7 L I D D E L L , T I Frank Serpico F F A rank Serpico is arguably the most famous police officer in the United States, even thoughN he hasn’t worked in law enforcement since 1972. After serving in Korea, he Y He realized that became a New York City police officer in 1959. F Fred W. McDarrah/Premium Archive/Getty Images Police Corruption and Responses Chapter Objectives 1. Describe the types of police corruption (economic corruption and abuse of authority). the “pad” (payments by store owners to the cops) was widespread, and when he refused to take the money he earned the 2. Describe individual explanations of 1 corruption and potential solutions. distrust of those who did. Over 12 years, he rose to the rank of detective and never participated in the5pad. After repeated 3. Describe organizational explanations of corruption and potential solutions. attempts to get supervisors to do something, 6 in 1970–1971, he and David Durk, a fellow officer, went to the New York Times 4. Describe societal explanations of 8 corruption and potential solutions. and participated in an exposé of police corruption. The series of stories led to the Knapp Commission. T Serpico and Durk continued to work even though rumors that they were the S “rats” were widespread and there was a real danger that corrupt police officers would retaliate against them. Before he had a chance to testify, Serpico was shot in the face at point-blank range in a drug bust while his fellow officers stood behind him. The 183 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 184   Part II   Police shooting was suspected of being a setup, especially since the “officer down” call never was issued. However, no officer was investigated or charged with any wrongdoing in relation to the shooting. Serpico survived and went on to testify before the Knapp Commission. The name Serpico continues to elicit two different reactions. For some, it represents the epitome of an honest and brave man who stood against corruption at great risk to self. For others, it represents a “rat,” a man who turned his back on his friends, and, for some officers, to be called a “Serpico” is a serious insult. Why we still talk about Frank Serpico is that his story includes all the elements of the problem of police corruption. From what we know, the problem is “vertical” in that supervisors and administrators are either involved, have been involved, or, more often, actively try to cover up or ignore the corruption. Secondly, the problem is known to many offic s even if few are involved, but the “blue curtain” shields the corrupt few. Finally, whistleblowers that expose the corruption are considered traitors and, someL times, serious retaliation occurs. There is no doubt that Imost police offic s are honest and strive to be ethical in all they do; however, examples of corruption and graft in law enforcement agencies are not D difficult to fi d. In this chapter, we provide a more detailed discussion of misconduct. Dmisconduct into two broad categories: economic corrupFor our purposes, we divide tion and abuse of authority. E Economic corruption can be defi ed as the use of one’s position to obtain improper fi ancial benefit. Abuse of authority is when the power and authority of the offic Lis misused. First, we discuss prevalence, then we provide examples. Finally, individual L explanations for corruption are presented, followed by organizational and societal explanations. Th s same order is followed when discussing , responses and potential solutions. Since the very beginning of organized police departments, various investigative bodies have documented T cases of corruption. Fyfe and Kane (2006), for instance, provide a long list of commissions and task forces that investigated police corruption I scandals in a number of cities, including the Chicago Police Committee (in 1931), the Knapp Commission (New York City in 1972–1973), the Kolts Commission (Los F Angeles County in 1992), the Mollen Commission (New York City in 1993), the PhilaF delphia Police Study Task Force (in 1987), the Christopher Commission (Los Angeles in 1996), the New OrleansAMayor’s Advisory Committee (in 1993), the Royal Commission (Sydney, Australia,Nin 1997), and the St. Clair Commission (Boston in 1992), to name only a few. Bayley and Perito (2011) analyzed 32 different commissions that Y thirteen were in the United States, six in Australia, three investigated police corruption; in the United Kingdom, four in Canada, and one each in a number of other countries, including India, Ireland, Kenya, and Israel. 1 Even though there is a large body of literature on police corruption, few studies have been able to measure5its extent and prevalence. An obvious barrier to discovery is getting police offic s to6admit to wrongdoing. One early study reported that, by offic s’ own accounts, 39 percent of their number engaged in brutality, 22 percent per8 had sex on duty, 8 percent drank on duty, and 39 percent jured themselves, 31 percent slept on duty (Barker and Carter, T 1994). Barker (1983) reported that between 9 and 31 percent of offic s who had been employed for 11 months or less reported observing S corrupt practices. In a sample of narcotics offic s, Stevens (1999) reported that 63 percent said they had very often heard of narcotics offic s using more force than necessary to make an 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   185 arrest, 26 percent had often heard of other offic s personally consuming and/or selling drugs, and 82 percent had very often heard of other narcotics offic s violating the civil rights of suspects. These numbers must be interpreted carefully in that they do not mean that large numbers of offic s were corrupt, only that a fairly large number of offic s were aware of at least one offic ’s misconduct. Fyfe and Kane (2006; also see Kane and White, 2009) studied police offic s in New York City who were terminated for cause and found that only 2 percent of offic s in the 22 years under study (1975–1996) were terminated for misconduct. Th s study’s fi dings must also be interpreted with caution since the number of offic s who come to the attention of supervisors and are offi ally sanctioned by termination is probably quite a bit lower than the numbers who commit corrupt acts. Further, offic s are sometimes terminated for rule breaking that does not fit into any category of corruption. L of 3,818) were arrested on charges from In 2011, 23 Washington, D.C. offic s (out sexual assault to murder. One office allegedly I fi ed into a car of transgendered people. Another had sex with a teenager. Yet another lied about a murder to protect her boyD friend. Police Chief Cathy Lanier defended the department, stating that many of the arrests were due to internal investigations; atDleast four of the offic s were detected in a departmental audit and sting operation. We E have no way of knowing whether this rate of offic s committing misconduct is higher than in other departments, especially because in many states, personnel records L of police offic s are not subject to open records requests (McCabe, 2011). L In 1977, 37 percent of the public rated police integrity and ethics as high or very , high, and 12 percent rated police integrity as low or very low. In 2011, 54 percent of the public rated police integrity as high or very high and 11 percent of the population rated police integrity as low or very low (Sourcebook T of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2007, 2011). Of course, perceptions are not necessarily refl ctive of reality, so the fact is that, other I than the corruption scandals that occur periodically, we really do not have any good data on the prevalence of economic corruption or abuse of authority. F Space prohibits any description of corruption in other countries. Suffic to say F that the same types of scandals and examples of corruption that we see in the United States exist across the world in developingAand developed countries. Transparency International charts corruption worldwide,Nranking more than 90 countries. Th s agency defi es corruption as abuse of public offic (including police) for private gain (e.g., bribe taking). The countries withYthe highest scores for honesty typically are fi st-world countries, while poorest countries produced very low scores. In the latest rankings available from Transparency International, which used polls to rank 1 180 countries, New Zealand was ranked fi st in the public’s trust in the honesty of their public offi als, followed by Denmark,5Finland, Sweden, Singapore, Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland, and then 6 Canada in the tenth position on the list. The United States followed the United Kingdom in rankings of 18 and 17, respectively, 8 had dropped to 24, but returned to in 2009. In the 2011 rankings, the United States the 17th spot in 2014. At the bottom of the T current rankings were countries such as Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia (Transparency S International, 2011, 2014). Before one can begin to research prevalence, it would be necessary to have some shared understanding of a defin tion of corruption. There are many defin tions and 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 186   Part II   Police typologies in the literature. Fyfe and Kane (2006: 37–38), for instance, reviewed the literature, and then identifi d a long list of types of misconduct: • Profit-motivated crimes (all offenses with the goal of profit except those that are drug-related) • Off-duty crimes against persons (all assaultive, non-profit-related crimes off-duty) • Off-duty public-order crimes (not including drugs, and most commonly DWI [driving while intoxicated] and disorderly conduct) • Drugs (all crimes related to possession, sale, conspiracy, and failing departmental drug tests) • On-duty abuse (use of excessive force, psychological abuse, or discrimination) • Obstruction of justice (conspiracy, perjury, official misconduct, and all other ­offenses with the goal ofLobstructing justice) I perform (violating one or more departmental rules, poli• Administrative/failure to cies, and procedures) D • Conduct-related probationary failures (simple failure to meet expectations). D In the discussion to follow,Ewe will offer a much simpler typology of simply economic corruption and abuse of authority. L L Economic Corruption , Corruption has been described as “acting on opportunities, created by virtue of one’s authority, for personal gain at the expense of the public one is authorized to serve” T (Cohen, 1986: 23). Baksheesh, a euphemism for graft, is endemic in many developing I countries where officials, including law enforcement officers, expect baksheesh before doing the job they are supposed to do; alternatively, they extort money in exchange for F not doing their job. “It’s just the way it is” is the explanation for why such corruption F is not systemic in this country; however, one can find exists. Obviously the problem many examples of police officers A using their position to acquire unfair benefits. In 1973, the Knapp Commission detailed its findings of corruption in the New York N City Police Department. The terms grass eaters and meat eaters were used to describe Y who took advantage of their position to engage in corrupt New York City police officers practices. Accepting bribes, gratuities, and unsolicited protection money was the extent of the corruption engaged in by grass eaters, who were fairly passive in their deviant 1 practices. Meat eaters participated in shakedowns, “shopped” at burglary scenes, and engaged in more active deviant 5 practices. The Mollen Commission, which investigated New York City Police Department corruption 20 years later (1993), concluded that 6 meat eaters were engaged in a qualitatively different kind of corruption in more recent 8 with