Anti-Federalist: Patrick Henry's speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (1788)
From Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
Patrick Henry passionately opposed the ratification of the United States Constitution in this
speech delivered June 5, 1788 in the Virginia ratifying convention. It is also known as his "Shall
Liberty or Empire Be Sought?" speech. This document has been edited for brevity.
[ 43 ] Mr. Chairman, I am much obliged to the [ 44 ] very worthy gentleman for his encomium.
I wish I was possessed with talents, or possessed of any thing that might enable me to elucidate
this great subject. I am not free from suspicion: I am apt to entertain doubts. I rose yesterday to
ask a question which arose in my own mind. When I asked that question, I thought the meaning
of my interrogation was obvious. The fate of this question and of America may depend on this.
Have they said, We, the states? Have they made a proposal of a compact between states? If
they had, this would be a confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated
government. The question turns, sir, on that poor little thing — the expression, We, the people,
instead of the states, of America. I need not take much pains to show that the principles of this
system are extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous. Is this a monarchy, like England — a
compact between prince and people, with checks on the former to secure the liberty of the
latter? Is this a confederacy, like Holland — an association of a number of independent states,
each of which retains its individual sovereignty? It is not a democracy, wherein the people
retain all their rights securely. Had these principles been adhered to, we should not have been
brought to this alarming transition, from a confederacy to a consolidated government. We have
no detail of these great considerations, which, in my opinion, ought to have abounded before
we should recur to a government of this kind. Here is a resolution as radical as that which
separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition; our rights and privileges are
endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be relinquished: and cannot we plainly see
that this is actually the case? The rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your
immunities and franchises, all pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered
insecure, if not lost, by this change, so loudly talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others.
Is this tame relinquishment of rights worthy of freemen? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude
that ought to characterize republicans? It is said eight states have adopted this plan. I declare
that if twelve states and a half had adopted it, I would, with manly firmness, and in spite of an
erring world, reject it. You are not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor how you are
to become a great and powerful [ 45 ] people, but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty
ought to be the direct end of your government.
Having premised these things, I shall, with the aid of my judgment and information, which, I
confess, are not extensive, go into the discussion of this system more minutely. Is it necessary
for your liberty that you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system? Is
the relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press necessary for your liberty?
Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend to the security of your liberty? Liberty,
the greatest of all earthly blessings — give us that precious jewel, and you may take every thing
else! But I am fearful I have lived long enough to become an old-fashioned fellow. Perhaps an
invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man may, in these refined, enlightened days, be
deemed old-fashioned; if so, I am contented to be so. I say, the time has been when every pulse
of my heart beat for American liberty, and which, I believe, had a counterpart in the breast of
every true American; but suspicions have gone forth — suspicions of my integrity — publicly
reported that my professions are not real. Twenty-three years ago was I supposed a traitor to
my country? I was then said to be the bane of sedition, because I supported the rights of my
country. I may be thought suspicious when I say our privileges and rights are in danger. But, sir,
a number of the people of this country are weak enough to think these things are too true. I am
happy to find that the gentleman on the other side declares they are groundless. But, sir,
suspicion is a virtue as long as its object is the preservation of the public good, and as long as it
stays within proper bounds: should it fall on me, I am contented: conscious rectitude is a
powerful consolation. I trust there are many who think my professions for the public good to be
real. Let your suspicion look to both sides. There are many on the other side, who possibly may
have been persuaded to the necessity of these measures, which I conceive to be dangerous to
your liberty. Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who approaches
that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright force. Whenever you give up
that force, you are inevitably ruined. I am answered by gentlemen, that, though I might speak
of terrors, yet the fact was, that we were surrounded by none of the [ 46 ] dangers I
apprehended. I conceive this new government to be one of those dangers: it has produced
those horrors which distress many of our best citizens. We are come hither to preserve the
poor commonwealth of Virginia, if it can be possibly done: something must be done to preserve
your liberty and mine. The Confederation, this same despised government, merits, in my
opinion, the highest encomium: it carried us through a long and dangerous war; it rendered us
victorious in that bloody conflict with a powerful nation; it has secured us a territory greater
than any European monarch possesses: and shall a government which has been thus strong and
vigorous, be accused of imbecility, and abandoned for want of energy? Consider what you are
about to do before you part with the government. Take longer time in reckoning things;
revolutions like this have happened in almost every country in Europe; similar examples are to
be found in ancient Greece and ancient Rome — instances of the people losing their liberty by
their own carelessness and the ambition of a few. We are cautioned by the honorable
gentleman, who presides, against faction and turbulence. I acknowledge that licentiousness is
dangerous, and that it ought to be provided against: I acknowledge, also, the new form of
government may effectually prevent it: yet there is another thing it will as effectually do — it will
oppress and ruin the people…
A standing army we shall have, also, to execute the execrable commands of tyranny; and how
are you to punish them? Will you order them to be punished? Who shall obey these orders?
