Volume 70 Number 3
26 FEDERAL PROBATION
and
Pereto
Sacios
A
Suve
Paym
en
c
f
f
R. Barry Ruback, Pennsylvania State University
Stacy N. Hoskins, Pennsylvania State University
Alison C. Cares, Central Connecticut State University
Ben Feldmeyer, Pennsylvania State University
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE been
criticized because they are perceived to be
unfair to poor defendants, to have no effect
on wealthy defendants, and to be unenforceable because offenders cannot be imprisoned
for nonpayment of debt (Ruback & Bergstrom, 2006). Nevertheless, for three reasons
their use is likely to increase. First, because
the costs of criminal justice operations are
high, offenders are now expected to pay at
least part of those costs. Second, concern for
victims has increased, so that restitution is
likely to be awarded more frequently. Third,
there are increasing pressures for intermediate sanctions, because of the high cost of
incarceration, questions regarding whether
incarceration is effective in deterring future
crime, and the need to limit prison space to
the most serious offenders.
Despite these three pressures for increasing the number and amount of economic
sanctions imposed on offenders, the reality
is that large proportions of these sanctions
are not paid. Collection rates for restitution
are around 50 percent (Cohen, 1995). At the
federal level, there is more than $35 billion
in unpaid fines (Mendoza & Sullivan, 2006).
The usual assumption is that nonpayment is
the result of offenders not having sufficient
means to pay the sanctions. Aside from
inability to pay, however, there are three
alternative explanations for high rates of
nonpayment: lack of understanding of the
sanctions, disagreement with the rationale
"
for the sanctions, and belief that the sanctions are unfairly applied. To explore these
three rationales, we surveyed sentenced
offenders in two Pennsylvania counties.
The Use of Economic Sanctions
Nationally, fines are imposed in 25 percent
of all state felony convictions: 23 percent of
violent offense convictions, 24 percent of
property offense convictions, and 27 percent of drug offense convictions (Durose &
Langan, 2004). Restitution is imposed in 12
percent of all felony convictions: 11 percent
of violent offense convictions, 21 percent of
property offense convictions, and 6 percent
of drug offense convictions.
Offenders generally perceive economic
sanctions to be severe. McClelland and Alpert
(1985) and Apospori and Alpert (1993) found
that recent arrestees believed a $5,000 fine was
about as severe as spending a year in jail, a
$1,000 fine was about half as severe, and a $500
fine was about one-quarter as severe. Similarly,
Spelman (1995) found that 128 offenders in
Texas believed a $1,000 fine was about as severe
as one year of regular probation, and a $5,000
fine was about as severe as two years of regular
probation. Almost half (46 percent) of the sample believed a $5,000 fine was more severe than
three months in county jail, primarily because
they had few legitimate sources of income.
Spelman also found that the perceived difficulty of paying economic sanctions depended
on the type of offender and the amount of the
sanction, such that property offenders viewed
large fines as very severe, whereas drug and
vi)lent offenders did not.
Despite believing that economic sanctions are severe, offenders seem to believe
that they can pay the ordered amounts.
Pctersilia and Deschenes (1994) found that
their sample of Minnesota inmates believed
that the chances of paying a $100 fine would
be close to 80 percent, and the chances of
paying victim restitution or paying a $500
fine would be close to 70 percent. Interestinily, for all three conditions correctional
staff said the chances of inmates' completing
the condition was significantly lower (less
than 50 percent for the last two conditions).
Additionally, both inmates and correctional
staff rated the chances of paying a $20/week
supervision fee at around 50 percent.
Nonpayment of Economic
Sanctions
Even though many offenders believe they can
pay their ordered economic sanctions, only
about half of economic sanctions are paid.
One possible explanation for this finding is
the inability to pay. Three possibilities relate
to a lack of motivation to pay: offenders may
nct want to pay the ordered amounts because
thcy do not understand the purpose of the
sa:-ictions; they disagree with the reasons given
for paying the sanctions; or they believe the
amounts ordered and the procedures used to
determine those amounts are unfair.
