University of California Los Angeles Inductive Reasoning Green vs Grue Paper
Choose only ONE of these topics that come most fluidly to you.Write a 3-4 page paper (double-spaced) on one of the following topics. Papers will be graded on
the basis of clarity, insight, organization, and depth of argumentation.
Brief general note on philosophy papers: Generally, one is not looking merely for your opinion
on any given topic --- though a thesis ought to be clearly stated. Rather, at least as important are
the reasons for your opinion. That is, your view ought to be made to seem reasonable to the
reader, and simply declaring what your view is does not do that. For example, in class, we have
not just stated the standard opinion that the verificationist theory of meaning is wrong, but we
have given reasons to think that it is wrong. If we were doing an even more thorough job, we
would explore possible responses to those reasons — and even responses to those responses.
When at its best, philosophy is the practice of evaluating positions using rational considerations.
Thus, the reasons for your thesis are rather important philosophically. At a minimum, the reasons
you give ought to be sufficient to make your view seem somewhat plausible. Of course, one
cannot argue for everything since some things have to be taken for granted as reasonable. But, it
is good to show awareness of what you are taking for granted, when you do take something for
granted. Ideally, the things you take for granted ought to be views held in common by whoever
you take yourself to be arguing against so that there is some chance that they will be persuaded. 1) Since we have spent relatively little time on any individual thinker (or group of thinkers like
the logical positivists), it is reasonable to think that their views have been presented --- both
in the textbook and in lecture --- in a way that is not terribly fair to the person being
discussed. That is, one might think either that 1) their actual views had to be more
sophisticated than presented or 2) even if their actual views were not more sophisticated, it is
possible to make their views more plausible while preserving the core of the view. Either by
looking more deeply into the view of a certain person (or group of people) that we have
studied or by thinking up a reasonable defense on your own, argue (i.e. give reasons) that at
least one objection to the view that we discussed can be successfully answered. (Although
certain figures were mentioned in class, we did not study Hegel, Heidegger, Adler or Freud.
When in doubt about whether we studied a figure, consult your TA or me.) Here is an
example: a. We dismissed Popper by noting that holism about testability suggests that no
theory is straightforwardly (or “outright”) falsifiable since one may always place
the blame for a bad prediction on something other than the theory. But, maybe
Popper doesn’t need to think that theories are straightforwardly falsifiable to
solve the demarcation problem. Perhaps we only defeated a rather crude and
simplistic version of his view. How could his view be made to be more
sophisticated while still solving the demarcation problem? 2) Another thing one might think is that the views that we have dismissed really cannot be made
more sophisticated without rejecting a core element of the view. One way to argue this is to
suggest the most reasonable response to a certain objection to the view and then to suggest
that that response will contradict other elements of the thinker’s views. For example: a. One might think that if Popper doesn’t think that theories are outright falsifiable
(because of holism about testability) then he thinks instead that we are sometimes
justified in thinking that theories are false even if they might be true. But, it can,
at least, look as if that claim contradicts his view that induction is unjustified; we
come to a conclusion that is not guaranteed by our evidence. If it does, then it
doesn’t seem that his view can be made more sophisticated without leading to
internal contradiction. Can it? 3) In the online forum, it was suggested that a key difference between “green” and “grue” is that
I can tell purely observationally whether something is green whereas I cannot tell whether
something is grue by observation alone. For example, if I become confused about what year
it is and I am unsure whether it is currently 2020 or 2050, if you show me something green, I
will be able to tell you that it is green by looking at it (assuming reasonable lighting), but if
you ask me whether it is grue, I won’t know. (It is grue if it was first observed before 2030
and it is not grue, if it wasn’t. But I don’t know whether it was or wasn’t in the imagined
scenario.) Why would the fact that one can observe whether something is green but not
whether something is grue suggest that the all emeralds are green induction is more cogent
than the induction that concludes that all emeralds are grue? Alternatively, argue that it isn’t
that fact that suggests that the one induction is better than the other. One way to do that
would be to argue that it is some other fact that suggests it. Another way is just to argue
directly that it isn’t that fact without giving a positive suggestion as to what fact it, instead, is. 4) Has Quine provided convincing reasons to think that there are no analytic truths, that every
statement could, in principle, be given up as a response to experiment? If you think he has,
why not think that when we come to reject a sentence that we previously took to be analytic,
we have simply changed the meanings of the words it contains? For example, though there
might be an observation that might make us say “There are non-male bachelors”, one might
think that we are now simply using the word “bachelor” with a different meaning than before.
The idea here is that using the original meaning of “bachelor”, “bachelors are male” really
was an analytic truth. All he has shown, one might think, is that we can change the meanings
of words, but that is obvious insofar as you and I could set up a code in which the word
“bachelor” means anything we like and it isn’t clear why that fact would show that there are
no analytic truths. If, on the other hand, you think Quine hasn’t shown that there are no
analytic truths, why do so many putative examples of analytic truths seem not to really be so.
For example, most would say that “Bicycles have two wheels” is an analytic truth, but
bicycles with four wheels (including two additional “training wheels”) are routine and wellknown to us. So it looks as if it is not straightforwardly part of the meaning of “bicycle” that
a bicycle has only two wheels. Why not think that other putative examples of analytic truths
are exactly like this in not really being analytic? Perhaps we just lack the ability to imagine
their falsity, but they could be false.GRADING RUBRIC:I will grade based on the following categories:
Organization (40 points)
30 points: Paper structure and clarity
Structure – does the order in which you present your ideas to make your argument make
sense?
Clarity – is there a clearly stated thesis that directly addresses the prompt? Does the
entirety of the paper support that individual thesis in a cogent manner?
10 points: Style
Flow – are the transitions between sentences and paragraphs purposive?
Writing style – are you writing philosophically (clearly, deliberately, and without
unnecessary “flowery” language or jargon)?
Quotes vs. paraphrase – do you paraphrase content, rather than use direct quotes?
Citations – did you include all necessary citations?*
Spelling and grammar
Content (60 points)
30 points: Strength of argument
Conciseness – do you avoid repetition and include only relevant and necessary details?
Completeness – have you answered all parts of the prompt fully?
Dialectic – do the claims you make, as presented, interact logically and cohesively?
Accuracy – are you true to the text?
Precision – do you avoid ambiguity?
30 points: Comprehension of course materials
Do you display a clear, well-rounded understanding of the text?
I will provide brief comments and a fial breakdown of points by category when I return your papers.
Organization: x/40
Paper structure: x1/30
Style: x2/10
Content: y/80
Philosophical argument: y1/30
Comprehension: y2/30
Overall: x+y/100
*A word on citations: When in doubt, cite. Any style (MLA, Chicago, APA) is fine but be consistent.
Lack of citation is plagiarism and will be treated as such. I will be more strict about this policy on your
finals than I was on midterms. For minor citation issues (i.e. lack of citation when required) I will deduct
2 points. For larger plagiarism issues, I will send your paper to Professor Smith, who will decide how to
proceed. Include authors, year published, and page numbers, like (Godfrey-Smith 2020, 31).