criminals, the corrupt cops were active criminals times. Beyond just cooperating themselves, selling drugs, robbing drug dealers, and operating burglary rings. T Economic corruption includes gratuities (when they conflict with law and policy), S companies), overtime schemes (e.g., such as a 2014 scankickbacks (e.g., from towing dal in Houston where officers made up tickets in order to create the need to appear and earn overtime), misuse/appropriation of departmental property, payoffs (payment for shifts, promotions, or other benefits), ticket “fixing,” bribery/extortion (shakedowns of storeowners or protection money to drug dealers), and theft from burglary 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   187 scenes. The more serious acts in this list are also crimes. An important distinction that should be made is between crimes and ethical transgressions. It is an insult to law enforcement officers when certain actions, such as stealing from a burglary scene or taking money from a drug dealer to guard a shipment of drugs, are discussed as if they were ethical dilemmas in the same category as whether to avoid responding to a minor traffic accident or whether an officer should call in sick so he can go fishing. Stealing from a burglary scene and conspiring to protect drug dealers are crimes. The officers who engage in such acts are criminals who are quite distinct from officers who commit ethical lapses akin to other workers who do so within the parameters of their particular professions or jobs. Gratuities L individual because of his or her role or Gratuities are items of value received by an position rather than because of a personal relationship with the giver. The widespread I practices of free coffee in convenience stores, half-price or free meals in restaurants, D and half-price dry cleaning are examples of gratuities. Frequently, businesspeople offer Dfor the police officers’ work. Although gratuities as a token of sincere appreciation the formal code of ethics prohibits accepting Egratuities, many officers believe there is nothing wrong with businesses giving “freebies” to police officers. They see these as small rewards indeed for the difficulties theyLendure in police work. Justifications for gratuities include the idea L that some businesses need (and should pay for) extra protection; that they are no different than the perks of other occupations; , that they compensate for poor pay; and that they cement community relations (when the officer stays and drinks coffee with the storeowner; Prenzler, 1995; Kania, 1988). Research indicates that people do not T support gratuities, but do not think they are very serious either, especially when the items were infrequent, food, or inexpensive (Prenzler, 1995; Lord and Bjerregaard, I2003). Critics of gratuities argue that they “erode public confidence in law enforcement F and undermine our quest for professionalism” (Stefanic, 1981: 63). Cohen (1986: 26) believes that gratuities violate the F social contract because citizens give up their liberty to exploit only to be exploited. A 2004b) argue against gratuities for the Critics (Ruiz and Bono, 2004; Coleman, 2004a, following reasons: N gratuities Items of value received by an individual because of his or her role or position rather than because of a personal relationship with the giver. • Police are professionals, and professionalsYdon’t take gratuities. • Gratuities are incipient corruptors because people expect different treatment in return. 1 • Gratuities are an abuse of authority and create a sense of entitlement. 5 • Gratuities add up to substantial amounts of money and can constitute as high as 6 30 percent of an officer’s income. • Gratuities can be the beginning of more serious forms of corruption. 8 • Gratuities are contrary to democratic ideals T because they are a type of fee-forservice for public functions that are already paid for through taxes, such as police S protection. • Gratuities create a public perception that police are corrupt. Kania (1988, 2004) argues that only when either or both the giver and taker (officer) have impure intent are gratuities wrong. For instance, it would be an unethical exchange 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 188   Part II   Police if the intent of the giver was to give in exchange for some future service, not as reward for past services rendered. Another unethical exchange would be when the intent of the police officer taking the gratuity was not to receive unsolicited but appreciated gifts, but rather, to use the position of police officer to extort goods from business owners. A third type of unethical exchange would occur if both the giver and the police officer’s motives were unethical: if the giver expected special treatment and the officer’s intent was to take the gratuity in exchange for performing the special service. In Kania’s scheme, ethical exchanges are only when true rewards or gifts with no expectation of future acts are offered and received with no expectations. Unethical exchanges are when either the giver or receiver expects something in return, such as understandings, bribes, arrangements, and shakedowns. Where should one draw the line between harmless rewards and inappropriate gifts? Is a discount on a meal okay, but not a free meal? Is a meal okay, but not any L or tires or car stereos? Do the store or restaurant owners other item, such as groceries expect anything for their money, such as more frequent patrols or overlooking sales I of alcohol to underage juveniles? Should they expect different treatment from officers D than the treatment given to those who do not offer gratuities? Suppose that an officer D owner that she can help herself to anything in the store— is told by a convenience store free coffee, candy, cigarettes, E chips, magazines, and the like. In the same conversation, the store owner asks the officer for her personal cellphone number “in case something happens and I need to getLin contact with you.” Is this a gift, or is it an exchange? Should the officer accept the L free merchandise? Many merchants give free or discount food to officers because they like to have , police around, especially late at night. The question then becomes the one asked frequently by citizens: Why are two or three police cars always at a certain restaurant? Police argue that they deserve T to take their breaks wherever they want within their patrol area. If it happens that they choose the same place, that shouldn’t be a conI an impression of unequal protection occurs when officers cern of the public. However, make a habit of eating at certain restaurants or congregating at certain convenience F stores. Free meals or even coffee may influence the pattern of police patrol and, thus, F may be wrong because some citizens are not receiving equal protection. Avaries from city to city. In cities where rules against graThe extent of gratuities tuities are loosely enforced, N“dragging the sack” may be developed to an art form by some police officers, who go out of their way to collect free meals and other gifts. Ruiz Y a restaurant owner, who had been giving free meals to and Bono (2004) describe when officers stopped doing so. Officers then engaged in a ticket-writing campaign, targeting his customers who double parked. After several weeks of this, the restaurant owner 1 changed his mind and began giving free meals to officers again. Those authors also 5 whereby officers competed to see how many free bottles mentioned a type of contest of liquor they could collect; 6 the winning team collected 50 bottles from the bars and businesses in one district on a single shift. “The blue discount suit,” according to the 8 authors, was a term that indicated how officers felt about gratuities. Some other terms described businesses that offered free or discounted goods; these establishments were T said to “show love” or give “pop”—hence the saying, “If you got no pop, you got no cop.” S Officers in some departments are known for their skill in soliciting free food and liquor for after-hours parties. In the same vein, officers also solicit merchants for free food and beverages for charity events sponsored by police, such as youth softball leagues. The first situation is similar to individual officers receiving gratuities, but the second situation is harder to criticize. Officers bring up the seeming hypocrisy of 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   189 a departmental prohibition against individual officers accepting gratuities, yet at the same time there may be an administrative policy of actively soliciting and receiving donations from merchants for departmental events, such as pastries, coffee, or more expensive catering items. MacIntyre and Prenzler (1999) conducted a survey of officers to see if they would be influenced by gratuities. They asked officers what they would do if a café owner who gave them free coffee and meals was stopped for a traffic violation. The researchers found that supervisory officers were more likely than rookies to give a ticket. Although only 15 percent would not write the ticket and would continue to go back for meals, an additional 41 percent would also not write the ticket but would give the owner a warning and not go back for free meals. The remaining officers would write the owner a ticket. Another study evaluated police coverage in a medium-sized U.S. city, taking into account whether or not the businesses gave gratuities, food quality, L gratuities increased coverage (DeLeoncost, convenience, and location and found that Granados and Wells, 1998). These studies indicate that gratuities do influence officers’ I decisions both in how they patrol and what they might do when they have to make a D decision about a giver of gratuities. More research is needed to see if these findings D would be replicated. E L Ethical DilemmaL You are a police officer who, after eating at a new, restaurant, is told that the meal is “on the house.” You did not go to that restaurant knowing the owner gave free meals to T police officers. Should you accept the offer? I Law While bribery laws punish taking or receiving something F of value in return for a specific act of omission or commisF punsion related to one’s office, conflict-of-interest laws ish merely taking something of value prohibited byAthe law when one holds a public office, with no necessity to show N by that a specific vote or decision was directly influenced receipt of the valued items or services. Conflict-of-interest Y laws recognize the reality that public official’s discretion is compromised after receiving things of value from stake1 holders, even if there is no way to prove a direct connection. Recently, in Skilling v. U.S. (130 S. Ct. 2896, 2010), the 5 Supreme Court invalidated a federal “honest services” law 6 it a as being vague. The law (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1346) made crime to deprive someone of honest services. The8federal prosecutor did not have to prove a specific bribe or kickback, but only that there was some loss of honestT services from the suspect to their clients or fiduciaries (because S of private dealing or conflict of interest). The holding makes it more difficult for federal prosecutors to pursue those suspected of corruption, but it is unclear at this point whether or not the holding implicates state conflict-of-interest laws. Even conflict of interest laws would probably not apply to a free meal. Policy Many departments have policies that say “no gratuities,” while others specify some nominal value of goods that may be received. Gratuity policies are often the most ignored of all policies and considered to be hypocritical by the rank and file since the administration often solicits goods from the same type of vendors that might offer gratuities to individual officers. Policies