The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency
Management
After Action Report
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing
19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Information Contributors
Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Oklahoma City Fire Department
National Weather Service
Emergency Medical Services Authority
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation
Oklahoma Department of Education
Oklahoma Department of Health
Oklahoma Department of Human Services
Oklahoma State Insurance Fund
Board of Medicolegal Investigations - Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services
Oklahoma Military Department
Oklahoma Department of Public Safety
Oklahoma Department of Transportation
Oklahoma Water Resources Board
The Daily Oklahoman
The Dallas Morning News
Government Technology
Oklahoma Today
Public Safety Communications
American Red Cross
Salvation Army
Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma
Feed the Children
Oklahoma Seventh-Day Adventists
Photographs
FEMA Photo Documentation Team
FEMA Urban Search & Rescue Team
Associated Press World Wide Photos
KWTV Channel 9, Oklahoma City
Tinker AFB Photo Lab
This publication is printed by the Department of Central Services Central Printing Division as issued by the
Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management. One thousand five-hundred copies (1,500) have been
prepared and distributed at a cost of $3,750.00. Copies have been deposited with the Publications Clearinghouse of
the Oklahoma Department of Libraries.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
April 19th at the Site
At the SEOC
April 20th and beyond
Long-term Recovery
In Closing
Detailed Summary of Daily Activities
Introduction and Log Entries April 19 - April 25
Log Entries April 26 - May 23
Operational Strengths
Introduction and Major Reasons the Operation Ran Smoothly
Additional Strenghts Observed
Lessons Learned
Major Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned through Response/Recovery Operations
Lessons Learned from Other Agencies
Statistics
Introduction, Summary of Fatalities and Injuries
Exhibits
Exhibit A - Murrah Building Floor Plan
Image of Floors 1 and 2 (73Kb)
Image of Floors 3 and 4 (66Kb)
Image of Floors 5 and 6 (60Kb)
Image of Floors 7 and 8 (59Kb)
Image of Floor 9 (37Kb)
Exhibit B - Downtown Reference Map (93Kb)
Exhibit C - Governor's Executive Order (115Kb)
Exhibit D - President's Emergency Declaration (91Kb)
Exhibit E - Downtown Map with Response Elements (94Kb)
Exhibit F - Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces (72Kb)
Exhibit G - President's Major Disaster Declaration (68Kb)
Exhibit H - ODCEM Personnel Roster
Exhibit I - Acronyms
The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency
Management
After Action Report
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing
19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Executive Summary
At 9:02 a.m., Wednesday, April 19, 1995, terrorism struck Oklahoma City, when a
bomb exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. The bomb was
located within the confines of a 24-foot Ryder rental truck. The explosive mixture had
been prepared for charge with a detonation cord and pre-positioned, parked parallel, in
a loading lane on the north side of the Murrah Building, near the intersection of N.W.
5th Street and Robinson Avenue. The force of the explosion was of such magnitude
that it destroyed approximately one-third of the Murrah Building. The entire north
face of the structure was reduced to rubble and each of the nine floors, plus the roof,
received extensive damage. Contents of the first and second floors were blown against
the southern portion of the building, while the third through ninth floors were initially
raised by the blast and proceeded to pancake one atop the other at street level. When
the dust cleared, approximately one-third of the structure was located in a pile of
debris, measuring in some places 35-feet in height and running the length of the
building. At the time of the blast, the Murrah Building housed some 600 federal and
contract workers, as well as an estimated 250 visitors.
Federal agencies housed in the Murrah Building included the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Secret Service; the
Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Social Security Administration;
the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps recruitment offices; the Veterans
Administration; the General Accounting Office; the Department of Health and Human
Services; the Department of Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the Department of
Agriculture; the Department of Transportation; and, the General Services
Administration. An office of the Federal Employees Credit Union and the "America's
Kids" Child Care Development Center were also housed in the building. (A floor plan
of the Murrah Building is detailed in Exhibit A) Damage extended throughout
Oklahoma City's downtown, covering an estimated 48-square-block area. The
explosion overturned automobiles and numerous vehicles erupted into flames after the
blast. Extensive structural damage was not limited to the Murrah Building, but also
extended to the Regency Tower, a twenty-four story, 273-unit apartment complex,
located one block to the west. Additionally, directly north of the Murrah Building, the
two-story Oklahoma Water Resources Board office building, the six-story, historic,
Journal Record Building, and the three-story Athenian Building received heavy
damage. Surrounding structures which received the brunt of the explosion included
the First Methodist Church and YMCA, to the east; the federal courthouse, to the
south; and, the St. Joseph's Old Cathedral and Rectory, and U.S. Post Office, to the
west. (see Exhibit B)
The explosion knocked-out primary and back-up phone lines for the Emergency
Medical Services Authority (EMSA), the local ambulance service. Subsequently, 9-11 was the only communication remaining. The first call for medical assistance was
received by EMSA at 9:03:25 a.m. However, upon hearing the blast, seven emergency
medical service (EMS) units responded from EMSA's headquarters (N.W. 10th St. &
Walker Ave.).
First-in fire companies were faced with an overwhelming rescue operation. The
closest fire/emergency response units to the scene were at the Oklahoma City Fire
Department's Station One, five blocks away. Emergency personnel and equipment
from this station responded immediately to the bombing site. A meeting of the
department's chiefs was in progress at Station One at the time of the explosion. They
too reacted immediately to the sound of the blast and relocated to each one's
appropriate point of command. As personnel and apparatus approached the scene,
firefighters encountered debris scattered throughout the streets, covering several
blocks surrounding the Murrah Building. Passages had to be cleared to allow entry of
responding equipment. Additionally, firefighters encountered injured victims fleeing
the blast site. Realizing that injuries would be numerous, two medical triage areas
were quickly established. Primary triage and treatment was initially positioned at
N.W. 6th St. and Robinson Ave. (with medical command), but was later moved to
N.W. 5th St. and Robinson Avenue. Secondary triage and treatment was established at
the federal building. The injured were staged in these areas awaiting assessment,
immediate treatment, and prioritized transportation.
Without delay, fire, emergency medical, law enforcement personnel, voluntary
organization workers and many civilians, entered the bombed structure in a massive
search and rescue effort. In some instances, human chains were formed to
accommodate the safe and rapid removal of victims as they were located. A minimum
of two subsequent "bomb scares" forced the evacuation of these personnel. The
evacuation of the structure allowed officials to create a controlled perimeter around
the dangerous site. Rescue workers were not allowed to re-enter the site until
confirmation was given that no additional explosive devices were located.
Immediately following the blast, an Incident Command System (ICS) was quickly
established by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, to manage the intensive search
and rescue mission. The "system" effectively handled the massive influx of resources
which included federal, state, local and voluntary agency response personnel and
equipment, under the sole command of the Oklahoma City Fire Department. The
Oklahoma City Police Department handled the traffic and security aspects of the event
in coordination with the Oklahoma County Sheriff, state and federal agencies.
At 9:00 a.m. on April 19th, Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management
(ODCEM) personnel were conducting a planning meeting with state agency liaison
officers at the Oklahoma National Guard Military Academy, located at N.E. 63rd St.
and Kelley Avenue. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) is located in the
tunnel between the Sequoyah and Will Rogers Buildings on the State Capitol
Complex. The SEOC was constructed in 1963, during the height of the cold war, and
designed to withstand the shock of a 20-megaton blast as close as three miles away,
coincidentally, the approximate distance to the Murrah Building. Even though the
explosion was reported to have been felt as far as 30 miles from the site, the first
notification to the SEOC came at 9:04 a.m., when personnel at the military academy
made contact. All SEOC personnel, as well as the state agency liaison officers, were
advised to report to the operational area of the center immediately. The Disaster
Recovery Manager was issued two hand-held radios and ordered to deploy to the site
by State Director Tom Feuerborn. By 9:25 a.m. the center was fully operational and
Director Feuerborn made the decision to maintain 24-hour operations until further
notice. State agencies initially represented in the SEOC included the Oklahoma
Department of Public Safety, the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, the
Oklahoma Military Department, the Oklahoma Department of Health and the
Oklahoma Department of Education. These agencies were shortly supplemented by
the National Weather Service, the Civil Air Patrol and the American Red Cross.
The incident was reported to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Region VI headquarters, in Denton, Texas, at 9:30 a.m. Regional Director R.L.
"Buddy" Young ordered the immediate activation of the Regional Operations Center
(ROC), the regional, federal counterpart to the SEOC.
At 9:45 a.m. Governor Frank Keating ordered a "State of Emergency" (see Exhibit C)
and released from duty all Oklahoma City area, non-essential state personnel as a
safety measure. Accompanied by their staffs, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
Mary Fallin arrived at the SEOC at 10:05 a.m. and received an immediate situation
briefing from ODCEM Director Feuerborn. For the remainder of the day the Governor
alternated his command between the SEOC and the disaster site.
By 10:35 a.m. Regional Director Young had briefed FEMA headquarters, in
Washington D.C., and organized a group of key staff to accompany him to Oklahoma
City. FEMA immediately put Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces from
Phoenix, Arizona and Sacramento, California on alert and at 10:55 activated each
team for deployment to Oklahoma City.
April 19th at the Site
After arriving at the Murrah Building, the Disaster Recovery Manager located the
Incident Command Post (ICP) at the intersection of N.W. 6th St. and Harvey Avenue.
He made initial contact with the Incident Commander (IC) and offered all state assets
necessary to supplement the response efforts. At the time, the most pressing need was
to cordon-off and maintain a secure perimeter around the structure. The option of
National Guard troops and additional Public Safety Officers was discussed and agreed
upon. The Recovery Manager attempted to make this request to the SEOC via cellular
telephone, but found the effort to be impossible due to an obvious system overload.
The transmission was completed by means of a hand-held radio.
