The Second Treatise of Government
John Locke
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Introduction
One hundred years before the birth of the United States of America,
England was embroiled in two civil wars, a devastating fire and the plague. It
is during these tumultuous years that John Locke was raised (1632-1704).
Despite these obstacles, as an adult he saw the establishing of the Right of
Habeas Corpus, Freedom of Conscience and a Bill of Rights under
constitutional monarchy. These circumstances make the publishing of
Locke's Second Treatise of Government in 1690 all the more interesting.
For, though many of the ideas expressed in the Treatise are not new Natural
Rights [Those rights that human beings have merely in virtue of being
human. For Locke, these are Life, Liberty, and Property. Non-natural rights
are those rights that may or may not be extended to human beings; e.g., the
right to bear arms.], Social Contract [The Lockean Social Contract is an
agreement that recognizes the natural human rights and sets out the
means by which those will be protected. The Hobbesian Social Contract is an
agreement between individuals that seeks the protection of individuals from
the State of Nature.], they are clearly presented, defended in a single text
and contributed greatly to the "civilizing" of human society.
Commentary
The Second Treatise covers four broad topics: Chapter 1. The definition of
governmental power. 2. The basis of governmental power (chapters II-VII). 3.
A legitimate government and their types (chapters VIII-XV). 4. An
illegitimate government (chapters XVI-XIX).
First, in chapter 1, Locke states that what constitutes "power" of a
government is its ability to make laws, enforce them, defend the people all
only for the public good. One the one hand, the government has the
authority to make the laws of the land. On the other hand, the government
is not there to serve only the rich and powerful. Rather, it is there to serve
all of the people.
Second, Locke re-states the well-known argument for the social contract.
The argument begins with the question, what would be the condition of
people without a government: the so-called "state of nature [The Lockean
State of Nature refers to the essence of human beings, namely that there
are inalienable natural rights that the Social Contract is to protect. Without
that protection, on Locke's view, the social structure will descend into the
State of War. The Hobbesian State of Nature is roughly equivalent to the
Lockean State of War. It is a state prior to the social contract
characterized by a war of each against all. Life in this state is "solitary,
rude, nasty, brutish, and short." The Hobbesian Social Contract is a
protection of individuals from the State of Nature.]." In such a condition, as
there is no government limiting actions, one is in "perfect freedom to order
their actions." Nonetheless, one cannot do whatever one wants. For reason
"teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty [Liberty
is not the freedom to do as one pleases, but the ability to act without
coercion and to enjoy the natural rights innate to all human beings.], or
possessions." (This limitation within the state of nature is in stark contrast
to other versions of the state of nature that equate it with a state of war
[The state of human community when the Social Contract has broken down
and the social fabric has been ripped. In the State of War, there is a
Hobbesian kind of State of Nature marked by a battle of each against all.].)
All of these are grounded in our right to survive. Since these natural rights
are equal, therefore, you cannot transgress these same rights in others;
and if one's rights are transgressed, then one has the right to punish the
transgressor. Since one cannot necessarily be an impartial judge in cases
involving one's own rights, therefore one needs a government.
Locke states that a state of war arises when one's rights are violated, and
in such a case one has the right to self-defense. In the case where the initial
aggression was unjustified, then if the aggressor is defeated then, since it
is simply an extension of the state of war, the victor "owns" the aggressor
as a slave.
Chapter V is perhaps the most unique and significant in the Treatise. For it
is in this section that Locke lays out his views on property. These views
have been very influential in the development of political and economic views
in western culture. The idea begins with two reasonable claims: first, that
God has given the natural world to humans for their survival (even if one
does not believe in God, the natural world is still needed for survival).
Second, everything that comes from me is mine. So, on the basis of these
two foundational principles, Locke concludes that if anyone "hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it
his property." This is the key idea. For it is what justifies one's claim to own
property, which is central to capitalism (and opposed in communism). The
view states that if you work the land, then the product of that labor is
yours. So, for example, if one plants crops, then one "owns" the produce
(fruits, vegetables...). Nonetheless, one cannot waste and one cannot
prevent others from having their needs met.
Third, in chapters VIII -XV Locke explains the types and powers of a
legitimate government. As mentioned above, the legitimacy of a
government is required to adjudicate disputes, ensure the protection of
rights and to ensure the safety of the citizens. It follows naturally that the
citizens benefit from this government protection. As such, the authority
stems from the consent of the citizens. Further, in the final four chapters
Locke shows that if the government does not do its duty, if it violates the
rights of its own people, then there is a just as much right to rebellion as
there is to self-defense.