that are not enforced and prevalently ignored are problematic in the organization. Ethics Professional ethics discourages gifts or gratuities when the profession involves discretionary judgments about a clientele (i.e., judges, professors, appraisers, and inspectors). Whether gifts are unethical relates to whether one’s occupation or profession involves judgments that affect the gift givers. The police obviously have discretionary authority and make judgments that affect store owners and other gift givers. This may explain why some think it is wrong for police to accept gifts or favors. It also explains why so many other people do not see anything wrong with some types of gratuities, for police officers in most situations are not making decisions that affect the giver and, instead, (continued) 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 190   Part II   Police are simply providing a service, such as responding to a burglary or disturbance call. Ethical formalism would indicate that we must be comfortable with a universal law allowing all businesses to give all police officers certain favors or gratuities, such as free meals, free merchandise, or special consideration. However, such a blanket endorsement of this behavior would probably not be desirable. The second principle of ethical formalism indicates that each should treat every other with respect as an individual and not as a means to an end. In this regard, we would have to condemn gratuities in cases where the giver or receiver had improper motives according to Kania’s typology. This also explains why some gifts seem acceptL able. When something is given freely and accepted without strings, there is no “using” of others; therefore, it mightI be considered an innocent, honorable act by both parties. D If utilitarian ethics were used, one would have to weigh the relative good or utility of the interaction. On D one hand, harmless gratuities may create good feelings inE the Graft graft Any exploitation of one’s role, such as accepting bribes, protection money, or kickbacks. c­ ommunity toward the officers and among the officers toward the community (Kania’s “cementing the bonds” argument). On the other hand, gratuities often lead to perceptions of unfairness by shopkeepers who feel they are being taken advantage of, or those who feel they are not receiving the appropriate police protection because they don’t give gratuities, by police who think they deserve rewards and don’t get them, and so on. Thus, the overall negative results of gratuities, even “harmless” ones, might lead a utilitarian to conclude that gratuities are unethical. The ethics of virtue would be concerned with the individual qualities or virtues of the officer. A virtuous officer could take free coffee and not let it affect his or her judgment. According to this perspective, no gift or gratuity would affect the judgment of the virtuous officer. However, if the officer does not possess those qualities of virtue, such as honesty, integrity, and fairness, even free coffee may lead to special treatment. Further, nonvirtuous officers would seek out gifts and gratuities and abuse their authority by pursuing them. L L , Graft is the exploitation of one’s role by accepting bribes or protection money. Graft also occurs when officers receive T kickbacks from tow truck drivers, defense attorneys, or bail bond companies for recommending them. In Klockars, Ivkovic, and Haberfeld’s I (2004) international comparison of officers’ views regarding hypotheticals drawn to illustrate various forms of corruption, officers in the United States rated bribery as the F second most serious offense. Only theft from a crime scene was rated as more serious. F Examples of graft involve a range of seriousness from “cheating a little” on overA that utilize police powers for private gain. For instance, time to sophisticated schemes a former Savannah-Chatham N police chief was convicted for running interference for a gambling operation headed by Randall Roach for 10 years, earning payoffs to protect Y him (Skutch, 2014). In Baltimore, 17 officers were indicted for conspiracy to commit extortion in a scheme whereby they received $300 for each time they had a car towed to a particular 1 repair shop that was not on the city’s approved list of towing companies. The repair 5 vehicles towed, even if they were not disabled. In one shop paid the officers to have case, the officer earned $14,400 6 from such payments over a two-year period (CNN. com, 2011). 8 In Stoughton, Massachusetts former police officers pleaded guilty to federal obstruction charges and toTmaking false statements in an investigation of corruption. The officers were accused of trading information obtained through official police S computers for stolen goods, such as large screen televisions, and gift cards from Home Depot. It turned out to be an FBI sting operation, though, and the officers were caught on tape and video making the arrangements and accepting the goods (Guilfoil, 2010; Saltzman, 2010). 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   191 At the most serious end of the economic corruption continuum is blatant theft. In 2010, a Miami police officer was convicted and sentenced for theft. The officer responded to a traffic accident and drove the victim home. Later he found her ATM card in his patrol car and called her to get her PIN number, telling her it was for an investigation. He then stole $440 from her account (Moskovitz, 2010). A Suffolk County, New York, officer was arrested for stopping Hispanic drivers who he believed to be illegal immigrants and stealing from them (Cergol, 2014). More commonly, news items appear regularly that describe police officers who pick up items from stores or burglary scenes and are caught on camera doing so. Economic corruption covers a wide range of activity, some of which is similar to what occurs in other occupations and professions, and some which is unique to law enforcement. L Abuse of Authority I Dof the power and authority inherent in Abuse of authority involves officers’ misuse their positions. Barker and Carter (1994) D and Fyfe and Kane (2006) discuss police abuse of authority which can be summarized as follows: E • Physical abuse—excessive force, physical L harassment, retaliatory brutality • Psychological abuse—disrespect, harassment, ridicule, excessive stops, intimidaL tion, deception in interrogation , • Legal abuse—unlawful searches or seizures, manufacturing evidence, perjury, planting evidence, hiding exculpatory evidence T I Professional Courtesy and Ticket Fixing F One practice not included in the typologies above is called “professional courtesy,” F an officer who is stopped for speeding which refers to the practice of not ticketing or for other driving violations. Obviously officers do not ticket everyone they stop. A They often give warnings instead, and that is a legitimate use of their discretion. Whether to ticket or give a warning shouldN depend on objective criteria, such as the seriousness of the violation. If the officer would Y let another person go with a warning in the same situation, there is no ethical issue in giving a warning to a fellow officer. However, if every other person would have received a ticket, but the officer did not 1 officer, that is a violation of the code issue one only because the motorist was a fellow of ethics (“enforce the law . . . without fear or 5 favor”). It is a violation of deontological universalism as well as utilitarianism. Under deontological ethics, it is the officer’s 6 duty to enforce the law against everyone, including officers. Under utilitarianism, the fact that the speeding officer can cause an accident means that the utility for society 8 is greater if the ticket is issued, for it might make the officer slow down, and by doing T that, accidents can be avoided. Justifications for not ticketing otherSofficers are diverse and creative. For instance, some honest justifications are purely egoistic: “If I do it for him, he will do it for me one day.” Other justifications are under the guise of utilitarianism: “It’s 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 192   Part II   Police best for all of us not to get tickets, and the public isn’t hurt because we’re trained to drive faster.” One troubling aspect of professional courtesy for traffic offenses is that the practice has a tendency to bleed over into other forms of misconduct. Officers who are stopped for driving while intoxicated are sometimes driven home rather than arrested, but this application of discretion is less likely to be afforded to any other citizen. In some cases of domestic violence, victims of police officer husbands or boyfriends describe how the responding officers do nothing or take their complaints more lightly than they would if the alleged perpetrator were not a police officer. The idea that officers are above the law is insidious. Officers who believe that they should not have to follow the same laws they enforce against others may be more prone to other forms of abuse of authority as well. It should also be noted that many officers think that they are held to a higher standard of behavior than the public. Officers point L DUI, or any other arrest may cost them their job, which out that a domestic violence, may not be the case for others. I The argument against this position is that perhaps one who has taken an oath to uphold the law but is engaged in unlawful behavior should D not have the job. One step more seriousDthan not ticketing an officer (or anyone) solely for preferential reasons is “fixing” a ticket E that has already been written. The reason is that such acts could be considered and charged as “tampering with official documents.” A major L York City is ongoing, involving a widespread practice in ticket-fixing scandal in New one precinct of “fixing” tickets L for friends and family. A former lieutenant has been fired and convicted of obstruction for tipping the officers to the investigation. Indict, ments have been handed down for 16 police officers and 5 civilians. The Bronx district attorney’s office has estimated that ticket-fixing cost the city more than $1 million in ticket revenue (Hu, 2014). T I On-Duty Use of Drugs and Alcohol F Carter (1999) discussed the extent of on-duty drug use, citing previous research that F found up to 20 percent of officers in one city used marijuana and other drugs while on A figure; in other surveys, about 8 percent of employees duty. That seems to be a high reported drug use and onlyN3 percent of all workers in a “protective services” category reported drug use. In a more recent survey, protective service employees were the least Y (Mieczkowski, 2002: 168). It could be that the decrease likely to report any drug use seen in the use of drugs by the general population is reflected in police officer samples. As well, the sources are not exactly comparable. Thus, it is impossible to determine 1 which source is more accurate. Certain circumstances5are present in law enforcement that, perhaps, create more opportunities for drug use.6Elements of police work (especially undercover work) that can lead to drug use include exposure to a criminal element, relative freedom from 8 availability of contraband. Drug use by officers cresupervision, and uncontrolled ates the potential for even T more serious misbehavior, such as stealing evidence, being blackmailed to perform other unethical or illegal actions, and being tempted to steal S from drug users instead of arresting them. This, of course, is in addition to the obvious problem of compromising one’s decision-making abilities by being under the influence of any drug while on duty. 