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Warfare and Wanton Destruction: A Reexamination of Deuteronomy 20: 19-20 in Relation to Ancient Siegecraft Author(s): Jacob L. Wright Source: Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 127, No. 3 (Fall, 2008), pp. 423-458 Published by: The Society of Biblical Literature Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25610132 Accessed: 23-04-2017 11:54 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25610132?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms The Society of Biblical Literature is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Biblical Literature This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms JBL 127, no. 3 (2008): 423-458 Warfare and Wanton Destruction: A Reexamination of Deuteronomy 20:19-20 in Relation to Ancient Siegecraft JACOB L. WRIGHT wrightjacob@hotmail.com Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 To Michael Walzer, with admiration In January 1865, Henry Halleck, chief of staff in Washington, D.C., wrote to Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in Savannah, Georgia: "Should you capture Charleston, I hope by some accident the place may be destroyed, and if a little salt should be sown upon its site it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullifica tion and secession." In response Sherman wrote: "I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston but don't think salt will be necessary. [. . .] The truth is the whole army is burning with insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate."1 The horrific devastation of a city and its surrounding territory planned in this Civil War correspondence is an atrocity common to the history of warfare. For ethi cists and jurists, these strategies of urbicide (wiping out a city's architectural memory) and ecocide (ravaging an environment) concern ius in hello,2 and by This article is based on a lecture at Emory University on November 13, 2006, and was pro duced in the process of writing my forthcoming book, War and the Formation of Society in Ancient Israel (Oxford University Press). 1 See E. Milby Burton, The Siege of Charleston 1861-1865 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 312-13. 2 For the term "urbicide," see Robert Bevan, The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War 423 This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 424 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) proscribing the destruction of fruit trees in siege situations, Deut 20:19-20 has made a historic contribution to this area of Just War theory and Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). In what follows I examine the Deuteronomic prohibition in the setting of ancient siege warfare. In particular I challenge some current interpreta tions according to which the law constitutes a polemic against, or subversion of, foreign imperial ideology. After situating the practice forbidden by Deuteronomy in the larger context of military tactics in ancient Western Asia and the eastern Mediterranean, I attempt to show that the law emerged from an intrasocietal dis course on acceptable military conduct rather than an intersocietal response to the warfare of other nations. We begin by looking briefly at the reception of the law in modern jurisprudence. I. Hugo Grotius, and Neo-Assyrian Siege Techniques More than two hundred years before the American Civil War, the Dutch jurist, philosopher, dramatist, poet, and Christian apologist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) published De iure belli ac pacts, a three-volume treatise that stands as a formidable monument in the history of international law.3 One particularly influential chap ter of this work exhorts military leaders to display Temperamentum circa vasta tionem et similia.4 Appealing to the universal authority of ius naturae,5 its pages quote a wide range of Greco-Roman authors, demonstrating the frequency with which they condemn the wanton destruction of lands and cities. But it also draws heavily on Jewish authors such as Philo and Josephus, as well as medieval com mentators, who censure the gratuitous wasting of property.6 For Grotius, the views (London: Reaktion, 2007), and for "ecocide," see Aaron Schwabach, "Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs and Environmental Damage in Non-International Con flicts," Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy 15 (2003/2004): 1-38. 3 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck: From the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac (3 vols.; Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005; first pub lished in 1625). Many legal historians regard this Dutch thinker as the most important figure in the history of international law; see, e.g., Hersh [Hersch] Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law," British Year Book of International Law 23 (1946): 1-53. For an overview of Grotian scholarship since Lauterpacht, see Renee Jeffery, "Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Chal lenge and 'Grotian Tradition in 20th-century International Relations," European Journal of Inter national Relations 12 (2006): 223-50. 4 "Concerning Moderation in regard to the spoiling the Country of our Enemies, and such other Things," the title of ch. 12, book 3. 5 For Grotius, ius humanum consisted of ius naturae, ius civile, and iusgentium (naturale, vol untarium); see Rights of War and Peace, 1:150-62, as well as N. Konegen, "Zum Staatsverst?ndnis von Hugo Grotius," Institut f?r Staatswissenschaften 7 (1998): 6-30; and Knud Haakonssen, "Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought," Political Theory 13 (1985): 239-65. 6 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, 3:1459-62. Grotius maintained a lively correspondence This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 425 of this group are imbued with greater authority since they descend directly from "the Law" (i.e., the Torah). The specific biblical passage to which these writers appeal is the Deuteronomic prohibition of destroying fruit trees when one besieges a city, known in Jewish tradition as rpntt>n bl/tib: When in your war against a city you have to besiege it a long time in order to capture it, you must not destroy its trees, wielding the ax against them. You may eat of them, but you must not cut them down. Are trees of the field human to withdraw before you into the besieged city? Only trees that you know do not yield food may be destroyed; you may cut them down for constructing siege works against the city that is waging war on you, until it has been reduced. (Deut 20:19-20 according to TNK) On the basis of this scriptural text Grotius admonishes his readers: For if the Creator and supreme LORD of Mankind did not approve, that the Israelites should lay waste without Necessity the Lands of the People, against whom he had armed them in an extraordinary Manner, and had made them as it were the Executors of his terrible Judgments; much more would he not approve our doing so in ordinary Wars, often unjust, and undertaken without much Necessity, and wherein the Party who boasts the most of the Justice of his Cause, is sometimes in the wrong.7 The principles of "proportionality" and "necessity" that Grotius elaborates here, as well as the norms defended throughout the chapter, had a deep impact on Just War theory as well as LOAC that proscribe the ruination of civilian infrastructures.8 In order to measure their influence, one can compare Grotius s arguments to the word ing of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the Nuremberg Principles, or the United Nations Charter.9 On November 5,2006, the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal con victed Saddam Hussein of crimes against humanity on the basis of a special statute informed by these and other international conventions.10 One of the five charges brought against Hussein was significantly the destruction in Dujail of250,000 acres of fruit trees?precisely the sort of vegetation that the biblical law sought to protect. with Menasseh ben Israel, and, although often struggling and confused, he read with lively inter est medieval Jewish commentators in Hebrew. See Phyllis S. Lachs, "Hugo Grotius Use of Jewish Sources in On the Law of War and Peace" Renaissance Quarterly 30 (1977): 181-200. 7 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, 3:1459 (italics in original). 8 It was primarily through Grotius that Deut 20:19-20 had its significant impact on mod ern jurists. De Indis de jure belli by Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) refers often to Deuteronomy 20, but never to w. 19-20. 9 Other chapters also had an impact on these conventions. See Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris: Presses universit?res de France, 1983). 10 These include the Iraqi Law Number 7 of 1958, the Iraqi Criminal Code Number 111 of 1969, Iraqi Law Number 10 of 2005, the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal from 2003, as well as articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 426 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) By way of De iure belli ac pacts one can thus trace a line of continuity from con temporary international jurisprudence to the Deuteronomic prohibition.11 With respect to this law in Deuteronomy, many scholars claim that the authors of the code framed the law as a direct response to Neo-Assyrian military tactics. The view is not new. Supporting the opinion of Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752 1827), August Dillmann wrote in 1886 that the war laws in Deuteronomy 20 aim to hinder "the wild barbarism and brutality with which many ancient peoples, espe cially the Assyrians, fought wars," and to affirm the "the higher moral spirit of Yahwism, namely, the basic principles of leniency and clemency."12 In recent years this view has won more adherents.13 Thus Eckart Otto avers with respect to w. 19 20: "One could not formulate a more explicit protest against Assyrian warfare, 11 It is important to note that the censure of wanton destruction has a long tradition in Iraq. The official gazette of Iraq, Al-W?qaV al-Tr?qitya, in which the Statute of Iraqi Special Tribunal from 2003 was published, has on its front cover an image of Hammurabi's Laws, which in ?59.4-9 specifies heavy punishments for the destruction of property?in particular fruit trees (date palms). In addition to earlier witnesses to this legal tradition (see, e.g., Jerrold S. Cooper, Sumerian and Akkadian Royal Inscriptions, vol. 1, Presargonic Inscriptions [New Haven: American Oriental Soci ety, 1986] 71-72, cols, and x), the Quran enjoins Muslims to abstain from harming trees in a jihad; see . I. H. Farooqi, Plants of the Quran (Lucknwo: Sidrah, 1992), 25; Al-Hafiz B. A. Masri, "Islam and Ecology," in Islam and Ecology (ed. Fazlum Khalid and Joanne O'Brien; New York: Cassel, 1992), 13. Some Muslim armies were accompanied by a special officer whose duties included ensuring that the soldiers abstained from burning trees. In modern Iraq, orchards (owned most often by the local elite) surround cities and villages, and the situation does not seem to have been much different in ancient Babylonia. I thank Nili Wazana for the inspiration to research Husseins trial in this context. 12 August Dillmann, Numeri, Deuteronomium und Josua (2nd ed.; EHAT; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1886), 334-35 (my translation of"... wilde Rohheit u. Grausamkeit, mit welcher von manchen alten V?lkern, zumal den Assyrern, die Kriege gef?hrt wurden" and "den h?heren sittlichen Geist des Jahvethums, nam. die Grunds?tze der Milde u. Schonung"). Unfortunately I could not locate the passage from Eichhorn to which Dillmann refers. 