This research was supported by grants from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency to the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
The points of view expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Pennsylvania Cimmission on Crime and Delinquency or the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
December 2006
December 2006
PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 27
PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 27
Inability to pay. Lack of resources is some flexibility in terms of payment schedprobably the most important reason that ules for fines and restitution (Alexander,
offenders do not pay economic sanctions. Montgomery, Hamilton, Dutton, Griswold,
For example, a survey of federal probation- Russell, Salo, & Muse, 1998). Thus, offenders
ers found that about a third reported that may be treated inequitably and may feel that
the sanction resulted in a significant hard- their sanctions are unfair.
ship, and slightly more than a tenth said the
Hypotheses
sanction resulted in a severe deprivation.
However, slightly more than half said that We expected most offenders in our survey
the sanction did not present any specific to express difficulty in paying the economic
hardship (Allen & Treger, 1994).
sanctions they owe. Therefore, we expected
Lack of understanding. Supreme Court nonpayment to be related to an inability to
decisions since Miranda have indicated that make the payments (i.e., low income). Addibefore offenders can be convicted of a crime, tionally, we expected non-payment to be
they must understand the nature of the pro- related to the three factors that would reduce
ceedings against them so they can contriboffenders' motivation to pay the sanctions:
ute to their defense. After being convicted, lack of understanding, disagreement with
however, offenders have fewer rights, and the the rationale for the sanctions, and percepsystem places less emphasis on the offender's tion that the sanctions are unfairly applied.
understanding. However, it may be that
Method
offenders are more motivated to pay sanctions when they understand what they are We surveyed offenders in two Pennsylvania
paying for. Moreover, understanding that counties about the economic sanctions they
their payments go to victims has implica- were ordered to pay, their understanding
tions for rehabilitation, in that restitution is and perceptions of the sentencing process
likely to be effective only if offenders under- (especially with regard to economic sancstand that they are taking responsibility and tions), and their judgments about the fairmaking reparations for their wrongdoing ness and impact of economic sanctions.
(Outlaw & Ruback, 1999).
Disagreement with the purpose of the Description of the Survey
sanctions. A second possible rationale for The self-report survey, which was mailed
nonpayment is that offenders disagree with
to the offenders, was divided into four secthe purposes of the sanctions and there- tions and included 41 questions. The first
fore choose not to pay. Allen and Treger
section asked questions about the respon(1994) interviewed 82 probationers in the dent's offense and punishment, in terms of
Northern District of Illinois about fines and incarceration and probation. The second
restitution. Probationers believed fines and section asked offenders about the economic
restitution primarily served the goal of pun- sanctions imposed in their cases, including
ishment, followed by the goal of justice. They the amounts for costs, fees, fines, and resdid not believe these sanctions served the titution and the payments they had made.
goal of either deterrence or rehabilitation. This section also asked how well offenders
Despite this pattern, however, perceptions understood how the various amounts of
of the purpose of sanctions were not related economic sanctions were determined. The
to payment.
third section asked offenders about their
Perception that the sanctions are unfair. case, including their perceived responsibility
Research suggests that individuals care for the crime and their judgments about the
about both the outcomes they receive (dis- amounts of the economic sanctions in their
tributive fairness) and the process by which
case and the procedures used to determine
those outcomes were reached (procedural those amounts. Additionally, the survey
fairness). Thus, a third possible rationale included a 22-item scale assessing offenders'
for nonpayment is that offenders believe understanding of different punishment goals
economic sanctions are unfair because the as they applied to their case (e.g., just desamounts are too high or the procedures used erts, revenge, recognition of victim status,
to determine the amounts are unfair. There deterrence of the offender, rehabilitation,
is some research to support this notion. For general deterrence, positive general prevenexample, probation officers typically have tion, victim security, and societal security).
For this scale, offenders were asked to read
a series of statements beginning, "It was
important that I should be punished" and
to indicate the importance of each statement
for why they should be punished. Statements
included such items as "to even out the
wrong that I had done," "to bring satisfaction to the victim," and "to stop me from
further offenses." Responses were coded
"very important," "somewhat important,"
"not very important," or "not important."
Of the 22 items on the scale, 18 came from
a study by Orth (2003). We added 4 items to
increase the number of goals assessed (moral
outrage, treatment, education, restitution
to the victim). The fourth section asked for
offenders' opinions about economic sanctions in general, including their perception
of the burden that payment placed on them
and other offenders. The final section asked
about the offender's background, including
gender, race, age, marital status, education,
and socioeconomic status.'