This brings us back to the historical context in which the Second Treatise
was written. The instability of the government, then tension between the
state and the people, and the question of revolution all were relevant to
Locke's life and times. His Treatise was one of the most influential
statements of the rights of the people and the proper role and power of the
government. These all were central to establishing the Constitution of the
new "America" about 75 years later.
Reading
CHAPTER I
1. IT HAVING been shown in the foregoing discourse:
(1)That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive
donation from God, any such authority over his children or dominion over the
world as is pretended.
(2)That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.
(3)That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God
that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right
of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been
certainly determined.
(4)That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the
eldest line of Adam's posterity being so long since utterly lost that in the
races of mankind and families of the world there remains not to one above
another the least pretense to be the eldest house, and to have the right of
inheritance.
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible
that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit or derive any the least
shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power:
Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not
give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product
only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but
that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for
perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion — things
that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against — must of
necessity find out another rise of government, an other original of political
power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it
than what Sir Robert Filmer has taught us.
2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be
political power; that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be
distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his
servants, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which
distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be
considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish
these powers one from another, and show the difference betwixt a ruler of
a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of
death and, consequently, all less penalties for the regulating and preserving
of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution
of such laws and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury;
and all this only for the public good.
CHAPTER II
OF THE STATE OF NATURE
4. To UNDERSTAND political power right and derive it from its original, we
must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and
persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal,
no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than
that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the
same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also
be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection; unless
the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his
will, set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear
appointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
5. This equality of men by nature the judicious Hooker looks upon as so
evident in itself and beyond all question that he makes it the foundation of
that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties we
owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice
and charity. His words are:
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their
duty to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal
must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even
as much at every man's hands as any man can wish unto his own soul, how
should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied unless myself be
careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of
one and the same nature? To have anything offered them repugnant to this
desire must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that, if I do
harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show
greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them; my
desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature, as much as possibly
may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the
like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them
that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath
drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant. (Eccl. Pol. lib. i.).
6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license;
though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much
as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern
it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker — all
the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and
about his business — they are his property whose workmanship they are,
made to last during his, not one another's, pleasure; and being furnished
with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be
supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to
destroy another, as if we were made for one another's uses as the inferior
ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve
himself and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his
own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice to an
offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of
the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights and
from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which
wills the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of
nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a
right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may
hinder its violation; for the law of nature would, as all other laws that
concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in that state
of nature had a power to execute that law and thereby preserve the
innocent and restrain offenders. And if anyone in the state of nature may
punish another for any evil he has done, everyone may do so; for in that
state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law,
everyone must needs have a right to do.
8. And thus in the state of nature one man comes by a power over another;
but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal, when he has got
him in his hands, according to the passionate heats or boundless
extravagance of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm
reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,
which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint; for these two
are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is
that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender
declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their
mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tie which is
to secure them from injury and violence being slighted and broken by him.
Which being a trespass against the whole species and the peace and safety
of it provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the
right he has to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or, where it is
necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on
any one who has transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing
of it and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like
mischief. And in this case, and upon this ground, every man has a right to
punish the offender and be executioner of the law of nature.
9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men; but
before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by what right any
prince or state can put to death or punish any alien for any crime he
commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction
they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a
stranger; they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to
them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects
of that commonwealth, has no power over him. Those who have the supreme
power of making laws in England, France, or Holland, are to an Indian but like
the rest of the world — men without authority; and therefore, if by the law
of nature every man has not a power to punish offenses against it as he
soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any
community can punish an alien of another country, since, in reference to
him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have
over another.
10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law and varying from
the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate and
declares himself to quit the principles of human nature and to be a noxious
creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some
other man receives damage by his transgression; in which case he who has
received any damage has, besides the right of punishment common to him
with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done
it; and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is
injured and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may
make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
11. From these two distinct rights — the one of punishing the crime for
restraint and preventing the like offense, which right of punishing is in
everybody; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured
party — comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate has
the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the
public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of
criminal offenses by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the
satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That
he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and
he alone can remit; the damnified person has this power of appropriating to
himself the goods or service of the offender by right of self-preservation,
as every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent its being
committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind and doing all
reasonable things he can in order to that end; and thus it is that every man,
in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others
from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the
example of the punishment that attends it from everybody, and also to
secure men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason
— the common rule and measure God has given to mankind — has, by the
unjust violence and slaughter he has committed upon one, declared war
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one
of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor
security. And upon this is grounded that great law of nature, "Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." And Cain was so fully
convinced that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal that, after
the murder of his brother, he cries out, "Every one that findeth me, shall
slay me"; so plain was it written in the hearts of mankind.
