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Read Wareham, “Fiscal Policies and the Institutions of a Tax State,” 910-931 and post 200 word response to the article identifying the main argument(s), the main sources of evidence used by the author, and also the other scholarly commentaries on this subject to which the author is responding.

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bs_bs_banner Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012), pp. 910–931 Fiscal policies and the institution of a tax state in Anglo-Saxon England within a comparative context1 By ANDREW WAREHAM* This article begins by noting that military revolutions and civil wars in early modern Europe provide an unduly narrow framework for understanding the transition from a domain to a tax state.Taking Anglo-Saxon England as a case study, it is suggested that political restrictions led to the establishment of direct and indirect taxation, thereby providing rulers with revenues which surpassed those from domain resources. The main section of the article uses sources from coinage and wills to poetry and letters in order to give a general idea of the chronological development of a medieval tax state. This analysis challenges the views of the new fiscal historians, who argue that a collapse in a medieval domain state acts as the precondition for the emergence of a tax state. Instead, this article suggests that new policies arose because of the need of AngloSaxon kings and their advisers to take account of the requirements of ecclesiastical authorities, as well as a heavy revenue imperative, in paying for resistance against the Vikings. The article ends with a discussion of the comparative applications of the contexts and catalysts which lead to the adoption of pioneering fiscal policies. I t has been proposed that political crisis and military revolution provided the catalyst and context for the destruction of the medieval domain state, leading to the creation of the European tax state. Schumpeter made this argument in ‘The crisis of the tax state’,2 and it has since been developed in a number of influential works.3 Consensus contrasts the achievement of early modern Europe with the fiscal failings of its medieval predecessor, and counterparts in early modern Asia.4 In early modern Europe, rulers in the pursuit of power and their own survival sought to control resources in new ways which led them to tap the wealth of markets and trade, especially that concentrated in urban areas, and, through the provision of peace and various public goods, contributed to the remarkable growth of the modern European economy.5 In general those working on continental Europe have emphasized the importance of the military revolution, while those * Author Affiliation: University of Roehampton. 1 I am grateful to the University of Winchester’s Wessex Centre for History and Archaeology seminar, University of Roehampton, the London Library, and the editors of the Economic History Review for assistance. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees, Elisabeth Wareham, and Dr Ryan Lavelle for commenting upon the text; and Dr Chris Thornton and Dr Guillaume Sarrat de Tramezaigues for discussion of the Maldon campaign and medieval coinage respectively. 2 Schumpeter, ‘Crisis of the tax state’, pp. 8–16. 3 Bonney and Ormrod, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1–16; Braddick, State formation, pp. 233–65; Hoffman and Norberg, eds., Fiscal crises; Weiss and Hobson, States and economic development, pp. 17–49. 4 For example, Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 504–5; Deng, Chinese premodern economy, p. 87; McNeill, Pursuit of power, pp. 63, 69–79; Weiss and Hobson, States and economic development, pp. 42–54. 5 Good summaries are provided by Bates, Prosperity and violence, pp. 34–56; Glete, War and the state, pp. 213–17; McNeill, Pursuit of power, pp. 102–16; Tilly, Coercion, pp. 45–66. © Economic History Society 2011. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 911 working on the British Isles have given more attention to major political upheavals.6 The model has been confirmed, added to, modified and qualified,7 but it has not been subjected to a revision which questions the template of early modern (European) political and military revolutions as the crucible for the creation of tax states. Consequently, moral and intellectual issues have been neglected in seeking to understand why pioneering fiscal policies were adopted. It is worth considering the established narrative a little further, and then analysing the issue through some key case studies.The European Science Foundation project on European state finance between the twelfth and early nineteenth centuries developed the subject of new fiscal history as a template for understanding the evolution of the tax state.8 Bonney and Ormrod edited three collections of essays from the project, and had a pessimistic view of fiscal transitions in medieval Europe. They suggested that only in the early modern period did the fiscal imperative, prompted by warfare, create a tax state in Europe.9 In a key contribution, Ormrod and Barta commented: ‘the adoption of such tax systems—a development to which modern historians give such prominence—was not so much a grand policy of advancing state control as an ad hoc (and sometimes rather inadequate) response to the shortfall resulting from a decline in domain revenues’.10 This view arose because they placed considerable emphasis upon an example from fourteenth-century Hungary, where a gradual disintegration of domain revenues was followed by the establishment of indirect taxation.11 The traditional model was reaffirmed: the domain state collapses as the pre-condition for the creation of tax states. The model has been modified by work on medium and small states in northern and southern Europe.12 Epstein suggested that the key turning point in the overall performance of the European economy does not lie in the early modern period, and instead argued that the inflection point was during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.13 In discussing long-run themes in economic history it makes sense to study the medieval as well as the early modern period. Taking one chronological step back from Epstein’s work turns our attention to the kingdom of Sicily during the early middle ages. In the early twelfth century, revenues derived 6 Contributions from historians include Braddick, State formation, pp. 233–65; Brewer, Sinews of power, pp. 137–66; Glete, War and the state; O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England 1485–1815’; Sacks, ‘Paradox of taxation’; and from social scientists, D. Acemoglu, D. Cantoni, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson, ‘The consequences of radical reform: the French Revolution’, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, Working Paper series, no. 09-08 (2009) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369681; Dinecco, ‘Fiscal centralization’; Weiss and Hobson, States and economic development, pp. 27–48. 7 For a recent bibliography on the theme, see O’Brien, ‘Britain’s exceptional fiscal state’, pp. 440–6. For contributions to the debate on parliamentary government/secure property rights as the key political condition for the establishment of a tax state; and direct taxation, indirect taxation, or credit as more important for establishing a reliable revenue base, see above, n. 3; Brewer, Sinews of power, pp. 95–100; Hoffman and Norberg, ‘Conclusion’; O’Brien and Hunt, ‘Rise of a fiscal state’. 8 European Science Foundation scientific programme ‘The origins of the modern state in Europe, 13th–18th centuries’ included among its outputs Bonney, ed., Economic systems; idem, ed., Rise of the fiscal state; Ormrod, Bonney, and Bonney, eds., Crises. 9 A summary of the project’s work is provided by Bonney and Ormrod, ‘Introduction’, pp. 4–19 (esp. tab. 0.2, pp. 4–8); for data and commentary, see Bonney, Capra, ’t Hart, Muto, and Schulze, ‘Evolution of the state system’. A similar (but simpler) table to 0.2 is provided by Krüger, ‘Public finance’, tab. 3.1, p. 52. 10 Ormrod and Barta, ‘Feudal structure’, p. 79. 11 Ibid., p. 78; Barta and Barta, ‘Royal finance’. 12 For work that combines analysis of these states and European powers with global interests, see Dinecco, ‘Fiscal centralization’. 