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   193 In the News FBI Agent Convicted A veteran FBI agent was investigated, tried, and convicted of theft of drugs from an evidence property room. He worked on a task force focusing on heroin traffickers along the borders of the District, Maryland, and Virginia, and his thefts went on for 14 months before being discovered when he was found incoherent in a bureau car surrounded by open, empty evidence bags of heroin along with a shotgun and a derringer pistol seized during a drug raid but never logged into evidence. The agent said he began using heroin after becoming addicted to prescription painkillers. He would check out drugs from the evidence room and say he was taking them to be tested, but before bringing them in for testing or returning to the property room, he would take out some of the heroin and replace it with a filler. He would forge signatures of supervisors and other agents in order to make the evidence bags appear ­untouched. At least 28 cases against defendants had to be dropped because of the agent’s thefts of drugs. Source: Hermann, 2015. L I In a study of drug use, it was found that officers used drugs to relieve stress and D for social reasons. No predictors emerged as to which officers were more likely to be D crimes that were associated with drug drug users. The study results also noted other use, including giving drugs to others, providing E confidential information to suppliers and theft (Gorta, 2008). L is longstanding, but periodic and/or The use of drug tests during the hiring process random drug testing of employed officers L is a more recent policy. Generally, courts have upheld the right of law enforcement agencies to employ drug testing, applying , the balancing test between a compelling governmental interest and individual privacy rights. Officers have some due process rights, however, and they must be notified of the policies and procedures involved in theTagency’s drug testing, have access to the findings, and have available some sort of appeal process before sanctions are taken I (2006) study of police officers termi(Mieczkowski, 2002: 179). In Fyfe and Kane’s nated for cause in New York City, the most Fcommon reason for termination was a failed drug test. F Alcohol use is more socially acceptable than drug use, and it has also been cited as a problem. In one survey, it was found A that about 8 percent of those in protective services occupations (which include police N officers) reported heavy alcohol use. This compared to 12 percent of construction workers and 4 percent of sales workers ­(Mieczkowski, 2002: 179). Barker and CarterY(1994) indicated that 8 percent of officers reported drinking alcohol on duty. The problem of drinking on duty does not involve the vulnerability to blackmail that drug use does, but there are obvious problems, 1 and officers who are aware of another’s on-duty intoxication are faced with an ethical 5 dilemma of whether or not to take official action. Officers may choose to informally isolate themselves from drinking officers by refusing to partner with them or avoid 6 working calls with them. 8 T Sexual Misconduct S It is a sad reality that a few police officers use their position of authority to extort sex from female citizens (there doesn’t seem to be the parallel situation of female police officers extorting sex from male victims). Amnesty International documented 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 194   Part II   Police widespread mistreatment of women by police around the world. Egregious cases in the United States include rapes by officers on duty and by jailers in police lockups, and a few instances where the sexual misconduct of police officers was widespread and protected by departmental supervisors, such as in Wallkill, New York. In that town, the 25-member police department evidently engaged in numerous instances of sexual intimidation of citizens before being investigated by the state police and sued in a federal civil rights lawsuit (reported in McGurrin and Kappeler, 2002: 133). Kraska and Kappeler (1995) looked at a sample of 124 cases of police sexual misconduct, including 37 sexual assaults by on-duty officers. These authors challenged earlier studies that found sexual misconduct of officers occurred most often when women traded sexual favors for lenient treatment. This study’s authors concluded that norms in a police department that ignored or condoned the exchange of sex for favored treatment opened the door to officers who used more aggressive tactics to L coerce sex from citizens. Kraska and Kappeler (1995: 93) proposed a continuum of sexual invasion that ranged I from some type of invasion of privacy to sexual assault. This range of behavior includes the following: • • • • • • • • • • D Viewing a victim’s photos Dor videos for prurient purposes Field strip searches E Custodial strip searches L Illegal detentions L Deception to gain sex , Provision of services for sex Sexual harassment Sexual contact Sexual assault Rape T I F F misconduct includes the following: Sapp’s (1994) inventory of sexual A • Nonsexual contacts that are sexually motivated (non-valid traffic stops) N lovers’ lanes to watch sexual activity) • Voyeurism (e.g., patrolling Y (excessive call-backs that are not necessary for investi• Contact with crime victims • • • • gative purposes) Contact with offenders (sexual demands or inappropriate frisks) 1 Contacts with juvenile offenders (sexual harassment and sexual contact) 5 Sexual shakedowns (demanding sex from prostitutes or the homeless) 6 Citizen-initiated sexual contact (an officer is approached by a citizen because of his 8 officer status) T of contacts between female citizens and officers— Even the most innocuous whereby an officer might S ask a woman he has stopped for a date—involve issues of power and coercion. In Kraska and Kappeler’s study, police described how they routinely went “bimbo hunting,” which involved sexual harassment of women out drinking (1995: 104). Maher (2010) interviewed female officers who described how this type of sexual misconduct by their male colleagues was very common. 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   195 In the News Sexual Misconduct Cases of police officers who commit sexual harassment or abuse can easily be found in the news: Craig Nash was fired from the San Antonio Police Department and indicted for sexually assaulting a transgender prostitute. In 2009, San Antonio fired 18 officers over various forms of misconduct, including sexual assaults and indecent exposure (Holley, 2010). In New York, an officer was convicted for extorting sex from an 18-year-old girl and two other women. A Brooklyn officer extorted oral sex from a woman in a precinct bathroom. This officer is also facing rape charges inLa separate case (Sulzberger and Eligon, 2010). I In San Diego, Christopher Hayes was fired and received a felony conviction for forcing women to perform sex acts. Anthony Arevalos was convicted in 2011 of extorting sex acts from women and is serving eight years in prison (Davis, 2014). In Tennessee, a police officer was acquitted of rape but convicted of official misconduct and decommissioned. He received a 12-count indictment involving demanding sex from prostitutes while on duty. The officer had already been acquitted of a prior similar sexual battery and official misconduct charge (Allyn, 2013). D D Prostitutes and homeless women are populations that are extremely vulnerable E people tend not to believe them. But to sexual extortion by police officers, because women who have been subject to intimidation L and outright assault come from all social classes (McGurrin and Kappeler, 2002). The defense of officers is usually that, if L is that when officers acting in their offisex occurred, it was consensual. The problem , cial capacity meet women (as victims, witnesses, defendants, or suspects), the power differential makes consent extremely problematic. McGurrin and Kappeler’s (2002) research on sexual misconduct describes sexual T in and out of uniform. Rape charges assault, rape, and even murder by police officers commonly were downgraded to a conviction I of “official oppression” in a plea agreement, or the officer was not punished at all. Also, these researchers found that some officers who had criminal records for sexualFoffenses simply moved and obtained law enforcement positions in other jurisdictions.F The Cato Institute sponsors the National A Police Misconduct Reporting Project, which acts as a clearinghouse for misconduct reports across the nation. It was N reported that 9.3 percent of all civilian complaints on police involved sexual misconduct, the second most common form ofYmisconduct after excessive use of force. About 354 of the 618 officers under investigation for sexual offenses involved nonconsensual sexual acts, and 51 percent, or 180, of these 354 acts involved minors 1 (Packman, 2011). Stinson, Brewer, and Mathna (2015) analyzed 771 sex-related arrest cases from 5 2005 to 2008 of 555 sworn officers at 449 non-federal law enforcement agencies in 6 officers were female; most were patrol 44 states. Less than 1 percent of the offending officers. The modal time in service was 1 to 8 5 years. On-duty and off-duty offenses were about equally divided. A majority (70 percent) of the victims were minors (under T occurred when the officer was off duty 18). Most of the cases involving a child victim S occurred when the officer was on duty. and most of the cases involving an adult victim Forcible fondling was the most serious offense charged in the majority of cases, followed by forcible rape, statutory rape, and forcible sodomy. This study and others like it show that sexual misconduct of officers is not a negligible problem and involves more serious crimes and victimization than previously believed. 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 196   Part II   Police Sexual harassment of fellow officers is also a problem. In one research study, 70 percent of female officers reported being sexually harassed by other police officers (Kraska and Kappeler, 1995: 92). In another study, 75 percent said they have been sexually harassed but only 2 percent reported it (Maher, 2010). It may be that the culture of policing is particularly conducive to sexual harassment. It has been described as a “macho” or “locker room” culture even though women have been integrated into patrol since the early 1970s. Female officers today do not encounter the virulent harassment and hostility that was present in the 1970s when patrol forces were first integrated, but some remnants of that culture remain. More research is needed to update older studies of the prevalence of sexual harassment. One study reported that while 50 to 58 percent of women in the general workforce have experienced sexual harassment, 69 to 77 percent of women in male-dominated professions (like policing) experience sexual harassment (reported in Maher, 2010: 266). Female officers who inLundercover work pretend to be prostitutes are especially targeted for sexual innuendos, I jokes, and other forms of comments about their body and dress, and behavior from other officers that could be considered sexual harassD ment, such as betting which female officer would receive more sexual offers or throwD room. While some research indicates that many female ing money at her in the squad officers consider such work E degrading and humiliating (Nolan, 2001; Maguire and Nolan, 2011), other research found that the female officers who participated found the work exciting and fun andLthe joking harmless (Dodge, Starr-Gimeno, and Williams, 2005). It is interesting to note L that, in these studies, it was found that male officers were never asked to pose as homosexual prostitutes even though one might argue that , was also a crime problem in these areas. There have been other cases where officers may receive administrative punishments for “conduct unbecoming T to an officer” related to their sexual activity or other off-duty conduct. For instance, in a few cases officers have posed nude, participated in sexually explicit videos, or,I in one case, an officer posted nude pictures of his wife on the Internet (Egelko, 2007). F In the cases where these officers have been fired, courts have generally upheld the department’s right to fire, although the First Amendment F rights of officers is still an unsettled area of law. In other cases, officersAwho have affairs with supervisors, coworkers, or wives of coworkers sometimes get N sanctioned for “conduct unbecoming” (Martinelli, 2007). The fact of the matter is that officers are held to a higher standard of behavior, and Y the behavior may be unethical in that it brings discredit even when no laws are broken, or embarrassment to the department. 