13 See, inter alia, George Adam Smith, The Book of Deuteronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1918), 249; Walther Eichrodt, Theologie des Alten Testaments (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1933), 64; Gottfried Seitz, Redaktionsgeschichtliche Studien zum Deuteronomium (BWANT 13; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971), 159; Horst Dietrich Preuss, Deuteronomium (EdF 164; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1982), 120; Joseph Blenkinsopp, "Deuteronomy" in The Jerome Biblical Commentary (ed. Raymond E. Brown et al.; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968), 101-22, here 114; Mark W Hamilton, "The Past as Destiny: Historical Visions in Sam3al and Judah under Assyrian Hegemony," HTR 91 (1998): 215-50, here 237; and Jeffrey Stackert, "Rewriting the Torah: Literary Revision in Deuteronomy and the Holiness Legislation" (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2006), 175-79, 185. Many appeal to both Assyrian and biblical sources; see, e.g., Samuel R. Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy (3rd ed.; ICC; Edin burgh: T&T Clark, 1951), 236; Karl Kr?mer, Numeri und Deuteronomium (Heilige Schrift f?r das Leben II/1; Freiburg: Herder, 1955); Fritz Stolz, Jahwes und Israels Kriege (ATANT 60; Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972), 27-28; and Israel Eph'al, "The Assyrian Ramp at Lachish: Military and Lexical Aspects" (in Hebrew), Zion 49 (1984): 343 . 28. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 427 which is reflected in their royal inscriptions and palace reliefs."14 In a finely nuanced essay, Nili Wazana argues similarly to Otto, treating this law as a polemic retort that "sheds light on the way subjugated peoples countered ideological pressure dur ing their contacts with the worlds first empire."15 Parallels between the law and Assyrian sources have even been cited as external evidence for dating the compo sition of Deuteronomy, and this in turn prompted a book-length response by Michael G. Hasel.16 Now if it is warranted to claim that the Deuteronomic law originated as a protest against Neo-Assyrian imperial ideology, and if the law, by way of Grotius s influential treatise, directly informs our modern war conventions that condemn wanton destruction, then the line of continuity traced above would extend from these conventions back to anti-Assyrian imperial polemics! Although this bold thesis may have a certain appeal in a scholarly context gov erned by postcolonial discourse, it proves upon closer inspection to be untenable. The weak link in the chain of reception history is not the one that connects Deuter onomy 20 to Grotius or Grotius to modern war conventions, but rather the attempt to interpret the ancient law as a polemic against "the empire." In what follows I endeavor to demonstrate that this approach fails to account adequately for both the Deuteronomic text and the Neo-Assyrian sources. I begin by treating the Deuteronomic law in the broader context of ancient military practices. II. Intentional and Incidental Destruction in War For both ancient and modern warfare, one can distinguish two general ways of jeopardizing civilian infrastructures, or to use a more felicitous term, Life Sup 14 "Deutlicher kann man seinen Protest gegen assyrische Kriegspraxis, die sich in neu assyrischen K?nigsinschriften und Palastreliefs niedergeschlagen hat, nicht zum Ausdruck bringen." See Eckart Otto, Krieg und Frieden in der Hebr?ischen Bible und im Alten Orient (Theologie und Frieden 18; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1999), 100. 15 Nili Wazana, "Are the Trees of the Field Human? A Biblical War Law (Deut. 20:19-20) and Neo-Assyrian Propaganda," in Treasures on Camels' Humps: Historical and Literary Studies from the Ancient Near East Presented to Israel Ephal (ed. Mordechai Cogan and Dan3el Kahn; Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2008), 275-95, here 295. 16 Michael G. Hasel, Military Practice and Polemic: Israels Laws of Warfare in Near Eastern Perspective (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2005). Hasel's argument is based on what I regard as a misunderstanding, namely, that the authors of Deut 20:19-20 were primarily opposed to the use of fruit trees to build siege works. Hasel finds evidence of this practice in one text (the account of the siege of Megiddo by Thutmosis III) and concludes that the law represents a polemic against military practices from the mid-second millennium. I have reviewed his argu ment elsewhere (see RBL [http://www.bookreviews.org ] and JBL 124 [2005]: 755-58) and thus will not focus on it here. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 428 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) port Systems (LSS).17 The first is incidental or unintentional destruction.18 In ancient western Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, populations were especially hard hit from this side of military conflicts. During lengthy periods of armed con flict, farmers could not attend to the daily chores of plowing and planting, nursing the vineyards and olive orchards, or repairing terraces that facilitate agriculture in hilly terrain.19 This is a case of winning the battle yet losing the war insofar as the population, prohibited from duties of husbandry, faced severe economic depres sion, if not famine, long after the enemy had desisted from its assault. An illustration of this phenomenon is provided by the corpus of seventy-one letters from Rib-Adda that were found among the Amarna archives (fourteenth century b.c.e.).20 In one of the letters from this corpus, Rib-Adda writes to the king of Egypt complaining that he was beleaguered, trapped in his city of Byblos "like a bird in a cage" (EA 79, 90 et al.). Because of the enemy at his doorstep, planting was impossible: "For lack of cultivation my field is like a woman without a hus band" (EA 74, 75, 81).21 This in turn had catastrophic consequences. Rib-Addas people had sold not only their household objects but also their children for provi sions (ibid.). The escalation of hostilities made fieldwork impossible, and the threat of starvation during the winter led to a depopulation of the region. Even if the inhabitants of Byblos could hold out against their besiegers, famine was inevitable and would continue to inflict losses for many months after the siege had been lifted.22 17 LSS are "any natural or human-engineered system that furthers the life of the biosphere in a sustainable fashion. The fundamental attribute of LSS is that together they provide all of the sustainable needs required for continuance of life" (The Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems [EOLSS], Developed under the Auspices of UNESCO [Oxford: EOLSS Publishers, http:// www.eolss.net]; see "Definition of EOLSS"). Although not referring to the EOLSS, Hasel occa sionally uses this term in Military Practice. 18 This category includes "collateral damage," a euphemism used since the Vietnam War for tangential harm caused to civilians and their properly; see USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide (Air Force Pamphlet 14-210: Intelligence, 1998), 179-80. 19 For ancient Israelite agricultural practices, see Oded Borowski, Agriculture in Iron Age Israel (Boston: ASOR, 2002); and D. C. Hopkins, The Highlands of Canaan: Agricultural Life in the Early Iron Age (SWBA 3; Sheffield: Almond, 1985). 20 See Mario Liverani, "Rib-Adda, Righteous Sufferer," in Myth and Politics in Ancient Near Eastern Historiography (ed. Zainab Bahrani and Marc Van de Mieroop; London: Equinox, 2004; orig. publ. in 1974), 97-124; and W. L. Moran, "Rib-Hadda: Job at Byblos?" in Biblical and Related Studies Presented to Samuel Iwry (ed. Ann Kort and Scott N. Morschauser; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1985), 173-81. 21 This line is widely assumed to reformulate a proverb: "A woman without a husband is like a field without a farmer." 22 As William L. Moran observes for the Amarna letters, "Interference in the basis of agrar ian life, flocks and fields, seems to belong to the topos of under siege"' (The Amarna Letters [Bal timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987], 298). One could argue that this is a case of an enemy army intentionally interfering with LSS. The besieging army accordingly meant only to This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 429 A more obscure, yet nevertheless important, example of incidental destruction of LSS is locust plagues. During a time of extended military conflict, fields cannot be plowed. In western Asia this situation allows grasshopper egg pods, deposited by the female in the topsoil, to survive and reach maturity. As a consequence, there is a high chance that the region will face a locust plague in the following year. Such was the case, for example, in Afghanistan after the war in 2002. For ancient west ern Asia, locust plagues after lengthy periods of war are evidenced by various let ters.23 In them we hear of local rulers declaring that their subjects were on the verge of deserting the region because of locust plagues or of soldiers working in special pest management task forces assigned to treat the pests.24 LSS were imperiled not only inadvertently but also when armies consciously selected them as the targets of their aggression. Examples of such wanton destruc tion are depicted throughout the Bible. In Judg 9:45 Abimelech quells a revolt in Shechem by razing the city and sowing it with salt. As with regard to Charleston in the letters quoted above, these ecocidal and urbicidal measures were intended to have both a strategic and a symbolic impact.25 An act that corresponds to the destruction of water utilities by modern armies is reported in 2 Kgs 3:19,25, where the Israelite coalition stops up the wells of the Moabites (see also Gen 26:15, 18). Direct assaults on agricultural subsistence are depicted at least twice in the book of Judges. Every time the Israelites had finished sowing, the Midianites would come up against them to ravage their produce and livestock (Judg 6:3-5).26 Similarly, weaken the power base of the local ruler by prohibiting agricultural activities. Polyaenus 4.6.20 provides an analogy. This motivation for the siege of Byblos cannot be ruled out, and we must assume that the aggressor did whatever it took to get the job done. But from other letters it seems that the besieging army aimed to conquer the city as quickly as possible and was not always aware of?or at least not satisfied with?the economic effects of the armed conflict. 23 See Karen Radner, "Fressen und gefressen werden: Heuschrecken im Alten Orient," WO 34 (2004): 7-22. 24 The book of Joel contains prophecies of an impending war that seem to describe various developmental stages of locusts. See, e.g., John A. Thomson, "Joel's Locusts in the Light of Near Eastern Parallels," JNES 14 (1955): 52-55. 25 Sowing a land with salt-cress or salt was a common punitive measure in ancient western Asia; see, e.g., Sefire I, A, 35-36 (ANET, 660a); A. K. Grayson, Assyrian Rulers of the Third and Sec ond Millennia BC (to 1115 BC) (RIM A 1; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 183, II. 47 53 (Shalmaneser I); A. K. Grayson, Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium BC (2 vols.; RIMA 2,3; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), Prisma 87.1: V:99-VI:22 (Tiglath-pileser I); and Maximilian Streck, Assurbanipal und die letzten assyrischen K?nige bis zum Untergang Nineveh's (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1916), 50-58 126-vi 103; all the latter examples use zar? ("sow"). See also Stanley Gevirtz, "Jericho and Shechem: A Religio-Literary Aspect of City Destruction," VT 13 (1963): 52-62; and Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Claren don, 1972), 109-11. 26 The tactic of demoralizing one's enemies by repeatedly allowing them to plant and then destroying the fields is mentioned also by Frontinus 3.3.1. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 430 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) Samson catches three hundred foxes, ties torches to their tails, and sets them free to burn the Philistines' grain, vineyards, and olive groves (15:4-5). While these sto ries may not be historically reliable, they demonstrate that their authors were well aware of the tactical potential of LSS destruction. A closer analogy to the law in Deuteronomy is found in another letter from Rib-Adda to the Egyptian court (EA 91). Here the Phoenician ruler reports that his enemy had vanquished all his cities and was striving now to take Byblos. While waiting for the city either to capitulate or deliver a large sum of silver and gold as a payoff for terminating the siege, he plundered the city's grain and began to cut down its orchards.27 Deuteronomy 20:19-20 bans the kind of warfare that seems to have been waged against Byblos insofar as it forbids Israelite armies to destroy fruit trees when the city they are besieging has not surrendered after an extended period of time. The law envisions a situation of a protracted siege: "If you besiege a city for many days (D^Xl D^QO ... ."28 Moreover, it refers to gradual tree destruction that occurs before the city capitulates. Taken strictly, the law does not refer to conduct after a siege has been lifted (see v. 20b). Finally, it presupposes that the Israelite armies would be inclined to cut down orchards when besieging a city. In order to understand why an Israelite army or Rib-Adda's antagonist would have felled fruit trees when investing a city, we must take a brief glance at the reper toire of ancient siege tactics. III. The Indirect Approach Before the advent of heavy artillery and explosives, most armies of the first millennium b.c.e. lacked the logistical and tactical expertise required to breach fortifications.29 Because one could not always rely on the efficacy of sonic warfare, 27 The condition of the tablet does not permit certainty. See J. A. Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna Tafeln, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1915), 430-31; as well as R. F. Youngblood, "The Amarna Corre spondence of Rib-Haddi, Prince of Byblos" (Ph.D. diss., Dropsie College, 1961), 351-54. William L. Moran suggests that am-ma-qu-ut may have been contaminated by ammassah in line 16 (The Amarna Letters [Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992], 165). Anson F. Rainey has confirmed Knudtzons reading of line 14, translating it accordingly: "My orchards [and] my [field] s were cut down" (private correspondence from March 19, 2007, based on transcription made on September 22,2003). 28 The protasis is formulated as expected for a situation before the city has been taken; see, e.g., 1 Kgs 20:1 (m orrVi maw bv nm). 29 The biblical record does recount several cases in which the Israelite armies captured cities by direct assault. The most explicit example is 2 Sam 20:15 ( V'?rr? DTTTIWD). This con ventional siege warfare consisted of sapping (undermining), ramming, scaling, and tunneling, This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 431 as in the battle of Jericho,30 it was necessary to devise poliorcetic methods with which an aggressor could either penetrate the city by subterfuge or entice its inhab itants to come forth.31 Modern military science refers to this type of warfare as "the indirect approach."32 Although large professional armies such as that of the Assyr ians did employ this method, they also had the option of frontal assault, which involved most often the construction of time-consuming siege ramps.33 This con trasts starkly with Assyria's weaker competitors in the southern Levant. Because their armies consisted of mostly conscripted soldiers serving short duties, they relied more heavily on alternatives to frontal assaults. When beginning a siege, one usually attempted to reason with the city. Thus the eighth-century b.c.e. Nubian ruler Piye offered his foes an alternative: "'Look, two ways are before you; choose as you wish. Open [your gates], you live; close, you die. My majesty will not pass by a closed town!' Then they opened immediately. which in the first millennium were practiced most effectively by the Assyrians; see the exemplary work of Israel Ephal, Siege and Its Ancient Near Eastern Manifestations (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1996), as well as Erika Bleibtreu, "Five Ways to Conquer a City," BARev 17 (May/June 1991): 52-61, 75; A. Mierzejewski, "La technique de siege assyrienne aux IX-VII siecles avant notre ere," Etudes et Travaux 7 (1973): 11-20; Walter Mayer, Politik und Kriegskunst der Assyrer (ALASP 9; M?nster: Ugarit, 1995), 470-74. 30 Although the term is used here tongue-in-cheek, sonic and ultrasonic warfare (USW), which employs sound-pressure and -power, represents a heavily researched area in modern mil itary technology and is already employed by many armies in both their lethal and nonlethal arse nals. Additional biblical examples are found in Judg 7:18-22; 2 Chr 13:15; 20:21-23. 31 The book of Proverbs refers several times to battle tactics (see 11:14; 20:18; 21:22; 24:6; as well Jer 49:20, 30), and military officers in ancient Israel would likely have undergone formal training in siegecraft. See Abraham Malamat, "Israelite Conduct of War in the Conquest of Canaan," in Symposia Celebrating the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the American Schools of Oriental Research (1900-1975) (ed. Frank Moore Cross; Zion Research Foundation Occasional Publications; Cambridge, MA: ASOR 1979), 35-55, here 44-45. Because military knowledge is famously well transmitted through time and space, the Strategemata of Frontinus and Polyaenus may provide insights into siege tactics employed earlier in western Asia. See Ephal, Siege; as well as idem, "Ways and Means to Conquer a City," in Assyria 1995: Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Symposium of the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, Helsinki, September 7-11, 1995 (ed. Simo Parpola and Robert M. Whiting; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1997), 49-53. Ephal refers to I. Starr, Queries to the Sungod: Divination and Politics in Sargonid Assyria (SAA 4; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1990), which provides catalogues of stratagems. 32 The concept was introduced by Basil Liddell Hart after World War I; see The Decisive Wars of History (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1929). Malamat draws on this concept for a quite dif ferent purpose: to explain the success of the Israelite armies in the conquest of Canaan ("Israelite Conduct of War, 44-47; see also idem, "How Inferior Israelite Forces Conquered Fortified Canaan ite Cities," BARev 8 [1982]: 24-35). 33For an illustrative example, see Israel Ephal, "The Assyrian Siege Ramp at Lachish: Military and Lexical Aspects," Tel Aviv 11 (1984): 60-70. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 432 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) His majesty entered the town" (line 82).34 Significantly, Deuteronomy 20 com mands Israel to begin a siege with an offer of peace.35 When a city spurned the offer, it often paid a dear price when it was finally conquered. Thus, 2 Kgs 15:16 reports that Menahem attacked the region sur rounding Tiphsah (or Tappuah) and "ripped open all its pregnant women" because it did not "open" to him. The harsh treatment epitomized by this expression would have served to encourage other cities to choose the path of peace, rendering future sieges unnecessary.36 This tactic of psychological warfare seems to have been employed widely.37 A favorite siege tactic in war legends is the ruse. In addition to the popular tale of the Trojan horse,38 an older and less familiar Egyptian account tells how Thoth, a general of Thut-mose III, captured Joppa by hiding armed warriors in two hun dred large baskets that another three hundred soldiers carried into the Canaanite city, claiming they contained gifts for the governor.39 While we cannot be sure what is intended, ruses are also mentioned often in the "Queries" from Sargonid Assyria 40 Schemes and ambuscades are also popular motifs in biblical siege stories. Battles involving feigned retreats, decoys, diversionary maneuvers and "liers in wait" ( ) are depicted in the conquest stories of Ai (Joshua 8), Shechem (Judg 34 Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings (3 vols.; 2nd ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 3:74. See Pnina Galpaz-Feller, "The Victory Stela of King Piye: The Biblical Perspective on War and Peace," RB 100 (1993): 399-414. His words may be compared to Jer 38:17-18 (see A. Niccacci, "Egitto e Bibbia: Sulla base della stele di Piankhi," LASBF 32 [1982]: 7-58, here 28); Deut 20:11; 30:15-20; 2 Kgs 18:19-35/Isa 36:4-20. That the Assyrians also negotiated with cities is well documented: In addition to 2 Kings 18, the omen lit erature refers often to the possibility of taking a city through "kind words" and peaceful negotia tions. See Starr, Queries, texts 30, 43, 44, 101, 209, 267 as well as Eph'al, Siege, 27. See also A. L. Oppenheim, "'Siege-Documents' from Nippur," Iraq 17 (1955): 69-89; Grant Frame, "A Siege Doc ument from Babylon Dating to 649 B.C.," ICS 51 (1999): 101-6. 35 An alternative to offers of peace as means for enticing the enemy out onto the battlefield is vilification; see 1 Kgs 20:9-12 and (generally in battle) J. J. Gl?ck, "Reviling and Monomachy as Battle-Preludes in Ancient Warfare," Acta Classica 7 (1964): 25-31; and W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War (5 vols.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 2:153-55; Starr, Queries, texts 29, 43,44, 102. 36 For the possibility that the expression is a hyperbolic trope, see Mordechai Cogan, '"Rip ping Open Pregnant Women in Light of an Assyrian Analogue," JAOS 103 (1983): 755-57; and Nadav Naaman, "The Deuteronomist and Voluntary Servitude to Foreign Powers," JSOT 65 (1995): 37-53. 37 See the classic statements by H. W F. Saggs, "Assyrian Warfare in the Sargonid Period," Iraq 25 (1963): 149-50, as well as the discussion below. 38 See the and Odyssey 8.487-520. 39 For the story of Thoth, see ANET, 22b-23b. Hans Goedicke shows the connections between this trick, reminiscent of Ali Baba, and the tale of the Trojan horse ("The Capture of Joppa," ChrEg43 [1968]: 219-21). 40 See Starr, Queries, texts for nikiltu in the glossary. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 433 9:25, 30-45), Gibeah (Judg 20:29-48), the city of the Amalekites (1 Sam 15:5), and Samaria (2 Kgs 7:12). In the story of the conquest of Bethel (Judg 1:24-25), spies from the tribe of Joseph make a pact with an informant in order to learn of a secret ingress into the city.41 Although not mentioning any treachery, the legend of Davids conquest of Jerusalem seems to allude to the penetration of the city via its water shaft (2 Sam 5:8). A water source was not just a vulnerable point of entry; it could also be blocked in order to force a city's residents to surrender. In preparation for the onslaught of the enemy, Nahum enjoins the Ninevites not only to strengthen their forts but also to "draw water for the siege" (3:14). Without a source from which they could be replenished, reservoirs were ultimately insufficient. Thus, the Rab shakeh, standing next to one of Jerusalem's water sources, refers to the people sit ting on the wall as those who are doomed "to drink their own urine" (2 Kgs 18:27). The tactic of cutting off the municipal water supply was, however, not always practicable, since wartime experiences could be counted on to make an impact on urban planning. Hezekiah is said to have created a conduit to direct the waters of the Gihon into Jerusalem (2 Kgs 20:20; 2 Chr 32:30; see also Isa 22:9-11), presum ably in preparation for Sennacherib's campaign. Many Iron Age Ha cities in the Levant invested their resources in ensuring that the municipal water sources were located within the city walls or at least well protected, making feats like that of David's army ideal material for the heroic tradition.42 The strategic defense of waterworks stimulated the creativity of tacticians. Thessalos (fifth century b.c.e.) reports that in the "First Sacred War" (595-585 b.c.e.), the amphictyons discov ered the water pipe leading into the city after it was broken by a horse hoof. An asclepiad named Nebros advised the leaders of the alliance to poison the water with hellebore roots. The advice was heeded, and the defenders of the city, who had imbibed the infected water and were seized with obstinate diarrhea, deserted their posts.43 Most armies, however, were not as lucky as the Amphictyonic League. When besieging a city, they thus concentrated their attention on other aspects of a city's 41 This story of a loyal insider resembles the Rahab account in Joshua 2 and 7. 