Sampling
In the summer of 2005, we worked with
probation personnel in two Pennsylvania
counties to obtain a list of all offenders
sentenced in 2003. Using cases from 2003
ensured that offenders who were surveyed
had had at least a year to pay economic sanctions. Additionally, 2003 cases were recent
enough that offenders should have been
able to remember the details of their cases
and could more easily be tracked down by
mail. After obtaining the two samples, we
mailed offenders packets containing a cover
letter from the probation office, two consent
forms, a survey, and a one-dollar incentive. Participants were promised that their
participation and responses would remain
confidential and would not be shared with
their probation officers or other criminal
justice personnel. After returning the com-
SAfter designing the survey instrument, we
obtained from the local probation office the
names of two offenders willing to participate in
cognitive interviews. The cognitive interviews
proceeded in two stages. First, the offenders
completed the self-report survey. Second, we
discussed each of the survey questions with the
offenders. The purpose of the cognitive interviews was to help us identify questions that were
difficult to understand or that did not accurately
reflect what we intended. We then modified the
survey to reflect any changes suggested by the
offenders. The offenders were paid $25 for their
participation in the cognitive interviews.
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28 FEDERAL PROBATION
Volume 70 Number 3
28 FEDERAL PROBATION
We received completed surveys from 122
offenders, for a response rate of 15 percent
(122/833).' A key reason for the low response
rate is that offenders, unless imprisoned, often
do not complete surveys. Also, compared to
the rest of the country, survey response rates
are lower in the Northeast and especially in
Pennsylvania (Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, & Tourangeau, 2004).
The sample of respondents consisted primarily of offenders who were male (61 percent) and white (93 percent) and who ranged
in age from 20 to 67 (M = 34.1, Mdn = 33).
In terms of marital status, 39 percent had
never been married, 41 percent were married
or living with someone, and 20 percent were
divorced. Regarding education, 25 percent
had not completed high school, 28 percent
had graduated from high school, 38 percent
had at least some college or advanced technical training, 5 percent had a college degree,
and 4 percent had some graduate training.
Of the sample, 30 percent were employed full
time, 13 percent were employed part time, 20
percent were unemployed, 21 percent were
disabled, and the remainder included students, retirees, homemakers, and occasional
workers. In terms of income, 80 percent
reported annual incomes less than $20,000.
Only 7 percent reported incomes greater
than $30,000.
Most respondents were convicted of DUI/
traffic offenses (39 percent), followed by drug
offenses (24 percent), property offenses (24
percent), personal offenses (9 percent), and
other offenses (which consisted of firearms
violations, gambling, fleeing from police,
and false ID; 3%).4 Two individuals did not
complete this item about their conviction
offense. In subsequent analyses, we excluded
"other offenses," because there were so few
cases and because they did not form a cohesive category. In terms of punishment, 5
percent had been sentenced to state prison,
38 percent to county prison, and 71 percent
to probation (multiple sentences were possible). The most common of the remaining
sentences listed were house arrest (5 percent), parole (6 percent), and loss of license
(2 percent).
The two counties were chosen because we had
worked with them on a previous study examining the imposition and payment of economic
sanctions. In one county, our sample of 405 adult
offenders sentenced in 2000 was 78% male, 90%
white, with an average age of 31.5 (Mdn = 29.1),
and with 11.7 years of education (Mdn = 12.0).
The offenses they were convicted of were 27%
property, 17% personal, 16% drugs, 24% traffic/DUI, and 16% other. In terms of sentence
received, 4% were incarcerated in state prison,
21% were incarcerated in county jail, and 51%
received probation. In the other county, our sample of 394 adult offenders sentenced in 2000 was
80% male, 88% white, with an average age of 33.2
(Mdn = 31.5), and with 12.0 years of education
(Mdn = 12.0). The offenses they were convicted of
were 21% property, 17% personal, 15% drug, 39%
traffic/DUI, and 8% other. In terms of sentence
received, 3% were incarcerated in state prison,
28% were incarcerated in county prison, and 51%
received probation. Thus, our sample of respondents for calendar year 2003 is representative.
3 We received 78 completed surveys from one
county and 44 completed surveys from the other
county. We mailed 501 surveys to offenders in
the first county, 64 of which were returned as
undeliverable. We also received letters from family members that 2 additional offenders had died.
Thus, the response rate was 18% (78/435). We
mailed 508 surveys to offenders in the second
county, 110 of which were returned as undeliverable. Thus, the response rate was 11% (44/398).
Two surveys were returned because the inmates
were in prison and prison rules prohibited them
from completing the survey.