1 5 Criminal Cops 6 Some of the acts discussed above are crimes, for example, theft, sexual assault, official 8 can be found where a very few officers enter into a realm oppression. Other examples that can only be describedT as criminal cops. These are instances where the transgressions that officers engage in become patterns of brutality and other abuses of authority, S racketeering, and even armed robberies. Very often drugs are involved. In the 1980s, the “Miami River Rats” committed armed robberies of drug deals, collecting cash and drugs. These robberies by a small group of police officers eventually led to at least one homicide (Dorschner, 1989; see also Rothlein, 1999). More 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   197 recently, a Miami internal affairs officer was investigated by federal authorities who alleged he participated in aiding in the distribution of cocaine, organizing a murderfor-hire plot, providing firearms and sensitive law enforcement information to drug traffickers, and facilitating the transport of drug proceeds (Golgowski, 2014). In the early 1980s, the “Buddy Boys” in New York were able to operate almost openly in a precinct rife with lesser forms of corruption. Ultimately, 13 officers in a precinct of only a little over 200 were indicted for crimes ranging from drug use to drug sales and armed robbery (Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert, 1984/1994). In the early 1990s, Michael Dowd testified to the Mollen Commission that he and other officers accepted money for protecting illegal drug operations, used drugs and alcohol while on duty, robbed crime victims and drug dealers of money and drugs, and even robbed corpses of their valuables (Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert, 1994: 201–202). Other cities have had their own criminal cops. In 1996, seven Chicago cops were indicted for conspiracy to commit robberyLand extortion for shaking down undercover agents they thought were drug dealers I (Crank and Caldero, 2000). In 2009, a similar scandal occurred and seven officers pleaded guilty to felony theft or official D misconduct. The alleged ringleader, ex-cop Jerome Finnigan, was charged in a murderD thought to be cooperating with investifor-hire plot aimed at a fellow officer who was gators (Meincke, 2009). E Indianapolis police officer Robert Long also ran a corrupt ring of officers. Six incidents involving thefts of drugs and money L formed the case against the officers, who were under surveillance by the FBI from March L to June 2008. Long was sentenced to 25 years. The prosecutor had to dismiss 26 pending cases where the involved officers , were witnesses (Murray, 2009). New Orleans police officers have also been linked to drugs, robberies, and attempted murder when a police officer was Toverheard in a federal wiretap of hiring someone to kill a female witness against him (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Other I locations where police officers have been linked to drug dealers and evidently provided protection to them, or actually stole drugs and engaged in drug dealing themF selves, include Prince George’s County, Maryland (Valentine, 2009); Boston (Vaznis, F 2008); and Philadelphia (Graham and Gormisky, 2010). Costs of Corruption A N Y We have examined a range of corruption, from the arguably trivial (gratuities) to criminal acts that include murder. The costs to communities are considerable. First, there 1 is the cost of lost prosecutions. Literally thousands of cases across the country have 5 not trust that the evidence provided by had to be dismissed because prosecutors could police officers was legitimate or the officer had 6 lost credibility as a witness for any case because of his or her wrongdoing. 8 also faced large judgments in response Many cities and police departments have to the wrongdoing of officers. These lawsuits Tare most often claims of police brutality, traffic accident claims, or wrongful death suits due to police shootings. There is no S way to know the total amount of money taxpayers pay across the nation in any given year because of police misconduct. Some specific localities do not even keep tallies of how much is spent in judgments or in settling lawsuits, but news reports are beginning to appear that call attention to the costs of misconduct: 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 198   Part II   Police Cleveland—The city has spent $8 million between 2003 and 2013 on claims related to police misconduct. Minneapolis—A 2013 examination of city payouts for alleged police misconduct found $14 million in payments in the previous seven years; in 95 payouts between 2006 and 2012, only eight led to officers being disciplined (McKinney, 2015). Chicago—The city paid nearly $5.4 million just to settle three cases of misconduct in 2012–2013; more than a half-billion dollars to resolve police brutality cases over the last decade (Dardick, 2013; Wallack, Ransom, and Anderson, 2015). Boston—The city spent more than $36 million to resolve 2,000 legal claims and lawsuits against the police department over the past decade (mostly brutality and wrongful death claims); $31 million was paid in 22 cases worth $100,000 or more, including nine awards for well over $1 million (Wallack, Ransom, and Anderson, 2015). New York City—Just in fiscal year 2013, New York paid out more than $138 milL nearly $217 million for claims of false arrest, excessive lion; in fiscal year 2014, it paid force, and civil rights violations I (Hennelly, 2015). Despite the costs to the city of such lawsuits, there is no evidence to indicate that D they are a deterrent to errant police officers. In fact, one study showed that there is D the police officers involved. The lawsuit doesn’t appear no follow-up generally with in the officers’ personnel E records, nor does anyone keep track of patterns or problem officers. In some cities, an incident is not investigated by internal affairs once it L becomes the subject of a lawsuit; instead, the investigation proceeds out of the city’s legal department. Police officials sometimes don’t even know when the city settles L because it is a decision made by city officials outside the police department. Police , officers believe that city lawyers are too quick to settle “nuisance” claims, where the officer is not at fault; however, when such cases do go to trial, there is the risk of a much larger judgment (Schwartz, 2010). The important point to note though is that T civil lawsuits seem to be independent from the department’s own discipline system I and, rarely, is there the mechanism to take note of when officers become the target of lawsuits multiple times. F Sometimes lawsuits are brought by officers themselves against the department, F usually by whistleblowers for retaliation or by minority officers who are successful in A showing discriminatory practices; for example, Minneapolis, Minnesota had to pay $740,000 to five African American officers who convinced a court they were discrimiN nated against by the department (Williams, 2009). Y Consent Decrees 1 In addition to possible lawsuits and settlement costs, police departments face the possibility of being a target of5the Department of Justice. Because of the Rodney King incident, Congress in 19946passed the Violent Control and Law Enforcement Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 14141), which authorizes the Department of Justice to investigate and bring 8 a lawsuit for “equitable remedies” against police departments that are found to have a “pattern or practice” of unconstitutional actions. From 1994 to 2009, there were over T 70 preliminary investigations, 33 full investigations, seven consent decrees, and seven S memorandums of understanding (Harmon, 2009). Between 2009 and 2015, there have been proportionally even more. Cities such as Spokane, Seattle, Portland, Miami, Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Oakland, and Los Angeles have been the target of the Justice Department’s 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   199 investigations. Even smaller cities like East Haven, Connecticut, have been subject to decrees. Recently, Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland, were the subject of a federal investigation due to recent events. Sometimes a police chief or mayor asks for an investigation and review. Mayor Mitch Landrieu asked the Justice Department to investigate the New Orleans police department. In March 2011, the Justice Department issued a report that detailed a pattern of misconduct that included racial profiling, not investigating police shootings, allowing extra jobs to corrupt the chain of command, and having procedures that served to intimidate citizens not to file complaints on officers, among other findings. Landrieu then reversed his support for the reform efforts demanded by the Justice Department, arguing that they were too expensive (Winston, 2013). Consent decrees focus on the department itself rather than the individual officer and involve changes in policies or procedures, and they may require hiring more L The most common targets for change officers and/or increasing training for officers. involve policies concerning use of force, citizen complaint procedures, in-car video I use, racial profiling, data collection, early identification systems, and training. D Compliance with consent decrees is expensive for cities and police departments. D Ross and Parker (2009) report that the Los Angeles Police Department spent $30–$40 million annually to reach compliance after the department became the object of a conE sent decree. Sometimes monitoring drags on for years as the city struggles to meet the L has become a “cottage industry” with reform goals. Police chiefs argue that monitoring monitors’ pay sometimes running into millions L of dollars with no incentive to end the supervision (Goode, 2013). , Other costs include damage to the department’s reputation, and a reduction in morale and potentially the loss of good officers (Ross and Parker, 2009). For instance, the LAPD was required to have officers inTnarcotics and gang divisions file annual individual financial reports to ensure they were not receiving illegal income. While most officers complied, in a few gang units, Ithe majority of officers in the unit refused, requiring the department to dismantle the unit F until new officers could be transferred and trained. There were also reports of intimidation and threats by those who refused F to officers who did comply (Rubin and Gold, 2011). Awith external monitoring is a voluntary An alternative to costly consent decrees agreement entered into where collaboration N between the city and Justice Department replaces an adversarial relationship. These agreements are not externally monitored and the Justice Department providesYtechnical assistance rather than acts as an enforcer (Goode, 2015). Arguably, because the patterns of identified issues and required reforms are so similar in the dozens of cities that have undergone or are 1 under consent decrees, there is really no excuse that a police department doesn’t know what best practices are or how to avoid being5targeted by such investigations. Before we leave this discussion of examples 6 of police corruption, it is important to note that most officers in this country are honest and strive to do their best every 8 or types of unethical behaviors that are day. Also, officers who engage in rule breaking not criminal should not be in the same discussion T as “criminal cops” whose pattern of wrongdoing and criminality is much more serious. However an environment where S minor transgressions flourish leads to the possibility that truly rogue cops feel free to engage in criminality with all officers then engaged in a conspiracy of silence. The Walking the Walk box illustrates how difficult it is to come forward in an atmosphere where even criminal cops are sometimes protected. 