INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
CJI 550
LECTURE
Putting It All Together and Conclusion
Introduction
During this final week of the course, we will look at several case examples in the
readings to illustrate the flow of entire investigations. The first one concerns the assassination of
Martin Luther King and the second concerns the Lindbergh kidnapping case. This week’s
readings also touch on raids and their management. This final lecture will focus on the
importance of perception as it relates to dealing with conflict between (inter-organizationally)
and within (intra-organizationally) law enforcement agencies.
Inter-Organizational Conflict, Intra-Organizational Conflict, and Perception
The job of investigators is rife with conflict, both within and outside their agencies.
Investigators are constantly trying to meet the needs of the investigation and when someone or
something blocks those needs, conflict ensues. Many of the most noticeable investigative
conflicts occur inter-organizationally with entities outside of the investigator’s parent agency.
For example, an investigator who needs a certain witnesses’ testimony would experience conflict
if that witness refused to testify. Likewise, conflict would occur if, at the last minute, a
prosecutor unilaterally decides to plea a defendant to a lesser charge against the wishes of the
investigator, causing the investigator to lose credibility with his or her agency because the bigger
crime was not charged as promised.
Intra-organizational conflict occurs when an investigator’s needs are blocked by someone
within the parent agency. For example, an investigator who believes that an undercover buywalk purchase of drugs from a suspect would be the best way to prove the case is prevented from
doing so from the supervisor who believes that a buy-bust scenario would be better. In this
example, differences in perception are at the root of the conflict. The investigator is focused on
the buy-walk scenario because he or she perceives that this will lead to a better case, as this will
allow multiple drug purchases from the suspect (thus more charges) and better the odds of the
undercover officer being able to penetrate deeper into the criminal organization and eventually
arresting more people. Contrarily, the supervisor is focused on the buy-bust scenario because
this will ensure an arrest and likely conviction (stats!) and allow the recovery of the buy money
for other operations.
Waco: An Example of Perceptual Intra-Organizational Conflict
One of the most vivid examples of how differences in perception can underpin deadly
conflict occurred in 1993 during the siege at Waco, Texas. On February 28, 1993, ATF agents
raided the Mount Carmel Center with a search warrant for illegal weapons. Upon attempting to
serve the warrant, four ATF agents were killed and 16 others were wounded. Additionally, an
undetermined number of Branch Davidians were killed or injured. Among the Branch
Davidians injured was David Koresh, who was their leader. Following the botched raid, the
Copyright 2017 Gregory M. Vecchi
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
CJI 550
ATF agents withdrew and the FBI deployed their elite tactical and non-tactical teams from
Quantico, Virginia: the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and the Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU).
Negotiators began negotiating with Koresh and some of his followers, while the HRT set up a
perimeter around the compound and deployed armored vehicles.
The CNU advised against using harassment and favored establishing rapport and trust
with Koresh and his followers. Nevertheless, the electricity to the Mount Carmel Center was cut
off and the compound was illuminated with bright lights at night to increase the pressure on the
Branch Davidians to surrender. These actions by the HRT occurred despite objections from the
CNU, which caused Koresh and his followers to perceive this action as a “huge setback.” The
HRT wanted to show force, but the CNU believed that force would break the fragile trust
between Koresh and the negotiators.
Negotiations continued and Koresh allowed several of his followers to leave the
compound. Despite this success, the HRT responded by playing loud music causing Koresh to
respond by saying that no others would come out.
The conflict between the HRT and the CNU intensified, as the CNU tried to influence the
FBI commanders to use non-lethal tear gas to evict the Branch Davidians from the compound
while the HRT continued to increase their tactical posturing. The tear gas plan was ultimately
accepted. The HRT subsequently cleared away Koresh’s cars and other vehicles. In response,
some Davidians held children up in tower windows and a sign reading “Flames Await” was
posted.
On April 19, 1993, a FBI negotiator telephoned the Branch Davidians and announced the
siege. The HRT then began inserting tear gas into the compound using armored vehicles and the
Davidians opened fire on them. The HRT continued the application of tear gas, breaching
several areas of the building, causing a portion of the roof and the right-rear wall to collapse.