(e.g., personal more serious than property).
pleted survey and signed consent form, each
respondent received an additional $10.2
Results
Participants
2
Of the respondents, 72 percent said they
had been shown a sheet that indicated the
total costs and fees they owed, and 50 percent said they had been given a sheet to
k(!ep that indicated the specific costs and
fe2s they owed. Of the respondents who
received a sanction sheet, most rated on a
7-point scale that having been given a sheet
was very important (M = 5.70; Mdn = 7). An
ac.ditional 39 percent of individuals who had
not been given a sheet indicated on a 7-point
scale that they would have liked to have been
given a sheet listing the specific amounts
they owed (M = 5.90; Mdn =7).
Economic Hardship
The primary purpose of this study was to
dctermine the reasons for nonpayment of
economic sanctions. We used four measures
of the extent to which economic sanctions
posed a hardship to respondents: a) their
reported difficulty in making their monthly
pqyments, b) their responses to two questions about whether paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders' ability to
successfully complete probation or parole
ar[d to provide for their families, c) their
expectations about paying off their ordered
economic sanctions, and d) two behavioral
Economic Sanctions Imposed
indicators of hardship: whether they had
missed any payments and whether their
In terms of economic sanctions, 23 percent
of offenders had been ordered to pay jail fees, monthly payments had been reduced.
We asked respondents to indicate on a
59 percent to pay court costs, 48 percent to
pay supervision fees, 28 percent to pay other 7-point scale how difficult it is for them to
make their monthly payments. Respondents
costs and fees, 59 percent to pay fines, and 24
percent to pay restitution. Overall, 65 percent indicated that it was difficult, with 66 perof respondents said they had been ordered to cent of the sample answering above the midpay some type of economic sanction, with the point of 4 (M = 5.14; Mdn = 6.0). As would be
total amounts ranging from $101 to $25,000 expected, difficulty in making payments was
(M = $2,848; Mdn = $1,400). An additional n(gatively related to income, r(117) = -. 28,
34 percent of respondents said they did not p < .01, and positively related to the total
know the total amount they owed. Although araount of economic sanctions owed (for this
crime and prior crimes), r(105) = .18, p < .07.
71 percent of all respondents said they were
However, difficulty in making payments was
ordered to make monthly payments that
not related to monthly payments for other
ranged from $1 to $2,000 (M = $104; Mdn
= $68), 22 percent of respondents said they expenses, r(118) = -. 06, n.s., or to the numdid not know what their ordered monthly bfr of dependents, r(112) = .05, n.s.
Also consistent with expectations, difpayments were.
ficulty in making monthly payments was
positively related to respondents' beliefs that
4 The respondents had been convicted of burglary
poying economic sanctions interferes with
(7%), theft (20%), robbery (2%), assault (8%), drug
offenders successfully completing probation
possession (20%), drug selling (12%), DUI (36%),
traffic offenses (10%), and other (21%), most of or parole, r(113) = .26, p < .01, and that
which were property (8%) or drug offenses (4%). paying economic sanctions interferes with
The percentages total more than 100 because offenders being able to provide for their famindividuals could be convicted of more than one ilies, r(115) = .16, p < .10. That is, offenders
offense (range = 1-4; M = 1.4; Mdn = 1, Mode =
1). When a respondent listed more than one con- who had more difficulty making monthly
viction offense, we coded the most serious crime poyments were also more likely to say that
December 2006
December 2006
PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
TABLE 1.
Other Monthly Payments Due
Type of
Payment
Child support
Rent/mortgage
Food
Car payments
Insurance
Utilities
Credit card bills
Health care
Other
29
PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 29
% Who
Pay
11
47
45
16
31
43
17
12
17
Mean Monthly
Payment ($)
33.42
228.29
172.31
51.00
112.48
113.06
200.20
10.20
28.24
making payments interferes with their ability to successfully complete probation or
parole and to provide for their families. A
list of the monthly obligations offenders
reported, together with the mean amount
owed, is presented in Table 1.
In terms of objective measures of difficulty in making payments, we found that 53
offenders (43 percent) said they had missed
making a payment of some kind at least
once, 13 offenders (11 percent) had had their
monthly payments reduced, and 2 offenders
(2 percent) had been allowed by the court
to stop payments. However, consistent with
Petersilia and Deschenes (1994), who found
that about 70 percent of their sample of
offenders said that they would pay all of the
restitution they owed, we found that 103
of our respondents (80 percent) said they
expected to pay all of the money they owed.