Will your mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment? In what situation are we to be?
The clause before you gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded and unlimited, exclusive
power cf legislation, in all cases whatsoever, for ten miles square, and over all places purchased
for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, &c. What resistance could be made?
The attempt would be madness. You will find all the strength of this country in the hands of
your enemies; their garrisons will naturally be the strongest places in the country. Your militia is
given up to Congress, also, in another part of this plan: they will therefore act as they think
proper: all power will be in their own possession. You cannot force them to receive their
punishment: of what service would militia be to you, [ 52 ] when, most probably, you will not
have a single musket in the state? for, as arms are to be provided by Congress, they may or may
not furnish them.
Let me here call your attention to that part which gives the Congress power "to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the service of the United States — reserving to the states, respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." By this, sir, you see that their control over our last and best defence is
unlimited. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless: the
states can do neither — this power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing
officers over men not disciplined or armed is ridiculous; so that this pretended little remains of
power left to the states may, at the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nugatory. Our situation
will be deplorable indeed: nor can we ever expect to get this government amended, since I
have already shown that a very small minority may prevent it, and that small minority
interested in the continuance of the oppression. Will the oppressor let go the oppressed? Was
there ever an instance? Can the annals of mankind exhibit one single example where rulers
overcharged with power willingly let go the oppressed, though solicited and requested most
earnestly? The application for amendments will therefore be fruitless. Sometimes, the
oppressed have got loose by one of those bloody struggles that desolate a country; but a willing
relinquishment of power is one of those things which human nature never was, nor ever will
be, capable of…
When the American spirit was in its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, sir,
was then the primary object. We are descended from a people whose government was
founded on liberty: our glorious forefathers of Great Britain made liberty the foundation [ 54 ]
of every thing. That country is become a great, mighty, and splendid nation; not because their
government is strong and energetic, but, sir, because liberty is its direct end and foundation.
We drew the spirit of liberty from our British ancestors: by that spirit we have triumphed over
every difficulty. But now, sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of
consolidation, is about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire. If you make
the citizens of this country agree to become the subjects of one great consolidated empire of
America, your government will not have sufficient energy to keep them together. Such a
government is incompatible with the genius of republicanism. There will be no checks, no real
balances, in this government. What can avail your specious, imaginary balances, your ropedancing, chain-rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contrivances? But, sir, we are not feared by
foreigners; we do not make nations tremble. Would this constitute happiness, or secure
liberty? I trust, sir, our political hemisphere will ever direct their operations to the security of
those objects…
Suppose the people of Virginia should wish to alter their government; can a majority of them
do it? No; because they are connected with other men, or, in other words, consolidated with
other states. When the people of Virginia, at a future day, shall wish to alter their government,
though they should be unanimous in this desire, yet they may be prevented therefrom by a
despicable minority at the extremity of the United States. The founders of your own
Constitution made your government changeable: but the power of changing it is gone from
you. Whither is it gone? It is placed in the same hands that hold the rights of twelve other
states; and those who hold those rights have right and power to keep them. It is not the
particular government of Virginia: one of the leading features of that government is, that a
majority can alter it, when necessary for the public good. This government is not a Virginian,
but an American government. Is it not, therefore, a consolidated government? The sixth clause
of your bill of rights tells you, "that elections of members to serve as representatives of the
people in Assembly ought to be free, and that all men having sufficient evidence of permanent
common interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage, and
cannot be taxed, or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or
that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like
manner assented for the public good." But what does this Constitution say? The clause under
consideration gives an unlimited and unbounded power of taxation. Suppose every delegate
from Virginia opposes a law laying a tax; what will it avail? They are opposed by a majority;
eleven members can destroy their efforts [ 56 ] those feeble ten cannot prevent the passing
the most oppressive tax law; so that, in direct opposition to the spirit and express language of
your declaration of rights, you are taxed, not by your own consent, but by people who have no
connection with you…
This Constitution is said to have beautiful features; but when I come to examine these features,
sir, they appear to me horribly frightful. Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting; it
squints towards monarchy; and does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true
American?