12. By the same reason may a man in
breaches of that law. It will perhaps be
Each transgression may be punished to
severity as will suffice to make it an ill
the state of nature punish the lesser
demanded: with death? I answer:
that degree and with so much
bargain to the offender, give him
cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offense that
can be committed in the state of nature may in the state of nature be also
punished equally, and as far forth as it may in a commonwealth; for though
it would be beside my present purpose to enter here into the particulars of
the law of nature, or its measures of punishment, yet it is certain there is
such a law, and that, too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a
studier of that law as the positive laws of commonwealths, nay, possibly
plainer, as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and
intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put
into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries,
which are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature, by
which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
13. To this strange doctrine — viz., that in the state of nature every one
has the executive power of the law of nature — I doubt not but it will be
objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases,
that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends, and, on
the other side, that ill nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far
in punishing others, and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow;
and that therefore God has certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, which must
certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case; since it is
easy to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury
will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it; but I shall desire those
who make this objection to remember that absolute monarchs are but men,
and if government is to be the remedy of those evils which necessarily
follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is
therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that
is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man
commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may
do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any
one to question or control those who execute his pleasure, and in
whatsoever he does, whether led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be
submitted to? Much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not
bound to submit to the unjust will of another; and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind.
14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, "Where are or ever were there
any men in such a state of nature?" To which it may suffice as an answer at
present that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all
through the world are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was,
nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all
governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in
league with others; for it is not every compact that puts an end to the
state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together
mutually to enter into one community and make one body politic; other
promises and compacts men may make one with another and yet still be in
the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the
two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his
history of Peru, or between a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America,
are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature in
reference to one another; for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as
men, and not as members of society.
15. To those that say there were never any men in the state of nature, I
will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol., lib. i.,
sect. 10, where he says,
The laws which have been hitherto mentioned (i.e., the laws of nature) do
bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any
settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what
to do, or not to do; but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to
furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as
our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply
those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living singly and solely
by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship
with others. This was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in
politic societies.
But I, moreover, affirm that all men are naturally in that state and remain
so till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic
society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse to make it very clear.
CHAPTER III
OF THE STATE OF WAR
16. THE STATE of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and,
therefore, declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty but a
sedate, settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war
with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has
exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him or anyone that
joins with him in his defense and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable
and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with
destruction; for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be
preserved as much as possible when all cannot be preserved, the safety of
the innocent is to be preferred; and one may destroy a man who makes war
upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason
that he may kill a wolf or a lion, because such men are not under the ties of
the common law of reason, have no other rule but that of force and
violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and
noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into
their power.
17. And hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his
absolute power does thereby put himself into a state of war with him, it
being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life; for I have
reason to conclude that he who would get me into his power without my
consent would use me as he pleased when he got me there, and destroy me,
too, when he had a fancy to it; for nobody can desire to have me in his
absolute power unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against
the right of my freedom, i.e., make me a slave. To be free from such force
is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him as
an enemy to my preservation who would take away that freedom which is
the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me thereby
puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature,
would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state must
necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that
freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of
society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or
commonwealth must be supposed to design to take away from them
everything else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.
18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least
hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life any farther than, by the use
of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he
pleases, from him; because using force where he has no right to get me into
his power, let his pretense be what it will, I have no reason to suppose that
he who would take away my liberty would not, when he had me in his power,
take away everything else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as
one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e., kill him if I can; for
to that hazard does he justly expose himself whoever introduces a state of
war and is aggressor in it.
19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and
the state of war which, however some men have confounded, are as far
distant as a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance, and preservation,
and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are one from
another. Men living together according to reason, without a common
superior on earth with authority to judge between them, is properly the
state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person
of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for
relief, is the state of war; and it is the want of such an appeal [that] gives a
man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society and
a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm but by appeal to the law
for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill when he sets on me to rob me
but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my
preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present
force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own
defense and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the
aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision
of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable.
Want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of nature;
force without right upon a man's person makes a state of war both where
there is and is not a common judge.