Following this initial communication between the site and the SEOC, the first of at
least two bomb scares occurred. People began running north from the Murrah
Building, relaying that another bomb had been located. Without the ability to either
confirm or deny the threat, the IC made the decision to relocate the command post two
blocks north to a vacant parking lot on the southwest corner of N.W. 8th St. and
Harvey Avenue. After the relocation of both the Oklahoma City Fire Department
Mobile Command Vehicle and the Oklahoma City Police Department Mobile
Command Vehicle, other similar units began arriving in the same parking lot. Such
units included vehicles representing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). Southwestern Bell Telephone Company also parked a truck at
this location for the purpose of issuing free-use cellular phones to any and all response
personnel. They also reported that a temporary "cellular-on-wheels" site was currently
being erected to accommodate the high-traffic cellular use in the downtown area.
By 10:30 a.m., the State Exercise Training Officer arrived at the ICP to supplement
the forward State Emergency Management element. Reports from the National
Weather Service predicted a threat of rain by the afternoon and the request was made
through the SEOC to have the National Guard erect a tent near the ICP. Due to the
lack of shelter and the increasing number of emergency personnel and equipment
arriving at the confined parking lot, the IC made the decision to once again relocate
the ICP. The new location selected was directly across the street in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company's Corporate Headquarters parking lot (S.E. corner of N.W.
8th St. and Harvey Ave.), an option which was given to the IC by company officials.
The new location was far more accommodating to emergency personnel as it provided
a larger parking area, a sheltered garage where voluntary agencies and private
organizations could distribute food and store immediate donations, and the office
building, itself, which met the sanitary needs of the emergency/relief personnel and
later housed the first two US&R Task Forces.
Additional mobile command units arriving at the ICP represented the U.S. Marshals
Service and two vehicles from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety. The
Oklahoma National Guard erected their tent in the parking lot, with assistance from
Oklahoma City Public Works, and maintained forward operations from this site
throughout the event. Chained-link fencing was placed around the parking lot and
access was restricted on Harvey Ave. from 8th St. south.
Through the aid of Oklahoma City officials, the FBI secured a vacant building located
at 11 N.E. 6th St. to utilize as a command post for the investigative element of the
crime. The BATF and the DEA joined forces with the FBI in this effort and their
respective staff spent the afternoon establishing the operations center, while field
operations continued. Weldon Kennedy, of the Phoenix, Arizona office of the FBI,
was assigned Special Agent-In-Charge of the incident and arrived at the FBI
command post later that evening.
The two-man State Emergency Management forward element maintained a walking
post which consisted of periodic discussions with Oklahoma City Fire Department,
Oklahoma City Police Department and Oklahoma County Emergency Management
concerning potential needs in which state resources could be utilized. Additionally,
constant liaison relationships were maintained with the Oklahoma Department of
Public Safety, the National Guard and the American Red Cross, to attempt to better
coordinate a unified effort. Requests from the Oklahoma Medical Examiner's Office
were channeled directly through the SEOC, though periodic visits, by the forward
element, were made to the temporary morgue, established at the First Methodist
Church Building at the N.E. corner of 4th St. and Robinson Avenue.
By mid-afternoon, the promised precipitation arrived and donated rain gear was issued
by volunteers. In fact, by early afternoon, it became increasingly apparent that
donated goods would be a problem for the duration of the event. Commercial tractortrailers, pick-ups and other private vehicles began lining-up at the corner of N.W. 8th
St. and Harvey Ave., loaded with everything from wheel barrows to football helmets.
Voluntary organizations began storing items as best they could, but new drop-off
locations had to be established rapidly and inventory control became an
overwhelming task. It should also be noted that the ICP was not the only location
where donated goods were being delivered. This added to the overall lack of
donations coordination and represents one of the major deficiencies in the state and
local planning effort.
Another escalating problem facing the IC was the increasing influx of media
representatives arriving at the scene. The decision was made to locate all media
personnel within a vacant parking area, covering approximately one-half a square
block, on Harvey Ave. between N.W. 6th and 7th streets. This area was roped-off,
with access allowed to credentialed personnel. While it was not as close to the Murrah
Building as the media would have liked, it did offer an unobstructed view of the
structure. Oklahoma City Police and Fire public information specialists provided
initial periodic updates to the media and a joint federal, state and local press
conference was scheduled for the following morning at the Civic Center Music Hall's
"Hall of Mirrors", located at 201 Channing Square.
Due to the nature of the incident, crime scene standard operating procedures had to be
followed and the FBI cordoned-off an inner perimeter around the Murrah Building,
allowing access on N.W. 5th St. at either the Robinson Ave. or Harvey Ave.
intersection. The FBI also began a procedure to create and issue numerical, photoidentification badges to necessary personnel. Additionally, Oklahoma City established
a day-pass procedure which restricted unauthorized personnel entry to the site.
The Oklahoma City Fire Department established a Forward Command Post inside the
interior loading dock of the Murrah Building. This site was located at the northwest
corner of the building, inside the single-story concrete structure which stood alone, yet
was in contact with the Murrah Building. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA's) Incident SupportTeam (IST) was activated and co-located in the
Forward Command Post. The IST is a trained and equipped unit of operational
personnel from around the nation, designed to manage and coordinate the site-specific
FEMA response mission during catastrophic disasters. Equipment, including electrical
power, telephones, copiers, tables, chairs, and other necessary items, was immediately
brought in to support their efforts.
At 3:30 p.m. the First Christian Church, N.W. 36th St. and N. Walker Ave., was
established by the State Medical Examiner's Office as the site of the "Family
Assistance Center" (a.k.a. "The Compassion Center"). Immediate family members
received accurate briefings directly from the State Medical Examiner's Office at this
location twice daily. The Assistance Center provided information, mental health
counseling, and comfort to those who had fallen victim to this event or who either lost
or had missing family members in the building. Center support was provided by many
organizations, including the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Oklahoma
Funeral Directors Association, and many pastors, chaplains, and mental health
professionals throughout the area, state and nation. The Oklahoma County Sheriff's
Office and the Oklahoma National Guard provided security for the center.
The American Red Cross opened a shelter for those displaced by the explosion. They
also activated the National Disaster Services Human Resources Team to administer
large scale disaster assistance to the victims of this incident.
With donated goods and appropriate distribution becoming an increasing concern,
Red Cross logistics support was provided from warehouses at the ICP and at N.W. 5th
St. and Harvey Ave., inside the damaged U.S. Post Office. Other logistics sites were
provided by "Feed the Children", an Oklahoma City headquartered relief organization,
and the Salvation Army.
Feed The Children responded by shipping requested food and disaster supplies out of
their local warehouse at 32 N. McCormick, in Oklahoma City, by processing newly
donated items supplied by the public, by calling corporate contacts with requests for
specifically needed items, and by supervising volunteers. They also set-up and staffed
an on-site supply center near N.W. 5th St. and Robinson Ave., where a coordinated
effort was established to provide needed items to rescue workers from their
international headquarters at 333 N. Meridian and their warehouse.
The Oklahoma City Fire Department established their Technical Logistics Center at
225 N.W. 6th St., in a covered parking garage.
The Oklahoma Restaurant Association had just finished their annual conference when
the explosion occurred. Subsequently, they quickly established a 24-hour food service
operation, at the Myriad Convention Center, to feed all emergency response workers.
Eventually, the Myriad was established as a center which met the needs of all
personnel responding to the incident. Donated clothing, food, equipment and supplies
were available on a 24-hour basis. Other volunteer and donated services included
over-the-counter pharmaceutical and personal hygiene items, hair care, optometric,
chiropractic, and podiatric care, and massage therapy. AT&T provided free telephone
calls home for the US&R Task Forces, complimented by a free mail and parcel
delivery service provided by United Parcel Service. The Myriad also housed nine of
the 11 US&R Task Forces.
Critical Incident Stress Debriefings and mental health services were offered by, but
not limited to, professionals from the Oklahoma City Fire and Police Departments, the
Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, the FBI, the
American Red Cross and volunteer private specialists. Additionally, crisis hotlines
were established throughout the city to meet the needs of the general public.
At 4:00 p.m., CST, President Clinton announced that he had signed Emergency
Declaration FEMA-3115-EM-OK. (see Exhibit D) This declaration, under provisions
contained in Title V ofthe Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended), permits the federal government to provide
emergency assistance to save lives, protect property, public health & safety, and to
lessen or avert the threat of further damage. The declaration was specifically made
under the authority of Section 501 (b), which Congress created to allow the President
to provide immediate assistance for an "emergency involving primary federal
responsibilities."
The signing of this declaration not only gave the federal government primary
responsibility to respond to the disaster, but also authorized 100% federal financial
reimbursement for all eligible response missions performed by local and state
government. It should be noted that even though this declaration provided authority
and responsibility to the federal government, the chain of command did not change.
Oklahoma City Fire Department still controlled the search and rescue mission and the
FBI was still in charge of the investigative mission of the federal crime which had
been committed.
By late afternoon a meeting was held at the ICP between Oklahoma City Police,
Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety,
Oklahoma Military Department and ODCEM to permanently establish an outer
perimeter to the scene. Oklahoma City Police requested state support to maintain a 24hour perimeter encompassing 18 square blocks. It was decided the north-south limits
would be N.W. 8th St. and Robert S. Kerr Ave., respectively. The perimeter was
maintained on N. Hudson Ave. on the west and N. Broadway on the east. (see Exhibit
E) Numbers of personnel from each entity were decided upon and the outer perimeter
was immediately established around-the-clock, until further notice. Prior to this
meeting, outer perimeter control had been maintained by Oklahoma City Police and
the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office.
The inner perimeter, initially encompassing the Murrah Building and adjacent
damaged structures, which could potentially contain evidence, was secured by the FBI
and subsequently reduced as areas were combed and determined free of additional
evidence. This was accomplished through federal law enforcement manpower and
temporary chained-link fencing. The square block on which the Murrah Building sat
remains secured, by the General Services Administration (GSA), at the date of this
report.