Your President may easily become king. Your Senate is so imperfectly constructed that your
dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority; and a very small minority may
continue forever unchangeably this government, [ 59 ] although horridly defective. Where are
your checks in this government? Your strongholds will be in the hands of your enemies. It is on
a supposition that your American governors shall be honest, that all the good qualities of this
government are founded; but its defective and imperfect construction puts it in their power to
perpetrate the worst of mischiefs, should they be bad men; and, sir, would not all the world,
from the eastern to the western hemisphere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights
upon the contingency of our rulers being good or bad? Show me that age and country where
the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance of their rulers being good
men, without a consequent loss of liberty! I say that the loss of that dearest privilege has ever
followed, with absolute certainty, every such mad attempt.
If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how easy is it for him to render
himself absolute! The army is in his hands, and if he be a man of address, it will be attached to
him, and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first auspicious moment
to accomplish his design; and, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens?
I would rather infinitely — and I am sure most of this Convention are of the same opinion — have
a king, lords, and commons, than a government so replete with such insupportable evils. If we
make a king, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, and interpose such
checks as shall prevent him from infringing them; but the President, in the field, at the head of
his army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far that it will puzzle any
American ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke. I cannot with patience think of this
idea. If ever he violates the laws, one of two things will happen: he will come at the head of his
army, to carry every thing before him; or he will give bail, or do what Mr. Chief Justice will order
him. If he be guilty, will not the recollection of his crimes teach him to make one bold push for
the American throne? Will not the immense difference between being master of every thing,
and being ignominiously tried and punished, powerfully excite him to make this bold push? But,
sir, where is the existing force to punish him? Can he not, at the head of his army, beat down
every opposition? Away with your [ 60 ] President! we shall have a king: the army will salute
him monarch: your militia will leave you, and assist in making him king, and fight against you:
and what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you and your rights ? Will
not absolute despotism ensue?...
Permit me, sir, to say, that a great majority of the people, even in the adopting states, are
averse to this government. I believe I would be right to say, that they have been egregiously
misled. Pennsylvania has, perhaps, been tricked into it. If the other states who have adopted it
have not been tricked, still they were too much hurried into its adoption. There were very
respectable minorities in several of them; and if reports be true, a clear majority of the people
are averse to it. If we also accede, and it should prove grievous, the peace and prosperity of our
country, which we all love, will be destroyed. This government has not the affection of the
people at present. Should it be oppressive, their affections will be totally estranged from it;
and, sir, you know that a government, without their affections, can neither be durable nor
happy. I speak as one poor individual; but when I speak, I speak the language of thousands. But,
sir, I mean not to breathe the spirit, nor utter the language, of secession.
I have trespassed so long on your patience, I am really concerned that I have something yet to
say. The [ 64 ] honorable member has said, we shall be properly represented. Remember, sir,
that the number of our representatives is out ten, whereof six is a majority. Will those men be
possessed of sufficient information? A particular knowledge of particular districts will not
suffice. They must be well acquainted with agriculture, commerce, and a great variety of other
matters throughout the continent; they must know not only the actual state of nations in
Europe and America, the situations of their farmers, cottagers, and mechanics, but also the
relative situations and intercourse of those nations. Virginia is as large as England. Our
proportion of representatives is but ten men. In England they have five hundred and fifty-eight.
The House of Commons, in England, numerous as they are, we are told, are bribed, and have
bartered away the rights of their constituents: what, then, shall be come of us? Will these few
protect our rights? Will they be incorruptible? You say they will be better men than the English
commoners. I say they will be infinitely worse men, because they are to be chosen blindfolded:
their election (the term, as applied to their appointment, is inaccurate) will be an involuntary
nomination, and not a choice.
I have, I fear, fatigued the committee; yet I have not said the one hundred thousandth part of
what I have on my mind, and wish to impart. On this occasion, I conceived myself bound to
attend strictly to the interest of the state, and I thought her dearest rights at stake. Having lived
so long — been so much honored — my efforts, though small, are due to my country. I have
found my mind hurried on, from subject to subject, on this very great occasion. We have been
all out of order, from the gentleman who opened to-day to myself. I did not come prepared to
speak, on so multifarious a subject, in so general a manner. I trust you will indulge me another
time. Before you abandon the present system, I hope you will consider not only its defects,
most maturely, but likewise those of that which you are to substitute for it. May you be fully
apprized of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience, but by some abler advocate than
I!
Anti-Federalist: Richard Henry Lee’s Objections to the Constitution. October 16, 1787
LETTER FROM THE HON. RICHARD HENRY LEE, ESQ., ONE OF THE DELEGATES IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, TO HIS EXCELLENCY, EDMUND RANDOLPH, ESQ., GOVERNOR OF
SAID STATE. This document has been edited for brevity.