42 See Ronny Reich, "The Excavations at the Gihon Spring and Warrens Shaft System in the City of David," in Ancient Jerusalem Revealed (2nd ed.; ed. Hillel Geva; Jerusalem: Israel Explo ration Society, 2000), 327-39; Norma Franklin, "Relative and Absolute Chronology of Gallery 629 and the Megiddo Water System: A Reassessment," in Megiddo III: The 1992-1996 Seasons (ed. Israel Finkelstein et al.; 2 vols.; Monograph Series 18; Tel Aviv: Institute of Archaeology, 2000), 2:515-23; Ronny Reich, "Notes on the Gezer Water System," PEQ 135 (2003): 22-29; Shlomo Bunimovitz, "The Final Destruction of Beth Shemesh and the pax Assyriaca' in the Jordan She phelah," TA 30 (2003): 3-26; and finally Zecharia Kallai, "Note on J. A. Emerton: Lines 25-6 of the Moabite Stone and a Recently-Discovered Inscription," VT56 (2006): 552-53. 43 See also Pausanias (Descr. 10.37.5), Frontinus (Str. 3.2.11) and Polyaenus (Str. I), as well as the discussion in A. Mayor, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World (Woodstock: Duckworth, 2003), 100-101. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 434 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) LSS, such as the fields and grain reserves. The aforementioned Rib-Adda corre spondence from the Amarna archives describes repeatedly how the enemy had robbed the grain of Byblos in an attempt to force its surrender (see esp. EA 85).44 This tactic too was not always feasible: granaries could be situated within the municipal fortifications, and, because of logistical problems, sieges were difficult to conduct during the harvest season.45 One therefore turned to the most vulnerable target of a city: its fruit trees. IV. Destruction of Fruit Trees in Siege Warfare Fruit trees represented a precious component of LSS in ancient western Asia and the Mediterranean world 46 Not only do they require many years to mature, but they also demand persistent care if they are ever to yield a profitable harvest. A female date palm, for example, does not reach maturity until fourteen to thirty five years of age, and it can bear its calorie-rich, easily preservable fruit for more than a century.47 Olive trees, which can live considerably longer than date palms,48 need seven years to bear edible fruit and reach maturity after fifteen to twenty years In contrast, grapevines require only two years to reach maturity. This shorter time span and their relative lack of nutrients rendered them less valuable and thus less a target of aggression in times of a protracted siege, which may explain why they are not mentioned in our law from Deuteronomy 49 The felling of two grown olive trees meant the permanent loss of 1.5 to 2.2 kilograms of olive oil per year, and this 44 Since arable soil was also valuable, it too became a target of hostility. One could cause lasting damage to it by sowing salt or salt-cress. This punitive measure seems, however, to have been a ritual action performed primarily against inhabited municipal areas and after conquests, not during a siege. See the literature cited in n. 24 above. 45 Because soldiers had to tend their own crops, sieges during the harvest season were rare and confined by and large to professional armies. Ephal discusses fortuitous times for sieges; see Siege, 61-63. 46 The role of fruit trees in ancient LSS is easiest to assess by a perusal of the various Baby lonian, Akkadian, Assyrian, and Hittite law collections, which treat fruit trees as the most valu able property. 47 See W. H. Barreveld, Date Palm Products (FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 101; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome, 1993). Because of the time they require to reach maturity, date palms belonged to the most valuable property in southern Mesopotamia. The penalty for harming a neighbors date palm was one mina of silver or a male boy; see, e.g., Georges Contenau, Contrats -Babyloniens I: De Tiglath-phalasar III ? Nabonide (Musee du Louvre, Textes Cuneiformes 12; Paris: Geuthner, 1927), 89. 48 An olive tree in Bar, Montenegro, is over two thousand years old, and one-thousand year-old trees throughout the Mediterranean are not unusual. 49 Halakic tradition, however, requires that one allow a vine to mature for four years before harvesting its grapes. As prestige objects, vineyards were nevertheless targets of enemy aggression (see, e.g., Judg 15:4-5; Jer 12:10; Joel 1). This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and. Wanton Destruction 435 oil, in contrast to wine, represents a critical component of the diet in western Asia and Mediterranean lands.50 Equally high in caloric value are figs, producing fifteen million kilocalories per hectare, as compared to 1.3 to 2 million for wheat or wheat polycropped with olives.51 Fruit orchards and gardens were also prestige objects and symbols of dominion. In Babylonia the date palm was known as "the tree of wealth."52 Qohelet boasts of his gardens and parks (D^DTlfll mix), in which he planted all kinds of fruit trees ( 2 [2:5]). Although a late text, it accurately mirrors the role of gardens in displays of power and wealth.53 Finally, gardens and orchards often belonged to temples and cultic complexes,54 or were themselves cul tic places.55 For these reasons, fruit trees were prime strategic targets in siege situations. Whereas interference with the water supply and the robbing of grain guaranteed surrender through the immediate physical effect of dehydration and starvation, the practice of gradual fruit tree destruction, as described in Deut 20:19-20 and E A 91, had enduring consequences and was thus more psychological in nature. The 50 See F. R. Riley, "Olive Oil Production on Bronze Age Crete: Nutritional Properties, Pro cessing Methods, and Storage Life of Minoan Olive Oil," Oxford Journal of Archaeology 21 (2002): 63-75; as well as the articles in History and Technology of Olive Oil in the Holy Land (ed. Etan Ayalon; Arlington, VA: Olearius, 1994) and Olive Oil in Antiquity: Israel and Neighboring Coun tries from Neolith to Early Arab Period (ed. Michael Heltzer and David Eitam; Haifa: University of Haifa, 1987). 51 Figs were also the most important wartime food in Attica; see Lin Foxhall, "Farm and Fighting in Ancient Greece," in War and Society in the Greek World (ed. John Rich and Graham Shipley; London: Routledge, 1993), 134-45, here 141. 52 See, e.g., Wilfred G. Lambert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959), 74:56. The best example in the Bible for gardens, vineyards, and orchards as prestige objects is 1 Kings 21. On the Garden of Uzza and the Kings Garden, see F. Stavrakopoulou, "Exploring the Garden of Uzza: Death, Burial and Ideologies of Kingship," Bib 87 (2006): 1-21. 53 A discussion of the evidence cannot be provided here. See Terje Stordalen, Echoes of Eden: Genesis 2-3 and Symbolism of the Eden Garden in Biblical Hebrew Literature (CBET 25; Leuven: Peeters, 2000); Lawrence E. Stager, "Jerusalem and the Garden of Eden," Erlsr 26 (1999): 183-94; R. Bichler and R. R?llinger, "Die H?ngenden G?rten zu Ninive: Die L?sung eines R?tsels?" in Von Sumer bis Homer: Festschrift f?r Manfred Schretter zum 60. Geburtstag am 25. Februar 2004 (ed. Robert R?llinger; AOAT 325; M?nster: Ugarit, 2005), 153-218; Stephanie Dalley, "The Hanging Gardens of Babylon at Nineveh," in Assyrien im Wandel der Zeiten: XXXIXe Rencontre assyriologique internationale, Heidelberg, 6-10 Juli 1992 (ed. Harald Hauptmann and Hartmut Waetzoldt; Heidelberger Studien zum alten Orient 6; Heidelberg: Heidelberger Orientverlag, 1997), 19-24; Bruce Lincoln, "? la recherche du paradis perdu," HR 43 (2003): 139-54. 54 See the literature cited in the preceding footnote. Gardens belonging to cultic centers would not have been the first targets in siege warfare insofar as they were located intramurally. In the Assyrian sources they are destroyed as a part of punitive measures against cities; see below. 55 Ingo Kottsieper "B?ume als Kultort," in Das Kleid der Erde: Pflanzen in der Lebenswelt des Alten Testaments (ed. Ute Neumann-Gorsolke and Peter Riede; Stuttgart: Calwer; Neukirchen Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2002), 169-87. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 436 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) tactic aimed to achieve two related objectives: (1) to elicit a decisive battle on open ground, and (2) to precipitate the city's capitulation.56 Lengthy sieges were extremely costly for the beleaguerer?even more than for the beleaguered. When one was attacked by a stronger opponent, the best strategy was to withdraw to the safety of ones city and simply wait out the impending siege. Against large professional armies with well-organized logistical operations like those of the Assyrians and Babylonians, such a plan was less effective. But against small armies employing many conscripted soldiers who neither were adept at siege craft nor could afford to neglect their farms for any extended time period, this wait ing game was usually won by the besieged.57 For a commander it was thus imperative to provoke a quick and decisive battle in the field so that his levied sol diers could return to their duties back home. Some accounts describe the means with which they seduced the besieged into battle,58 whereas most do not. The grad ual destruction of fruit trees, however, would have been a superb tactic with which one could draw out the inhabitants of a city into the open where they could be trounced in battle.59 The second objective of orchard destruction in a siege situation was to bring about an early surrender. The army would hold the trees "hostage" as if they were human captives, gradually killing them off when demands were not met. In E A 91 the ransom was either a large amount of silver and gold or Byblos itself. Moreover, 56 See Jeffrey . Tigay, Deuteronomy = Devarim: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 190; Israel Ephal, "On Warfare and Military Control in the Ancient Near Eastern Empires," in History, Historiography, and Interpretation: Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Literatures (ed. Hayim Tad mor and Moshe Weinfeld; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1983), 97; and idem, Siege, 54-55. 57 See Sun Tzu's Art of War (fifth century c.e.), which argues at length in ch. 3 that the worst possible strategy is to besiege walled cities. One of the reasons given is time: it would require at least six months to breach the walls (three months for logistical preparations and three months to build siege ramps); a skillful leader therefore subdues the enemy by means of a stratagem. One of the earliest Iron Age instances of a major siege is found at Tell es-Safi/Gath. See Oren Ackermann, Hendrik J. Bruins, and Aren . Maeir, "A Unique Human-Made Trench at Tell es Safi/Gath, Israel: Anthropogenic Impact and Landscape Response," Geoarchaeology 20 (2005): 303-28. 58 See the examples listed above in section III. 59 Such was a conventional practice of early Greek armies. Foxhall writes in regard to the Peloponnesians' technique of crop ravaging: "[T]he aim was to crack the city's unity. The threat perceived by individual households to their own subsistence was the enemy's most powerful weapon" ("Farm and Fighting," 143). See also Yvon Garlan, Recherches de poliocretique grecque (Bibliotheque des Ecoles francaises d'Athenes et de Rome 223; Paris: de Boccard, 1974); as well as J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age ofXenophon (Berkeley: University of Cal ifornia Press, 1970), 47-48; Josiah Ober, Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404-322 B.C. (Mnemosyne 84; Leiden: Brill, 1985), 32-35; and Paul Bentley Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 90-91, 97-98,104. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 437 because fruit trees were both lucrative sources of income and prestige objects, they belonged not only to the local ruler but also to other wealthy landowners.60 A char acteristic feature of siege stories is the struggle between political factions within the city.61 The Rib-Adda correspondence speaks often of how the enemy pressured political actors within Byblos to depose their ruler and join forces with them.62 After describing how his orchards were ravaged, he remarks: "my own men have become hostile to me."63 One way of coercing this power base to stage a putsch would have been to chop down fruit trees until the group cooperated. This tactic of systematically razing orchards may be compared to later evi dence collected by Steven W. Cole.64 When the Muslim armies laid siege to al-Hira in the seventh century c.e., they threatened to destroy their fruit trees before the town surrendered.65 Cole quotes the work of Fred Donner: It was normal procedure for nomads wishing to subject an oasis to resort to a process of psychological warfare; they invested the whole settlement, and then gradually cut down palm trees a few at a time until the residents, watching the destruction of the towns livelihood from the safety of their towers, finally agreed to pay tribute before too much damage was done.66 Early-nineteenth-century accounts refer to similar threats of razing orchards. According to Alois Musil, "If the nomads want to compel the settlers to pay them regular tribute, they encamp before the kasr [stronghold],... light a fire under one of the large fruit trees,. . . threaten to burn and break all their trees and bushes, and in this manner force them to surrender."67 The gradual nature of fruit tree destruction in these accounts corresponds to the situation of a protracted siege depicted in Deut 20:19-20. 60 See, e.g., the schedule of estates with orchards assigned to officials (221) and the survey of large estates sold (222) in F. M. Fales and J. N. Postgate, Imperial Administrative Records, part 2, Provincial and Imperial Administration (SAA 11; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1996). 61 For biblical accounts, see Jeremiah 36-38 (and perhaps Lachish Ostracon 6); 2 Samuel 20; 2 Kings 7; and the insightful observations of Eph'al, Siege, 55-57, 142-47. 62 See the attempted assassination in EA 81 and 138, as well as 69 and 85. On the theme in general, see Liverani, "Rib-Adda," 108-11. 63 See Youngblood, "Rib-Haddi," 352. Liverani translates lines 13-15: "(Abdi-Ashirta) has tried to take Byblos and to cut my gardens down, so that my men have gone away/become hos tile ..." ("Rib-Adda," 109). 64 Steven W. Cole, "The Destruction of Orchards in Assyrian Warfare," in Assyria 1995, ed. Parpola and Whiting, 29-40, here 34-35. 65 Alois Musil, The Middle Euphrates: A Topographical Itinerary (Oriental Explorations and Studies 3; New York: AMS, 1927), 288. 66 Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 30. 67 Musil, Middle Euphrates, 288. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 438 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) V. Destruction of Fruit Trees by Neo-Assyrian Armies While the comparative material cited by Cole assists us in understanding the tactic proscribed by Deuteronomic law, its explanatory value for the evidence for the Neo-Assyrian armies is questionable.68 Cole surveys the references to the cut ting down of fruit trees in Neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions and notes that in many cases we can be sure that the army did not initially succeed in capturing their enemy.69 From this Cole concludes that references to orchard destruction function in the royal narratives as hyperbolic tropes that veil the use of a siege tactic with which the Assyrians forced cities to surrender. This tactic involved gradually raz ing fruit trees in order to achieve the city s capitulation.70 Coles reading of the inscriptions raises questions, and a somewhat different interpretation seems preferable: According to a long literary tradition, the demo lition of lands, fields, and water sources was the epitome of a decisive victory. By devoting more space to demolition in cases where the Assyrian army ultimately failed to capture the enemy ruler, the scribe strives to remove any doubt that the king had achieved his strategic goals. The late Hayim Tadmor isolated this phe nomenon, calling it a "face-saving device." His interpretation is supported by a sub sequent study by Bustenai Oded. Both scholars contend that the apologetic royal inscriptions seek to obscure the king's failure by reporting that he contained the enemy ruler in his city and denuded his entire land.71 Even the trees next to the city walls are uprooted, while the walls themselves serve to imprison (rather than protect) the ruler "like a pig in a sty" or "a bird in a cage."72 Now if, as Cole main 68 Hasels arguments against interpreting Deut 20:19-20 as a response to Neo-Assyrian mil itary practice, while helpful, diverge from my own at critical junctures as a result of his convic tion that the text polemicizes against Egyptian siege warfare. 69 Thus, Shalmaneser III reports that "Marduk-bel-us?te [from Gannan?te], the usurper who was not aware of his own deeds, came out against me to do battle and combat. I defeated him and brought a great slaughter upon him, enclosed him in his own city. I ripped out his harvest, cut down his orchards, damned his river." See Ernst Michel, "Die Assur-Texte Salmanassars III 858-824," WO 4 (1967): 29-37, here 30, iv 3-5. However, Gannan?te appears not to have been con quered until a year later; if so, the narrative would describe an uncompleted siege. 70 Cole, "Destruction of Orchards," 34-36. 71 Hayim Tadmor, The Inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III, King of Assyria (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1994), 79; Bustenai Oded, "Cutting Down Orchards in Assyrian Royal Inscriptions: The Historiographie Aspect," JACiv 12 (1997): 93-98. He refers to the "historiographic code" of the royal inscriptions. See also R. J. van der Spek, "The Struggle of King Sargon II of Assyria against the Chaldean Merodach-Baladan (710-707 B.C.)," JEOL 25 (1977-78): 55-66, here 62. 72 Thus, Tiglath-pileser III claims, "I enclosed Mukin-zeri of Bit-Amukkani in Sapiya, his royal city. I inflicted a heavy defeat upon him before his (city) gates. I cut down the orchards and the sissoo-trees around the city walls, and did not leave a single one. I killed the date-palms This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 439 tains, the Assyrian armies gradually destroyed fruit trees as a coercive siegecraft tactic, and if the readers of the royal inscriptions were familiar with this tactic, then the description of orchard destruction next to city walls would have been ineffec tive as a face-saving device. Cole also offers a questionable reading of the iconographic evidence. He refers to a relief from Sennacherib in Nineveh portraying the siege of Dilbat (fig. 1), tarixSZ - ._*_I_" ^*^ -_ Fig. 1. Destruction of Dilbat s date palms during the despoliation of the city. Archibald Paterson, Assyrian Sculptures: Palace of Sinacherib. Plates and Ground-plan of the Palace (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1915), pi. 13. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 440 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) suggesting that we should read this relief as a narrative from top to bottom. Accord ingly, the soldiers first cut down the date palms and then the city capitulates (the bottom register depicts despoliation). The suggestion poses several problems: Whereas early reliefs (e.g., from the time of Assurnasirpal II) represent pictorial narratives with a set direction in which they are to be read, this was not always the case in the iconography of the Sargonids. Artists attempted to produce panoramas with landscape illusion, perspective, and background. Hence, one cannot assume that a relief from the time of Sennacherib follows a fixed narrative sequence. More over, the top and bottom registers of the relief in question agree insofar as both depict scenes of devastation and demolition. Fighting is not portrayed anywhere, while trees are being felled in both the upper and lower registers.73 Finally, destruc tion of fruit trees after a siege is evidenced elsewhere in Sennacherib's reliefs, such as one showing the defeat of a Babylonian city (fig. 2): In the background we can see the city's inhabitants performing presumably post-conquest rituals while sol diers chop down intramural trees.74 Fig 2. Destruction of date palms during despoliation of a city in southern Mesopotamia. Austen Henry Layard, Nineveh und Babylon nebst Beschreibung seiner Reisen in Armenien, Kurdistan und der W?ste (Leipzig: Dyk, 1856), p. 449, pi. VIILB. throughout his land. I stripped off their fruit and filled the meadows" (Tadmor, Tiglath-pileser HI, 162:23-24). Support for this understanding of orchard destruction as a face-saving device is provided by Summary Inscription I, in which the king claims to have inflicted a great defeat on Sarduri in front of the gates of Turushpa and then to have finally set up a royal image in front of the city (ibid., 125:23-24). 73 The now lost relief underwent heavy damage already in antiquity so that the portrayal of Sennacherib in the middle was missing when it was found. As in other images of Sennacherib, the damage may have been wrought in revenge (in this case by Babylonians during the conquest of Nineveh). 74 See Irene Winter, "Royal Rhetoric and the Development of Historical Narrative in Neo Assyrian Reliefs," Studies in Visual Communication 7 (1981): 2-38. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 441 Surveying the Assyrian reliefs, Hasel points out that in many cases trees are still standing after the city has been captured, while there are no scenes of trees being cut down prior to a conquest. This observation provides a necessary correc tive to Coles interpretation. Nevertheless, it fails to explain a scene from the Central Palace of Tiglath-pileser III in Nimrud (fig. 3) in which a tree has been felled and the trunk of another one can be seen to the right. Hasel claims that the first tree is Fig. 3. Scene portraying a city being stormed and two fallen (date) palms (from the reign of Tiglath pileser III). C. J. Gadd, Stones of Assyria: The Surviving Remains of Assyrian Sculpture, Their Recovery, and Their Original Positions (London: Chatto and Windus, 1936), pi. 12. still standing and attributes its strange angle to the artist s attempt to portray a dif ferent perspective. His reproduction of the relief inexplicably does not include the trunk of the second tree. An alternative interpretation of the scene is thus war ranted.75 At the risk of generalizing, the depictions of destruction and demolition in Assyrian writing serve to emphasize the limitless fury of the king when it comes to 75 Hasel, Military Practice, 67-68, 89-90 . 121. See also Richard D. Barnett and Margarete Falkner, The Sculptures of Assur-banipal II (883-859 BC) Tiglath-pileser III (745-727 BC) Esarhad don (681-669 BQfrom the Central and Southwest Palaces at Nimrud (London: British Museum, 1962), slab 14a/plate XXXI (probably belonging to the same scene as that depicted in fig. 3), which shows fallen date palms under a siege engine. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 442 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) punishing rebels. When he goes to battle against an enemy, the king displays his unfathomable glory and might by destroying everything in his path.76 A city is not just despoiled and burned; its peripheral territory is also thoroughly denuded.77 In keeping with his dual nature, the Assyrian king could "build up" and create life by establishing cities and planting lush, exotic gardens,78 and he could also "tear down" and annihilate life by flattening cities and uprooting orchards.79 In composing pro pagandists texts, scribes drew on any image that could effectively communicate the ideology of the empire.80 In the reliefs, the destruction of trees goes hand in hand with other measures of terror the army employed to vanquish resistance to the empires expansion.81 These measures are presented as the rightful recompense for a vassals rebellious behavior. The ruination of LSS can begin already during an attack on a city, as in fig. 3, yet more often it is executed after the defeat. Enemy lead ers are impaled and flayed; divine images and symbols of power are ceremonially deported; the temple and its gardens are desecrated; the rest of the city is sacked and 76 Thus, Sennacherib claims that "the terrifying radiance of my majesty overwhelmed" his enemy; see, e.g., D. Luckenbill, The Annals of Sennacherib (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), 29:ii 38 and passim; and the studies by A. L. Oppenheim, "Akkadian pul(u)h(t)u and melammu" JAOS 63 (1943): 31-34; and Elena Cassin, La splendeur divine: Introduction a letude de la mentalite mesopotamienne (Civilisations et societes 8; The Hague: Mouton, 1968). 