13 Epstein, Freedom and growth, pp. 1–37, 147–74. © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 912 ANDREW WAREHAM principally from indirect taxation on trade passing through the city of Palermo reputedly exceeded revenues collected in England under King Henry I (1100–35), and a century later in Sicily a feudal aid in 1233 became a regular tax.14 The parameters of this revenue system have been discussed from three perspectives: first, the agricultural wealth of Sicily and its location at a maritime crossroads; second, the extent of royal estates on the island of Sicily; and third, the contribution of administrative and fiscal systems established by the Greeks and Arabs.15 Detailed investigation of fiscal organization in Sicily in the early medieval period is hindered by the incomplete survival of the records, but these references point towards a high level of fiscal development.16 Case studies from northern Europe question the view that the collapse of the domain state provided a catalyst for the establishment of the tax state. In midsixteenth-century Denmark cooperation between the monarch and the royal council enabled the consolidation of fiefs, which contributed to a dramatic rise in revenue especially in 1553–9, with the result that extraordinary taxes were only needed to maintain mercenary troops.17 In the German state of Hessen, revenues from property management rose from 58,000 guilders per annum to 101,000 per annum between 1530–9 and 1560–8.18 In Hessen new direct taxes based upon assessments and indirect excise taxes filled the gap that had previously been met by medieval subsidies and loans, but domain and taxation revenues were in equilibrium between the mid-sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries.19 These examples demonstrate that domain revenues continued in equilibrium with tax revenues, with diversification rather than crisis explaining fiscal development. A case study from Northern Song China (960–1127) also questions the traditional model.The new policies ofWang An-Shi (d. 1086), chief councillor (1070–3, 1075–6), led to a dramatic increase in revenues from indirect taxation that harvested wealth from trade and crafts,20 and in 1085 income based upon commercial and indirect taxes outweighed revenues from the land tax by two to one.21 Councillors debated the relationship between revenue, expenditure, and economic growth, but, fundamentally, revenue funded warfare, which in 1065 accounted for 50 out of 60 million strings of cash.22 The army increased in size from around 380,000 men in 975 to about 1.25 million in 1045,23 but after military defeats the state paid out tribute payments to procure peace. Examples include the 1004 tribute paid to the Liao, comprising 1,000 copper coins and 200,000 balls of silk; and the treaty of 1044 which fixed the tribute to the Xi Xia at 130,000 rolls of silk, 50,000 ounces of silver, and 20,000 pounds of tea.24 Northern Song China provides an example of an early tax state which financed payment of tribute to attackers from central Asia through taxation of an agricultural and urbanized society, at a time when steppe societies 14 Smith, History of Sicily, p. 30; Matthew, Norman kingdom of Sicily, p. 241. Matthew, Norman kingdom of Sicily, pp. 234–53; Abulafia, Two Italies, pp. 31–55. 16 Matthew, Norman kingdom of Sicily, pp. 337–8. 17 Lockhart, Denmark 1513–1660, pp. 34–5, 52–3; Petersen, ‘From domain state to tax state’, p. 144. 18 Krüger, ‘Public finance’, p. 59. 19 Ibid., pp. 54–9 (esp. tab. 3.2). 20 Gernet, History, pp. 300–29; Kühn, Die Song-Dynastie, pp. 83–6;Smith, ‘Shen-Tsung’s reign’, pp. 414–47. 21 Bao, Songdai difang, p. 318 (tabs. 7.9 and 7.10 on direct and indirect taxation). 22 Smith, ‘Shen-Tsung’s reign’, p. 349. 23 Kühn, Die Song-Dynastie, p. 97. 24 Ibid., pp. 88, 98. 15 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 913 experienced economic, social, and political crises as their states formed.25 These dislocations provided opportunities for charismatic leaders to acquire fearsome reputations when they led campaigns into China. Di Cosmo’s model is applicable to the relationship between the kingdom of England and Scandinavian societies during the Viking age.26 These examples modify the view that tax states came into being initially in early modern Europe, as a consequence of political and military revolution. In discussing these themes, it is vital to take account of the distinction between the wealth of territories and states, and the revenues of their rulers.Wealthy countries today do not necessarily provide the basis for wealthy governments, and nor is there is any reason to suppose a simple connection in the pre-modern period. Abulafia commented on the connection between the wealth of the island of Sicily and its rulers: ‘It is surprising that such a simple question [the connection between the wealth of the island and that of the king], so deeply concerned with the whole mechanics of medieval royal finance, should never explicitly have been answered’, and called for closer definitions in discussion of sources of revenue.27 These case studies point to two important neglected points.The term ‘domain state’ refers to a type of revenue system rather than only states in medieval Europe, and in some cases domain and taxation revenues operated in tandem. As regards fiscal constitutions and frameworks, we might want to look for wider types of activity than parliamentary assemblies (with limited suffrages) and property law as the criteria for maintaining tax states.28 ‘In the middle ages, rulers relied on their own estates or domain for resources, and on the provision of goods and services by dependants’.29 This definition of the medieval domain state has often been summarized by the idea that medieval rulers should ‘live off their own’, but as Braddick pointed out, such economic definitions are too narrow; domain or royal prerogative revenue ‘refers not simply to the lands of the monarch, but to all revenues arising from a personal right belonging to the monarch’.30 Theories of medieval state finance, as elaborated by medieval historians, focus upon domain revenue, and distinguish between payments exacted on an ad hoc basis as tribute, rent derived from royal estates, and wealth collected from subjects as a whole.31 St Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) articulated the long-held view that medieval rulers had the right to draw upon these three domain revenues to meet ordinary expenditure, including that required for the provision of justice, court ceremonial, and state-building programmes.32 Nevertheless, from the late twelfth century onwards rulers occasionally levied direct and indirect taxes on land, moveables, and hearths to meet extraordinary expenditure on warfare.33 25 Di Cosmo, ‘State formation’. For example, for Denmark, see Hybel and Poulsen, Danish resources, pp. 113–14, 150–4, 198–200, 230–3, 259–62; Randsborg, Viking age, pp. 45–103. 27 Abulafia, Two Italies, p. 33. 28 On the role of representative government in Britain, see, for instance, Jones, ‘Fiscal policies’; and in the United Provinces, Tracy, Financial revolution, pp. 219–20. On mechanisms (which did not necessarily match the blueprint of early modern Britain), see ’t Hart, ‘United Provinces’; eadem, ‘Merits’, pp. 22–7. 29 Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, p. 2. 30 Braddick, Nerves of state, p. 12. 31 Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance theories’, pp. 31–5. 32 Ibid., pp. 31–5. 33 Ibid., pp. 32–3, 43–4; Wolffe, Royal demesne, pp. 38–9, 42. 