20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between
those that are in society and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair
determination of the law, because then there lies open the remedy of appeal
for the past injury and to prevent future harm. But where no such appeal is,
as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws and judges with authority
to appeal to, the state of war once begun continues with a right to the
innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor
offers peace and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any
wrongs he has already done and secure the innocent for the future; nay,
where an appeal to the law and constituted judges lies open, but the remedy
is denied by a manifest perverting of justice and a barefaced wresting of
the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or
party of men, there it is hard to imagine anything but a state of war; for
wherever violence is used and injury done, though by hands appointed to
administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however colored with the
name, pretenses, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and
redress the innocent by an unbiased application of it to all who are under it;
wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who
having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in
such cases — an appeal to heaven.
21. To avoid this state of war — wherein there is no appeal but to heaven,
and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no
authority to decide between the contenders — is one great reason of men's
putting themselves into society and quitting the state of nature; for where
there is an authority, a power on earth from which relief can be had by
appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the
controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any
superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephthah and
the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war; but we see he was
forced to appeal to heaven: "The Lord the Judge," says he, "be judge this day
between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon" (Judges xi. 27.),
and then prosecuting and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to
battle. And, therefore, in such controversies where the question is put,
"Who shall be judge?" it cannot be meant, "who shall decide the controversy";
every one knows what Jephthah here tells us, that "the Lord the Judge" shall
judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven.
That question then cannot mean: who shall judge whether another has put
himself in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephthah did,
appeal to heaven in it? Of that I myself can only be judge in my own
conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme Judge of all
men.
CHAPTER IV
OF SLAVERY
22. THE NATURAL liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on
earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to
have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to
be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the
commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of any law but
what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it. Freedom
then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us "a liberty for every one to do
what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws"; but
freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by,
common to every one of that society and made by the legislative power
erected in it, a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule
prescribes not, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown,
arbitrary will of another man; as freedom of nature is to be under no other
restraint but the law of nature.
23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary to, and
closely joined with, a man's preservation that he cannot part with it but by
what forfeits his preservation and life together; for a man not having the
power of his own life cannot by compact or his own consent enslave himself
to any one, nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another to
take away his life when he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has
himself; and he that cannot take away his own life cannot give another
power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act
that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in
his power, delay to take it and make use of him to his own service; and he
does him no injury by it, for whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery
outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his
master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else but "the
state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive"; for if
once compact enter between them and make an agreement for a limited
power on the one side and obedience on the other, the state of war and
slavery ceases as long as the compact endures; for, as has been said, no
man can by agreement pass over to another that which he has not in himself
— a power over his own life.
I confess we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell
themselves; but it is plain this was only to drudgery, not to slavery; for it is
evident the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical
power; for the master could not have power to kill him at any time whom, at
a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the
master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over
his life that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of
an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi).
CHAPTER V
OF PROPERTY
25. WHETHER we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being
once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and
drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence; or
revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world
to Adam, and to Noah and his sons; it is very clear that God, as King David
says (Psalm cxv. 16), "has given the earth to the children of men," given it
to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very
great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in
anything. I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make
out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his
posterity in common, it is impossible that any man but one universal
monarch should have any property upon a supposition that God gave the
world to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his
posterity. But I shall endeavor to show how men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and
that without any express compact of all the commoners.
26. God, who has given the world to men in common, has also given them
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The
earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of
their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces and beasts it
feeds belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the
spontaneous hand of nature; and nobody has originally a private dominion
exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their
natural state; yet, being given for the use of men, there must of necessity
be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of
any use or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit or venison which
nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure and is still a tenant in
common, must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of him, that another can no
longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of
his life.
27. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet
every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but
himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has
provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed
from the common state nature has placed it in, it has by this labor
something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For
this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he
can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is
enough and as good left in common for others.
28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the
apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated
them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then,
When did they begin to be his? When he digested or when he ate or when he
boiled or when he brought them home? Or when he picked them up? And it is
plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labor
put a distinction between them and common; that added something to them
more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became
his private right. And will anyone say he had no right to those acorns or
apples he thus appropriated because he had not the consent of all mankind
to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what
belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man
had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in
commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of
what is common and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in which
begins the property, without which the common is of no use. And the taking
of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the
commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut,
and the ore I have digged in any place where I have a right to them in
common with others, become my property without the assignation or
consent of anybody. The labor that was mine, removing them out of that
common state they were in, has fixed my property in them.