Thereafter, fires started in at least three locations within the compound. The CNU telephoned
Koresh and implored him to lead his followers out safely. Nine Davidians fled Mount Carmel
and were arrested. Several FBI agents then heard “systematic gunfire,” which convinced them
that the Davidians were killing themselves or each other. After the fire was squelched, 80
Branch Davidians, including 22 children, were found dead.
Differences of Perception
By instinct and training, the HRT was inclined to action. One member of the HRT stated:
“A crime’s been committed. I’m talking the murder charges and you’ve got to do something
about it. You CAN NOT [emphasis added] just let these people sit.” An HRT sniper stated:
“The more uncomfortable we make them inside, the more apt they are to try and negotiate
better.” The negotiations coordinator at Waco, exhibited a different perspective: “You can’t
deal with a cohesive group like it’s a group of bank robbers because the things you can do to
bank robbers to make them come out simply drives the Davidians together. If you look at the
core of a nuclear bomb, it’s this tightly packed ball of uranium, and what makes that so powerful
is it’s so tightly packed. The Davidians were tightly packed and all we did was compress it even
more and make it more volatile.”
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Copyright 2017 Gregory M. Vecchi
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
CJI 550
The conflict between the HRT was more than just a difference of perspectives; it was also
played out physically. For example, during a negotiation between the FBI chief negotiator and
Steve Schneider (an assistant to Koresh), Schneider informed the negotiator that the HRT was
running over their [Davidians’] guard shacks. The negotiator, surprised and upset about not
knowing about this, tells Schneider: “You’re kidding, I know they’ve [HRT] been ordered NOT
[emphasis added] to go in there!”
Conclusion
During Waco, conflict developed over the perceived differences in perspectives and
worldviews between the tactical and non-tactical teams. This conflict occurred as a result of the
individual organizational culture of each team, which separated them from each other based on
their differing perspectives, worldviews, beliefs and philosophies. Similarly, on an individual
level, investigators also experience intra-organizational conflict as a result of differences of
opinions and perceptions on how best to handle investigations. To reduce this conflict, the
investigator must be aware of these other opinions and perceptions and take them into account
when presenting alternatives that strive to meet the needs of all stakeholders of the investigation.
Bibliography
Boyer, P. J., & Kirk, M. (1995). Waco: The inside story (M. Kirk, Director). In M. Kirk, M.
McLeod, & K. Levis (Producers), Frontline. Boston: WGBH Educational Foundation.
Dennis, E.S.G., Jr. (1993). Evaluation of the handling of the Branch Davidian stand-off in Waco,
Texas: February 28 to April 19, 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Vecchi, G. M. (2002). Hostage/barricade management: A hidden conflict within law
enforcement. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 71(5), 1-7.
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Copyright 2017 Gregory M. Vecchi
Sanborndet
How would you deal with a difficult prosecutor?
Although it can be frustrating to deal with a difficult prosecutor, it is important to remember that we all
have an individual job to do, despite having the same goal of a successful prosecution. For example, an
investigator may arrest a person for committing a crime and their goal is to have that person prosecuted
and taken off the street. The prosecutor has the same goal but may make a plea bargain with the
suspect that the investigator does not agree with. It is important to remember that ultimately the goal
of getting the criminal off the street was achieved. As frustrating as this can be for an investigator, they
need to remember that their job is to investigate the crime, gather the facts, and arrest the suspect.
They can not always control how the next step in the criminal justice process is handled.
How would you deal with a supervisor who was reluctant to give you the resources necessary to
complete your investigation?
If I had a supervisor that was not providing me with the resources needed to complete an investigator, it
would be important for me to know the reason why. Does my superior not have the resources because
of larger systems issues or are the resources available and the supervisor just does not believe in the
success of the investigation. If the latter is the case, I would put together all the information to plead my
case to my superior and make a formal request for resources. If it is a larger systems issue, then I might
try and work with my superior to come up with more creative or out of the box ways to utilize the
already limited resources.
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