26 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 914 ANDREW WAREHAM These ad hoc sources of revenue did not become part of the state’s regular and permanent revenues, and often involved rulers in dialogues with specially convened consultative assemblies. A classic English example is the link in 1225 between the grant of a tax of a fifteenth on moveables and the re-issue of Magna Carta.34 It is worth briefly discussing the state in late Anglo-Saxon England.Whether one uses the word state or the term lordship of rulers, there is no Weberian conception of the state involved here.35 Lords and their agents exercised authority over communities with public obligations covering military service, bridge-building, and work on fortifications.36 Reuter raised comparisons with Germany.37 The weakness of imperial power in medieval Germany led rulers to give considerable emphasis to social power, in the form of ritual, kinship, and friendship, often through communal prayer and feasts, in maintaining authority and ensuring obedience.38 Such customs and practices were present in late Anglo-Saxon England and were especially visible in the ceremonies at Bath and Chester in 973,39 but ritual may have played a less pivotal role than in the Ottonian and Salian Empire. Reuter joined others in arguing that a uniform coinage is the strongest primary evidence for the power of the late Anglo-Saxon state,40 but Domesday Book, its satellites, and geld rolls provide even stronger evidence, and it is curious that Reuter’s critique passed over the latter evidence.41 In late Anglo-Saxon England a powerful and decentralized state operated with a high degree of local initiative; a sense of nationhood arose from a common language, culture, and religious practice.42 I The wars of King Alfred of Wessex (871–99) were waged through the resources of royal lordship.43 It is, however, unhelpful to restrict discussion of the Alfredian domain state to ninth-century Wessex, and the picture can be broadened to Wessex and England as a whole from the accession of Alfred to the coinage reforms of King Edgar in c. 973.44 The best surviving documentary evidence for assessing royal wealth in this period comes from royal wills. Alfred’s will, drawn up between 872 and 888, includes properties that were part of the king’s estate during the reign of Æthelred II (978–1016).45 This suggests that Alfred’s will dealt with properties that were or came to be regarded as royal land. The majority of his land bequests in Hampshire, Somerset, and Wiltshire, lying in the ancient heartlands of 34 Carpenter, Struggle for mastery, pp. 307–8. Davies, ‘Medieval state’. 36 Brooks, Communities and warfare. 37 Reuter, ‘Making of England and Germany’. 38 Althoff, Family, friends and followers, pp. 14–15, 23–90, 136–59. 39 Jones, ‘Significance’. 40 Reuter, ‘Making of England and Germany’, p. 292; Carpenter, Struggle for mastery, p. 175; Metcalf, ‘Continuity and change, part 1’, p. 20. 41 For Domesday Book and taxation, see McDonald and Snooks, Domesday economy, pp. 51–76; cf. Wareham and Wei, ‘Taxation and the economy’; for a geld roll, see below n. 71. (Braddick’s template (Braddick, State formation, pp. 11–20) is applied to Anglo-Saxon England in Foot, ‘Historiography’, pp. 131–2.) 42 This perspective is suggested by Fletcher, Bloodfeud, pp. 13–29. 43 Lavelle, Alfred’s wars. 44 Dumville, Wessex and England. 45 Keynes and Lapidge, eds., Alfred the Great, pp. 175, 177; Keynes, Diplomas, pp. 166, 192. 35 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 915 the kingdom of Wessex, along with his bookland in Kent, were bequeathed to his eldest son, Edward the Elder, the future king of England (899–924).46 By contrast the majority of Alfred’s properties outside the core of Wessex were divided between his younger son (Æthelwulf), maternal kin, and agnatic nephews.47 The practice of commuting food rents into cash payments was not established on royal estates in this period.48 Royal officials such as reeves and riding men organized sustenance for the court for specified periods, most notably during the winter, while some vills were also used as collection points for hundredal revenues.49 The organization of a sophisticated system of food farms was linked to known royal itineraries, which during the early tenth century came to be concentrated within southern and midland England.50 The evidence indicates that Alfred bequeathed land to ensure that his eldest son received the estates that were best suited to meeting the needs of royal entourages, thereby seeking to control power and succession after his death.51 This practice can also be seen in the bequests of one of Alfred’s early tenth-century successors,52 and suggests that traditional attitudes towards the functions of the domain state predominated. Another way to look at Alfred’s wealth is to consider his bequests of cash and heirlooms, valued at around £2,000.53 These goods were divided between Alfred’s kin, followers, and the needy, generally mirroring his preferences for descent of land: £1,000 was pledged to his two sons; £800 to his kinswomen and retainers; and £200 was divided between the clergy, the poor, and the destitute.54 This bequest of a tenth of his moveable wealth to the needy and the poor demonstrates Alfred’s piety, but he was not sure if he had the means to make these payments: ‘I do not know for certain whether there is so much money; nor do I know whether there is more, although I suspect so’.55 This comment on the absence of coin may refer to an anticipated development rather than the situation at the time of writing. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the king’s uncertainty over the money that he had, and points towards the absence of a developed fiscal system. King Alfred responded to the Viking threat by investing in domain sources of power, primarily by increasing labour services and public obligations. Favourable terms were offered to lords entrusted with ‘the protection of all the people’, and to peasants (ceorls) in encouraging them to take up the hard life of garrisoning fortified towns (burhs), while the church took on responsibility for urban defence.56 It is not surprising that a domain state flourished under King Alfred since the Heptarchy (the division of England into seven kingdoms) influenced the political landscape, with limitations being placed upon the opportunity for innovation.57 A more remarkable aspect of investment in the domain state by King Alfred and his 46 Keynes and Lapidge, eds., Alfred the Great, pp. 175, 177. Ibid., pp. 175, 177. 48 See below, n. 121. 49 Stafford, ‘“Farm of one night”’, p. 500; Sawyer, ‘Royal tun’, pp. 281–2. 50 Sawyer, ‘Royal tun’, p. 281. 51 Abels, Alfred the Great, pp. 179–80. 52 See below, nn. 59–60. 53 Keynes and Lapidge, eds., Alfred the Great, p. 324, n. 97. 54 Ibid., p. 177. 55 Ibid., p. 177. 56 Abels, Alfred the Great, p. 205; Brooks, ‘Administrative background’, p. 134–5; idem, ‘Alfredian government’, pp. 157–8, 162. 57 Keynes, ‘Heptarchy’; Brooks, ‘Administrative background’, pp. 120–1. 47 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 916 ANDREW WAREHAM early tenth-century successors was the terms by which kings exchanged property with the church.58 Delays in returning church property and exchanges favourable to the Crown resulted in the distribution of the church’s lands to royal followers. This helped King Alfred and his successors to defeat the Vikings, but it contributed to the economic and social problems of the English church during the first age of the Vikings and its aftermath. Around 50 years after Alfred’s death, King Eadred (946–55) bequeathed money and treasure valued at £1,400 to kin, prelates, ealdormen, and household officials in a will drawn up between 951 and 955.59 These gifts were overshadowed by the promise of £1,600 to redeem the English people from the disasters of famine and an invasion by a Viking army. The money for these two purposes was held in monastic treasuries, with £200 allocated to each county, while £400 was set aside for the benefit of the people of Mercia. In addition, 2,000 mancuses of gold (around £250), which was ‘to be taken and minted into mancuses’, was left for the redemption of the king’s soul.60 In meeting the threats of famine and the Vikings, Eadred relied upon traditional methods; county communities were given the means to enter into negotiations with Viking war bands, perhaps with the intention that they should be guided by the prelates who had custody of the bequeathed monies. The treasury of the mid tenth-century English kings was more sophisticated than King Alfred’s, with a distinction between the state treasury and the personal treasure of the king.61 Money was accounted for precisely with an awareness of the differentiation between payments in silver pence and gold mancuses.62 Nonetheless, there is little indication of a reorganization in the structure of the revenue base, or a shift in royal attitudes to the use of royal wealth. King Alfred and his immediate successors waged war with the resources of a domain state, which in periods of military expansion lent itself to the collection of tribute from neighbouring territories.63 The Prophecy of Britain (Armes Predein), probably written in the 930s by a Welsh cleric, referred to the English as the ‘tax gatherers of Cirencester (Gloucs.)’