At the SEOC
When the decision was made at 9:25 a.m. to establish 24-hour operations, selected
ODCEM staff were sent home, and were required to report to the SEOC for a
midnight to noon shift. The ODCEM Chief of Operations also required staff to report
15 minutes prior to each shift for briefing purposes. A similar 12-hour-on, 12-hour-off
format was established for forward operations, with additional time inserted for
briefing/de-briefing responsibilities. State agency liaisons were requested to establish
staffing patterns consistent with ODCEM's, to ensure operational continuity.
FEMA Regional Director Young and his staff arrived at the SEOC at 2:05 p.m. and
immediately began coordinating federal operations. ODCEM Director Feuerborn
received notification from Washington, D.C. that FEMA's National Director, James
Lee Witt, would arrive in Oklahoma City at approximately 7:30 p.m. After a
conference call with Washington and the FBI, FEMA's Mobile Emergency Response
Support (MERS) was alerted to establish secure satellite communications at the FBI's
investigative center. Discussion ensued among executives to establish a FEMA
Disaster Field Office (DFO) and to appoint both a Federal and a Defense
Coordinating Officer.
At 5:00 p.m. Director Feuerborn and Lt. Governor Fallin briefed Oklahoma's
Congressional Delegation.
FEMA Director Witt and selected staff arrived at the SEOC at 8:10 p.m. By this time
FEMA had response specialists in the field and task-specific personnel, i.e., public
affairs, public health, resource management and GSA, in Oklahoma City designing
appropriate response strategies.
The US&R Task Force from Phoenix arrived at approximately 10:45 p.m. to meet
with command personnel, survey the incident structure, and to conduct a pre-work
assessment of the overall situation. The Sacramento US&R Task Force arrived at
11:00 p.m. These two initial teams were housed at the Southwestern Bell
Headquarters Building. An additional nine US&R teams were activated and housed at
the Myriad Convention Center.
The two ODCEM forward operations personnel were relieved by the Senior
Operations Officer at approximately 11:35 p.m. They returned to the SEOC and
briefed the Director, Governor and his staff on continuing operational developments
and issues at the site.
April 20th and beyond
Following the chaotic series of activities on April 19th, structure and responsibility
gradually emerged throughout the response and recovery efforts. Strategy meetings at
the SEOC were held early every morning between Witt, Feuerborn and their
accompanying personnel. Situation reports were developed and distributed daily to
both the Governor and the President. The FBI held investigative meetings twice daily
and all key players briefed the public at press conferences, on a minimum schedule of
once per day.
Special Agent Kennedy made it clear in his initial April 20th meeting that priorities
were as follows: 1. locate any survivors; 2. remove any victims; and, 3. process the
crime scene. This basic directive helped to avert many potential problems which could
have arisen in this unique situation.
A Disaster Field Office (DFO) was established at 420 W. Main St. where state and
federal efforts could be unified. A request from the IC to establish a Multi-Agency
Coordination Center (MACC), where federal and state personnel could support local
coordination efforts, was accomplished and created within the confines of the Myriad
Convention Center on April 23rd. This facility also housed the Joint Information
Center, which facilitated the release of all public information.
The MACC was reduced in size and transferred to the Oklahoma City 9-1-1 Center,
formerly the Oklahoma City Emergency Operations Center (4600 N. Martin Luther
King Blvd.), on April 27th. All coordination of requests for assistance were reverted
back to the IC, SEOC and DFO on May 2nd.
At the site, the search and rescue mission continued for 17 days. A total of 11 US&R
Task Forces were activated to support the Oklahoma City Fire Department. (see
Exhibit F) The mountain of debris which was deposited on the north face of the
Murrah Building was removed almost entirely by hand, in five-gallon buckets. This
was done for three reasons: 1. The possibility that a survivor could be located and out
of respect to each fatality and their families; 2. The continuing concern over the
structural integrity of the building, which prevented the use of heavy equipment; and,
3. The control and analysis of each piece of debris removed for evidentiary purposes.
The operation was also delayed by mother nature. During the 17-day mission, rescue
workers were subjected to high winds, rain, sleet, lightening and hail on numerous
occasions.
Shortly after midnight on May 5th, search and rescue operations were determined to
be officially complete. It was anticipated at that time that three bodies remained in the
rubble. Due to the believed location and potential safety hazards, the decision was
made to leave the remaining bodies in the rubble until after the implosion of the
structure.
Long-term Recovery
On April 26th, the State of Oklahoma requested and received Presidential Major
Disaster Declaration FEMA-1048-DR-OK. (see Exhibit G) This declaration activated
a multitude of recovery and relief programs for victims' families, injured, small
business owners and public entities. Consistent with this long-term relief effort, the
"Oklahoma City Bombing Disaster Resource Coordination Committee" (RCC), made-
up of government and voluntary agencies and donated funds administrators, was
formed to service the unmet needs of victims which were not covered under the
declaration. The RCC continues to meet on a weekly basis and to date has distributed
over $2 million of donated funds.
Pursuant to Presidential Declaration FEMA-1048-DR-OK, a "Recovery Service
Center" (RSC) was officially opened at Shepherd Mall, N.W. 23rd St. and Villa, on
Saturday, April 29th. The RSC allowed victims of the disaster an opportunity to visit
face-to-face with local, state, federal and voluntary agency representatives who
administered relief programs provided under the declaration. As soon as the President
signed the declaration on the 26th, the national toll-free teleregistration system was
activated for victim registration.
The Family Assistance Center (a.k.a. The Compassion Center) was officially
transferred to the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services on May 5th and became known as "Project Heartland". A facility for long
term mental health services was established in Oklahoma City and designated as the
Project Heartland Center, located at 5500 N. Western. It continues to provide support
for survivors, families, rescue workers, and others affected by the disaster.
The Alfred P. Murrah Building was imploded at 7:02 a.m., Tuesday, May 23rd. The
three remaining victims were found where predicted.
On June 11-13, 125 local, state and federal response partners met in Oklahoma City to
discuss the disaster and make recommendations for improved response. The
Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management (ODCEM) participated in
this review and results of the conference are on file at FEMA's headquarters in
Washington, D.C.
From the time of the blast, through the building implosion, Oklahoma City Police
received no reports of looting or price gouging. Additionally, it should be noted that
there was no evidence of individuals attempting to profit from the disaster, i.e., T-shirt
and paraphernalia sales, etc. For this, all Oklahomans should be commended.
Throughout the event, ODCEM utilized a full-time staff of 25 to maintain 24-hour
operations (a 4/19/95 Staff Roster is provided in Exhibit H). Since that time, six of the
25 have left the department, yet all should be commended for their determined efforts
under extreme conditions.
In Closing
The purpose for the production of this document is to provide an overview of the
disaster, identifying actions taken, operational strengths and lessons learned. The
Oklahoma City Bombing is an event which is unique to the state and nation.
Throughout the United States, emergency services agencies and organizations are
reviewing plans and procedures, based on the Oklahoma disaster. Because of this
event, our state's personnel and agencies/organizations, which had direct involvement
in the response and recovery missions, have an added responsibility to inform the
nation of what happened, what worked and what could have been done better. The
most important information in this document is located under the section "Lessons
Learned". This is not meant to mean lessons learned from the operations outweighed
the strengths. It simply means that appropriate personnel can learn more from
problems and recommendations than from successes realized through existing
procedures. This report is limited to an emergency management perspective. From
this point of view, we have outlined seven rather generic items which we list as major
lessons learned from this event.
They are as follows:
1) The "Heartland" of America is no longer isolated from the reaction of
political action groups of either the extreme left or right;
2) The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) works best when all
functions are in place;
3) The Federal Response Plan needs to be modified to incorporate the response
activities and missions of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies;
4) State and local plans and exercises need to be changed to incorporate
response forces working in and around a crime scene;
5) State and local plans should mirror the Federal and Regional Response Plans
with additional emergency support functions added to fit the state and local
situation;
6) A need exists for national and regional integrated training between federal,
state and local emergency management, fire and law enforcement services, in
managing the consequences of terrorism incidents; and,
7) A federal, state and local cooperative partnership is essential for successful
response and recovery operations, following a catastrophic disaster.
As previously stated, these seven observations serve as merely umbrella headings to
many planning and procedural modifications which should be examined by
emergency management organizations at all levels of government, prior to the next
similar event. There is no doubt that the response/recovery missions achieved by
federal, state, local and voluntary organizations, pursuant to the bombing, should and
will be viewed as a successful operation. However, if the knowledge and experience
gained from this disaster remains docile in the minds of those involved, the
probability of future successful operations will not increase. It is for this reason that
this report is provided.
Much time has passed since the day which will be benchmarked as a period which
illustrated the very best and very worst mankind has to offer. Consequently, much has
been done to honor those who served. This is appropriate because actions completed
by these men and women were done so under extraordinary circumstances and
conditions. The last survivor of the blast was pulled from the rubble at 10:05 p.m. the
first day, yet determination and motivation remained high for 16 more days, under
less than ideal conditions.
However, there is but one fact, alone, which supersedes all others concerning this
disaster. On the 19th of April, 1995, 168 people lost their lives for no reason. This
shall never be forgotten.
The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency
Management
After Action Report
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing
19 April 1995 1995 in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma
Detailed Summary of Daily Activity
Daily Summary, Introduction and Log Entries for April 19 09:02 CDT - April 25
The following text is a compilation of significant events and log entries related to the
April 19th bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. This information has
been extracted from the Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management's
Emergency Information System (EIS), a computerized emergency management
system utilized at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). This text identifies
only the major developments concerning the disaster. It does not identify every action
taken and requested at the SEOC. Times, where provided, are done so to adequately
illustrate the sequence of events which occurred. Each is consistent with ODCEM
records, though they might not coincide precisely with after-action reports constructed
by other agencies.
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1995
0902 HRS: An explosion occurs in downtown Oklahoma City at the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building. Oklahoma City Fire Station One responds
immediately, reacting to the sound. Fire, emergency medical, and law
enforcement personnel, American Red Cross Disaster workers, and civilians,
enter the bombed structure without delay as they immediately initiate a massive
search and rescue effort.
0904: The explosion is reported to the Oklahoma Department of Civil
Emergency Management (ODCEM) by staff in the field. State agency liaison
officers are requested to report to the SEOC immediately.
