possible X Punishment Goals interaction, F(9, 288) = of Nonpayment 2.19, p < .05. Property offenders were most Explanations We were also interested in the extent to which concerned with Justice and least concerned with Deterrence. Personal offenders were the four possible explanations for nonpaymost concerned with Justice and showed the ment of economic sanctions related to each least Concern for Victims. Drug offenders other. The first explanation we explored, were most concerned with Rehabilitation lack of money to pay the sanctions, was relatand least concerned with Deterrence. DUI/ ed to offenders' perceptions of the system. traffic offenders were equally most con- Respondents who said it was difficult to make cerned with Justice and Rehabilitation and their monthly payments said they understood sentencing less, r(118) = -. 19, p < .05, showed the least Concern for Victims. believed the amounts of economic sanctions Procedural and Outcome were less fair, r(117) = -. 29, p < .001, and Fairness believed the procedures for setting the economic sanctions were less fair, r(115) = -. 27, For each of the five types of economic sanctions, respondents rated the fairness of the p < .01. Three of the sentencing goals, Justice, amounts and the fairness of the procedures Deterrence, and Concern for Victims, were used to determine those amounts. These 10 significantly positively related to composite measures of the perceived fairness of the ratings were analyzed using a 2 X 4 Between (Incarceration Status X Type of Crime) X 5 amounts of economic sanctions, the perceived fairness of the procedures used to set X 2 Within (Type of Economic Sanction X Type of Fairness) doubly repeated measures the economic sanctions, and the perceived analysis of variance. Incarceration status fairness of sentences in general. That is, offenders who more strongly endorsed these (sentenced to jail/prison or not) was included because we wanted to test whether individu- sentencing goals were also likely to believe als who had been incarcerated were likely to their sentences were fairer. Rehabilitation 5 was significantly related only to the composbelieve economic sanctions were unfair. This analysis revealed one significant ite measure of the fairness of the amounts of between-subjects effect, for type of crime, economic sanctions. None of the four goals F(3, 100) = 2.92, p < .05. In terms of over- was significantly related to total economic all fairness, property offenders (M = 3.06) sanctions owed, total monthly payments, or believed their economic sanctions were sig- household income. To determine how important the one nificantly fairer than did person offenders explanation relating to ability to pay and the (M = 2.58), DUI/traffic offenders (M = 2.45), three explanations relating to motivation and drug offenders (M = 2.33). These last three groups of offenders did not have sig- to pay (understanding, agreement with the nificantly different perceptions of fairness, rationales, fairness) are in actually making payments, we conducted logistic regressions according to a post-hoc Newman-Keuls test in which we tested these explanations as (p < .05). predictors of nonpayment. For example, in withinone significant also was There subjects effect, a significant effect for the one model we used composite scores for the type of sanction, F(4, 100) = 2.92, p < .05. understanding of economic sanctions, the Restitution (M = 2.72) was judged to be perceived fairness of the amounts of economic sanctions, the perceived fairness of the most fair economic sanction, followed the procedure used to determine economic 5 Incarceration could have contradictory effects. sanctions, the composite score for Justice On the one hand, incarceration indicates that the as a goal for sentencing, and the offender's offender had probably committed a more serious income to predict whether or not the offendcrime, had a longer prior record, or both. On the er had ever missed a payment. None of the other hand, incarceration likely means that the offender would have more difficulty paying the measures of motivation to pay was signifieconomic sanctions. cantly related to payment, and the only signil icant predictor of missing a payment was household income. Discussion W! hypothesized that offenders pay only syr all percentages of their ordered economic sanctions both because they are unable to pap and because they are not motivated to do so. This survey of offenders found some support for all four reasons that we investigated. Inability to Pay Alkhough there was support for all three reasons pertaining to motivation to pay, the strongest explanation related to inability to pay. Our multivariate analyses of an objective indicator of nonpayment (having to miss payments) revealed that our indicators of motivation to pay were not significantly related to missing a payment, whereas indical:ors of ability to pay (e.g., total economic sanctions owed, total monthly payments) were significant