.64 But using a domain state to overcome the Vikings required expropriation of the wealth of monastic houses. Since a domain state flourished c. 871–973, the stages by which England became a tax state must lie quite close to the early eleventh century. Political civil war cannot be put forward as the explanation for this fiscal change. The royal council was united politically during the first third of the eleventh century, with the exception of a dispute between the king and his son in 1015–16.65 The evidence is no stronger for military revolution. From the 980s the English state needed to mobilize its wealth and that of its subjects to pay for ships, armour, swords, and other military 58 Fleming, ‘Monastic lands’, pp. 250–5, 261–4; Thacker, ‘Æthelwold’, p. 45; cf. Dumville, ‘Ecclesiastical lands’. 59 Discussion based upon Whitelock, ed., English historical documents, no. 107, pp. 555–6. 60 Ibid., p. 155. Mancus was typically a weight but the word was also applied to a gold coin. 61 Brooks, ‘Career of St Dunstan’, pp. 169–70; Biddle, ‘Felix urbs Winthonia’, p. 133. 62 Whitelock, ed., English historical documents, no. 107, p. 555; Dolley, Anglo-Saxon pennies, p. 24. 63 Cf. Maddicott, ‘Trade’, pp. 21–31, argued that new profits from tin in south-west England augmented King Alfred’s wealth. The argument meshed some ninth-century evidence with indirect indicators drawn from the Roman and Angevin periods. In the absence of Anglo-Saxon data, there are no convincing grounds for arguing that Alfred developed a fiscal power base. Nor is it clear how this putative wealth was generated, beyond general comments on exports of metals, so the hypothesis cannot be linked to fiscal history. 64 Williams, Kingship and government, p. 85. 65 Lavelle, Aethelred II, pp. 73–134. © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 917 equipment against Viking threats organized at state level, as well as continuing to provide coastal defence against independent war-bands.66 These developments cannot be regarded as a military revolution, any more than rearmament in Northern Song China.67 The changing fiscal power base in late Anglo-Saxon England cannot be readily connected to either political or military revolution. General economic developments partly explain the process. The system of relying upon royal estates to support an itinerant court was of less value because of the growth of rural and urban settlements, and their widespread reorganization, combined with the consequences of political unification during the tenth century.68 II It is assumed that in early modern states there was a broad concordance between state revenue and expenditure.69 For late Anglo-Saxon England this methodological necessity is compounded by the use of original terms to refer to both revenue and expenditure, but it is vital to note that the words gafol, heregeld, and Danegeld do not refer to one concept.70 Heregeld, under Æthelred II and the Anglo-Danish kings (1016–42), refers to both stipends paid to warriors and land taxation, whereas the Danegeld in sources such as the Northamptonshire geld roll and the Leges Henrici Primi refers only to the land tax.71 Although the heregeld taxation provided the basis for the development of Danegeld, these two taxes should be regarded as distinct,72 with different systems of assessment and collection. It is no less important to distinguish between tribute (gafol) which was paid to secure peace with the Vikings, and stipendiary payments (heregeld) used to meet the expenses of crews of warships and warriors of the royal household.73 According to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, payments made on the order of Æthelred II and his councillors in 991, 1002, 1007, 1012, and 1018 were gafol (tribute);74 for 1014 heregeld (stipendiary payments) was paid;75 and for the 994 entry there is a degree of ambiguity.76 Finally, the payment made in 1009 by the people of East Kent was phrased in terms of securing a local peace.77 In total, seven national stipendiary and tribute payments were paid between 991 and 1018, with a median of £24,000 66 Brooks, ‘Arms, status and warfare’, pp. 150–1, 155–6; Metcalf, ‘Large Danegelds’; Randsborg, Viking age, pp. 96–103. 67 For instance, the Zhe military family supported itself through farming; Ong, ‘Zhe military family’, p. 11. I am grateful to Prof. Ong for his permission to cite from his paper. 68 Dyer, Making a living, pp. 13–70; Stafford, Unification and conquest, pp. 45–68. 69 O’Brien and Hunt, ‘Rise of a fiscal state’, p. 133. 70 For a discussion of systems, see Lawson, ‘Collection’; Roffe, Decoding Domesday, pp. 183–209. 71 Keynes, Diplomas, pp. 221, n. 243, 283, n. 185. The confusion is partly caused by publications that refer to Danegeld under Æthelred II, based upon the statement in the legal text drawn up between 1116 and 1118, Downer, ed., Leges Henrici Primi, pp. 36, 121 (clause 15.1), which stated: ‘If Danegeld, which was formerly given to Danish forces . . . ’. For the Northamptonshire geld roll, see Douglas and Greenaway, eds., English historical documents, pp. 483–6. 72 Roffe, Decoding Domesday, pp. 309–10. 73 Keynes, ‘Historical context’, p. 101; Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 77. 74 O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 86, 89, 92, 96, 104; Cubbin, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 48, 51, 54, 57, 63; Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 61, 64, 66, 69, 72–3. 75 O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 99; Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 71. 76 O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 87; Cubbin, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 49; Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 62. 77 O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 93; Cubbin, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 55; Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 67. © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 918 ANDREW WAREHAM (1002) (see tab. 1).78 In this article expenditure figures on gafol and heregeld are used as the source framework to address the political context for the adoption of pioneering fiscal policies, so it is important to consider the reliability of the figures recorded in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.79 For every annal between 983 and 1022 the C, D, and E versions of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle agree at least in part, which suggests that they drew upon a common source.80 The discrepancies between C and E on the tribute payments in 1007 and 1012 arose from scribe E failing to add the second number in the sequence, so that ‘xxxvi’ was rendered as ‘xxx’ and ‘forty’ was presumably omitted from the number ‘forty-eight’, leaving only the number ‘eight’ when it was translated from the vernacular into Latin.81 These are scribal slips on the part of scribe E, and confirm scribe C’s accuracy. Accuracy can be checked from another angle. Scribe C’s reporting on the appointment of ealdormen, prelates, and other high officials can be verified by charters and witness lists that have been subject to comprehensive analysis.82 Gillingham rightly pointed out that the £1,600 left in the will of King Eadred to deal with famine and the Vikings represented a poor showing in comparison to the figures paid out c. 991–1018.83 However, Keynes’ summary has demonstrated a direct relationship between the size and ferocity of the Viking attacks with rises in tribute and stipendiary expenditure.84 The fluctuations in expenditure mainly directed towards warfare between the late tenth and twelfth centuries tell us about the ups and downs of the English financial system and its relationships with the changing political framework; they do not provide a uniform trendline against which to adjust stipend and tribute figures recorded in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.85 This source needs to be understood critically and, following a constructive debate, the figures recorded by scribe C are to be regarded as accurate. The political context for the establishment of national expenditure on tribute can now be probed by looking at two sources, which first need to be contextualized. The ‘Poem of the Battle of Maldon’ described the death of Ealdorman Byrhtnoth and the defeat of his army at Maldon (Essex) in 991.86 The poem was composed between the early 990s and the 1020s, with an earlier date generally being preferred.87 Clark identified the geographical milieu of the poem as England’s eastern counties, perhaps not that far from the area where the borders of Essex, Suffolk, and Cambridgeshire converge.88 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, written by scribe C covering the period 991–1022, provides contextual information, but it must be remembered that the entries for these years were written as a 78 If local payments are included, £21,000 (1014). For debate, see Gillingham, ‘“Most precious jewel”’; idem, ‘Chronicles and coins’; cf. Lawson, ‘Those stories look true’; idem, ‘Once more’. 