77 See, e.g., Walter Mayer, "Sargons Feldzug gegen Urartu - 714 v.Chr. Text und ?ber setzung," MDOG 115 (1983): 65-132. 78 See the literature cited above in n. 59. 79 These images, which are already heavily imbued with divine associations, are appropri ated extensively by the biblical authors when describing the dual character of Israels God (see, e.g., the numerous passages in Jeremiah in which a form of WnJ occurs). The clearest point of contact is when the Assyrian army serves as the instrument of divine wrath, as in Isa 10:5-19. In this way the power and ideology of Assyrian imperial rhetoric are subverted by one of its subjects. More over, the destruction of an enemy is likened, as in Assyrian texts, to the destruction of a cedar, oak, or fruit tree in, e.g., Amos 2:9 and Isa 10:33-34. On the Assyrian evidence, see C. Zaccagnini, "An Urartean Royal Inscription in the Report of Sargons Eighth Campaign," in Assyrian Royal Inscrip tions: New Horizons in Literary, Ideological, and Historical Analysis (ed. F. M. Fales; Orientis Antiqui Collectio XVII; Rome: Instituto per L'Oriente, 1981), 259-95, as well as the extensive comments of Wazana, "Trees of the Field." 80 For example, the actions of Tiglath-pileser I are compared to the flood (ab?bu); Liter arische Keilschrifttexte aus Assur (ed. Erich Ebeling; Berlin: Akademie, 1953), 63 r. 14-18. See also Victor Horowitz and Joan G. Westenholz, "LKA 63: A Heroic Poem in Celebration of Tiglath Pileser Is Musru-Qumanu Campaign," JCS 42 (1990): 1-49, here 4 r. 14-18. The correlation between flood and orchard destruction is found also much later in an account of Sargon II recounting the punishment of Aramaens; see Andreas Fuchs, Inschriften Sargons IL aus Khorsabad (G?ttingen: Cuvillier, 1994), 148-49: 288-91. For Ninurtas most prominent weapon, ab?bu, see Amar Annus, The God Ninurta in the Mythology and Royal Ideology of Ancient Mesopotamia (SAA 14; Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, 2002), 122-33. 81 See Steven W. Holloway, Assur Is King! Assur Is King! Religion in the Exercise of Power in the Neo-Assyrian Empire (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 10; Leiden: Brill, 2002). This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 443 burned, the population exiled, and the surrounding orchards chopped down. Everyone passing by the region should shudder in horror, and news of the atroci ties should spread to other lands far and wide. Such is the rationale of Assyrian psychological warfare. Ubi solitudinemfaciunt, pacem appellant ("They devastate an area and call it peace") to borrow Tacitus s description of the Roman imperial army (Agricola 30). These depictions of "shock and awe" warfare do not correspond to the conduct forbidden in Deut 20:19-20. The biblical law, as argued above, censures a practice of cutting down fruit trees when a city has still not capitulated after an extended period, a practice representing the "the indirect approach" discussed above. In con trast, the Assyrian reliefs and inscriptions depict orchard destruction as part of a more comprehensive denudation of a land and in reprisal for previous injuries.82 This practice, in keeping with its nature as recompense levied against impervious peoples or rebellious rulers, aimed simultaneously to have a psychological effect by instilling fear in the hearts of both friend and foe. If the king failed to conquer a city, he would adopt a "scorched earth policy," despoiling, slashing, and burning everything in sight before abandoning the region. By laying waste the LSS, he deprived his enemies of a means of survival, thus rendering them ineffective as a threat to his homeland or the balance of power in the region. It is worth noting that of the numerous depictions of orchard destruction in Assyrian inscriptions and reliefs, none relates to the southern Levant. To the con trary, the Lachish reliefs portray the conquered city surrounded by more than one hundred trees of perhaps five different species, all still standing and laden with fruit.83 Some inscriptions do refer to acts of torture before gates of besieged cities, ostensibly as a method of applying psychological pressure. From this, Israel Ephal suggests that the same would have been done with respect to orchards since the felling of fruit trees is explicitly mentioned in several of these contexts. Neverthe less, the evidence is not clear. For example, Ashurnasirpal claims to have impaled live soldiers on posts before the city of Amedu and then to have fought his way inside the city and cut down its orchards.84 The point of the inscription, however, seems to be that the Assyrian king demonstrated his indisputable superiority over his opponent by entering his royal city and tearing down his gardens. The uncon quered city of Amedu had therefore to admit its de facto defeat. It is thus unwar ranted to surmise that the desolation was gradual and meant to break the defenders 82 See the examples cited in n. 80 above, as well as the comments of Hasel, Military Practice, 81. 83 See Christoph Uehlinger, "Clio in a World of Pictures," in "Like a Bird in a Cage": The Invasion of Sennacherib in 701 BCE (ed. Lester L. Grabbe; JSOTSup 363; London: Sheffield Aca demic Press, 2003), 221-305, esp. 242-43. 84 See Grayson, Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium, 2:220, as well as the similar case of Hazael of Damascus in ibid., 3:48:14-17. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 444 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) resistance slowly.85 The depicted situation does not therefore correspond to Deuteronomy 20.86 One cannot, however, preclude the possibility that the orchard destruction also functioned as a coercive tactic of siegecraft. Although the Assyrians were sec ond to none when it came to conventional siege techniques (sapping, ramming, tunneling, and scaling), such methods cost not only a lot of time but also exorbi tant human and financial resources. Therefore Cole may be correct with respect to actual practice. In order to avoid these expenses, field commanders would have resorted to the destruction of orchards as a way of forcing a city to capitulate. How ever, we face a problem of evidence. Neither inscriptions nor letters, documents, or other non-propagandistic texts?the most reliable sources of information?witness to this practice. Moreover, data from "mass media" witness to a coherent ideology of the Assyrians supremacy.87 If the authors of the Deuteronomic law indeed had the Assyrian practice in view, we would expect them to have responded more explicitly to this ideology, rather than focusing on a method of orchard destruction that was employed as a cost-saving tactic and that was more common to smaller armies. To summarize: Although it is quite likely that the Assyrians, as masters of siegecraft, recognized the potential of orchard destruction as a coercive measure, the available evidence presents them as felling fruit trees only in order to punish rebels. One must therefore exercise caution with respect to the suggestion that the Deuteronomic law originated as a reflex of, or even polemic against, Assyrian mil itary practices. If it were intended as protest against this particular empire, one would expect it to have been formulated in a way that corresponds more closely to the Assyrian methods. In the inscriptions and reliefs, destruction of trees is a puni tive measure and, rather than being isolated, is consistently part of a larger pro gram of destruction and despoliation. One would expect these aspects to be 85 Pace Eph'al, Siege, 50-55. 86The evidence of 2 Kgs 18:31//Isa 36:16 is suggestive. The Assyrian kings statements pos sibly imply that if the besieged Jerusalemites did not depose Hezekiah and open the city gates, then Assyrian soldiers would destroy their vineyards, orchards, and cisterns (see Wazana, "Are the Trees of the Field Human?" 286). Yet this is probably reading too much into the statement. More likely is that the Jerusalemites are simply being offered the alternative between eating their dung and drinking their urine in the city (v. 27), and eating from their own fruit trees and drinking from their own cisterns if they surrender. The same applies to 2 Kgs 19:29. Destruction is clearly threat ened elsewhere (18:25 and 19:11), but it is not implicit in the rhetoric in this verse. Moreover, the destruction referred to elsewhere is to the land in general and is part of a larger program of denudation, in keeping with the royal inscriptions and reliefs. 87 For the use of the expression "mass media" in this context, see Ursula Seidl, "Babyloni sche und assyrische Kultbilder in den Massenmedien des 1. Jahrtausends v.Chr.," in Images as Media: Sources for the Cultural History of the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean (1st Mil lennium BCE) (ed. Christoph Uehlinger; OBO 175; Fribourg: University Press; G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 89-114. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 445 integrated into the law if it were formulated specifically against the Assyrians. As it is, the reader has no reason to think specifically of these northern aggressors. The following sections consider the two sides of this argument in more detail. VI. Reasons for Interpreting Deuteronomy 20:19-20 as an anti-assyrian polemic There are several reasons for the popularity of the view that the law responds specifically to Assyrian military conduct. The first has to do with the trajectory of Deuteronomy research since 1805, when Wilhelm . L. de Wette submitted a dis sertation proposing that the origins of Deuteronomy should be traced to the reign of Josiah.88 Although most scholars today insist that the law code contains older and later material as well, they also insist that it must be understood within a geopolit ical context dominated by Assyrian expansion.89 In the second half of the twentieth century, two streams of research began to converge in Deuteronomy studies. On the one hand, works appeared arguing against the dependence of Deuteronomy on second-millennium Hittite treaties, and, on the other, these studies increasingly emphasized themes such as imperial ism, ideology, and propaganda. The discovery of Esarhaddons vassal treaties in 1955 prompted research that endeavored to show a genetic link between this doc umentary form and Deuteronomy (esp. chs. 13 and 28).90 Simultaneously, it 88 Wilhelm . L. de Wette, Dissertatio critico-exegetica qua Deuteronomium... (Jena: Literis Etzdorfii, 1805). The view was anticipated by Jerome; see Louis Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews (7 vols.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1946), 6:377 n. 116. 89 These claims have not gone uncontested; see, e.g., Reinhard G. Kratz, Die Komposition der erz?hlenden B?cher des Alten Testaments (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 137-38. 