0907: The Oklahoma County Chapter of the American Red Cross responds to
the incident, followed shortly by the local Salvation Army unit. Each begins
immediate services to victims, as well as initial assessment of the situation.
0920: The ODCEM Disaster Recovery Manager is dispatched to the scene.
State agency liaison officers begin arriving at the SEOC.
0925: The SEOC is fully operational and State Director Tom Feuerborn orders
24-hour operations until further notice. Selected staff are sent home to report
for the second shift beginning at 2400. Agencies initially represented in the
SEOC include:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
ODCEM
The Oklahoma Department of Public Safety
The Oklahoma Military Department
The Oklahoma Department of Human Services
The Oklahoma Department of Health
The Oklahoma Department of Education
The National Weather Service
The Civil Air Patrol
0930: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VI, in
Denton, Texas, is notified of the incident and immediately activates the
Regional Operations Center (ROC).
0945: Governor Frank Keating orders a "State of Emergency" and releases all
non-essential state employees, in the Oklahoma City area, as a safety measure.
1000: The National Weather Service (NWS) reports that weather will
deteriorate over the next six hours.
1005: Governor Keating and selected staff arrive at the SEOC and receive an
initial situation briefing from Director Feuerborn.
1015: ODCEM Forward Operations reports a "bomb scare" at the site, resulting
in the relocation of the Incident Command Post (ICP) to the southwest corner
of N.W. 8th St. and Harvey Avenue.
1030: The ODCEM Exercise Training Officer arrives at the ICP to supplement
forward operations.
1035: FEMA Regional Director Buddy Young reports to Director Feuerborn
that FEMA National Headquarters, in Washington D.C., has been briefed on
the situation and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces from Phoenix,
Arizona and Sacramento, California have been put on alert for immediate
deployment to Oklahoma City.
1055: FEMA activates the Phoenix and Sacramento US&R Task Forces and
begins organizing a list of additional US&R teams to supplement future efforts
in Oklahoma City. Additionally, FEMA activates an Incident Support Team
(IST), consisting of response specialists nationwide, to report to Oklahoma City
and coordinate the efforts of incoming US&R teams.
1100: The FEMA Regional Director and selected staff deploy from Denton,
Texas, en route to the SEOC.
1115: Due to limited space and approaching weather, the Incident Commander
(IC) relocates the ICP to the southeast corner of N.W. 8th St. and Harvey Ave.,
in the parking lot of Southwestern Bell Telephone's Corporate Headquarters.
Chained-link fencing is brought in to effectively cordon-off the area.
1150: Military medical personnel arrive to supplement the Emergency Medical
Services Authority (EMSA) with the triage mission at the site.
1200: With the aid of Oklahoma City officials, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) secures a building at 11 N.E. 6th St. to serve as a command
post for investigative efforts by law enforcement agencies. Weldon Kennedy,
of the Phoenix, Arizona office of the FBI, is named Special Agent-In-Charge
and the incident is titled "OK BOMB".
1330: A temporary morgue is established in the First Methodist Church, N.W.
4th St. and Robinson Avenue.
1405: FEMA Regional Director and staff arrive at SEOC. A conference call is
held with headquarters and FEMA's Mobile Emergency Response Support
(MERS) is alerted to establish secure satellite communications at the FBI
investigative center. The General Services Administration is asked to find
adequate office space for the establishment of a Disaster Field Office (DFO).
Director Feuerborn is advised that FEMA Director James Lee Witt will be
arriving in Oklahoma City at 1930 HRS.
1530: The Office of the State Medical Examiner establishes a "Family
Assistance Center" (a.k.a. "Compassion Center") at the First Christian Church,
N.W. 36th St. and Walker Avenue. Security is provided by the Oklahoma
County Sheriff's Office and the National Guard.
1600: President Clinton announces the signing of Emergency Declaration
3115-EM, which, under provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, permits the federal government to provide
emergency assistance to save lives, protect property, public health and safety,
and to lessen or avert the threat of further damage. The declaration is
specifically declared under the authority of Section 501 (b), which allows the
President to provide immediate assistance for an "emergency involving primary
federal responsibilities".
1630: Staffing pattern, consisting of Oklahoma City Police, Oklahoma County
Sheriff's Office, Department of Public Safety and Oklahoma Military
Department personnel, is established to cordon-off an 18-square-block area on
a 24-hour basis.
1700: Director Feuerborn and Lt. Governor Fallin brief Oklahoma's
Congressional delegation at the SEOC.
1830: The American Red Cross opens a shelter for victims displaced by the
explosion. Local hospitals report 472 injured and admitted or treated and
released.
2010: FEMA Director Witt and staff arrive at the SEOC.
2205: The last survivor of the explosion is removed from the rubble.
2245: The Phoenix US&R Task Force arrives at the site.
2300: The Sacramento US&R Task Force arrives.
2335: The ODCEM Forward Operations personnel are relieved at the site and
return to the SEOC to brief the State Director, Governor and his staff.
THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1995
0004 HRS: American Red Cross completes survey of area hospitals and reports
702 disaster victims seen.
0100: Oklahoma City Fire Department reports completion of their primary
search, including all of the Murrah Building still standing, third floor and
above.
0200: FEMA MERS arrives to support FBI and other response agencies. They
locate at the FBI Investigative Headquarters, 11 N.E. 6th Street. Additionally, a
Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT), provided by Public Health Services,
arrives to support the Medical Examiner's Office.
0554: National Weather Service reports improving weather through Friday,
with mostly sunny skies.
0659: Southwestern Bell Telephone completes the installation of a mobile
cellular site in downtown Oklahoma City, to accommodate high-traffic use.
0730: Agent Kennedy conducts his first inter-agency staff meeting for law
enforcement officers involved in the investigative mission of the disaster. He
makes it clear that priorities are as follows: 1. locate any survivors; 2. remove
any victims; and, 3. process the crime scene.
0900: An initial media briefing is held at the Oklahoma City Civic Center
Music Hall's "Hall of Mirrors".
From this point on, daily events will be denoted by a square, rather than a time entry.
•
•
Portable X-Ray equipment and trained staff are deployed from University
Hospital to the Medical Examiner's Office.
Critical Incident Stress Debriefings (CISDs) are established for rescue workers
and Governor Keating announces the implementation of a 24-hour, statewide
hotline to provide counseling support for victims and families of those involved
in the bombing.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
An evidence collection warehouse is established at 101 N.W. 4th Street.
Five hundred fifty (550) body bags arrive from Dallas, Texas and Memphis,
Tennessee.
The Myriad Convention Center becomes the designated location to house
additional US&R Teams responding to the disaster. The Oklahoma Restaurant
Association establishes 24-hour feeding operations, at the Myriad, to
accommodate all rescue workers.
American Red Cross President Elizabeth Dole arrives in Oklahoma City to tour
the bomb site and monitor ARC operations.
US&R Task Forces from Virginia Beach, Virginia, and New York City, New
York, arrive in Oklahoma City and begin 12-hour, alternating shifts with the
Phoenix and Sacramento teams.
Federal Coordinating Officer Dell Greer arrives in Oklahoma City and requests
General Services Administration (GSA) support in identifying a location to
establish a Disaster Field Office (DFO). Additionally, the following Emergency
Support Functions (ESFs), identified in the Federal Response Plan, are
activated for the operation:
o ESF 2 Communications
o ESF 3 Public Works and Engineering
o ESF 4 Firefighting
o ESF 5 Information and Planning
o ESF 6 Mass Care
o ESF 7 Resource Support
o ESF 8 Health and Medical Services
o ESF 9 Urban Search and Rescue
FEMA requests the Department of Defense (DOD), through appointed Defense
Coordinating Officer (DCO) Col. Stuart Bornhoft, provide six C-141 Starlifter
Transports in support of the operation.
Oklahoma First Lady Cathy Keating announces a Statewide Prayer Service to
be held at 3:00 p.m., Sunday, April 23rd, at the Oklahoma State Fairgrounds.
FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1995
•
•
•
The two-man, ODCEM forward operations day team is reduced to one, as the
Disaster Recovery Manager assumes his responsibilities as the State
Coordinating Officer of the disaster.
The Oklahoma State Health Department inspects the State Medical Examiner's
Office for possible biological contamination and finds M.E. procedures
acceptable. They also, work with the Oklahoma City Fire Department to
identify a disinfectant which can be sprayed on bodies to control bacteria and
odor.
The American Red Cross reports 68 individuals were housed at St. Luke's
Methodist Church on Thursday night. ARC also advises numerous Disaster
•
•
•
Welfare Inquiries have been received. Through these inquiries, ARC reports
711 victims accounted for and 167 victims missing.
US&R Task Forces arrive from Montgomery County, Maryland, and Los
Angeles County, California, to support efforts of the four prior teams.
At the request of Oklahoma City, ODCEM and FEMA agree to assist in the
establishment of a Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), at the Myriad
Convention Center, where local response efforts and resources can be
coordinated. Additionally, the decision is made to establish a Joint Information
Center (JIC), within the MACC, where public information and media inquiries
can be coordinated.
Oklahoma Military Department supports in the transfer of a suspect from Perry,
Oklahoma, to Oklahoma City.
SATURDAY, APRIL 22, 1995
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Heavy rain and high winds slow search and rescue operations throughout the
day.
U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich takes an early
morning tour of the bomb site, escorted by FEMA Director Witt and
representatives of the Governor's office.
The MACC, located in the Myriad Convention Center, becomes operational.
Personnel at the MACC include representatives of Oklahoma City departments,
Emergency Medical Services Authority, Oklahoma County Emergency
Management, Forward Operations for ODCEM, FEMA advisors, the National
Weather Service, the American Red Cross and technical advisors from the U.S.
Forestry Service.
The Disaster Field Office (DFO) begins operation at 420 W. Main St. In this
facility both the Federal and State Coordinating Officers locate with their
technical staffs and work the response, long-term recovery and administrative
aspects of the disaster. Additionally, a Congressional Liaison Office is
established at the DFO to coordinate inquiries from U.S. Senators and
Representatives.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) establishes a declaration for
disaster damage applications.