80 Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. lxvi–lxix. 81 O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 92, 96; Irvine, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 66, 69. 82 Keynes, ‘Declining reputation’, p. 236; idem, Diplomas, pp. 154–231. 83 Gillingham, ‘“Most precious jewel”’, p. 379, n. 8. 84 Keynes, Diplomas, pp. 223–4. 85 Lawson, ‘Those stories look true’, pp. 388–90. 86 For the poem, see Scragg, ‘Battle of Maldon’, pp. 18–31; for its historical context, see Lavelle, Aethelred II, pp. 68–73; Keynes, ‘Historical context’. 87 Scragg, ‘Battle of Maldon’, p. 32; Clark, ‘Dating the Battle of Maldon’, pp. 22–3. 88 Clark, ‘Dating the Battle of Maldon’, pp. 21–3. 79 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) © Economic History Society 2011 National National National National East Kent National National National and London 991 994 1002 1007 1009 1012 1014 1018 Totals £72,000 £206,000 £48,000 £10,000 £16,000 £24,000 £36,000 Tributes national £10,500 £13,500 £3,000 Tributes local £21,000 — — — — — — £21,000 Stipends 47 million 147 million 18 million 12 milllion 30 million Long Cross, 997–1003 Helmet, 1003–9 Last Small Cross, 1009–17 Quatrefoil, 1017–23 40 million. Estimated output of coins Crux, 991–7 Coin issue Tributes, stipendiary payments, and coinage data from England, c. 991–1018 0.90 g 1.44 g 1.25 g 1.13 g 1.36 g Average silver weight Sources: Based on: O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 86–7, 89, 92–3, 96, 99, 104; Jonsson, ‘Coinage of Cnut’, tab. 11.8, p. 218; Jones, ‘Devaluation’, tab. 2, p. 602. Payers and negotiators Date Table 1. ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 919 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 920 ANDREW WAREHAM block in c. 1022.89 The impressionistic characterization and motivation of key protagonists in scribe C’s version diminishes the reliability of his account as a source for the political history of Æthelred II’s reign, but the author’s use of poetry and irony invigorates our understanding of the climate of criticism that had formed during the early years of the reign of King Cnut (1016–35).90 The arguments and allusions that scribe C crafted around the payments to armies and royal appointments gives his version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle considerable value as a near retrospective view on King Æthelred’s rule. Historians differ over whether the encounter at Maldon was one in which powerful regional interests were being challenged, or whether the defence of the English nation was at stake from a Viking army.91 Byrhtnoth was the second most senior ealdorman c. 983–91, and in rank and ancestry he belonged to a small group of tenth-century ealdormen who were accorded the titles of ‘princeps’ and ‘halfking’ (semirex), the latter on account of advice given to rulers.92 Byrhtnoth’s defeat and death at Maldon was a momentous event independent of the size and intentions of the Viking army. For the purposes of our discussion the opening lines of the poem are noteworthy. Apparently a Viking messenger sought to prevent hostilities by suggesting that the English ‘should buy off this onslaught of spears with tribute-money’ and ‘a truce in return for the gold’.93 The poet was probably using knowledge of what happened after the battle to provide the audience with the context of the struggle. The linkage between defeat at Maldon and the payment of tribute was also made by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, C version, 991: ‘in that year it was determined that tribute (gafol) should be paid to the Danish men . . . the first payment was £10,000. Archbishop Sigeric (of Canterbury) first advised that course’.94 There is a concordance between the C version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and the ‘Poem of the Battle of Maldon’ in linking the battle to the payment of tribute, although the latter sees it as the prelude to battle and the former as its outcome. Both sources were drawn up after the battle, perhaps even contemporaneously,95 but provide differing perspectives. From a court perspective in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle,96 Maldon was remembered as the catalyst for the national introduction of tribute, but the ‘Poem of the Battle of Maldon’ is most profitably investigated as part of a series of local texts reaching into the early twelfth century.97 By commemorating the death of ‘our own leader’ (eorl) Byrhtnoth,98 the composer of the poem contributed to a group of sources from the southern Danelaw (East Anglia and the east midlands), which served to ensure that religious houses in the region retained the properties which had been given by 89 Keynes, ‘Declining reputation’, p. 233; cf.Williams, Æthelred the Unready, p. 50, who views scribe C as an oral history source. 90 Keynes, ‘Declining reputation’, p. 233; Clark, ‘Narrative mode’, pp. 11–12. 91 Keynes, ‘Historical context’, pp. 90–1; Lavelle, Aethelred II, pp. 70–1. 92 Keynes, Diplomas, tab. 6; Locherbie-Cameron, ‘Byrhtnoth’, pp. 253–5; Vita Sancti Oswaldi, in Raine, ed., Historians, pp. 428, 443; Macray, ed., Chronicon Abbatiae Ramesiensis, i, c. 4/iii, p. 11. 93 Scragg, ‘Battle of Maldon’, p. 19, lines 32, 35. 94 O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 86 (trans. Whitelock, ed., English historical documents, p. 234). 95 See above, nn. 87, 89. 96 Brooks, ‘Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’. I am grateful to Prof. Brooks for supplying me with a copy in advance of publication. 97 Clark, ‘Dating the Battle of Maldon’, p. 36, makes an illuminating comment in relation to the Gesta Herewardi. 98 Ibid., pp. 21, 33. © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 921 ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION Byrhtnoth, his descendants, and his companions.99 The combination of national and local perspectives suggests that the loss of Byrhtnoth was a traumatic event which prompted the introduction of tribute payments as a national policy. This contrasted with leaving payments to local communities, as was envisaged under King Eadred.100 The early payments of tribute were met through a combination of sources, but as Keynes and Metcalf have suggested, from 1012/13 payments were raised from land taxation as a regular source of revenue, with an estimated annual levy of 12d. per hide (around 120 acres).101 It is possible that this was preceded by earlier attempts to establish a land tax. Tantalizing inconclusive references point towards a land tax in c. 973, 994, and 1006/7,102 and royal councillors may have been aware of the national land taxes levied by Charles the Bald, as King of the West Franks in 866 and as Carolingian emperor in 877, to pay off the Vikings.103 The Frankish land taxation of 877 had a variable rate which provided relief for peasants at the expense of alienating the aristocracy.104 The English land tax from 1012/13 was simpler, with the tax being directly chargeable to warland, and in some shires upon inland.105 Further important issues outside the scope of this article include the proportion of the expenditure on gafol and heregeld which passed from