90 William L. Moran, "The Ancient Near Eastern Background of the Love of God in Deuter onomy," CBQ 25 (1963): 77-87; Dennis J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant: A Study in Form in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testament (AnBib 21; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1963); Moshe Weinfeld, "Traces of Assyrian Treaty Formulae in Deuteronomy," Bib 46 (1965): 417-27; and R. Frankena, "The Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon and the Dating of Deuteronomy," OtSt 14 (1965): 123-54. For more recent works, see Paul-Eugene Dion, "Deuteronomy 13: The Suppres sion of Alien Religious Propaganda in Israel during the Late Monarchical Era," in Law and Ideol ogy in Monarchic Israel (ed. Baruch Halpern and Deborah W. Hobson; JSOTSup 124; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 147-216; Bernard M. Levinson, "'But You Shall Surely Kill Him!': The Text-Critical and Neo-Assyrian Evidence for MT Deut 13:10," in Bundesdokument und Gesetz: Studien zum Deuteronomium (ed. Georg Braulik; Herders Biblische Studien 4; Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 37-63; Hans Ulrich Steymans, "Eine assyrische Vorlage f?r Deuteronomium 28,20-44: Bundesdokument und Gesetz," in Studien zum Deuteronomium, ed. Braulik, 119-41; idem, Deuteronomium 28 und die ade zur Thronfolgeregelung Asarhaddons: Segen und Fluch im Alten Orient und in Israel (OBO 145; Freiburg: Universit?tsverlag, 1995); Eckart Otto, "Treueid and Gesetz: Die Urspr?nge des Deuteronomiums im Horizont neuassyrischen Vertragsrechts," ZABR This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 446 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) sparked renewed interest in the reigns of Manasseh and Josiah and the question of Assyria's imposition of an imperial cult upon its vassals.91 The attention devoted to imperialism was in turn fed by social and political developments of the late 1960s and subsequent years. These changes left their mark on various disciplines in the humanities?not least on Assyriology, which has traditionally had the most direct influence on Deuteronomy research.92 Today interest in the multifaceted Judean responses to Assyria and her imperial successors has grown.93 It should not be sur prising, however, that this lively interest has occasionally aroused an eagerness to discover a subversion of, and protests against, the empire in texts that are innocent of such grand political motives.94 Another reason for the popularity of the view that the law addresses Assyrian military conduct is the profusion of Assyrian witnesses to the practice of denuding lands and felling orchards. What seems to have been overlooked, however, is that 2 (1996): 1-52; idem, Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsform in Juda und Assyrien (BZAW 284; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), esp. 13-56. 91 See J. W. McKay, Religion in Judah under the Assyrians, 732-609 BC (SBT 2/26; London: SCM, 1973); Morton Cogan, Imperialism and Religion: Assyria, Judah and Israel in the Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.CE. (SBLMS 19; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1974); and Hermann Spiecker mann, Juda unter Assur in der Sargonidenzeit (FRLANT 129; G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982). 92 See, e.g., the various papers in Power and Propaganda: A Symposium on Ancient Empires (ed. Mogens Trolle Larsen; Mesopotamia 7; Copenhagen: Akademisk, 1979), esp. 297-317 (Mario Liveranis contribution, "The Ideology of the Assyrian Empire"). 93 For an example of this development in another book, such as Isaiah, see the fine articles by Peter Machinist ("Assyria and Its Image in the First Isaiah," JAOS 103 [1983]: 719-37, and "Mesopotamian Imperialism and Israelite Religion: A Case Study from the Second Isaiah," in Symbiosis, Symbolism, and the Power of the Past [ed. William G. Dever and Seymour Gitin; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003], 237-64) and Moshe Weinfeld ("The Protest against Impe rialism in Ancient Israelite Prophecy," in The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations [ed. S. N. Eisenstadt; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986], 169-82). 94 Several scholars have criticized the attempts to draw a genetic link between Esarhaddon's treaties and Deuteronomy. See, e.g., Timo Veijola, "Wahrheit und Intoleranz nach Deuterono mium 13," ZTK 92 (1995): 287-314; Juha Pakkala, "Der literar- und religionsgeschichtliche Ort von Deuteronomium 13" in Redaktions- und religionsgeschichtliche Perspektiven zur "Deuterono mismus?Diskussion in Tora und Vorderen Propheten (ed. Jan Christian Gertz et al.; BZAW 365; Berlin: de Gruyter; 2006), 125-37; and above all Christoph Kochs comparison of Deuteronomy, Esarhaddon's vassal treaties and the Sefire treaties ("Vertrag, Treueid und Bund: Studien zur Rezeption des altorientalischen Vertragsrechts im Deuteronomium und zur Ausbildung der Bundestheologie im Alten Testament" [Dr. theol. diss., University of Heidelberg, 2006]), which builds on ideas of Hayim Tadmor, "Aramaization of Assyria," in Mesopotamien und seine Nach barn: Politische und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen im alten Vorderasien vom 4. bis 1. Jahrtausend v. Chr.: XXV. Rencontre assyriologique internationale Berlin 3. bis 7. Juli 1978 (ed. Hans-J?rg Nissen and Johannes Renger; 2 vols.; Berliner Beitr?ge zum Vorderen Orient 1; Berlin: Reimer, 1982), 2:449-70. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 447 the destruction of LSS, and specifically trees, is just as widely witnessed for other imperial armies, such as those of the Hittites and New Kingdom Egypt.95 Sources from the Neo-Babylonian empire and Persia contain admittedly far fewer refer ences to the destruction of orchards. The disparity is nevertheless due to the nature of the material. The Assyrian annals, structured according to military campaigns and boasting great feats in battle, can be traced to Hittite precursors. This inscrip tional tradition is, however, foreign to the Babylonian sources. As David Vander hooft suggests, the fact that the Babylonians do not adopt it, preferring instead consciously to archaize their chronicles according to earlier models, may be due to their long-standing antipathy for their northern neighbors.96 Similarly, they do not seem to have produced narrative reliefs depicting sieges and battles.97 This does not mean, as often claimed, that they were less violent or militant than the Assyr ians. To the contrary, archaeological evidence from Ashkelon, for example, sup ports the statements of the Babylonian Chronicle, graphically illustrating the ferocity with which Babylonian armies could achieve their geopolitical aspira tions.98 That also the extramural trees were often targeted for destruction is prob able. If so, it would correspond to Jeremiahs descriptions of Babylon (6:6; 7:20; 22:7; 46:22-23)." A second point seeming to support the interpretation of Deut 20:19-20 as anti- Assyrian polemic is that a particular aspect of the reliefs appears to match the 95 For the Hittites, see Ahmet ?nal, "Untersuchungen zur Terminologie der hethitischen Kriegsf?hrung, Teil 1, 'Verbrennen, in Brand stecken als Kriegstechnik," Or 52 (1983): 164-80; idem, "Studien ?ber das hethitische Kriegswesen, II, Verba Delendi harnink/harganu? Vernichten, zugrunde richten,"' Studi Miceni ed Egeo-Anatolica 24 (1984): 71-85; Sylvia Hutter Braunsar, "Die Terminologie der Zerst?rung eroberten Acker- und Siedlunglandes in hethitischen K?nigsinschriften," in Der orientalische Mensch und seine Beziehungen zur Umwelt (ed. Bern hard R. Scholz; Graz Morgenl?ndische Studien 2; Graz: RM-Druck & Verlag, 1989), 201-18. For New Kingdom Egypt, see Michael G. Hasel, Domination and Resistance: Egyptian Military Activ ity in the Southern Levant 1300-1185 B.C. (Probleme der ?gyptologie 11; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 75-83; idem, "A Textual and Iconographic Note on prt and mnt in Egyptian Military Accounts," G?ttinger Miszellen 168 (1998): 61-72; and idem, Military Practice, 104-13. 96 See David Vanderhooft, The Neo-Babylonian Empire and Babylon in the Latter Prophets (HSM 59; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), 22-23. The Babylonian and Esarhaddon chronicles do not even report that the Assyrians destroyed orchards on their campaigns. 97 For reasons why the Assyrians preferred this medium of art, see Irene Winter, "Art as Evi dence for Interaction: Relations between the Assyrian Empire and North Syria," in Mesopotamien und Seine Nachbarn, ed. Nissen and Renger, 2:355-81. One of the very few extant Babylonian reliefs significantly shows the felling of cedar trees; see F. H. Weissbach, Die Inschriften Nebukad nezars II im Wadi Brisa und am Nahr El-Kelb (WVDOG 5; Leipzig: Biblio-Verlag, 1906). 98 Lawrence E. Stager, "Ashkelon and the Archaeology of Destruction: Kislev 604 BCE," Erlsr 25 (1996): 61-74. 99 The sixteenth-century commentator Moshe Alshich suggests that Jeremiah alludes here to Deut 20:19-20. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 448 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) biblical text. The Assyrian soldiers are always depicted felling trees with axes, a tool to which Deut 20:19 explicitly refers (jru vbv ). This correspondence, however, is less significant than it appears at first. How else could the troops expect to cut down a tree? Saws were not used for this purpose until the eighteenth century c.e. in Europe.100 Not only did burning a tree pose more problems than chopping it down, but also sources from other times and places present armies using this method against their enemies.101 Another reason is the lack of biblical evidence: Whereas the Assyrian sources present orchard destruction in a situation of siege, the biblical accounts do not. This, too, may seem to be a strong argument in favor of the anti-Assyrian inter pretation, yet a closer examination reveals critical flaws. Just as in the case of axes, depictions of tree destruction in siege situations are not confined to Assyrian sources. One must also consider the functional differences between biblical war accounts and royal inscriptions. In stark contrast to the latter, biblical accounts serve a pedagogical purpose for generations long after the wars and events described. Their authors seek to find deeper meaning in this history. In recounting and interpreting the past, they shape the identity of a people, especially in a period during which Israel no longer possessed a king and army of its own. As one would expect from such literature, the most basic information regarding warfare and siegecraft, not to mention military and societal structures, is extremely meager. More often than not, its authors depict only unusual events on the battlefield, emphasizing the roles of priests and prophets in the place of tacticians and com manders. The lack of a direct correspondence to the practice forbidden in Deut 20:19-20 should therefore be no more of a surprise than the absence of accounts describing many of the most routine aspects of daily life in ancient Israel.102 VII. Deuteronomy 20:19-20 as a Product of an intra-societal discourse If the Deuteronomic prohibition does not protest against Assyrian martial conduct, then which empire does it have in view? Is it the Neo-Babylonians, or per 100 See Herbert Killian, "Vom 'Schinderblech' zum Diebswerkzeug: Ein R?ckblick auf die 400j?hrige Geschichte unserer Walds?ge," Centralblatt f?r das Gesamte Forstwesen 97 (1980): 65 101; Peter d'Alroy Jones, Story of the Saw (Manchester: Spear & Jackson, 1961); and Franz Maria Feldhaus, Die S?ge: Ein R?ckblick auf vier Jahrtausende (Berlin: Dominicus, 1921). 101 See, e.g., Hasel, Domination, 75-82. For use of axes by Israelite besiegers, see Judg 9:48-49. 102 This is in response to Hasel's question, "[I]f this practice was so widely employed in Israel as to warrant a polemic response, why do we not find any mention of it in the conquest accounts of Joshua and Judges, or in the wars described in Samuel through the rest of Kings?" (Military Practice, 133). Hasel seems to read these books as if they merely recorded Israelite history. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 449 haps New Kingdom Egypt, as Michael Hasel argues?103 The problem posed by this question is not so much the identity of the perpetrator as the very assumption that the law must condemn the behavior of another people.104 A similar premise seems to be operative in Maimonides' claim that seething a kid in its mothers milk was prohibited because it was "somehow connected to idolatry, forming perhaps part of the service, or being used on some festival of the heathen."105 That even the most mundane practices sanctioned by Deuteronomy betray a foreign cultic-religious provenance is an idea whose origins are in the book itself. Referring to its category of the "indigenous outsiders," Louis Stulman points out how the authors of Deuteronomy create communal identity and provide Israel with a survival strategy by attributing what they proscribe to non-Israelites.106 Both Maimonides and con temporary commentators carry this project a step forward by discovering foreign origins for practices that the book does not designate as non-Israelite and that were likely common to Israel and Judah. The difference between the medieval and mod ern biblical scholar is that the latter, in keeping with the trend of postcolonial stud ies in the humanities, often identifies the target of attack not with the cult of the Canaanites but rather with the propaganda of "the empire."107 Although there are many biblical texts that reflect the ways Israel and Judah responded to the pressure of foreign empires, Deut 20:19-20 is probably not one of them. Rather than an mter-societal polemic, this law, I propose, constitutes a reflex of an mfra-societal exchange on acceptable conduct for Israelite and Judean armies.108 Evidence for this claim is found first in the foregoing laws in Deuteronomy 20. It would be difficult to imagine how the regulations concerning exemptions from 103 See Hasel, Military Practice. 104 Thus Christopher Wright, while dating Deuteronomy earlier, nevertheless assumes that the law "was set up in contrast with practices of Israel's contemporaries" (Deuteronomy [NIB COT; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1996], 230). 105 See Maimonides, Guide to the Perplexed 3:48. Modern studies carrying this approach forward include Othmar Keel, Das B?cklein in der Milch seiner Mutter und Verwandtes: im Lichte eines altorientalischen Bildmotivs (OBO 333; Freiburg: Universit?tsverlag, 1990); and Ernst Axel Knauf, "Zur Herkunft und Sozialgeschichte Israels: 'Das B?cklein in der Milch seiner Mutter,"' Bib 69 (1988): 153-69. For more on the interpretation of this law, see below with n. 121. 106 Louis Stulman, "Encroachment in Deuteronomy: An Analysis of the Social World of the D Code,"/?L 109 (1990): 613-32. 107 The religious character of this propaganda nevertheless continues to be emphasized. 108 Rather than being mutually exclusive, intra-societal norm formation and inter-societal boundary drawing are projects that reinforce each other. Both relate to strategies of survival, and both build identity. But whereas the latter functions to demarcate and protect a people's distinc tiveness, the former strengthens the ethical foundation for its longevity. Thus, ethics is the objec tive of the former, while its formulation is presupposed by and subsumed to the task of the latter. (Contact with other peoples nevertheless necessarily influences and incites intra-societal dis courses.) For a somewhat similar understanding of inter- vs. intra-societal dynamics, see Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity (2nd ed.; London: Sage, 2000). This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 450 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) military service (w. 5-8) or directions for pre-battle negotiations and rules of engagement (w. 9-18) also represent protests against Neo-Assyrian military prac tices. Why, then, should the final paragraph (w. 19-20) be any different? Appar ently recognizing this inconsistency, Eckart Otto argues that the entire chapter indeed constitutes anti-Assyrian polemics. For example, he contends that Israel is required always to offer a city conditions of surrender before assailing it (w. 10-12), whereas the Assyrians did this only rarely.109 Ottos approach is hardly compelling, and it illustrates the dangers of searching too zealously for anti-imperial polemics in every corner of Deuteronomy. There is no need to pit these laws against the Assyrians when practices they condemn were quite common to the ancient world, including Israel and Judah. The Bible itself witnesses to a bellic ethos that is fundamentally opposed to the principles set forth in Deuteronomy.110 For example, when fighting against Shechem, Abimelech fails to offer the city terms of peace. Not only that, he kills the inhabitants indiscriminately, razes the city, and sows it with salt (Judg 9:45). Thereafter he and his soldiers proceed to cut boughs from trees with axes (fflOTlp) and set ablaze the place where survivors had taken refuge (w. 46-49).111 Similarly, in 2 Kings 3 Elisha prophesies divine aid for the Israelite coalition in its campaign against Mesha of Moab: "[YHWH] will also hand over Moab to you. You shall con quer every fortified city and every choice city; every good tree you shall fell, all springs of water you shall stop up, and every gqod piece of land you shall pain with stones" (w. 18-19).112 In telling how the coalition forces do just as Elisha prophe sies, this text represents one of the clearest biblical witnesses to ecocidal and urbi cidal aspects of ancient Israelite warfare. The applicability of the Deuteronomic law to the situation depicted in 2 Kings 3 has been disputed. Michael Hasel and Nili Wazana argue that the law is said to refer specifically to a situation of siege, while 2 Kings 3 describes how an entire land was laid waste.113 Yet if the law forbids the destruction of fruit trees even 109 Otto, Krieg und Frieden, 101-3. Otto argues that the Assyrians most often first applied military pressure and then negotiated. As evidence, he refers to 2 Kings 18-19 and a relief from Sargon II that shows an Assyrian officer reading a scroll while facing the walls of a besieged city (seeYigaelYadin, The Art of Warf are in Biblical Lands [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963],320,425). 110 In contrast to later books, Joshua depicts warfare in keeping with these rules. The erad ication of the Canaanites follows Deut 20:15-18. Joshua 9 plays on the distinction made by these laws between distant peoples and the Seven Nations; see the comments of Michael Fishbane, Bib lical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 206. 111 His actions directly violate not only w. 19-20 but above all w. 10-14. 112 The use of the word "pain" (TNDH1?) to describe the ecocidal actions against the land resembles the use of "kill" ( ) to describe the urbicidal actions against Abel-Beth-Maacah in 2 Sam 20:19. See also D"TNn in Deut 20:19. 113 Hasel, Military Practice; and Wazana, "Are the Trees of the Field Human?" 285-86, 294. One could attempt to harmonize Elishas prophecy with Deuteronomy 20 by arguing that Moab lay beyond the borders of Israel and thus would not come within the purview of the law. Such an This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Wright: Warfare and Wanton Destruction 451 when a surrender was not forthcoming after "many days," then how much more does it preclude beginning a campaign by ruining "every good tree" along with all the LSS (every choice city, fertile field, and water source)?114 The operative juridi cal principle here is a fortiori or bp. That 2 Kings 3 depicts a violation of the law could not be more patent.115 Wazana contends, however, that Deut 20:19-20 is more applicable to the Assyrian sources, since both refer to situations of protracted sieges. Yet reading the story in 2 Kings 3 with its conclusion in view, we can better appreciate why the author emphasizes the demolition of the Moabite lands. After a lengthy siege, the coalition forces had failed to capture the city Kir-hareseth and above all Mesha, who had rebelled against Israelite control (see 3:5 and 1:1). One may compare the narrative to the aforementioned "face-saving device" in the Assyrian royal inscrip tions employed by scribes when the king failed to capture an insurgent ruler. The demolition is highlighted in order to remove all doubt that the imperial army had vanquished and punished the kings enemy. This device parallels a similar conven tion in omen texts. Thus, YOS 10 41:74-75 reads: "the city, which you are going to besiege?you will cut down its (grove of) date palm(s) (then) you will go away (from it)... ."116 As in the Assyrian royal inscriptions, the lack of success in tak ing the city is compensated by the destruction of the orchards, and in this respect approach is taken by Hasel with regard to w. 19-20 ("The Destruction of Trees in the Moabite Campaign of 2 Kings 3:4-27: A Study in the Laws of Warfare" AUSS 40 [2002]: 197-206; and idem, Military Practice, 129-37). The interpretation fails, however, to appreciate the redactional character of w. 15-18, which was cogently demonstrated by Alexander Rofe (Introduction to Deuteronomy [in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Akademon, 1982], 17-28) and has been accepted by most commentators since. Yet even after this insertion it is not at all clear that w. 19-20 pertain only to wars against the Seven Nations. A second argument Hasel offers is that 2 Kings 3 does not refer to fruit trees. But does not "every good tree" include by definition trees that bear fruit? 114 The same point was made already by Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, 1461-63. 115 Since the texts may have originated in much different times and places, this violation emerges only with the placement of the law in its present narrative context. Most commentators, both ancient and modern, agree that the actions of the coalition are in fundamental opposition to the norms in Deuteronomy 20. To account for the contradiction, various solutions are pro posed. See the individual studies of Raymond Westbrook, "Elisha's True Prophecy in 2 Kings 3," JBL 124 (2005): 530-32; Jesse C. Long, Jr., and Mark Sneed, "'Yahweh Has Given These Three Kings into the Hand of Moab': A Socio-Literary Reading of 2 Kings 3," in Inspired Speech: Prophecy in the Ancient Near East: Essays in Honor of Herbert B. Huffmon (ed. John Kaltner and Louis Stul man; JSOTSup 378; London: T&T Clark, 2004), 253-75; Joe M. Sprinkle, "Deuteronomic 'Just War' (Deut 20,10-20) and 2 Kings 3,27," ZABR 6 (2000): 285-301; Philip D. Stern, Of Kings and Moabites: History and Theology in 2 Kings 3 and the Mesha Inscription," HUCA 64 (1993): 1-14; and John Barclay Burns, "Why Did the Besieging Army Withdraw? (II Reg 3,27)," AW 102 (1990): 187-94. 116 A. Goetze, Old Babylonian Omen Texts (YOS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947). Other omina in this series relate to military failures and successes. This content downloaded from 132.177.228.65 on Sun, 23 Apr 2017 11:54:16 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 452 Journal of Biblical Literature 127, no. 3 (2008) it may be compared to Elishas prophecy. From these observations, the two aspects of the story?siege and the felling of fruit trees?belong together just as much as in the Assyrian sources.117 But another look at the structure of Deuteronomy 20 reveals that this com pendium of war laws uses specific scenarios to illustrate more general points and thus should not be confined to siege warfare. Verses 2-8 treat the priests address to the troops before the battle. Verse 9 transitions to the appointment of commanders. The next paragraph sets forth rules of engagement, beginning with cities that sur render prior to battle (w. 10-11) and then turning to those which do not (w. 12 14). This progressive unfolding of a battle scenario continues in w. 19-20, which concerns a tactic for forcing cities to capitulate. Since siegecraft was the predominant form of warfare for all armies of ancient Western Asia and the Eastern Mediter ranean, it is not surprising that the author chooses to begin with this scenario in w. 10-11. That siege is still the focus of w. 19-20 seems therefore to be governed by the legal logic of the chapter, not a concern to formulate a protest against Assyrian impe rial ideology. Just as the rules of engagement in w. 10-18 are not to be...
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Warfare and Wanton Destruction
The main arguments
The author’s main argument revolves around the nature of war. He argues that a war
should not lead to the wanton destruction of property, plants, buildings, animals, or animals
among other things (Wright 424). He terms the process of wanton destruction of
“unnecessary” items during the war as unjust and unethical.
Wartime represents an age of aggression and conflic...


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