The FEMA Donations Coordination Support Team arrives at the DFO.
FEMA's Office of Emergency Information and Public Affairs begin periodic
satellite transmissions of pool video shot by US&R team members inside the
Murrah Building.
The Regional Operation Center (ROC), in Denton, Texas, closes. Future federal
resource support will be coordinated through the DFO.
US&R Task Forces from Fairfax County, Virginia, and Metro Dade County,
Florida, arrive in Oklahoma City to supplement the efforts of the six previous
teams.
•
•
The U.S. Public Health Service establishes a medical support unit to provide
assistance to the Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT). The Oklahoma City
Veterans Administration Hospital is tasked to provide logistical support to the
DMORT. The DMORT meets with city, county and state health officials
periodically, to provide updates. Also, 30 volunteer morticians, from the
Oklahoma Funeral Directors Association, provide support to the DMORT, the
Medical Examiner's Office and the Family Assistance Center.
The 61st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit completes inspection of the bomb
site. No additional explosive devices are found.
SUNDAY, APRIL 23, 1995
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Rescue efforts proceed slowly due to the instability of the Murrah Building.
Rain, lightening and wind hamper search efforts. Secondary searches of
surrounding buildings continue. The structural integrity of the federal
courthouse and U.S. Post Office are determined to be safe.
An Emergency Survivor Injury Registry is initiated by the Oklahoma Health
Department, with assistance provided by the Center for Disease Control. The
registry assists officials in victim identification and in documenting injuries and
any on-going medical needs.
The possibility of bacterial contamination continues to be a concern at the
bomb site. Five hundred (500) saranex-coated TYVEK suits are ordered,
through FEMA, for use by personnel at the scene.
At the MACC, the Joint Information Center (JIC), consisting of public
information specialists from all levels of government, becomes operational.
FEMA approves "Immediate Needs" crisis counseling funds of $142,350 to
assist the state in providing counseling services. These funds are transferred to
the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse for program
administration.
An In-Kind Donations Coordination Team is established at the DFO, consisting
of representatives of FEMA, ODCEM and voluntary organizations. The team's
functional responsibilities are outlined as follows:
o Process information provided by FEMA's toll-free donations hotline.
o Establish a single, coordinated, unmet needs list.
o Provide direct communication with the MACC.
o Address the management of spontaneous volunteers.
o Provide a liaison to the local business community.
o Share information concerning warehouse space and current inventory.
The American Red Cross assumes responsibility of the residents of the
Regency Tower, who are currently relocated at the Best Western Trade Winds
Motel, E. I-40 and Martin Luther King Boulevard. The ARC opens a service
center at the motel and works with each displaced family on an individual basis
of need.
•
•
The 16-person, 54th Quartermaster Graves Registration Unit, from Ft. Lee,
Virginia, arrives in Oklahoma City to support the Medical Examiner's Office at
the temporary morgue, located in the First Methodist Church, N.W. 4th St. and
Robinson Avenue.
More than 40,000 people converge at the Oklahoma State Fairgrounds for the
Prayer Service, attended by President and Mrs. Clinton, Governor and Mrs.
Keating, and Mayor and Mrs. Norick. The Reverend Billy Graham provides the
inspirational message.
MONDAY, APRIL 24, 1995
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Weather improves for the rescue workers at the site. Shoring of the structure
continues and areas along the base of the structure, in which victims are
thought to be located, take on familiar names, such as the pit, the bowl, the
forrest, the crater and the cave. In support of the Oklahoma City Fire
Department, US&R Task Forces continue 24-hour operations, with four teams
alternating during the day and two at night.
US&R Task Forces from Menlo Park, California, and Puget Sound,
Washington, arrive in Oklahoma City. Teams from Sacramento, California, and
Phoenix, Arizona, demobilize.
ODCEM and FEMA personnel conduct a preliminary applicant's briefing for
Oklahoma City officials, outlining long-term recovery issues and potential
funding sources.
A Biohazard Risk Assessment Team completes its one-day site visit to advise
on biological and chemical hazards. They relate the appropriate use of
protective equipment and the related health and safety issues to rescue workers.
Structural shifting is detected at the temporary morgue (First Methodist
Church) and the possibility of relocation is discussed. The decision is made to
have engineers constantly monitor the situation and report if relocation
becomes necessary.
An additional full-body X-Ray machine is obtained through FEMA to support
efforts of the Medical Examiner's Office.
The SBA announces that local business owners, who are currently unable to
access their structure, could be able to receive some temporary financial
assistance.
People who have vehicles parked outside the interior perimeter are allowed to
claim their automobiles through the Oklahoma City Police Department.
FEMA daily situation reports are made available to the public through the
internet.
TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 1995
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The search and rescue mission remains constant, but proceeds slowly due to the
massive piles of debris and continuing concern over the structural integrity of
the building. In many instances the mission is interrupted until additional
shoring measures can be implemented.
Two firefighters sustain injuries while working at the scene. One, an Oklahoma
City firefighter, is transported to St. Anthony's Hospital where he is treated and
released. The other, a Nichols Hills firefighter, is treated at the scene and
released for duty.
Lt. Governor Mary Fallin participates in a Donations Coordination Team
meeting held at the DFO. From the meeting, a joint voluntary agency media
release is developed reflecting the position that there is no longer a need for
mass quantities of goods or volunteers.
Oklahoma City, ODCEM and FEMA staff perform a joint Preliminary Damage
Assessment (PDA) of the affected area surrounding the Murrah Building. The
purpose of the PDA is to identify specific federal assistance and programs
necessary to return the damaged structures and victims as closely as possible to
pre-disaster condition.
Specialists from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers supplement efforts
concerning structural integrity and blast damage distribution.
The General Services Administration (GSA) conducts surveys necessary to find
temporary and permanent office space for the federal agencies previously
housed in the Murrah Building.
Defense Coordinating Officer Bornhoft coordinates a photographic fly-over of
the disaster area to assist in the investigative effort. The mission is achieved by
an Oklahoma Air National Guard C-130.
Governor Keating requests the President declare a major disaster for Oklahoma
City and provide Federal Individual Assistance in the form of Temporary
Housing, Low-Interest Loans, Disaster Unemployment and Individual and
Family Grants. A request for Federal Public Assistance (i.e. infrastructure
damages, emergency labor and materials) will be made at a later date since
most of these damages are currently covered under the Presidential Emergency
Declaration (FEMA-3115-EM) at a 100% federal share.
Daily Summary, Log Entries for April 26 - May 23
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1995
•
The one-week anniversary of the explosion is observed at the site as Governor
and Mrs. Keating, Lt. Governor Fallin and Mayor and Mrs. Ron Norick lead
the rescue workers in a one-minute moment of silence at exactly 9:02 a.m.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Search and rescue efforts continue with emphasis concentrated on the "pit" area
of the building (central-interior location), where debris is heavy and victims are
believed to be located. Six US&R Task Forces remain on rotating duty as the
New York City and Virginia Beach teams demobilize.
Four firefighters from Midwest City and six from Tinker Air Force Base
provide continuous decontamination support to the rescue workers.
National Guardsmen, provided by the Oklahoma Military Department, initiate
an evidentiary sifting mission through rubble transported to the Oklahoma
County Sheriff's gun range. This mission is tasked at the request of the FBI.
From previous donations coordinations meetings, a Donations Task Force is
identified and an organizational meeting is held at the DFO. Represented at the
meeting are Lt. Governor Fallin, the Federal Coordinating Officer, State
Coordinating Officer, Oklahoma City officials, the Oklahoma Department of
Human Services, FEMA's donations specialists, the FEMA Voluntary Agency
Coordinator, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Feed the Children,
Adventist Community Services, the Oklahoma Restaurant Association and
Americorps. The task force is presented with two separate issues to address: 1.
Items needed by individuals and families affected by the blast, and the workers
supporting them; and, 2. Items needed by individuals and organizations
working within the blast area. It is emphasized that the task force is not
challenged with meeting the long-term needs of victims nor the donated funds
which have been arriving from around the world, since the explosion.
Two bomb dog teams arrive in Oklahoma City to support the U.S. Marshal's
Service in providing security at the federal courthouse.
The FBI releases the Regency Tower from the crime scene. Inspection of the
building is completed and it is found to be structurally sound. Approximately
400 people resided in 260 apartment units at the time of the blast. Oklahoma
City Metro Transit provides transportation to the displaced residents, who are
allowed to enter the building and pick-up any essential items or possessions.
(The Regency Tower residents were allowed to move back in after repairs were
made on October 26, 1995)
President Clinton signs Major Disaster Declaration FEMA-1048-DR, providing
individual assistance to eligible applicants in Oklahoma City. The national
teleregistration number is activated and victims are encouraged to apply. The
Federal and State Coordinating Officers brief Oklahoma's Congressional
Delegation on this development at the DFO.
THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1995
•
Rescue crews are temporarily removed from "the pit" area of the building as a
concrete slab shift is detected. Engineers evaluate the situation and re-initiate
the recovery operation. To date, only ten minor injuries have been sustained by
rescue workers.
•
•
•
•
•
Oklahoma City Public Works officials release their initial survey figures of the
damaged area. Their assessment shows 312 structures sustaining some damage,
25 buildings with major structural damage and 10 buildings destroyed.
The MACC is down-sized and relocated to the Oklahoma City Emergency
Operations Center (EOC), 4600 Martin Luther King Boulevard. Emergency
Support Function Three (ESF-3: Public Works and Engineering), ESF-9 (Urban
Search and Rescue) and the Joint Information Center (JIC) move to the DFO.
The remaining ESFs and ODCEM Forward Operations move to the Oklahoma
City EOC.
Americorps volunteers assist the Donations Coordination Team with warehouse
inventory and goods reception at various sites.