Understanding of Economic
Sanctions
Respondents were asked to indicate on 7point scales how well they understood how
the amounts of five economic sanctions
(court costs, supervision fees, other costs and
fees, fines, and restitution) were determined.
In general, respondents did not understand
how the amounts were determined, in that
the mean responses for all five items were
below 4, the midpoint of the scale.
These responses were analyzed using a 4
Between (Type of Crime) X 5 Within (Type
of Economic Sanction) repeated measures
analysis of variance. This analysis revealed
a significant effect for type of economic
sanction, F(4, 416) = 15.34, p < .001. A posthoc Newman-Keuls test of the means (p <
.05) indicated that restitution (M = 4.03)
was understood better than all of the other
economic sanctions, which did not differ
significantly from each other (court costs:
M = 2.83; supervision fees: M = 2.81; other
costs and fees: M = 2.80; fines: M = 3.01).
There was also a significant Type of Crime
X Type of Economic Sanction interaction,
F(12, 416) = 2.19, p < .05. A post-hoc test
indicated that property offenders understood
the determination of restitution significantly
more than the four other types of economic
sanctions. Personal, drug, and DUI/traffic
offenders indicated that they understood the
determination of all five economic sanctions
at a fairly low level.
The relatively low levels of understanding
of the five specific sanctions can be better
understood in light of two other questions
pertaining to the understanding of sentencing.
In response to a question asking how well they
understood how criminal sentences are set in
Pennsylvania, offenders' responses were fairly
uniform across the scale, and the average was
at the midpoint (M = 4.04; Mdn = 4). There
were no differences in terms of crime committed (F < 1). Similarly, respondents were asked
how well they understood where their payments go. The average response was well below
the midpoint (M = 2.97; Mdn = 2), and there
was no significant difference as a function of
crime committed (F < 1). Overall, then, offend-
ers indicated they somewhat understood sentencing in general and the setting of restitution
amounts, but they did not understand how
other economic sanctions were determined or
where their payments went.
Purposes of Punishment
A factor analysis, using a Varimax rotation,
of the 22 items regarding punishment goals
extracted four factors, all of which had
eigenvalues greater than one. The rotated
factors accounted for 67 percent of the variance in the responses for these items. We
assigned each of the 22 items to the factor
on which it loaded highest and then averaged the scores across the items for each of
the four scales. Factor 1, justice, consisted of
8 items (V = .90). Factor 2, Deterrence,consisted of 5 items (V = .91). Factor 3, Concern
for Victims, consisted of 5 items (V = .85).
Factor 4, Rehabilitation,consisted of 4 items
(V = .80). A listing of the items by factor is
presented in Table 2.
A 4 Between (Type of Crime) X 4 Within (Punishment Goals) repeated measures
analysis of variance revealed a significant
effect for punishment goals, F(3,288) = 1.8.73,
TABLE 2.
Extracted Factors and Punishment Goals Loading on Each
Factor Name
It was important that I should be punished...
justice
to even out the wrong that I had done
to make amends for my guilt
to uphold the important values in society
to show that crime does not pay
to help me understand our legal system
to stop others from committing similar offenses
to make it clear that my act was wrong
so that I know that crime does not go unpunished
Deterrence
so that society does not have to fear me for now
so that I am not a danger to others
so that the victim does not have to fear me for now
so that the victim can live in safety
so that people are not frustrated with the legal system
Concern for Victims
to make it clear publicly that I did wrong to the victim
to bring satisfaction to the victim
to make it clear that society is on the side of the victim
to make me suffer, as the victim suffered by my action
to reimburse the victim for the losses he or she suffered
Rehabilitation
to treat my drug, alcohol, or mental health problems
to allow for my rehabilitation
to provide me with education or work skills
to stop me from further offenses
Factor Loading
.77
.73
.73
.63
.62
.60
.59
.56
.83
.81
.72
66
55
75
69
67
66
52
79
69
65
62
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30 FEDERAL PROBATION
30 FEDERAL PROBATION
p < .001. Justice (M = 3.02) and Rehabilita- by fines (M = 2.64), court costs (M = 2.64),
tion (M = 2.98), which did not differ signifi- and supervision fees (M = 2.61), which were
cantly from each other, were endorsed more not significantly different from one another
than Deterrence (M = 2.55) and Concernfor according to a post-hoc Newman-Keuls test
(p < .05). Other costs and fees (M = 2.43)
Victims (M = 2.48), which also did not differ
judged to be the least fair economic
were
significantly from each other, according to a
sanction.
post-hoc Newman-Keuls test (p < .05).