29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner necessary to any
one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children
or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master had
provided for them in common without assigning to every one his peculiar
part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can
doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labor has taken
it out of the hands of nature where it was common and belonged equally to
all her children, and has thereby appropriated it to himself.
30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who has killed it; it
is allowed to be his goods who has bestowed his labor upon it, though before
it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted
the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to
determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property
in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof what
fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of
mankind, or what ambergris any one takes up here, is, by the labor that
removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property
who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that anyone is
hunting is thought his who pursues her during the chase; for, being a beast
that is still looked upon as common and no man's private possession,
whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind as to find and
pursue her has thereby removed her from the state of nature wherein she
was common, and has begun a property.
31. It will perhaps be objected to this that "if gathering the acorns, or other
fruits of the earth, etc., makes a right to them, then any one may engross
as much as he will." To which I answer: not so. The same law of nature that
does by this means give us property does also bound that property, too.
"God has given us all things richly" (1 Tim. vi. 17) is the voice of reason
confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much
as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so
much he may by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is more
than his share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to
spoil or destroy. And thus considering the plenty of natural provisions there
was a long time in the world, and the few spenders, and to how small a part
of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself and engross it
to the prejudice of others, especially keeping within the bounds set by
reason of what might serve for his use, there could be then little room for
quarrels or contentions about property so established.
32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth
and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes
in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain that property in that, too,
is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his
labor does, as it were, enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his
right to say everybody else has an equal title to it, and therefore he cannot
appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent of all his fellow
commoners — all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all
mankind, commanded man also to labor, and the penury of his condition
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth,
i.e., improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it
that was his own, his labor. He that in obedience to this command of God
subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something
that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury
take from him.
33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land by improving it any
prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough and as good left,
and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was
never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself; for he
that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take
nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another
man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same
water left him to quench his thirst; and the case of land and water, where
there is enough for both, is perfectly the same.
34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for
their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to
draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain
common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and
rational — and labor was to be his title to it — not to the fancy or
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left
for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain, ought not
to meddle with what was already improved by another's labor; if he did, it is
plain he desired the benefit of another's pains which he had no right to, and
not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labor on,
and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed, and more
than he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.
35. It is true, in land that is common in England or any other country where
there are plenty of people under government who have money and
commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent
of all his fellow commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e., by
the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common in
respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind, but is the joint property of
this country or this parish. Besides, the remainder after such enclosure
would not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the whole was when
they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first
peopling of the great common of the world it was quite otherwise. The law
man was under was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants
forced, him to labor. That was his property which could not be taken from
him wherever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth
and having dominion, we see, are joined together. The one gave title to the
other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to
appropriate; and the condition of human life which requires labor and
material to work on necessarily introduces private possessions.
36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's
labor and the conveniences of life. No man's labor could subdue or
appropriate all, nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part, so
that it was impossible for any man, this way, to entrench upon the right of
another, or acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of his neighbor,
who would still have room for as good and as large a possession — after the
other had taken out his — as before it was appropriated. This measure did
confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as
he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody, in the first ages
of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost by wandering from
their company in the then vast wilderness of the earth than to be straitened
for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still
without prejudice to anybody, as full as the world seems; for supposing a
man or family in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the
children of Adam or Noah, let him plant in some inland, vacant places of
America; we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the
measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,
prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain or think
themselves injured by this man's encroachment, though the race of men
have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world and do infinitely
exceed the small number which was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
ground is of so little value without labor that I have heard it affirmed that in
Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow, and reap, without being
disturbed, upon land he has no other title to but only his making use of it.
But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him who
by his industry on neglected and consequently waste land has increased the
stock of corn which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress
on, this I dare boldly affirm — that the same rule of property, viz., that
every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in
the world without straitening anybody, since there is land enough in the
world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money and
the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it introduced — by consent —
larger possessions and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall
by-and-by show more at large.
37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more
than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things which depends only
on their usefulness to the life of man, or had agreed that a little piece of
yellow metal which would keep without wasting or decay should be worth a
great piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn, though men had a right to
appropriate, by their labor, each one to himself as much of the things of
nature as he could use, yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of
others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the
same industry. To which let me add that he who appropriates land to himself
by his labor does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind; for
the provisions serving to the support of human life produced by one acre of
enclosed and cultivated land are — to speak much within compass — ten
times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal
richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that encloses land, and
has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres than he
could have from a hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety
acres to mankind; for his labor now supplies him with provisions out of ten
acres which were by the product of a hundred lying in common. I have here
rated the improved land very low in making its product but as ten to one,
when it is much nearer a hundred to one; for I ask whether in the wild woods
and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any
improvement, tillage, or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and
wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten acres of equally
fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated.