Through the aid of ODCEM and the Oklahoma Department of Central
Services, FEMA and GSA locate a site to establish a Recovery Service Center
(RSC), where applicants can visit one-on-one with representatives of various
programs offering aid. The location is in Shepherd Mall, N.W. 23rd St. and
Villa. Plans are made to open the RSC Saturday, April 29th, but GSA and SBA
immediately relocate to handle administrative functions and assist with
previously disbursed loan applications. The American Red Cross makes plans
the move their service center to this location and the Oklahoma Baptists plan to
establish a child-care facility to aid in the assistance process.
By close of business, 250 individuals have applied for disaster assistance
through FEMA's teleregistration service.
FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1995
•
•
The Menlo Park US&R Task Force completes securing overhead hazards (large
concrete slabs) on the north and east sections of the building. Crews continue
working in "the pit" area, where several more victims are believed to be
located. Continued removal of debris, while necessary, is believed to weaken
the remaining structure. Numerous breaks are taken for constant engineering
evaluation and additional shoring efforts.
FEMA Director Witt and his staff meet with Governor Keating and ODCEM
Director Feuerborn before departing to Washington, D.C.
SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1995
•
•
•
Several more victims are recovered from "the pit" area of the building.
Additional debris is removed and hanging hazards secured. Cracks in two
northern columns of the building are shored with steel banding and epoxy.
The Orange County, California, US&R Task Force arrives in Oklahoma City as
the Los Angeles County and Montgomery County teams are demobilized.
Oklahoma City Fire Department disbands the Command Post at the
Southwestern Bell Telephone Building.
•
The RSC is fully operational at Shepherd Mall with personnel staffed to
represent the following organizations/programs:
FEMA Disaster Housing
FEMA/State Individual and Family Grants
ODCEM
Oklahoma Employment Security Commission
American Red Cross
Oklahoma Department of Human Services/Aging
Salvation Army
Department of Area-wide Aging
SBA
Federal Employees Education & Assistance Fund
Social Security Administration
Veterans Administration
Internal Revenue Service
Oklahoma County
FEMA/State Public Affairs
Oklahoma State Insurance Commission
•
•
•
A telephone bank is also provided for those who have yet to apply for
assistance through the teleregistration service. A total of 23 media outlets visit
the RSC during the first day of operation.
Oklahoma Representatives J.C. Watts and Frank Lucas are briefed at the DFO
and tour the Murrah Building.
The owner, head coach and several members of the Dallas Cowboys football
team visit the Myriad Convention Center, Family Assistance Center and area
hospitals on a good will mission.
SUNDAY, APRIL 30, 1995
•
•
•
•
A crane and dump truck are involved in an accident at the site, but no injuries
occur.
The MACC is down-sized once again and relocated to the Oklahoma City Fire
Department Technical Logistics Center at 225 N.W. 6th St., in a covered
garage. All FEMA support to the MACC is transferred to the DFO or
demobilized. ODCEM Forward Operations remain in the MACC.
The U.S. Public Health Service's "Disaster Studies Health Group" begin
collecting documentation concerning patients treated after the explosion.
California Congressman Jerry Lewis is briefed at the DFO and bomb site, and
visits Governor Keating and ODCEM Director Feuerborn.
MONDAY, MAY 1, 1995
•
•
Operations at the site officially transition to a recovery mission. Work is
continued by hand and with the limited use of heavy equipment, but is
suspended several times due to inclement weather conditions.
US&R Task Forces from Fairfax County and Metro Dade County are
demobilized. Prior to leaving, the Metro Dade County Team presents the
YMCA with $1,000 to replace damaged playground equipment.
TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1995
•
•
•
•
•
Recovery operations concentrate on the "bowl" area, as structural engineers
monitor the situation closely for signs of shifting. Due to unpredictable spring
weather, a growing concern for the safety of the workers and the newly
emphasized recovery mission, operations for the day are limited to an 0600 1800 HRS time frame.
US&R Task Forces from Menlo Park and Puget Sound are demobilized,
leaving Orange County as the only team remaining. At 1800 HRS the decision
is made to halt all US&R support, but to keep technical specialists on until May
6 to act in an advisory capacity to Oklahoma City Fire Department.
All rescue/recovery efforts are expected to be completed by Friday, May 5, at
which time the site will be turned over to the FBI and restricted to investigative
personnel only.
The 54th Quartermaster Graves Registration Unit is released.
All Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) personnel and equipment,
except logistical support, are released by 2400 HRS.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 1995:
•
•
•
•
All rescue/recovery operations at the site are being conducted by Oklahoma
City Fire Department, as the US&R Task Force from Orange County
demobilizes. Prior to departure, the Orange County Team presents an orange
tree and plaque to Oklahoma City officials.
The Oklahoma Military Department completes its sifting mission at the
Oklahoma County Sheriff's gun range.
Governor Keating requests the inclusion of Public Assistance (i.e.,
infrastructure damages) in Presidential Major Disaster Declaration FEMA1048-DR-OK.
By late afternoon, applications for disaster assistance total 968. Temporary
Housing checks issued to date total $408,696 and the Small Business
Administration has distributed 496 loan applications.
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995:
•
Recovery work continues at the site, conducted totally by Oklahoma City Fire
Department. The General Services Administration (GSA) requests engineering
•
support to monitor the structure after the rescue/recovery mission is completed.
Two structural engineers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Tulsa
District, assume this mission and relieve engineers currently supporting the
recovery operation.
The American Red Cross Family Services, Health Services and Mental Health
Divisions form a "compassion team", designed to contact families of the
deceased and all others who were directly victimized by the disaster.
FRIDAY, MAY 5, 1995:
•
•
•
•
•
At 0005 HRS the Oklahoma City Fire Department officially halts all recovery
operations at the site. It is believed that three bodies remain in the rubble, but
due to their perceived location, structural engineers feel that the safety factor is
too great to pursue their recovery until after the implosion of the building.
Rescue/recovery workers gather at the site for a memorial service, closed to the
media.
The FEMA Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT) completes its mission for the
State Medical Examiner's Office and is deactivated.
Responsibility of the Family Assistance Center, at First Christian Church, is
transferred to the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Services. The center, through federal funding efforts, becomes "Project
Heartland", a program designed to meet the long-term needs of victims.
("Project Heartland" eventually relocates to 5500 N. Western Ave., where it
remains at the date of this report.)
President Clinton approves the inclusion of Public Assistance in Major Disaster
Declaration FEMA-1048-DR-OK.
SATURDAY, MAY 6, 1995:
•
•
Training and demobilization of the FEMA Donations Team continues, with
emphasis placed on returning donated goods to the original donor.
Operations of the Defense Coordinating Office are transferred to Ft. Sill,
Oklahoma.
SUNDAY, MAY 7, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
MONDAY, MAY 8, 1995:
•
All Emergency Support Function (ESF) operations are transferred from the
Disaster Field Office (DFO) to FEMA Region VI, in Denton, Texas.
•
•
A consortium of 15 religious organizations is established, known as "Interfaith
Disaster Recovery of Greater Oklahoma City", to better meet the needs of
disaster victims.
The Recovery Service Center reports 889 visitors, to date. Individual
Assistance registrations total 1,242 and SBA reports 715 loan applications
issued. The American Red Cross and the Individual and Family Grant Program
are working together to meet the funeral/medical expense needs of victims.
TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1995:
•
•
•
•
After conferring with state and local officials, the General Services
Administration (GSA) determines the best way to raze the remains of the
Murrah Building is by implosion. GSA proceeds to make arrangements,
contracts and proposes a date for the pending event.
A Federal Building Performance Team arrives in Oklahoma City to study the
effects of the blast and make recommendations to mitigate damages from
similar events. The team is comprised of representatives from FEMA, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, GSA, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and support contractors. The
team is briefed by GSA officials on the status of the structure, but access is
prohibited, due to safety factors.
The donations distribution site at the U.S. Post Office, northwest corner of
N.W. 5th and Harvey Ave., is closed.
A Public Assistance Applicants' Briefing is held at the Oklahoma Historical
Society Auditorium to educate potential applicants on the intricacies of the
federal-state program.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1995:
•
The Recovery Service Center reports 1,368 registrations and 1,205 visitors, to
date. SBA has issued loan applications to 542 individuals and 243 businesses.
FRIDAY, MAY 12, 1995:
•
•
GSA selects the bid of a Maryland-based demolition company to implode the
Murrah Building. A date has yet to be announced.
The FEMA Voluntary Agency Coordinator holds the first Unmet Needs
Committee meeting with key members from the Voluntary Agencies Active in
Disasters (VOAD) group. Within a few weeks the group of approximately 20
agencies and funds grows to more than 80. (The group is renamed the
•
Oklahoma City Bombing Disaster Resource Coordination Committee and
continues to meet weekly. The committee is continuing to develop a long-term
recovery network, in cooperation with the National Association of Social
Workers, Oklahoma Chapter, to constantly address victim, survivor, family and
disaster workers' long-term needs. Additionally, FEMA, working in
conjunction with the Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, is
continuing the long-term recovery process by identifying issues that could be
resolved by federal assistance.)
The Recovery Service Center reports 655 Disaster Housing applications issued
to verification inspectors with 594 of the inspections completed and processed.
Disaster Housing payments, to date, total $547,951.
SATURDAY, MAY 13, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
SUNDAY, MAY 14, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
MONDAY, MAY 15, 1995:
•
•
FEMA representatives and Feed the Children volunteers assist Regency Tower
residents with the packing and moving of personal property so reconstruction
of the building can begin.
A meeting, coordinated by the United Way of Oklahoma City, is held for
families who had children at the Murrah Building day-care center. Individuals
are encouraged to talk with FEMA and voluntary agency representatives about
their immediate and long-term needs.
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1995:
•
•
It is determined that at the time of the explosion 260 units of the Regency
Tower were occupied, 72 of which still need to be vacated prior to
reconstruction. By close of business, only 15 units have items which have yet
to be moved or are under contract to be moved.