There was also a significant Type of Crime
Comparing Possible
X Punishment Goals interaction, F(9, 288) =
of Nonpayment
2.19, p < .05. Property offenders were most Explanations
We were also interested in the extent to which
concerned with Justice and least concerned
with Deterrence. Personal offenders were the four possible explanations for nonpaymost concerned with Justice and showed the ment of economic sanctions related to each
least Concern for Victims. Drug offenders other. The first explanation we explored,
were most concerned with Rehabilitation lack of money to pay the sanctions, was relatand least concerned with Deterrence. DUI/ ed to offenders' perceptions of the system.
traffic offenders were equally most con- Respondents who said it was difficult to make
cerned with Justice and Rehabilitation and their monthly payments said they understood sentencing less, r(118) = -. 19, p < .05,
showed the least Concern for Victims.
believed the amounts of economic sanctions
Procedural and Outcome
were less fair, r(117) = -. 29, p < .001, and
Fairness
believed the procedures for setting the economic sanctions were less fair, r(115) = -. 27,
For each of the five types of economic sanctions, respondents rated the fairness of the p < .01. Three of the sentencing goals, Justice,
amounts and the fairness of the procedures Deterrence, and Concern for Victims, were
used to determine those amounts. These 10 significantly positively related to composite
measures of the perceived fairness of the
ratings were analyzed using a 2 X 4 Between
(Incarceration Status X Type of Crime) X 5 amounts of economic sanctions, the perceived fairness of the procedures used to set
X 2 Within (Type of Economic Sanction X
Type of Fairness) doubly repeated measures the economic sanctions, and the perceived
analysis of variance. Incarceration status fairness of sentences in general. That is,
offenders who more strongly endorsed these
(sentenced to jail/prison or not) was included
because we wanted to test whether individu- sentencing goals were also likely to believe
als who had been incarcerated were likely to their sentences were fairer. Rehabilitation
5
was significantly related only to the composbelieve economic sanctions were unfair.
This analysis revealed one significant ite measure of the fairness of the amounts of
between-subjects effect, for type of crime, economic sanctions. None of the four goals
F(3, 100) = 2.92, p < .05. In terms of over- was significantly related to total economic
all fairness, property offenders (M = 3.06) sanctions owed, total monthly payments, or
believed their economic sanctions were sig- household income.
To determine how important the one
nificantly fairer than did person offenders
explanation relating to ability to pay and the
(M = 2.58), DUI/traffic offenders (M = 2.45),
three explanations relating to motivation
and drug offenders (M = 2.33). These last
three groups of offenders did not have sig- to pay (understanding, agreement with the
nificantly different perceptions of fairness, rationales, fairness) are in actually making
payments, we conducted logistic regressions
according to a post-hoc Newman-Keuls test
in which we tested these explanations as
(p < .05).
predictors of nonpayment. For example, in
withinone
significant
also
was
There
subjects effect, a significant effect for the one model we used composite scores for the
type of sanction, F(4, 100) = 2.92, p < .05. understanding of economic sanctions, the
Restitution (M = 2.72) was judged to be perceived fairness of the amounts of economic sanctions, the perceived fairness of
the most fair economic sanction, followed
the procedure used to determine economic
5 Incarceration could have contradictory effects. sanctions, the composite score for Justice
On the one hand, incarceration indicates that the as a goal for sentencing, and the offender's
offender had probably committed a more serious income to predict whether or not the offendcrime, had a longer prior record, or both. On the
er had ever missed a payment. None of the
other hand, incarceration likely means that the
offender would have more difficulty paying the measures of motivation to pay was signifieconomic sanctions.
cantly related to payment, and the only signil icant predictor of missing a payment was
household income.
Discussion
W! hypothesized that offenders pay only
syr all percentages of their ordered economic
sanctions both because they are unable to
pap and because they are not motivated
to do so. This survey of offenders found
some support for all four reasons that we
investigated.
Inability to Pay
Alkhough there was support for all three
reasons pertaining to motivation to pay, the
strongest explanation related to inability to
pay. Our multivariate analyses of an objective indicator of nonpayment (having to
miss payments) revealed that our indicators
of motivation to pay were not significantly
related to missing a payment, whereas indical:ors of ability to pay (e.g., total economic
sanctions owed, total monthly payments)
were significant indicators.