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 200   Part II   Police Walking the Walk In the movie Training Day, a new recruit is “schooled” in the methods of a veteran, decorated cop that included brutalizing suspects, planting drugs, and generally committing crimes to catch the criminals. In a real-life version of Training Day, Keith Batt earned a criminal justice degree at California State University at Sacramento and fulfilled his life’s dream by being hired by the Oakland Police Department. He graduated at the top of his recruit class and became an Oakland police officer in 1999. Batt was assigned to Clarence Mabanag as his field training officer. Almost from the first day, Batt says, he L was told to falsify offense reports and to use force on suspects. I Batt did as he was told for two and a half weeks, including hitting a suspect and lying on an offense report, because D he knew that he would be retaliated against if he did not. D Then he decided that he could not continue to be a police E officer if it meant violating the law he was sworn to uphold. He quit the Oakland force and turned in his FTO andL the other officers to internal affairs. L Mabanag and other officers, including Matt Hornung, Jude Siapno, and Frank (Choker) Vazquez, were known as,the “Riders.” According to testimony, they patrolled their western poverty-stricken district of Oakland with an iron fist and used excessive force, planted drugs, and intimidated witnessesTas the means to keep the peace. Partly as a result of Keith Batt’s I of report, all four officers were fired and charged with a range offenses including obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct F justice, filing false police reports, assault and battery, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. Even before these charges,F the four had records of misconduct. The department had paid A $200,000 to settle suits involving Siapno and Mabanag, and N other lawsuits existed against Vazquez and Hornung. Not everyone believes the foursome’s culpabilityYor applauds Keith Batt’s decision to testify against them. According to one fellow officer at the time, “These guys are awesome cops, they never did anything to anybody who 1 was innocent, just pukes, criminals, see? They just got a little too intense and went over the line.” Even residents had mixed feelings, with some arguing that it took a tough cop to police a tough street. As one resident said, “The only thing the bad people understand is force.” Sometimes, however, their activities evidently were not limited to just drug dealers and other criminals. One witness testified that he called police to report a stolen stereo, and when his dog wouldn’t stop barking and Mabanag threatened to shoot the dog, his angry response resulted in Mabanag’s choking him and ordering Batt to lie on the offense report to cover the use of force. In the course of the ensuing scandal, Oakland paid out $11 million to settle civil suits from 119 victims of police officers (including the Riders) and ended up under a court-ordered federal consent decree. Hornung, Mabanag, and Siapno were prosecuted in two lengthy trials between 2000 and 2005. Vazquez is a fugitive of justice, believed to be in Mexico. Perhaps he should have waited to have his day in court, too, as all three escaped guilty verdicts. Hornung was acquitted of all charges, and the jury deadlocked in two trials on Mabanag and Siapno. The police chief has refused to reinstate them, and they have sued for back pay and reinstatement. The fired officers and their attorneys say that the deadlocked jurors exonerated them. The prosecutor is convinced of their guilt, but decided not to seek a third trial because he believed that he could not get a jury to convict them. Batt has been honored as a courageous whistleblower who stood up to the “blue curtain of secrecy,” but also has been vilified as a liar who feared a negative evaluation. He became a respected police officer in Pleasanton, California, and received an award for “ethical courage.” But Clarence Mabanag is also a police officer in a different department in southern California, which hired him after the deadlocked jury verdict. In February 2009, in response to their appeal, an independent arbitrator ruled that the city was justified in dismissing Mabanag and Siapno. 5 6 8 T Explanations of Deviance S Sources: Institute for Law Enforcement Administration, 2008; Lee, 2004; Zamora, Lee, and van Derbeke, 2003; Bay City News, 2007. Explanations of corruption can be categorized into individual, organizational, and societal, based on the identified factors. These factors then provide an avenue for how to reduce misconduct. It is important to note at the outset that there is rarely only one factor or group of factors responsible for corruption scandals. Generally, a constellation of factors is present. 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   201 Individual Explanations The most common explanation of police officer corruption is the rotten-apple ­a rgument—that the officer alone is deviant and that it was simply a mistake to hire him or her. This argument has been extended to describe rotten bushels—groups of officers banding together to commit deviant acts. The point of this argument is that nothing is wrong with the barrel, that deviance is individual, not endemic. Sherman explained that deviant officers go through what he called a “moral career” as they pass through various stages of rationalization to more serious misdeeds in a graduated and systematic way. Once an individual is able to get past the first “moral crisis,” it becomes less difficult to rationalize new and more unethical behaviors. The previous behaviors serve as an underpinning to a different ethical standard, for one must explain and justify one’s own behaviors to preserve psychological wellL true that corrupt officers who come to being (Sherman, 1982). While it seems to be the attention of authorities engage in a rangeI of minor misconduct to serious behavior, there is no good evidence to indicate that something like taking gratuities inevitably leads to more serious forms of misconduct.DMany police officers have clear personal guidelines on what is acceptable and not acceptable. Whereas many, perhaps even D the majority of, police see nothing wrong with accepting minor gratuities, few police E condone thefts and bribes. would accept outright cash, and fewer still would L or labeling an individual action that Sherman also described a signification factor, is acceptable under a personal rationale (Sherman, 1985a: 253). Police routinely deal L with the seamier side of society—not only drug addicts and muggers but also middle, and corruption. The constant displays class people who are involved in dishonesty of lying, hiding, cheating, and theft create cynicism, and this, in turn, may develop into a vulnerability to temptation because officers may redefine them as acceptable T behaviors. Following are some rationales that police I might easily use to justify unethical behavior (Murphy and Moran, 1981: 93): F rotten-apple argument The proposition that the officer alone is deviant and that it was simply a mistake to hire him or her. • The public thinks every cop is a crook, soFwhy try to be honest? • The money is out there; if I don’t take it, someone else will. A • I’m only taking what’s rightfully mine; if N the city paid me a decent wage, I wouldn’t have to get it on my own. Y • I can use it because it’s for a good cause—my son needs an operation, or dental work, or tuition for medical school, or a new bicycle. 1 (2004) examined predictive variables Greene, Piquero, Hickman, and Lawton related to those who received citizen complaints or departmental discipline in the 5 Philadelphia police department. In their study, they utilized background and file 6 information on about 2,000 officers and obtained attitudinal survey results from a 8 data on citizen complaints, internal random sample of 500 officers. They collected investigations, departmental discipline incidents, T and police shootings. About a third of the sample had received departmental discipline (2004: iii). They found that 15 S characteristics were significantly related to receiving departmental discipline, including being younger, being previously rejected for hire, experiencing military discipline, scoring low on some sections of academy training, and receiving academy discipline. Officers having six or more of these risk factors were 2.5 times more likely to 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 202   Part II   Police receive departmental discipline (2004: iv). The research found that 22 factors were significantly related to receiving a citizen complaint of physical abuse, including being younger, receiving military discipline, having one’s driver’s license suspended, having ever been placed under arrest, and having had one or more deceptive polygraph results (2004: v). They found, using a cynicism scale, that higher levels of cynicism predicted disciplinary actions, shootings, and other misconduct. They also found that officers who worked in districts with lower ethics scores were more likely to be involved in shootings, but no other relationships were found (2004: 65). Note that this study did not collect the data in a way that would allow them to match the actions and attitudes of individual officers; instead they had to aggregate ethics scores by district level. Greene and his colleagues also utilized hypotheticals, finding that officers expressed a fair amount of “ethical ambiguity.” Findings also indicated that where an officer was assigned was associated with the likelihood of receiving discipline, comL in police shootings. The authors indicated that there plaints, or becoming involved seemed to be a district culture I that affected officer behavior, and the better way to look at risk factors is to see individual factors interacting with organizational elements. This D is an important finding and is related to the “bad barrel” research reviewed below. The D it seemed to be both individual and environmental facresearchers emphasized that tors that led to the likelihood E of misconduct (2004: 48). Fyfe and Kane (2006; also see Kane and White, 2009) identified correlates related L to termination in their study: L than male officers to be terminated during their 1. Women were more likely probation. They also ,found that, although male officers were more likely to be terminated for brutality and bribery, there was no difference in all other profitoriented misconduct. Other research provides mixed findings regarding whether T male peers to engage in misconduct. As more women women are less likely than enter policing, moreI examples of misconduct have emerged. Some studies examine female officer misconduct, but few carefully controlled studies exist Fdifferences exist (Pogarsky and Piquero, 2004; Stinson, to determine if gender Todak, and Dodge, 2013). F 2. Younger officers (those Aunder 22 years of age when appointed) were more likely to be terminated during probation. However, they also found that these young N officers were no more likely than older officers to be terminated for any form of Y Past research has indicated that college-educated offimisconduct after probation. cers receive fewer citizen complaints and in this study, those with more years of education upon hire were less likely to be terminated for misconduct. 