Due to decreased activity, representatives from the Oklahoma Department of
Human Services, Oklahoma County and Feed the Children relocate from the
Recovery Service Center to their appropriate headquarters. Arrangements are
made with Feed the Children to provide transportation for Regency Tower
victims from the Trade Winds and Central Plaza motels to the Recovery
Service Center.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
THURSDAY, MAY 18, 1995:
•
A Public Assistance meeting is held between ODCEM, FEMA and the
Oklahoma City YMCA. The meeting is designed to determine eligibility of the
non-profit organization, however, the YMCA reports it has accepted an
insurance settlement and additional assistance is unnecessary.
FRIDAY, MAY 19, 1995:
•
•
Disaster victims making application through FEMA's National Teleregistration
Center are advised that, due to computer problems, no individual control
numbers will be issued for three to five days. This creates a significant problem
since voluntary agencies use the control number to identify duplication of
benefits, etc. FEMA is working to correct the malfunction, but asks the
voluntary agencies to proceed in their efforts without the control number.
The Donations Management Team ceases operations at the DFO. Future
inquiries/activities will be coordinated through United Way personnel, located
at the Recovery Service Center.
SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
SUNDAY, MAY 21, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
MONDAY, MAY 22, 1995:
•
Recovery activities continue.
TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1995:
•
At 0702 HRS the remains of the Alfred P. Murrah Building are imploded. In
the next few days, the bodies of the three remaining victims are located,
precisely where they were believed to be. This brings the final death count to
168, including the Oklahoma City nurse who responded to the incident and was
mortally wounded when struck in the head by a piece of debris.
The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency
Management
After Action Report
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing
19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Operational Strengths
The operational strengths subsequent to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building are presented herein under the headings: I. Major Reasons the Operation Ran
Smoothly; and, II. Additional Strengths Observed. It should be noted that the
response/recovery challenges faced during the Oklahoma City Bombing are unique to
any disaster operation the United States has encountered, to date. It would be
impossible to document every positive response/recovery effort performed during this
tragedy, therefore, only a few, significant strengths are outlined. A strong point of
emphasis should be noted when reviewing this section and the next, dealing with
lessons learned. The response/recovery missions performed during the Oklahoma City
Bombing will and should always be considered a "total success". The following
observations are presented for consideration during future operations.
I. MAJOR REASONS THE OPERATION RAN SMOOTHLY
1. The disaster occurred in Oklahoma City, where there was a strong state and
federal government presence.
2. The disaster occurred in a jurisdiction which possesses an abundance of
emergency resources.
3. The intense search and rescue mission was limited to a relatively small,
confined area.
4. Damages were limited to a mostly non-residential section of the city.
5. Cooperation between local, state and federal government was unparalleled.
6. Strong executive leadership and common concerns were displayed at all
levels of government.
7. Every person involved in the response/recover operation possessed a
personal interest in the event. All were victims.
8. "THE OKLAHOMA STANDARD" Simply defined, The Oklahoma
Standard represents the greatest asset our state offers..."Our People"
II. ADDITIONAL STRENGTHS OBSERVED
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Unquestionable responsiveness, teamwork, and caring incurred on the part of
all first responders.
The American Red Cross and other voluntary organizations' response was
immediate and continues to meet the needs of all those affected by the disaster.
The National Weather Service (NWS) was instrumental in providing timely and
accurate weather data to those overseeing the rescue/recovery effort. The threehour, short-term weather forecasts should continue to be a standard, provided
by NWS to the Incident Command Post, during any major emergency/disaster.
Once the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) was established, a good
exchange of information began to evolve between ODCEM Forward
Operations Officers and the Tinker Air Force Base Fire Department, the
Oklahoma National Guard, the Oklahoma City Public Works, the Oklahoma
County Emergency Operations Center and their Emergency Management staff,
the Oklahoma City Fire Department and the National Weather Service.
Communication support from Cellular One, Southwestern Bell, et al, was
superb.
Unlike many of the agencies at the scene, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol could
talk directly with personnel from Oklahoma-based federal agencies, including
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FBI and the U.S. Marshal's
Service. They have a pre-determined disaster plan in place, and part of that plan
calls for the use of compatible radios and systems. A Department of Public
Safety technician was able to program radios within 45 minutes. The Mobile
Command Posts were indispensable for effective on-site communications. To
coordinate communications among the multiple agencies, the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol used their trunking capability to assign different sub-fleets for
different functions to different public-safety agencies, if they were equipped
with 800MHz trunking system radios.
Oklahoma City provided adequate space and resources for the establishment of
the two Multi-Agency Coordination Centers (MACCs).
Many officials indicated that city, county, state and federal response procedures
for this incident would become a model for the future. Urban Search and
Rescue Task Force members commented regularly that they had never been
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
treated so well before, and that the care and compassion they received while
here had become the standard -- "The Oklahoma Standard"
Security procedures were quickly established to limit access to the Incident
Command Post area, inner perimeter and outer perimeter.
The Oklahoma City Police Department had an Emergency Response Team
(ERT), established two years prior to the incident. They have trained monthly
and added a new mobile command post to their cadre of response equipment.
Forty-seven ambulance services, 103 ambulance units, and 384 emergency
medical personnel participated in the bombing incident. Some units were
already in Oklahoma City, transporting patients from their jurisdiction.
Subsequently, they stayed to assist, once their patients were delivered to their
appropriate destination. Other services were called in for mutual aid, to assist in
or take care of the routine calls. Others were asked to provide back-up for
communities, so that closer ambulances could respond, while others responded
to the numerous media requests for assistance.
A sophisticated piece of equipment used to search for survivors in the Murrah
Building was the "Life Detector", a listening device used to locate a conscious
person trapped under rubble. Search and rescue personnel would then use a
bullhorn to instruct victims to tap rhythmically on a large piece of concrete or
steel.
Another piece of technology used in the Murrah Building was the "System To
Locate Survivors" (STOLS), a specialized search camera system. Operators
would wear a 21-pound monitor strapped to their chest to view images
transmitted from a probe via a fiber-optic cable. The probe, which is two inches
in diameter and carries a camera and microphone on the end, can be extended
up to 79 inches into a structure through bored holes or cracks. The camera can
be articulated to allow for up to a 180-degree view. The operators wore
headphones to enable them to hear inside the crevice.
The immediate response by Oklahoma City's fire, police and emergency
medical personnel and other area fire, police and emergency medical personnel
was phenomenal. Personnel and apparatus appeared at a moment's notice,
willing to do whatever it took and work as long as it took to achieve the search
and rescue mission.
The Oklahoma City Bombing should be viewed as ultimate proof that the
Incident Command System works.
Operational strengths exhibited by ODCEM include the following:
1) Operational personnel responded to the site and made contact with the
IC within the first 30 minutes.
2) The SEOC was fully operational with liaison officers in-place within
the first hour.
3) Back-up communications were in-place and utilized to make initial
contact with FEMA.
4) Personnel recall was immediate and 24-hour operations were
maintained by a full-time staff of 25 for the next 17 days.
5) Volunteer resources were established prior to the bombing and
utilized to supplement manpower capabilities for the duration of the
operation.
6) Briefing reports were provided to the Governor at the beginning of
each day, outlining the previous 24-hours' developments.
7) State personnel exhibited operational flexibility necessary to
accommodate Oklahoma City with State resources and to request federal
resources, in this unique disaster situation.
The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency
Management
After Action Report
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing
19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Lessons Learned
The lessons learned subsequent to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building are presented herein under the headings: I. Major Lessons Learned; II.
Lessons Learned through Response/Recovery Operations; and, III. Lessons Learned
from Other Agencies. A strong point of emphasis is necessary when reviewing the
information contained herein. Regardless of whether all operations followed current
emergency management doctrine, the response phase of this emergency was
performed in a most professional, positive, caring, and safe manner. The following
observations are presented for consideration during future operations.
I. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED
1. The "Heartland" of America is no longer isolated from the reaction of
political action groups of either the extreme left or right.
2. The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) works best when all
functions are in place.
3. The Federal Response Plan needs to be modified to incorporate the response
activities and missions of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.
4. State and local plans and exercises need to be changed to incorporate
response forces working in and around a large crime scene.
5. State and local plans should mirror the Federal and Regional Response Plans
with additional emergency support functions added to fit the State and local
situation.
6. A need exists for National and Regional integrated training between Federal,
State and local emergency management, fire and law enforcement services.
7. A Federal, State and local cooperative partnership is essential for successful
response and recovery operations following a catastrophic disaster.
II. LESSONS LEARNED THROUGH RESPONSE/RECOVERY
OPERATIONS
(Lessons learned under this heading will be addressed under the appropriate
Emergency Support Function (ESF), as outlined by the Federal Response Plan.)
A. ESF #1 - TRANSPORTATION
Issues covered under "Lessons Learned from other Agencies"
B. ESF #2 - COMMUNICATIONS
Statement of Issue 1: Due to the initial chaos following the explosion and nonemergency services transmissions, communications capabilities from the
disaster site and between response agencies were limited at best.
Discussion: During the first 12 to 18 hours after the incident, standard and
cellular phone circuits were overloaded, making it extremely difficult to
communicate by telephone. Portable/mobile cellular sites were erected near the
incident site to ease the stress on cellular circuits. This action in itself made it
much easier to seize a circuit, greatly enhancing cellular communications.
However, other non-emergency communications traffic tied up standard phone
lines making coordination efforts difficult at best. During the first few critical
hours following the explosion, two-way radio proved to be the fastest and most
efficient way to relay information back to dispatchers and request specific
support.
Additionally, Oklahoma City Police Department indicated that they switched
much of their communications to a common police channel, enabling them to
better communicate with their personnel. This achieved a significant
improvement with their internal operations; however, it left them isolated and
unable to communicate and/or monitor activities of other responding law
enforcement units or response agencies.
Cellular One (now known as AT&T Wireless Services) served as the catalyst
for creation of the Oklahoma Disaster Preparedness Council in 1994. This
council included top-level management and operations personnel from
departments of municipal governments in the metropolitan area; Oklahoma
County, State and Federal agencies, hospitals, and the media. Through the
council, a directory of cellular telephone numbers of key personnel and
facilities was created. Immediately after the bombing, Cellular One
reconfigured their trunking system to provide priority service to those numbers
listed in the directory.