Motivation to Pay
We found some support for all three rationales related to offenders' motivation to pay.
First, there was strong evidence that offender, did not understand how fines, fees, and
co,3ts were imposed. Although offenders,
and particularly property offenders, said
they understood how restitution decisions
were imposed, the absolute number (a mean
of 4 on a 7-point scale) was in fact not
very high. Second, there was evidence that
ofienders did not agree with the rationale
foa economic sanctions. Our results indicaled that the offenders did not rate any of
the goals of punishment very highly. Third,
there was evidence that offenders did not
pe,ceive the amounts of the economic sanctions or the procedures used to determine
them to be very fair.
Alternative Explanation for
N onpayment
A rationale for nonpayment that we did not
investigate is that there are no perceived
pe aalties for nonpayment. Many probationern do not comply with their court-ordered
coaditions, and there are often no sanctions
for failing to comply (Langan, 1994). For economic sanctions in particular, research sugges;ts that often no punishments are imposed
for non-payment of court-ordered fines
and restitution (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).
December 2006
December 2006
Offenders learn that threats (e.g., meetings,
letters of reprimand, warnings) often have no
repercussions, and probation revocation for
failure to pay is unlikely (Wheeler, Hissong,
Slusher, & Macan, 1990). Nonpayment of
restitution is rarely the basis for revocation of
probation (Lurigio & Davis, 1990).
A study of probationers in Illinois illustrates these points (Allen & Treger, 1994).
The survey results suggested that offenders
start out believing that payment is required,
but that over time they learned this was not
true. About half of the offenders believed
their probation officer would report nonpayment to the court but would not recommend
incarceration. About a quarter believed their
probation officer expected them only to
make a good faith effort at making full payment, and more than a tenth believed their
probation officer did not expect them to
make full payment. In fact, as Petersilia and
Deschenes (1994) found, criminal justice
personnel often do not expect offenders to
make full payment.
However, in our study, we did not find
any support for this idea. In fact, openended responses to a question about whether
paying economic sanctions interferes with
offenders being able to complete probation or parole successfully indicated that
our respondents did fear repercussions for
nonpayment. Open-ended responses to this
question were coded (83 percent agreement;
kappa = .78), and the most common response
of the individuals who answered the question
(14/52 = 27 percent) was that failure to make
the payments meant that they could not
complete probation/parole. An additional 6
individuals (12 percent) said that failure to
pay resulted in going to jail.
A possible reason why we found that
offenders feared the repercussions of nonpayment is that our respondents were a selfselected sample of individuals who could
be reached by mail, who were not in prison,
and who were probably more likely to be in
compliance than those who did not respond.
The high rate of non-delivered questionnaires two years after conviction (17 percent)
suggests that our initial pool of individuals
was highly transient. Those individuals who
responded not only were probably less transient (and therefore probably had more ties
to the community) but also were likely more
concerned about earning money.
PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 31
PERCEPTION AND PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 31
Implications
One of our key findings was that, with
the possible exception of restitution, most
offenders did not understand how the
amounts they owed were determined. Nor
did they understand where the money they
paid went. The problem is probably even
more severe when offenders owe multiple
amounts for multiple cases. Correctional
scholars believe that by making payments
on a regular basis offenders can learn to take
responsibility for their crimes. However,
particularly with regard to restitution, this
belief is premised on the assumption that
offenders know where their payments go.
Thus, future research might investigate how
best to convey this information to offenders
and whether this information gives offenders a better understanding of the penalties,
makes them feel more responsible for their
crimes, and reduces their likelihood of committing a new offense.
Aside from not understanding how sanction amounts were determined, offenders
may also be confused over such logistical
issues as where they are supposed to make
their payments. In some counties, different
types of economic sanctions have to be paid
in different places. It might be that in those
counties, probation is better at monitoring
the economic sanctions collected by them,
versus the ones paid to the clerk of courts
or to someone else. If so, this possibility
may partially explain some prior findings
in Pennsylvania about differences in payment by type of economic sanction, as well
as some of our prior research that found
payment rates were higher when probation
officers were in charge of collection (Ruback,
Shaffer, & Logue, 2004).
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TITLE: Perception and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A
Survey of Offenders
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