indicators. Motivation to Pay We found some support for all three rationales related to offenders' motivation to pay. First, there was strong evidence that offender, did not understand how fines, fees, and co,3ts were imposed. Although offenders, and particularly property offenders, said they understood how restitution decisions were imposed, the absolute number (a mean of 4 on a 7-point scale) was in fact not very high. Second, there was evidence that ofienders did not agree with the rationale foa economic sanctions. Our results indicaled that the offenders did not rate any of the goals of punishment very highly. Third, there was evidence that offenders did not pe,ceive the amounts of the economic sanctions or the procedures used to determine them to be very fair. Alternative Explanation for N onpayment A rationale for nonpayment that we did not investigate is that there are no perceived pe aalties for nonpayment. Many probationern do not comply with their court-ordered coaditions, and there are often no sanctions for failing to comply (Langan, 1994). For economic sanctions in particular, research sugges;ts that often no punishments are imposed for non-payment of court-ordered fines and restitution (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). December 2006 December 2006 Offenders learn that threats (e.g., meetings, letters of reprimand, warnings) often have no repercussions, and probation revocation for failure to pay is unlikely (Wheeler, Hissong, Slusher, & Macan, 1990). Nonpayment of restitution is rarely the basis for revocation of probation (Lurigio & Davis, 1990). A study of probationers in Illinois illustrates these points (Allen & Treger, 1994). The survey results suggested that offenders start out believing that payment is required, but that over time they learned this was not true. About half of the offenders believed their probation officer would report nonpayment to the court but would not recommend incarceration. About a quarter believed their probation officer expected them only to make a good faith effort at making full payment, and more than a tenth believed their probation officer did not expect them to make full payment. In fact, as Petersilia and Deschenes (1994) found, criminal justice personnel often do not expect offenders to make full payment. However, in our study, we did not find any support for this idea. In fact, openended responses to a question about whether paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders being able to complete probation or parole successfully indicated that our respondents did fear repercussions for nonpayment. Open-ended responses to this question were coded (83 percent agreement; kappa = .78), and the most common response of the individuals who answered the question (14/52 = 27 percent) was that failure to make the payments meant that they could not complete probation/parole. An additional 6 individuals (12 percent) said that failure to pay resulted in going to jail. A possible reason why we found that offenders feared the repercussions of nonpayment is that our respondents were a selfselected sample of individuals who could be reached by mail, who were not in prison, and who were probably more likely to be in compliance than those who did not respond. The high rate of non-delivered questionnaires two years after conviction (17 percent) suggests that our initial pool of individuals was highly transient. Those individuals who responded not only were probably less transient (and therefore probably had more ties to the community) but also were likely more concerned about earning money. PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 31 PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 31 Implications One of our key findings was that, with the possible exception of restitution, most offenders did not understand how the amounts they owed were determined. Nor did they understand where the money they paid went. The problem is probably even more severe when offenders owe multiple amounts for multiple cases. Correctional scholars believe that by making payments on a regular basis offenders can learn to take responsibility for their crimes. However, particularly with regard to restitution, this belief is premised on the assumption that offenders know where their payments go. Thus, future research might investigate how best to convey this information to offenders and whether this information gives offenders a better understanding of the penalties, makes them feel more responsible for their crimes, and reduces their likelihood of committing a new offense. Aside from not understanding how sanction amounts were determined, offenders may also be confused over such logistical issues as where they are supposed to make their payments. In some counties, different types of economic sanctions have to be paid in different places. It might be that in those counties, probation is better at monitoring the economic sanctions collected by them, versus the ones paid to the clerk of courts or to someone else. If so, this possibility may partially explain some prior findings in Pennsylvania about differences in payment by type of economic sanction, as well as some of our prior research that found payment rates were higher when probation officers were in charge of collection (Ruback, Shaffer, & Logue, 2004). References Alexander, D., Montgomery, J., Hamilton, G., Dutton, D. W., Griswold, R. R., Russell, J. R., Salo, R. J., & Muse, M. K. (1998). Fines and restitution: Improvement needed in how offenders' payment schedules are determined. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office. Allen, G. F., & Treger, H. (1994, June). Fines and restitution orders: Probationers' perceptions. FederalProbation,58, 34-40. Apospori, E., & Alpert, G. (1993). The role of differential experience with the criminal justice system in changes in perceptions of severity of legal sanctions over time. Crime and Delinquency, 39, 184-194. Cohen, R. (1995). Probation and parole violation in state prison, 1991. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, DC: Durose, M. R., & Langan, P. A. (2004). Felony sentences in state courts, 2002. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin NCJ 1206916. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Groves, R. M., Fowler, F. J., Couper, M. P., Lepkowski, J.M., Singer, E., & Tourangeau, R. (2004). Survey methodology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Langan, P. (1994). Between prison and probation: Intermediate sanctions. Science, 264, 791-793. Lurigio, A. J., & Davis, R. C. (1990). Does a threatening letter increase compliance with restitution orders?: A field experiment. Crime andDelinquency, 36, 537-548. McClelland, K. A., & Alpert, G. P. (1985). Factor analysis applied to magnitude estimates of punishment seriousness: Patterns of individual differences. Journal of Quantitative Criminology,1, 307-318. Mendoza, M., & Sullivan, C. (2006, March 19). Unpaid federal penalties add up to a fine mess. Centre Daily Times, pp. Al, A6. Orth, U. (2003). Punishment goals of crime victims. Law and Human Behavior, 27, 173-186. Outlaw, M. C., & Ruback, R. B. (1999). Predictors and outcomes of victim restitution orders. Justice Quarterly,16, 847-869. Petersilia, J., & Deschenes, E. P. (1994). Perceptions of punishment: Inmates and staff rank the severity of prison versus intermediate sanctions. The PrisonJournal,74, 306--328. Petersilia, J., & Turner, S. (1993). Intensive probation and parole. In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and justice: A review of research (vol. 17, pp. 281335). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ruback, R. B., & Bergstrom, M. (2006). Economic sanctions in criminal justice: Purposes, effects, and implications. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 33, 242-273. Ruback, R. B., Shaffer, J. R., & Logue, M. A. (2004). The imposition and effects of restitution in four Pennsylvania counties. Crime and Delinquency, 50, 168-188. Spelman, W. (1995). The severity of intermediate sanctions. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,32, 107-135. Wheeler, G. R., Hissong, R. V., Slusher, M. P., & Macan, T. M. (1990). Economic sanctions in criminal justice: Dilemma for human service? Justice System Journal,14, 63-77. COPYRIGHT INFORMATION TITLE: Perception and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A Survey of Offenders SOURCE: Fed Probat 70 no3 D 2006 WN: 0633503271004 The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.gpo.gov/ Copyright 1982-2007 The H.W. Wilson Company. All rights reserved.
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Running Head: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

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Economic Sanctions
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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Introduction

Offenders typically view economic sanctions to be severe. This is because unlike other
fines imposed to common offenders, a significant amount of money is fined to offenders of
economic sanctions. Research studies have established that recent arrestees perceived a $1,000
fine was as severe spending a half a year in jail and $500 fine as severe as spending three months
in jail. In other words, economic sanctions have been condemned since they are viewed to be
unfair to underprivileged defendants, to have no impact on rich defendants, and to be unenforced
since offenders cannot be jailed for non-payments. However, for some reasons, economic
sanctions are expected to increase substantively (Ruback, Hoskins, Cares, Feldmeyer, 2006).

Reasons for the Increase of Economic Sanctions
The following are some of the reasons why economic sanctions are perceived to increase;
High Cost of Criminal Justice Operations
One of the reasons why economic sanctions are likely to in...


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