It has hitherto been supposed a fundamental maxim, that, in governments rightly balanced, the
different branches of legislature should be unconnected, and that the legislative and executive
powers should be separate. In the new Constitution, the President and Senate have all the
executive, and two thirds of the legislative power. In some weighty instances, (as making all
kinds of treaties, which are to be the laws of the land,) they have the whole legislative and
executive powers. They, jointly, appoint all officers, civil and military; and they (the Senate) try
all impeachments, either of their own members or of the officers appointed by themselves.
Is there not a most formidable combination of power thus created in a few? and can the most
critic eye, if a candid one, discover responsibility in this potent corps? or will any sensible man
say that great power, without responsibility, can be given to rulers with safety to liberty? It is
most clear that the parade of impeachment is nothing to them, or any of them: as little
restraint is to be found, I presume, from the fear of offending constituents. The President is for
four years’ duration; and Virginia (for example) has one vote of thirteen in the choice of him,
and this thirteenth vote not of the people, but electors, two removes from the people. The
Senate is a body of six years’ duration, and, as in the choice of President, the largest state has
but a thirteenth vote, so is it in the choice of senators. This latter statement is adduced to show
that responsibility is as little to be apprehended from amenability to constituents, as from the
terror of impeachment. You are, therefore, sir, well warranted in saying, either a monarchy or
aristocracy will be generated: perhaps the most grievous system of government may arise.
It cannot be denied, with truth, that this new Constitution is, in its first principles, highly and
dangerously oligarchic; and it is a point agreed, that a government of the few is, of all
governments, the worst.
The only check to be found in favor of the democratic principle, in this system, is the House of
Representatives; which, I believe, may justly be called a mere shred or rag of representation; it
being obvious to the least examination, that smallness of number, and great comparative
disparity of power, render that house of little effect, to promote good or restrain bad
government. But what is the power given to this ill-constructed body? To judge of what may be
for the general welfare; and such judgments, when made the acts of Congress, become the
supreme laws of the land. This seems a power coëxtensive with every possible object of human
legislation. Yet there is no restraint, in form of a bill of rights, to secure (what Doctor Blackstone
calls) that residuum of human rights which is not intended to be given up to society, and which,
indeed, is not necessary to be given for any social purpose. The rights of conscience, the
freedom of the press, and the trial by jury, are at mercy. It is there stated that, in criminal cases,
the trial shall be by jury. But how? In the state. What, then, becomes of the jury of the vicinage,
or at least from the county, in the first instance—the states being from fifty to seven hundred
miles in extent? This mode of trial, even in criminal cases, may be greatly impaired; and, in civil
cases, the inference is strong that it may be altogether omitted; as the Constitution positively
assumes it in criminal, and is silent about it in civil causes. Nay, it is more strongly
discountenanced in civil cases, by giving the Supreme Courts, in appeals, jurisdiction both as to
law and fact.
Judge Blackstone, in his learned Commentaries, art. Jury Trial, says, "It is the most transcendent
privilege, which any subject can enjoy or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his
property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors
and equals—a constitution that, I may venture to affirm, has, under Providence, secured the
just liberties of this nation for a long succession of ages. The impartial administration of justice,
which secures both our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that
be entirely intrusted to the magistracy,—a select body of men, and those generally selected, by
the prince, of such as enjoy the highest offices of the state,—these decisions, in spite of their
own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank
and dignity. It is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should always be
attentive to the good of the many." The learned judge further says, that "every tribunal,
selected for the decision of facts, is a step towards establishing aristocracy—the most
oppressive of all governments."
The answer to these objections is, that the new legislature may provide remedies! But as they
may, so they may not; and if they did, a succeeding assembly may repeal the provisions. The
evil is found resting upon constitutional bottom; and the remedy, upon the mutable ground of
legislation, revocable at any annual meeting. It is the more unfortunate that this great security
of human rights—the trial by jury—should be weakened by this system, as power is
unnecessarily given in the second section of the third article, to call people from their own
country, in all cases of controversy about property between citizens of different states, to be
tried in a distant court, where the Congress may sit; for although inferior congressional courts
may, for the above purposes, be instituted in the different states, yet this is a matter altogether
in the pleasure of the new legislature; so that, if they please not to institute them, or if they do
not regulate the right of appeal reasonably, the people will be exposed to endless oppression,
and the necessity of submitting, in multitudes of cases, to pay unjust demands, rather than
follow suitors, through great expense, to far-distant tribunals, and to be determined upon
there, as it may be, without a jury.