1 3. Blacks (but not other minorities) were more likely to be terminated. Prior research 5 were more likely than whites to be disciplined for misindicates that black officers conduct. A possible explanation might be differential rule enforcement or differ6 ential assignments and vulnerability to situations where use of force, for instance, 8 was necessary. T employment histories, dishonorable discharges, and/or 4. Those who had prior negative did poorly in the academy S were more likely to be terminated for misconduct. Other factors associated with high risk included prior citizen complaints, prior criminal history, and history of a public-order offense. Non-individual factors included being assigned to posts with low supervision and high citizen contact (Fyfe and Kane, 2006: xxvi–xxviii). 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   203 These findings must be viewed with caution, however, as they are only from one department, they utilize only official reports of misconduct, and they do not control for other variables. Manning (2009) criticizes Kane and White’s (2009) description of the study’s findings as complicating the variables of misconducts like administrative rule-breaking with much more serious deviance such as lawbreaking, not providing ethnographic data to enrich the quantitative findings, and not taking into account in their analysis of factors such as race, and the changes over time in the size and composition of the department. These are valid concerns, but arguably there is nothing in their findings regarding individual characteristics that seem to contradict earlier studies. What is more problematic is the relative weight of individual factors as compared to organizational factors that influence the presence and degree of deviance. It should also be noted that identifying correlates of misconduct is atheoretical. It is interesting to note that, with a few exceptions, researchers have not attempted to test traditional criminological theories L to see if they explain police deviance, or develop original theories. One example of applying a criminological theory to police I deviance is Hickman and colleagues’ (2001) use of the data from the Philadelphia D study to test Tittle’s control balance theory and social learning theory. These researchers found that officers with a control deficitD were more likely to report fellow officers engaged in misconduct. The Philadelphia E data was also used to test social learning theory to see if it was helpful in understanding police deviance, and researchers concluded that the data did support the socialLlearning theory (Chappell and Piquero, 2004). Once again, using the Philadelphia L data, Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) tested deterrence theory. They found that the threat of extra-legal and legal sanctions did , potentially deter misconduct and that the trait of impulsivity tended to reduce the effect of such threats. Harris (2010a, 2010b) adds to this discussion by offering a life-course perspecT tive to officer misconduct. He used citizen complaints as a measure of misconduct, I acknowledging that this is a somewhat problematic measure. He found that being female, having a higher education, and not F being a minority are related to lower levels of receiving citizen complaints. Other findings were that officers tend to receive F citizen complaints early in their career and there is a desistance over the course of A the career; however, most officers in his sample had fewer than three complaints over their entire career. There was a group of officers who received a higher level N of citizen complaints, and the number did not decline as dramatically as all other Y of officers (5 percent) received 20 perofficers after the sixth year. This small group cent of all complaints. He also found, contrary to other researchers, that productivity measures were not related to the number of citizen complaints. He also analyzed 1 internally generated complaints and these showed a somewhat different pattern. They were more likely to be substantiated5in formal disciplinary proceedings, and officers did not show a clear age desistance 6 pattern as they had for citizen complaints (Harris, 2012). 8some types of police misconduct is postOne emerging individual explanation for traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Researchers T have found that about 14 percent of military veterans may experience some symptoms of PTSD and other research indicates S that between 3 and 17 percent of police officers experience these symptoms as well. Of course a not insignificant percentage of police officers are military veterans also. Other research indicates that 7 to 35 percent of all police officers display some PTSD symptoms, or what is called subclinical PTSD. Symptoms include hypervigilance, trouble 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 204   Part II   Police sleeping, anger control issues, and flashbacks. Factors involved in developing PTSD symptoms include: • Witnessing the death of a law enforcement officer or viewing the body at the scene, especially when the victim was a friend or partner • Accidentally killing or wounding a bystander, especially if the victim is a child • Failing to stop a perpetrator from injuring or killing someone • Killing or wounding a child or teenager, even if the life of the officer was threatened by the person injured or killed • Viewing the body of a child victim, particularly if the officer has children (especially if the officer’s child is the same age and sex as the victim) • Interacting with grieving family members or friends of homicide victims L riot, especially if the officer cannot use deadly force to • Feeling caught in a violent defend him- or herself for I fear of hurting children in the mob • Viewing particularly bloody or gruesome scenes D • Observing an event involving violence or murder, but not being able to intervene D • Being undercover and constantly “on guard” because of the likelihood of being E hurt, killed, or discovered L who have been indicted, are being tried, or are incar• Being threatened by suspects cerated (Haidi and Koga, L2014) Other research shows that ,PTSD symptoms are correlated to family violence and alcohol abuse (Haidi and Koga, 2014). More research is needed to determine if officers who engage in drinking on duty, excessive force, and other forms of misconduct may T also display PTSD symptoms. In addition to individual I factors, it is important to look at organizational factors as well. F F Organizational Explanations A Various elements of the organization can breed misconduct. Recall from Chapter 4 that organizational factorsNmay include small work-group influences. Isolated work groups develop their own Y micro-climate which can be one that does not conform to organizational ethics. Other organizational elements include perverse incentives and a culture that does not emphasize integrity. 1 Small work groups 5 Small work groups are exemplified by special units and narcotics task forces. There 6 seems to be a pattern in news stories of such small work groups developing a micro8 culture of unethical behavior. The most famous example of this is the Ramparts scanT examples across the country exist as well. For instance, dal in Los Angeles, but other six Tulsa police officers and San ATF agent pleaded guilty or were convicted of charges ranging from theft of federal property to civil rights violations. They evidently planted evidence on individuals and/or used faked informant testimony to engineer false arrests and convictions, stole drugs seized as evidence, and lied in court proceedings against individuals they wrongfully accused. Sentences ranged from four months to 10 years in prison (Barber and Lassek, 2010; Newson6.com, 2011). 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   205 In Philadelphia, patterns of misconduct (theft from drug dealers, sales of drugs, falsifying evidence) in narcotics squads date back to the early 1980s, including the “One Squad” scandal, the “Five Squad” scandal, an unnamed scandal in the early 1990s involving five narcotics officers, and another scandal in 2000 with officers accused of using false information to get search warrants, planting evidence and committing perjury, and stealing drugs, cash, and valuables from drug dealers (Slobodzian, 2009). Most recently, a newspaper series spurred an internal investigation of a Philadelphia narcotics squad who were accused by Latino bodega owners of raiding their stores, turning off the security cameras, and then (allegedly) stealing money and goods from the stores. The squad was also accused of planting drugs, falsifying warrant affidavits, and stealing from drug dealers, and one of them was accused of sexual assault by several women. Recently, it was reported that neither the U.S. attorney nor state prosecutors were going to pursue charges because the witnesses were not credible. L arbitration (Newall and Whelan, 2014). The one fired officer obtained his job back in However, the city also quietly settled 21 ofIthe civil rights cases stemming from the officers’ actions (Faziollah, Slobodzian, and Steele, 2012). D D Perverse Incentives E As noted in Chapter 4, organizational incentives may encourage unethical behavior. L When there is pressure to achieve a goal without a corresponding message that ethiL actors are tempted to take shortcuts. cal means are just as important, organizational The best example of how good practices can , result in bad outcomes is the Compstat program, a computerized crime-counting method that emphasizes accountability of middle managers. William Bratton is credited with beginning the program in New York City. He also brought it with him to Los T Angeles in 2002 when he took over as police chief of Los Angeles. I Back in New York, the program continued but became the center of a scandal F routinely downgrading crime reports, when it was alleged that some precincts were even calling victims to encourage or coerceFthem to withdraw the report or change the facts. Adrian Schoolcraft, an officer in the 81st precinct, first reported the pracANYPD with examples of victims whose tice to the Quality Assurance division of the crimes were misrecorded, but nothing was done. N Then he went to the media. He also had secretly recorded tapes of roll calls where supervisors urged the officers to make Y arrests, regardless of whether there was probable cause, and employ a very aggressive style of policing in one particular housing project, telling officers to make the arrest and think of a reason later. After the news1broke, Schoolcraft was retaliated against and even, at one point, under the orders of high-level police supervisors, was forcibly taken to a mental ward in a Queens hospital,5supposedly because he left work early the day before and was not answering his phone.6It took him six days to obtain his release. Schoolcraft was suspended from the NYPD and now lives in upstate New York. He 8 reports that he is still harassed by NYPD officers and has filed a $50 million lawsuit against the NYPD, the city, and the hospital T (Rayman, 2010a, 2010b; S. Brown, 2015). In 2012, a report by the NYPD Quality SAssurance Division supported Schoolcraft’s claims (Parascandola, 2012). Academic research also supported the allegations that midlevel managers felt