England to Scandinavia, and the ways in which procedures were altered and assessments revised in the light of the meetings of the English royal council (witan) during the early eleventh century.106 It is a moot point whether heregeld should be defined as ordinary or extraordinary military expenditure. Payment to ships crews can be regarded as extraordinary expenditure, but feeding and clothing housecarls who undertook to defend England does not look qualitatively different from supporting the stipendiary knights in the households of Anglo-Norman rulers, which formed part of ordinary expenditure.107 Taxation and other revenue sources during the early eleventh century provided income for ordinary and extraordinary military expenditure, and achieved remarkable yields during the reign of Æthelred II and, most notably, two years after his death when gafol of £82,500 was paid.108 Awareness of the complexity of current political and diplomatic issues may have led scribe C to phrase his criticisms of gafol and heregeld carefully. In c. 1022 Viking warriors who had served Cnut in his 1014–16 campaign were still presumably enjoying some of the benefits of the 1018 tribute, and warriors, churchmen, townsmen, and peasants may have been grateful that these monies were paid quickly and effectively. Political questions arise: the predecessors of King Æthelred II and his son, Edward the Confessor (1042–66), relied principally upon domain wealth,109 raising the question of why Æthelred II preferred fiscal innovation. The answer 99 Wareham, Lords and communities, pp. 67–74, esp. tabs. 8 and 9. See above, section I. 101 Keynes, Diplomas, p. 221; Metcalf, ‘Ranking of boroughs’, p. 165. 102 Symons, ed., Regularis Concordia, c. 69, p. 69; O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 87, 92. 103 Nelson, Charles the Bald, pp. 28–9. 104 Ibid., p. 29. 105 Roffe, Decoding Domesday, pp. 190–7; Faith, English peasantry, pp. 48–53, 105–6. 106 Campbell, ‘Some agents and agencies’, pp. 207–8; Keynes, Diplomas, 126–34, 269–72. 107 Bolton, Empire of Cnut, pp. 54–5; Prestwich, ‘War and finance’, pp. 22–9. 108 See tab. 1. 109 Above, section I; Grassi, ‘Lands and revenues’. 100 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 922 ANDREW WAREHAM stems from the advice provided by Archbishop Sigeric in 991, but the pithy account in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle can be supplemented by analysis of the role of spiritual power within the political sphere, thanks to Cubitt’s work.110 Reflecting in 993 upon the mistakes of his youth (between c. 984 and 993), King Æthelred II admitted that he had seized estates from religious houses ‘on the advice of greedy councillors’.111 Land was taken from pre-eminent religious communities, such as Rochester Cathedral and the Old Minster at Winchester, with the result that Dunstan, archbishop of Canterbury (959–88), adopted a course which was even more extreme than excommunication, namely he cursed Æthelred II formally.112 Dunstan’s use of cursing looks extraordinary to us, but it may be among the factors that contributed to Æthelred II’s change of heart.113 Following the royal council at Winchester in 993, the next 13 years can be considered to be ‘one of the most prosperous for the advancement of the ecclesiastical cause before the Norman Conquest’.114 In the middle stage of Æthelred’s reign there was a policy reversal; during the late 980s the king and his councillors followed policies that had been adopted by King Alfred during the first age ofViking invasions; royal property was augmented from the resources of the church, but from c. 993 property was returned and there was further enrichment of the church. Therefore, domain wealth did not collapse in advance of the formation of tax state mechanisms. Instead the opportunity for drawing upon landed wealth from the church to meet the Viking threat was closed, raising the likelihood that other means would be adopted. The political dialogue between the king and successive archbishops of Canterbury created the circumstances for this policy change. III Land taxation could only function if there was sufficient money from which to pay the tax, and it has been argued that the need to meet these payments led to the prodigious increase in coinage output during the reign of Æthelred II.115 At its most provocative, this argument tied the issue of new coinage types to specific incidences of gafol and heregeld.116 Tribute and stipendiary payments accounted for over half the coin produced between c. 1003 and 1016, but this cannot explain the vast output of coin c. 973–1016, and especially for the period between c. 973 and 1003 when tribute and stipend payments at no point accounted for more than a third of coinage output.117 Indirect taxation arose from royal management of coinage, but before looking at this it is worth sketching in some of the principal details of the development of coinage, following King Edgar’s c. 973 reform of the coinage. Dolley and Metcalf identified three key aspects: first, the number of mints was increased from 40 to around 70 to provide a national network so that most places in midland and southern England were within 15 miles of a mint; second, 110 Cubitt, ‘Archbishop Dunstan’, pp. 146–55. Keynes, Diplomas, p. 196. 112 Ibid., pp. 177–80; Cubitt, ‘Archbishop Dunstan’, pp. 152–3, 162–3. 113 Cubitt, ‘Archbishop Dunstan’, pp. 163–5. 114 Ibid., pp. 163–4; Keynes, Diplomas, pp. 186–93, 199. 115 Lyon, ‘Some problems’, pp. 197–203. 116 Gillingham, ‘“Most precious jewel”’, p. 373, n. 2. 117 Metcalf, ‘Ranking of boroughs’, pp. 171–2. 111 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 923 each coinage issue only remained in use for around six years before being called back for exchange and reminting (subsequent research has shown that reminting was prompted by events and not planned);118 and third, there were significant variations in the weight of the coinage produced within the life-cycle of each issue.119 In deciding whether these revenues are best defined as part of a domain state or tax state, we need to consider the geographical distribution of mints and their relationship with profits derived from minting. There was a reversion to the Alfredian status quo ante under the c. 973 reform with a weight standard of 1.65g per coin, linked to the establishment of 16 new mints by 983, but it was not until the reign of Edward the Confessor that interior areas, including the lower Thames valley and western Suffolk, were provided with a density of mints to match the network of coastal mints running from Ipswich (Suffolk) to Totnes (Devon), and the concentration of mints in Somerset and Wiltshire.120 The latter concentration of mints is unlikely to have been connected to the need to ensure that every settlement within England was within 15 miles of a mint. The realization as part of the c. 973 reforms that the king was spending less time on the ancient demesne of Wessex meant that it made sense for the food rents there to be commuted into coin with a corresponding requirement for more mints.121 Alternatively because Æthelred II spent so much time in Somerset and Wiltshire it was necessary to establish a network of mints and secondary market centres to meet exceptional needs for cash.122 Both explanations share the view that a network of mints in these two shires was regulated by the king’s need to draw revenues from his tenants, and are in line with the view that revenues from recoinage comprised part of the domain state. Such theories do not explain the network of coastal mints which were established between c. 973 and 1000. For instance, new mints were established at Ipswich and Maldon within a decade of 973, but there appear to have been few royal estates in the hinterlands of these towns.123 Instead, the foundation of these mints was connected to high levels of population and economic activity, and contributed to the revenues of the king.124 Since the publication of Dolley and Metcalf’s key article there has been re-examination of data, much of it conducted by Metcalf, which suggests that lighter coins tended to be produced later in an issue, and from the mints in London, Southwark, and the southern Danelaw.125 In contrast coins with a higher intrinsic value were produced at the beginning of an issue and from mints in the heartlands of Wessex and Mercia, including those in the towns of Winchester, Wallingford (Berkshire), and Oxford. Such calculations enabled Metcalf to provide a model which differentiated between coinage mainly minted from coins already circulating in England (and hence presumably required 118 For a discussion of one example, see below, nn. 142–4. Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’; Metcalf, ‘Continuity and change, part 2’. 120 Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’, pp. 145, 149–51; Dolley, Anglo-Saxon pennies, p. 28; Blackburn, ‘Æthelred’s coinage’, p. 159. 121 Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’, p. 149; Stafford, ‘“Farm of one night”’, pp. 492–3. 122 Hill, ‘Trends’, pp. 217–22; Metcalf, ‘Taxation of moneyers’, p. 287; Stafford, ‘Historical implications’, p. 39. 123 Locherbie-Cameron, ‘Byrhtnoth’, pp. 255–60; Hart, ‘Eastern Danelaw’, pp. 70–1, 112; idem, ‘Ealdordom of Essex’, pp. 129–35. 124 Hart, ‘Eastern Danelaw’, pp. 106; Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’. 125 Following discussion based upon Metcalf, ‘Continuity and change, part 2’, pp. 61–4; Metcalf, ‘Ranking of boroughs’, pp. 185–7; Lyon, ‘Variations in currency’, pp. 113–14. 119 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 924 ANDREW WAREHAM for domestic use), and those coins mainly minted later in the issue as a consequence of the requirements of international trade.126 Money was used in late Anglo-Saxon England to pay rent, taxation, and legal payments, and to maintain long-distance trading connections,127 but the small size of the commercial economy meant that daily transactions depended upon barter.128 Debasement prompted a degree of inflation when transactions were based upon the intrinsic value of the coins, but inflationary effects were curtailed when coins were accepted at tale.129 Following the c. 973 reforms, England’s export sector enjoyed an economic advantage over its continental West Frankish counterpart as the latter operated on the basis of weight.130 Coins minted with the names and insignia of the Frankish rulers Lothair (954–86) and Louis V (986–7) were issued by great feudatories, with payments being dependent upon the intrinsic value of the coins.131 The divergence between England and the Continent meant that merchants after c. 973 enjoyed an advantage in exporting precious and luxury items from England, as well as perhaps some bulk commodities.132 The process may have received additional assistance from merchants’ use of lighter coins acquired later in the cycle, and from mints in London, Southwark, and the southern Danelaw, in exchange for continental bullion being brought into England. These developments yielded profits for the moneyers and the king.133 In short, a balance of trade surplus may have arisen from a fortuitous divergence in exchange mechanisms, which drew silver into the English economy, and provided the basis for a regular and general money tax. Debasement of the coinage as a means to raising large sums of money is associated with policies adopted in later medieval France.134 These initiatives differed substantially from debasement in early eleventh-century England. Between c. 979 and 985 (First Hand) and between c. 1016 and 1021 (Quatrefoil) there was a devaluation of around 30 per cent in the English coinage, but it was rolled out over a 30- to 40-year period in graduated steps.135 Spufford distinguished between strong, middle, and weak currencies, and argued that the optimum situation for landlords was a strong currency, for merchants the ideal was the middle type, and for tenants and peasantries weak money provided the best option.136 The devaluation of English currency c. 979–1021 provided a stable coinage (one that is gradually debased) as distinct from a strong one. Over time the weight of the silver in each coin was gradually worn down so that its value would eventually be less than the original tale value, at which point silver was kept at home rather than being brought into mints, and in order to prevent this it was vital for rulers to reduce the weight of the coinage 126 For consequences of devaluation, see Jones, ‘Devaluation’. Campbell, ‘Was it infancy in England?’, p. 181; Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’, p. 154; Faith, English peasantry, p. 182. 128 Metcalf, ‘Continuity and change, part 1’, p. 20; Britnell, Commercialisation, p. 12. 129 Blackburn, ‘Æthelred’s coinage’, pp. 156–7. Tale means when payment was accepted according to the number and given value of the coins, as distinct from payment by weight and by measure. 130 Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’, p. 154. 131 Grierson and Blackburn, Medieval European coinage, pp. 246–9. 132 See Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’, pp. 154–5. 133 Stafford, ‘Historical implications’, p. 36. 134 Spufford, Money, pp. 301–13. 135 Metcalf, ‘Ranking of boroughs’, pp. 179–80, 205 (tabs. j–k). 136 Spufford, Money, pp. 305–6. 127 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 925 periodically.137 Æthelred II and his advisers followed a steady devaluation policy. At each devaluation four old coins were handed over in exchange for three new coins.138 That it was effective can be demonstrated by the fact that of the 54 hoards with coins covering the period c. 973–1066, 15 hoards contained coins which were substantially from one issue, and none had ‘more than two types in any appreciable quantity’.139 A regular tax of 25 per cent around every six years on capital held in the form of coin was achieved, with the coinage output pointing to significant revenues (see table 1), which may in Campbell’s view have contributed the most in enabling King Æthelred II to pay off the Vikings.140 Spufford linked the introduction of national currencies in north-west Europe during the eleventh century to the role of ecclesiastics in persuading rulers that coins exalted the aura of kingship.141 The role of churchmen in advising Æthelred II on coinage can be illustrated by the Agnus Dei issue, which flourished briefly. The Lamb of God appeared on the obverse side and on the reverse the Holy Dove, with the coin being launched at either the council of Enham (Hampshire) at Pentecost (16 May) 1008 or at Michaelmas 1009.142 The Agnus Dei coinage was manifestly issued by the Crown in association with the church. At Enham it was agreed that every 310 hides would pay for manning a warship. Ecclesiastics were responsible for the organization of shipsokes, as demonstrated by the bishop of Sherborne’s concern, between c. 1002 and 1014, that he was 30 hides short of meeting his obligation for a shipsoke, while an earlier St Paul’s document shows how the church’s landholdings were organized to pay for the manning of a warship.143 At Michaelmas 1009 there were three days of national prayers and fasting, and it was agreed that each household would consume ‘bread, water and raw herbs’. The food that would normally have been consumed, together with a penny per household, was rendered to the church for distribution to the poor.144 Ecclesiastical advisers formulated advice which enabled the state to collect an indirect tax on the use of money, but the preference for a stable rather than a strong currency suggests that they took account of the needs of the merchants. II Æthelred, probably dating from 994, recorded a treaty between the Vikings and the English, in which peace was promised for trading ships.145 A generation later, at Rome in 1027, King Cnut attended the coronation of the new western European emperor. There he negotiated that all the Danes and English in his kingdom were to be free of barriers and tolls when they travelled on the Continent to Rome.146 Fletcher has convincingly argued for political negotiation between the AngloDanish merchant community and Cnut in advance of the Rome summit.147 Cnut encouraged Scandinavian watermen to forswear piracy in favour of trade. 137 Ibid., p. 312. Ibid., p. 93. 139 Dolley and Metcalf, ‘Reform of the English coinage’, pp. 156–7. 140 Campbell, Observations on English government, p. 138. 141 Spufford, Money, pp. 82–3. 142 Discussion based upon O’Keeffe, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 92; Fletcher, Bloodfeud, p. 94; Lawson, Cnut, p. 59; Blackburn, ‘Æthelred’s coinage’, p. 160. 