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit,
killed, caught, or tamed as many of the beasts as he could; he that so
employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature as any
way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any
of his labor on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them; but, if they
perished in his possession without their due use, if the fruits rotted or the
venison putrified before he could spend it, he offended against the common
law of nature and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbor's share,
for he had no right further than his use called for any of them and they
might serve to afford him conveniences of life.
38. The same measures governed the possession of land, too: whatsoever
he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of before it spoiled, that was his
peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed and could feed and make use of, the
cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure
rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering
and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still
to be looked on as waste and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at
the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till and make it
his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel's sheep to feed on; a few acres
would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased and
industry enlarged their stocks, their possessions enlarged with the need of
them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground
they made use of till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and
built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time to set out the bounds
of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their
neighbors, and by laws within themselves settled the properties of those of
the same society; for we see that in that part of the world which was first
inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as
Abraham's time they wandered with their flocks and their herds, which was
their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did in a country
where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain that at least a great part of the
land lay in common, that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property
in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough in
the same place for their herds to feed together, they, by consent, as
Abraham and Lot did (Gen. xiii. 5), separated and enlarged their pasture
where it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his
father and his brother and planted in Mount Seir (Gen. xxxvi. 6).
39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion and property in Adam
over all the world exclusive of all other men, which can in no way be proven,
nor any one's property be made out from it; but supposing the world given,
as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labor could make
men distinct titles to several parcels of it for their private uses, wherein
there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.
40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear,
that the property of labor should be able to overbalance the community of
land; for it is labor indeed that put the difference of value on everything;
and let anyone consider what the difference is between an acre of land
planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the
same land lying in common without any husbandry upon it, and he will find
that the improvement of labor makes the far greater part of the value. I
think it will be but a very modest computation to say that, of the products
of the earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects of labor;
nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use and cast up
the several expenses about them, what in them is purely owing to nature,
and what to labor, we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths
are wholly to be put on the account of labor.
41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several
nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land and poor in all the
comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other
people with the materials of plenty, i.e., a fruitful soil, apt to produce in
abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight, yet for want of
improving it by labor have not one-hundredth part of the conveniences we
enjoy. And a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds, lodges, and is
clad worse than a day-laborer in England.
42. To make this a little clear, let us but trace some of the ordinary
provisions of life through their several progresses before they come to our
use and see how much of their value they receive from human industry.
Bread, wine, and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty; yet,
notwithstanding, acorns, water, and leaves, or skins must be our bread,
drink, and clothing, did not labor furnish us with these more useful
commodities; for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than
water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins, or moss, that is wholly owing to
labor and industry: the one of these being the food and raiment which
unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our
industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in
value when anyone has computed, he will then see how much labor makes the
far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world. And the
ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as any, or
at most but a very small, part of it; so little that even amongst us land that
is left wholly to nature, that has no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or
planting, is called, as indeed it is, 'waste'; and we shall find the benefit of it
amount to little more than nothing.
This shows how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of
dominions; and that the increase of lands and the right employing of them is
the great art of government; and that prince who shall be so wise and
godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and
encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression
of power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbors;
but this by the bye.
To return to the argument in hand.
43. An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another
in America which with the same husbandry would do the like, are, without
doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value; but yet the benefit mankind
receives from the one in a year is worth £5, and from the other possibly not
worth a penny if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued
and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one-thousandth. It is labor, then,
which puts the greatest part of the value upon land, without which it would
scarcely be worth anything; it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its
useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread of that acre of wheat is
more worth than the product of an acre of as good land which lies waste is
all the effect of labor. For it is not barely the ploughman's pains, the
reaper's and thresher's toil, and the baker's sweat [that] is to be counted
into the bread we eat; the labor of those who broke the oxen, who digged
and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed
about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number
requisite to this corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being made
bread, must all be charged on the account of labor, and received as an
effect of that; nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless
materials as in themselves. It would be a strange "catalogue of things that
industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread" before it
came to our use, if we could trace them: iron, wood, leather, bark, timber,
stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dyeing drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and
all the materials made use of in the ship that brought any of the
commodities used by any of the workmen to any part of the work; all which
it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
44. From all which it is evident that, though the things of nature are given
in common, yet man, by being master of himself and proprietor of his own
person and the actions or labor of it, had still in himself the great
foundation of property; and that which made up the greater part of what he
applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had
improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own and did not belong
in common to others.