In this congressional legislature, a bare majority of votes can enact commercial laws; so that the
representatives of the seven Northern States, as they will have a majority, can, by law, create
the most oppressive monopoly upon the five Southern States, whose circumstances and
productions are essentially different from those of theirs, although not a single man of these
voters are the representatives of, or amenable to, the people of the Southern States. Can such
a set of men be, with the least color of truth, called a representative of those they make laws
for? It is supposed that the policy of the Northern States will prevent such abuses. But how
feeble, sir, is policy, when opposed to interest, among trading people! and what is the restraint
arising from policy? Why, that we may be forced, by abuse, to become ship-builders! But how
long will it be before a people of agriculture can produce ships sufficient to export such bulky
commodities as ours, and of such extent? and if we had the ships, from whence are the seamen
to come?—4,000 of whom, at least, will be necessary in Virginia. In questions so liable to abuse,
why was not the necessary vote put to two thirds of the members of the legislature?
With the Constitution came, from the Convention, so many members of that body to Congress,
and of those, too, who were among the most fiery zealots for their system, that the votes of
three states being of them, two states divided by them, and many others mixed with them, it is
easy to see that Congress could have little opinion upon the subject.
Some denied our right to make amendments; whilst others, more moderate, agreed to the
right, but denied the expediency of amending; but it was plain that a majority was ready to
send it on, in terms of approbation. My judgment and conscience forbade the last; and
therefore I moved the amendments that I have the honor to send you enclosed herewith, and
demanded the yeas and nays, that they might appear on the Journal.
This seemed to alarm; and, to prevent such appearance on the Journal, it was agreed to
transmit the Constitution without a syllable of approbation or disapprobation; so that the term
"unanimously" only applied to the transmission, as you will observe by attending to the terms
of the resolve for transmitting. Upon the whole, sir, my opinion is, that, as this Constitution
abounds with useful regulations, at the same time that it is liable to strong and fundamental
objections, the plan for us to pursue will be to propose the necessary amendments, and express
our willingness to adopt it with the amendments, and to suggest the calling a new convention
for the purpose of considering them. To this I see no well-founded objection, but great safety
and much good to be the probable result. I am perfectly satisfied that you make such use of this
letter as you shall think to be for the public good; and now, after begging your pardon for so
great a trespass on your patience, and presenting my best respects to your lady, I will conclude
with assuring you that I am, with the sincerest esteem and regard, dear sir, your most
affectionate and obedient, humble servant,
RICHARD H. LEE.
Federalist: The Federalist No. 10: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic
Faction and Insurrection (continued). Daily Advertiser. Thursday, November 22, 1787. James
Madison, often referred to as the Father of the Constitution, defends the Constitution in this
selection. This document has been edited for brevity.
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The
friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and
fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is
attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into
the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments
have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which
the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements
made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot
certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that
they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected.
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the
friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are
too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor
party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously
we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not
permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid
review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been
erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same
time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and,
particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for
private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be
chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has
tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the
other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the
liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions,
the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease.
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could
not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes
faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere
brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil
society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose
fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into
parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex
and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity
of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself,
the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly
passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those
who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are
creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,
grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by
different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms
the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and
render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view
indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which
one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and
that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
…From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a
society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government
in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will,
in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice
the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal
security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have
been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of
government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their
political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place,
opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the
points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the
cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the
delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter
may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the
purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local
prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain
the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether
small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the
public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the
representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a
few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to
guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two
cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater
in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large
than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater
probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the
large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice
with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the
people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which
inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render
the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests;
as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to
comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy
combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national,
the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which
may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this
circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former
than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a
majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust
in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in
controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, -- is enjoyed by the
Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of
representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to
local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the
Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater
security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able
to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties
comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater
obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and
interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be
unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects
dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from
that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property,
or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the
Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to
taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for
the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure
and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and
supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS
Federalist: The Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper
Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. Independent Journal. Wednesday,
February 6, 1788 [James Madison]. This has been edited for brevity.
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary
partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only
answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in
their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea,
I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and
enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government
planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers
of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the
preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and
consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as
possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously
adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative,
and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people,
through channels having no communication whatever with one another.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as
possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the
executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their
independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected
with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such
devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of
America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of
the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America,
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence
a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united
by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of
providing against this evil: the one by creating a will [read here ruler] in the community
independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the
society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a
majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed
authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the
society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified
in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and
dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from
interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must
be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests,
and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on
the number of interests and sects…
***
In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker
individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even
the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a
government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the
more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a
government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be
little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to
itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits
would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power
altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions
whose misrule had proved the necessity of it.
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties,
and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take
place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good…
It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been
entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly
capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable
sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the
federal principle.
PUBLIUS
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