143 Lawson, Cnut, p. 60; O’Donovan, ed., Charters of Sherborne, no. 13, pp. 46–8; Kelly, ed., Charters of St Paul’s, no. 25, pp. 192–201. 144 Whitelock, ed., English historical documents, no. 45, p. 447. 145 Clause 2/2.1 in ibid., no. 42, p. 438; Keynes, ‘Historical context’, pp. 103–7. 146 Whitelock, ed., English historical documents, no. 53, p. 477 (clause 6). 147 Fletcher, Bloodfeud, pp. 106–7. 138 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 926 ANDREW WAREHAM IV Before considering how our discussion of the institution of a tax state in AngloSaxon England can reconfigure understanding of the creation of pre-modern tax states, two issues need to be commented upon. First, why was the late AngloSaxon tax state not sustained; and second does it matter that this tax state only existed for a brief period? It would be very interesting to be able to speculate on the extent of the tax burden in early eleventh-century England in comparison to estimated fluctuations in domain revenues in relation to the yields from other pre-modern revenue systems, but this lies outside the scope of this article. Earlier experiments with the introduction of land taxation between c. 973 and 1006/7 assisted with its establishment within a national framework c. 1012, and heregeld continued to prosper until abolished in 1051.148 Three factors account for this; first, rulers were no longer able after 1039 to claim that dire circumstances required the levying of heavy taxes; second, taxation privileges of exemption were granted across the board, or through more specific reductions which generally favoured the greater nobility and leading religious houses;149 and third, the productivity of the land tax was tied to the silver supply, at this time coming from the Harz Mountains (Germany). Silver deposits were found at Goslar c. 961–8, and production gathered momentum in the 990s, reaching a peak of production c. 1025, before diminishing rapidly after 1040.150 The chronological concordance between the effective payment of stipends and tribute, the money supply, and the availability of silver from Goslar is striking, and is to be explained by international trade. The late Anglo-Saxon tax state flourished for a couple of generations, but unsustainability is less important than it might appear to be. Bonney and Ormrod observed that early nineteenth-century Britain was the first country to achieve a fiscal breakthrough because levels of per capita public debt provided the basis for the self-sustained growth of the fiscal state, in contrast to shortcomings in contemporary France, or for that matter other pre-modern states’ experiments in fiscal innovation.151 Their definition of sustainability is correct, but its application in defining the parameters of new fiscal history means that attention has been focused upon the operation of tax states in the modern and contemporary period during stages of maturity, at the expense of understanding the contexts for innovations and experiments. The rulers of Anglo-Saxon England and their advisers took the view that all subjects should contribute to the general welfare of the ruler and his realm,152 and new towns, agricultural innovation, and coinage provided the resources and infrastructure for the establishment of a tax state.153 While the approach of kings and ecclesiastical councillors differed from modern democracies and early modern parliamentary governments, nonetheless, the former successfully set about the establishment of a tax state in order to provide peace and protection 148 Above, section II; Cubbin, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, pp. 69–70. Roffe, Decoding Domesday, pp. 193–5. 150 Spufford, Money, pp. 73–5, 94–5. 151 Bonney and Ormrod, ‘Introduction’, pp. 19–20. 152 Brooks, ‘Administrative background’, pp. 133–7. 153 Dyer, Making a living, pp. 43–70; Fleming, Britain after Rome, pp. 241–68. 149 © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) ANGLO-SAXON TAXATION 927 for the whole country from the Vikings. Our argument has two points in focusing attention upon fiscal policies. Firstly, the transition to a tax state occurred at a time when King Æthelred II had the resources of a domain state at his disposal. There was no collapse in domain revenues in advance of the establishment of a tax state. Secondly, the transition arose from the narrowing of political options in negotiations with the church. From the early 990s it was no longer a viable option for the king to draw upon the church’s wealth as a means for strengthening defences against the Vikings. The fiscal imagination of successive archbishops in persuading Æthelred II and Cnut to turn to tax state mechanisms, in preference to despoliation of the church, contributed to the creation of a new state in an old country.154 In Prosperity and violence, Bates suggests that the creation of prosperity depends—whether one is dealing with medieval and early modern Europe or twentieth-century Africa—upon the political accommodation that is reached between rulers, kin, community, and political rivals, as well as upon the economic environment.155 Hoffman and Rosenthal take up the same issue in suggesting that rulers opt for new political and fiscal systems when faced by potential exile or execution as a result of threats of invasion.156 Their work directs attention towards politics, in line with our approach. King Æthelred II and his councillors established a direct land tax, in tandem with an expansion in indirect taxation on the use of money, as the means for procuring peace, mercenaries’ stipends, and military equipment. The key point is that the fiscal transition arose as a result of the problems faced by King Æthelred II. The question becomes: what prompts new policies at the expense of tried and trusted ones? In this case acute policy choices were at the heart of innovation. It was not feasible to increase domain revenues from existing landholdings sufficiently in the time available, and neither was it possible to procure revenues from the church, as a result of the opposition led by Archbishop Dunstan. A third option was adopted; acquiring revenues from the wider population by a combination of direct and indirect taxation. In focusing attention upon the role of ecclesiastical politics in the creation of a tax state, we suggest that attention should not just be focused on military and political revolutions, and we provide readers with an opportunity to broaden the template for understanding the emergence of the tax state in the pre-modern world. Our new approach means that there may be less room for contrasting the fiscal achievements of Protestant, maritime, and free societies with the apparent failings of Catholic, continental, and ancien régimes, and their counterparts. However, it opens up further analysis of the contributions of figures such as Archbishop Sigeric, Archbishop Wulfstan, Wang An-Shi, Sir William Petty (1623–87, a founding member of the Royal Society), and Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950, finance minister in Austria during the First World War), whose academic and moral 154 Archbishop Wulfstan ofYork (1002–23), a transitional figure under Æthelred II and Cnut, preached against the despoliation of churches (Bethurum, ed., Homilies of Wulfstan, p. 195, lines 40–3), and ordered excommunication in law codes for those who despoiled and violated churches (VI Æthelred, clause 15, and VIII Æthelred, clauses 1–4, in Robertson, ed., Laws, pp. 96–7, 116–19). For discussion, see Lionarons, Homiletic writings, p. 100. 155 Bates, Prosperity and violence. 156 P. T. Hoffman and J.-L. Rosenthal, ‘Divided we fall: the political economy of warfare and taxation’ (2000) www.hss.caltech.edu/~pth/Papers/newtaxunityapsr.doc (accessed on 12 Feb. 2011). © Economic History Society 2011 Economic History Review, 65, 3 (2012) 928 ANDREW WAREHAM interests in taxation influenced their careers.157 A new institutional framework for financial stability eluded these politicians, but recent events suggest that we may—in common with them—not be able to take for granted the self-sustained growth of the European fiscal state, in contrast to the optimistic views expressed by new fiscal historians during the 1990s. 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