great pressure and crime reports were routinely downgraded in NYPD (Eterno, Verma, and Silverman, 2014). Arguably, Compstat can be an effective tool for improving the accountability of middle managers and ultimately improve police services for the community, or it 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 206   Part II   Police can become a pressure for “making the numbers” that causes police to downgrade serious crime reports and increase stops and arrests. William Bratton has recently been appointed NYPD commissioner again. It will be interesting to see how Compstat evolves under his command. Organizational Culture Crank and Caldero’s (2000, 2005) “noble-cause” explanation of some types of deviance (described more fully in Chapter 5), whereby officers lie or commit other unethical acts to catch criminals, is an organizational explanation of corruption. Whenever deviance is explained as being supported by the organizational culture—whether that be the formal culture or the informal culture—it falls into the organizational level of explanation. Gilmartin and Harris (1998) also have discussed why some officers become compromised and argue that itL is because the law enforcement organization does not adequately train them to understand and respond to the ethical dilemmas they will face. I They coined the term continuum of compromise to illustrate what happens to the officer. D sense of victimization,” which refers to what happens The first element is a “perceived when officers enter the profession with naïve ideas about what the job will be like. CitiD zen disrespect, bureaucratic barriers, and the justice system’s realities sometimes make E officers cynical, feeling that no one cares and that they are needlessly exposed to danger. Lthe administration and the citizenry. At that point, the offiCynicism leads to distrust of cer is alienated and more prone L to corruption. Gilmartin and Harris also talk about the officers’ sense of entitlement and how that can lead to corruption. There is a sense that , because they are different from the citizenry they police. the rules don’t apply to them This leads to the “blue curtain of secrecy,” discussed more fully in Chapter 5, when officers believe it is more ethical to cover up for other cops than it is to tell the truth. T Crank (1998: 187) and others have noted that there is a pervasive sense among rankI and-file police that administrators are not to be trusted: “Officers protect each other, not only against the public, but F against police administrators frequently seen to be capricious and out of touch.” The classic work in this regard is Reuss-Ianni’s (1983) study of a New F 1970s. She described the “two cultures” of ­policing—street York City precinct in the late cops and management cops. AShe observed that law enforcement managers were classic bureaucrats who made decisions based on modern management principles. This conN trasted with the street-cop subculture, which still had remnants of quasi-familial relaY and commitments took precedence over the rule book” tionships in which “loyalties (1983: 4). The result of this conflict between the two value systems was alienation of the street cop. Despite the gulf between management and line staff, most agree that employee 1 by the behavior of superiors. One might note that most behavior is influenced directly large-scale police corruption 5 that has been exposed has implicated very high level officials. Alternatively, police departments that have remained relatively free of c­ orruption 6 have administrators who practice ethical behavior on a day-to-day basis. 8 supervision, especially by midlevel managers such as Research reveals that close sergeants, reduces the useT of force and incidents of misconduct by officers (Walker, 2007). Huberts, Kaptein, and Lasthuizen (2007) obtained measures of corruption (or S what they called integrity violations) by asking officers to report what they knew was happening. The independent variable was leadership style. Findings indicated that role modeling was significant in limiting unethical conduct of an interpersonal nature (sexual harassment, discrimination, bullying), while strictness in supervision seemed to be more important in controlling the misuse of resources, fraud, and other forms of 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   207 financial corruption. A third component of leadership was described as openness and referred to leaders encouraging subordinates to talk to them about ethical dilemmas. This was associated with fewer violations in a number of areas, especially in favoritism and discrimination. Interestingly, this study of more than 6,000 police officers found that strictness had no effect on reducing the gratuitous use of violence, but that role modeling and openness did. As discussed in previous chapters, the concept of organizational justice has been advanced by the pioneering work of Tom Tyler (1990) who distinguished procedural justice (whether people feel the process is fair) and outcome justice (whether they think the decision is fair). There has been a growing body of literature that explores how these concepts affect citizenry and employees (for instance, Tyler and Wakslak, 2004; Tyler and Huo, 2002). DeAngelis and Kupchik (2007) found that officers’ satisfaction with the discipline system was more influenced by procedural justice elements (perceptions of fairness in the process) than L outcome. Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that police officers’ beliefs about organizational I justice were associated with the likelihood of ethical misconduct. Those who believed their organization was fair were less D likely to engage in the code of silence or believe in noble-cause corruption. Further, D misconduct among those who more these researchers found lower levels of police strongly agreed that the organization was just. E Other researchers have also identified a correlation between the perception that the organization is unfair and negative behavL ior (Reynolds, 2015). Societal Explanations L , Murphy and Caplan (1989) argue that lax community standards over certain types of behavior (gambling, prostitution) and lack ofTsupport from prosecutors and the courts (or corruption at that stage of the system) leads to police corruption. Police hear mixed messages from the public regarding certainItypes of crime. They are asked to enforce laws against gambling, pornography, and prostitution, but not too stringently. They are F expected not only to enforce laws against drunk driving but also to be tolerant of indiF viduals who aren’t really “criminal.” They are expected to uphold laws regarding assault A the disputants want to settle privately. In unless it is a family or interpersonal dispute that other words, we want the police to enforce theNlaw unless they enforce it against us. Also, rationalizations used by some police when they take bribes or protection money from prostitutes or drug dealers are made easier byYthe public’s tolerant stance toward certain areas of vice; for example, to accept protection money from a prostitute may be rationalized by the relative lack of concern that the public shows for this type of law breaking. 1 We also ask the police to take care of social problems, such as the homeless, even if 5 they have to step outside the law to do so. Extra-legal means are acceptable as long as they are not used against us. Citizens who want police to move the transients out of a park or 6 get the crack dealers off the corner aren’t concerned with the fact that the police might not have the legal authority to do so. If a little8“informal” justice is needed to accomplish the task, that is fine with some people, as longTas it is used against those we don’t like. When we accept and encourage such extra-legal power in some situations, we S shouldn’t be surprised when it is used in other situations as well. The police role as enforcer in a pluralistic society is problematic. The justification for police power is that police represent the public: “The police officer can only validly use coercive force when he or she in fact represents the body politic” (Malloy, 1982: 12). But if the police do not represent all groups, their authority is seen as oppressive. Police take their cue from 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. 208   Part II   Police the community they serve. If they serve a community that emphasizes crime control over individual rights or other public service, we will see the results of that message in the way laws are enforced. The point is that, to a large degree, the community creates the police department by what it demands and what it is willing to overlook. Reducing Police Corruption Comprehensive lists of suggestions to reduce police misconduct and corruption have been proposed (Malloy, 1982; Metz, 1990; Carter, 1999; Wood, 1997; Prenzler and Ransley, 2002). Some date back decades but that doesn’t mean they have been implemented. Such lists include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • L Increase the salary of police Eliminate unenforceableI laws Establish civilian reviewD boards Improve training in ethics D (including specific training for supervisors) Set realistic goals and objectives for the department E Provide ethical leadership L Perform audits (of resources and funds paid to informants) L Have financial disclosure rules , ethics Provide a written code of Provide a whistleblowing procedure that ensures fair treatment Improve internal affairsT units Rotate staff in some positions I Have better evidence handling procedures F Employ early warning systems F Use video cameras in patrol cars A Use covert high-technology surveillance N Employ targeted and randomized integrity testing Y and the public Conduct surveys of police Decriminalize vice crimes 1 Note that the majority of these suggestions target administrative changes rather than 5 identifying the individual officer as the problem. In more recent years, body cameras, requiring police to carry their 6 own insurance, docking pensions for misconduct, and other suggestions have been offered to reduce the costs of misconduct. In the next sections, we take a closer look8at some of these means to reduce corruption and improve the ethical climate of policeTagencies. S “Rotten Apple” Responses The mechanisms discussed next address the “rotten apple” idea that misconduct is due to the wrong individuals being hired. 9781337259163, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, Ninth Edition, Pollock - © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Chapter 7   Police Corruption and Responses   209 Improving Screening Background checks, interviews, credit checks, polygraphs, drug tests, and other screening tools are used to eliminate inappropriate individuals from the pool of potential hires. The extent of screening varies from department to department, but generally has become more sophisticated, especially in the use of psychological testing and interviews. Sanders (2008) argues that the process is more “weeding out” than selecting in those candidates best suited to policing and points out that it is hard to develop tools to identify traits that are associated with successful police performance when, in fact, there is no consensus on what makes a good police officer. Most research on the effectiveness of screening tools utilizes academy test scores or firings as the measure of good (or failed) performance. The most common pre-employment screening tool that is used by law enforcement agencies is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI or its subsequent versions); (Arrigo and Claussen, 2003;LDantzker and McCoy, 2006). The Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI) was developed to measure personality charact...
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