Recommendations: Emergency plans should be reviewed and Agency
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) should be developed to provide for an
effective communications system when responding to a catastrophic event of
this nature. The activities of the Oklahoma Disaster Preparedness Council
should be enhanced and expanded to other communities/agencies serviced by
AT&T Wireless. Similar efforts should be initiated with other cellular
telephone companies.
Statement of Issue 2: Even though the SEOC provides adequate
communications capabilities for most disasters experienced within the state,
and the MACC was established to provide adequate capabilities for this event,
logistics for transmissions (via telephone, radio or FAX machine) sometimes
led to confusion and delays on action in each operations center.
Discussion:
At the MACC - There were numerous telephones in the Multi-Agency
Coordination Center (MACC). This being the case, when a phone would ring,
everyone would check to determine if it was their phone which was ringing.
Additionally, a "ring-down" telephone connected directly to the State EOC was
not always available to forward operations staff. This was asked for each time
the forward element relocated, however, such a system was only installed when
operations moved to the City EOC. It should be noted that a ring-down phone
was already located at the City EOC and was repositioned to the operations
area by the City Communications Officer.
At the SEOC - Pagers and cellular telephones do not work inside the State
EOC. Antiquated communications equipment was unable to make immediate
frequency changes for all of the influx of agencies involved. SEOC computer
equipment was extremely slow and no computers were dedicated solely for the
purpose of logging message traffic. There were also no electronic status boards.
Recommendations: A "ring-down" phone should be made available to
ODCEM staff wherever forward operations is located and visual notification
devices should be placed on each phone and FAX machine in the SEOC to
limit confusion and potential delays in action. Electronic status boards should
be installed in the SEOC along with a passive antenna system which would
allow pager and cellular phone use. As for computers and other
communications equipment, short and long-term upgrade plans need to be
established, including the need for dedicated computers for the purpose of
message-logging, donated goods, etc.
C. ESF #3 - PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING
Issues covered under "Lessons Learned from other Agencies"
D. ESF #4 - FIREFIGHTING
The State did not have a firefighting mission in this event. Search and rescue
operations were conducted locally and supplemented federally. Lessons learned
on this activity should be covered by each level's After Action Report.
E. ESF #5 - INFORMATION AND PLANNING
(Command and operational issues will also be covered under this ESF)
Statement of Issue 1: The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS)
and Incident Command System (ICS) were weakened early in the event due to
the immediate response of numerous local, state and federal agencies, three
separate locations of the Incident Command Post (ICP), within the first few
hours, and the deployment of many Mobile Command Posts (MCPs),
representing support agencies.
Discussion: At the Incident Command Post (ICP), there were a minimum of
seven (7) Mobile Command Posts (MCPs), representing various agencies,
coordinating numerous support functions. While the search and rescue mission
was always under the command of Oklahoma City Fire Department, the many
MCPs produced fragmented information from which decisions could be made
and actions tracked. This situation also led to confusion between agencies and
in some cases caused delayed action due to multiple chains through which a
request was made. Additionally, any officials visiting the ICP had to check with
a minimum of four MCPs to obtain the overall scope of the situation.
Recommendations: In reality, there was only one ICP at the Southwestern Bell
Telephone parking lot, the post manned by the Oklahoma City Fire
Department. Every other Mobile Command Post served simply as a forward
operations unit for the agency which it represented. For the Integrated
Emergency Management System to function properly, the following process
needs to be adhered to:
1) The ICP is established immediately at an appropriate location with the
Incident Commander (IC), representing local government*, identified;
* The term "Local Government" includes both City and County
2) All resources necessary to support the mission should be requested
from the IC to the Local Emergency Operations or Coordination Center;
3) Resources requested which the local government cannot
accommodate should be directed to the state, through the State
Emergency Operations Center; and,
4) Resources requested which the state government cannot accommodate
should be directed to the federal government, through the FEMA
Regional Operations Center or the Disaster Field Office, if one is
established.
Even though much has been stated concerning the unique response each level
of government was forced to take in this event, the fact remains that Oklahoma
City was in charge of the search and rescue mission from the time the bomb
exploded until they deemed the mission completed. Therefore, there is no
reason the IEMS process, detailed above, could not have been implemented.
Statement of Issue 2: A general lack of knowledge by key individuals and
agencies, concerning IEMS, disaster response/recovery planning and
implementation, and emergency management functions in general, led to
confusion and frustration among responding agencies at all levels of
government.
Discussion: There were some local, state and federal officials who did not have
a clear understanding of the terms "emergency" or "disaster", nor the
knowledge of the existence of a State or Federal Emergency Operations Plan.
Many calls were placed to various state and federal agencies without the
necessary coordination. This slowed the responsiveness of these support
organizations, since they had to back-track to conduct the required coordination
consistent with established law.
Recommendations: When implemented at all levels of government, the
Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), just as the Incident
Command System (ICS), has been proven effective on numerous occasions,
nationwide. However, the key to success of this system, or any system, is
commitment by all levels of government. This can only be established through
constant disaster planning, training and exercising. Oklahoma City does not
currently agree with the IEMS, nor did they at the time of the bombing. While
this is a local government prerogative, problems with future disaster situations
will continue to arise when state and federal support are required.
Statement of Issue 3: The establishment of the Multi-Agency Coordination
Center (MACC) was necessary, given the circumstances concerning the
response efforts following the Oklahoma City bombing. However, the MACC's
function carried two separate definitions, depending solely on who you talked
to. It was either: 1. A center where all appropriate agencies from all levels of
government should relocate to provide coordination actions and expertise; or,
2. An Oklahoma City Emergency Operations Center where all city resources
and information could be coordinated.
Discussion: Since ODCEM utilized definition #2 in its activities, the following
discussion points are to be taken with this fact in mind. The points are as
follows:
1) When Oklahoma City decided to consolidate response support actions, city
officials delegated implementation authority for the integrated emergency
management system to FEMA Headquarters personnel. The city is not a funded
Emergency Management Assistance (EMA) jurisdiction. The city's full-time
Emergency Management Director position had been vacant for approximately
10 months prior to this incident. The city has a federally-funded EOC,
however, it was converted to a 9-1-1 dispatch center several years ago, and city
officials do not appear to have a clear understanding of the integrated
emergency management system and the role of an EOC as a coordination
center.
2) When Oklahoma City decided to consolidate response support actions, city
officials refused to use the term EOC. Rather, the term Multi-Agency
Coordination Center (MACC) was used. This caused some confusion at all
levels relative to the terminology. In every respect, the MACC was an
operational city EOC, augmented by federal and state personnel. Response
coordination and exchange of information improved significantly when the
MACC was activated. However, the city should have been prepared to activate
a coordination center earlier than it did. As a special note, city officials were
not familiar with the role of the Disaster Field Office (DFO). City officials
initially thought that DFO operations could be consolidated into the MACC,
verses consolidating operations at a City EOC, State EOC and the DFO.
3) The ODCEM forward operations element moved from the State EOC to the
Incident Command area, to the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), at
the Myriad Convention Center, to the MACC, at the City 9-1-1 Center, and
finally to the Fire Department Logistics area, where it was deactivated. Special
note - There was also a DFO representative at the Fire Department Logistics
Center during the same time in which ODCEM forward operations personnel
were present. Based upon the circumstances, the city should have activated a
coordination center within the first 24 hours of the incident, in one location,
with the same phone numbers (not constantly changing), with city counterparts
assigned as applicable, so that information and resource coordination could
have been more stable and responsive.
4) City officials depended on FEMA representatives completely for MACC
communications set-up and all automation support, i.e., FAX machines,
computers, software, modems, copy machines, telephones, and telephone
service. When the decision was made to consolidate response support activities,
city officials indicated that necessary manpower, resources, experience and
time were not available to perform this function. An Integrated Emergency
Operations Plan (EOP) and an established coordination center would have
solved this problem.
Recommendations: Planning, training and exercising are the only feasible
recommendations. If an integrated emergency management system is to be
utilized and effective in future disasters, all levels of government must be on
the same page of the book. Effective coordination cannot be achieved during
the chaos following any disaster. Relationships must be established, plans
written and tested, and procedures agreed upon. It is the responsibility of each
level of government to see that these goals are met. Regardless of what our
particular role is, our mission is the same..."to provide effective response and
recovery through coordinated logistics, communications and information
support systems".
Statement of Issue 4: While ODCEM's plans and Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) are designed to meet "all hazards", the department's
quantitative resources, such as manpower and equipment, have been developed
to manage the state's common disasters, i.e., flooding, tornadoes, severe
storms. From the Murrah Building Bombing emerged numerous internal
limitations and deficiencies, in both the logistics and operational categories.
Each is detailed in the following discussion points.
Discussion:
1) Initially, ODCEM Forward Operations did not have a fixed location from
which to work. To enhance coordination responsiveness, it would be beneficial
to expedite securing a fixed location for State Operations Officers to operate
from. For this event, Forward EOC operations could have been located with the
Department of Public Safety or the Oklahoma National Guard Mobile
Command Posts, or preferably from a local Emergency Operations Center, if
one had been established.
2) There were some problems coordinating information within the State EOC
and State Forward Operations. Some State EOC personnel do not understand or
realize how critical a responsive and accurate exchange of operational
information is between forward operational personnel and the State EOC.
Normal day-to-day operational procedures need to be reviewed and
revised/changed when responding to emergency/disaster operations.
3) There was not enough state staff trained and familiar with State EOC
operations/coordination procedures.
4) Due to the long-term commitment, many state agencies did not have a
sufficient number of additional personnel trained in EOC Operations. While
most agencies are adequately represented through the second or third liaison
level, the length of this operation required personnel from the forth, fifth or
sixth tier. This incident was the first time the SEOC was activated longer than
five days.
5) ODCEM personnel were overtaxed during this lengthy, 24-hour operation.
This was further complicated when manpower was required to staff the forward
e...
Purchase answer to see full
attachment