45. Thus labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property wherever anyone
was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long
while the far greater part and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men,
at first, for the most part contented themselves with what unassisted
nature offered to their necessities; and though afterwards, in some parts
of the world — where the increase of people and stock, with the use of
money, had made land scarce and so of some value — the several
communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories and, by laws
within themselves, regulated the properties of the private men of their
society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which
labor and industry began. And the leagues that have been made between
several states and kingdoms either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim
and right to the land in the others' possession have, by common consent,
given up their pretenses to their natural common right which originally they
had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a
property amongst themselves in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet
there are still great tracts of ground to be found which — the inhabitants
thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use
of their common money — lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell
on it do or can make use of, and so still lie in common; though this can
scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the
use of money.
46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as
the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look
after, as it does the Americans now, are generally things of short duration,
such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of
themselves; gold, silver, and diamonds are things that fancy or agreement
has put the value on, more than real use and the necessary support of life.
Now of those good things which nature has provided in common, every one
had a right, as has been said, to as much as he could use, and property in all
that he could effect with his labor; all that his industry could extend to, to
alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a
hundred bushels of acorns or apples had thereby a property in them; they
were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that he used them
before they spoiled, else he took more than his share and robbed others.
And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more
than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to anybody else so that it
perished not uselessly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if
he also bartered away plums that would have rotted in a week for nuts that
would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not
the common stock, destroyed no part of the portion of the goods that
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Again,
if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its color, or
exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond,
and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others; he
might heap as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of
the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession,
but the perishing of anything uselessly in it.
47. And thus came in the use of money — some lasting thing that men
might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in
exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.
48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions
in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the
opportunity to continue and enlarge them; for supposing an island, separate
from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were
but a hundred families, but there were sheep, horses, and cows, with other
useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred
thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because of its
commonness or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money; what
reason could anyone have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use
of his family and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their
own industry produced or they could barter for like perishable, useful
commodities with others? Where there is not something both lasting and
scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to
enlarge their possessions of land were it ever so rich, ever so free for them
to take. For, I ask, what would a man value ten thousand or a hundred
thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated and well stocked, too,
with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America where he had no
hopes of commerce with other parts of the world to draw money to him by
the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should
see him give up again to the wild common of nature whatever was more than
would supply the conveniences of life to be had there for him and his family.
49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that
is now; for no such thing as money was anywhere known. Find out something
that has the use and value of money amongst his neighbors, you shall see
the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.
50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in
proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the
consent of men, whereof labor yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is
plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of
the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way
how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the
product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one, these metals not spoiling or
decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things in an
inequality of private possessions men have made practicable out of the
bounds of society and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and
silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money; for, in governments, the
laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is
determined by positive constitutions.
51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive how labor could at first
begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the
spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that there could then be no reason
of quarreling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it
gave. Right and convenience went together; for as a man had a right to all
he could employ his labor upon, so he had no temptation to labor for more
than he could make use of. This left no room for controversy about the
title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man
carved to himself was easily seen, and it was useless, as well as dishonest,
to carve himself too much or take more than he needed.
CHAPTER VI
OF PATERNAL POWER
52. IT MAY PERHAPS be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a
discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names that have
obtained in the world; and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new
ones when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of 'paternal
power' probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents
over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it;
whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find she has an equal
title. This may give one reason to ask whether this might not be more
properly called 'parental power,' for whatever obligation nature and the right
of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them equally to both
concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God
everywhere joins them together without distinction when it commands the
obedience of children: "Honour thy father and thy mother" (Exod. xx. 12);
"Whosoever curseth his father or his mother" (Lev. xx. 9); "Ye shall fear
every man his mother and his father" (Lev. xix. 5); "Children, obey your
parents," etc. (Eph. vi. 1), is the style of the Old and New Testament.
53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking any deeper
into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into those
gross mistakes they have made about this power of parents, which, however
it might without any great harshness bear the name of absolute dominion
and regal authority, when under the title of 'paternal power' it seemed
appropriated to the father, would yet have sounded but oddly and in the very
name shown the absurdity if this supposed absolute power over children had
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