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GLOBAL ETHICS AN INTRODUCTION “This book offers a timely introduction to the emerging subject of global ethics and provides the reader with the theoretical tools and information necessary to understand issues of global importance.” nick buttle, University of the West of England Global ethics is an exciting and growing field of study. It addresses the most pressing contemporary ethical issues, including torture, scarce resources, poverty, migration, consumption, global trade, medical tourism and humanitarian intervention. Global ethics is both topical and important. How we resolve (or fail to resolve) the dilemmas of global ethics shapes and limits how we understand human beings, our relationships and social and political frameworks of governance, now and into the future. This is obviously the case with climate change, where our actions now determine the environment our grandchildren will inherit, but it is also the case in other areas, because our decisions about what it is permissible for humans beings to do to each other determines the type of beings we are. This book introduces the reader to the theory and the practice of global ethics, with particular focus on global governance and citizenship, poverty and development, war and terrorism, bioethics, environmental and climate ethics, and gender justice. This page intentionally left blank GLOBAL ETHICS AN INTRODUCTION HEATHER WIDDOWS ROUTLEDGE Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK For Kit and Gillian First published in 2011 by Acumen Published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © Heather Widdows, 2011 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. isbn: 978-1-84465-281-5 (hardcover) isbn: 978-1-84465-282-2 (paperback) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in Minion Pro. CONTENTS Acknowledgements Abbreviations vii ix 1. What is global ethics? 1 2. Case studies for global ethics 13 3. Moral theory for global ethics 30 4. Political theory for global ethics 68 5. Rights theory for global ethics 98 6. Global governance and citizenship 130 7. Global poverty 149 8. Global conflict: war, terrorism and humanitarian intervention 173 9. Global bioethics 200 10. Global environmental and climate ethics 228 11. Global gender justice 250 Conclusion 271 Bibliography Index 273 288 v This page intentionally left blank ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book has been long in the making. In 2002 the University of Birmingham launched the first Masters in global ethics and in 2005 the Journal of Global Ethics followed. Thanks should go to my first colleagues in global ethics: to Donna Dickenson, the first Professor of Global Ethics (who gave me my first academic job), and to Christien van den Anker and Sirkku Hellsten. Most thanks must go to those who have pioneered the field of global ethics: thinkers who have built on the work of previous thinkers and have carved out distinctive global-ethics approaches. Of these fellow travellers I would first like to thank those I know best: Bob Brecher, Simon Caney, Nigel Dower, Darrel Moellendorf and Leslie Sklair. They have been truly excellent colleagues and working with them on shared projects, publications, workshops and conferences has been a great pleasure. Other global ethicists to whom I am exceptionally indebted – either personally or academically – are Richard Ashcroft, Gillian Brock, Roger Brownsword, Alastair Campbell, Ruth Chadwick, Normal Daniels, Andrew Edgar, Carol Gould, Stan van Hooft, Kim Hutchings, Alison Jaggar, Peter Jones, Graeme Laurie, Fiona MacCallum, Martha Nussbaum, Bhikhu Parekh, Anne Phillips, Thomas Pogge, Sigrid Sterckx, John Tasioulas, Leif Wenar and Gillian Youngs. Particular thanks must go to Bob Brecher for his editing comments, which were well beyond the duties of a reviewer and improved the manuscript no end. I would also like to give thanks to Phil Shiner and his team: an inspirational example of someone working against the odds at the coalface of global ethics. I would like to thank my current colleagues in the philosophy department of the University of Birmingham, particularly Helen Beebee, Darragh Byrne, Nick Effingham, Alex Miller, Yujin Nagasawa, Jussi Suikkanen and Joss Walker. Special mention should be given to Iain Law and Lisa Bortolotti, co-founders with me of the Birmingham “Health and Happiness” Research Cluster, who provide criticism, humour and support on a daily basis. Helen Harris also deserves special mention vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS for support above and beyond the call of duty. A final, and perhaps most important, thank you to a Birmingham colleague must go to Sean Cordell, who was my research assistant through the final months of this project. His intelligence, patience, humour and reassurance were fundamental in bringing this project to fruition. Others I would like to thank at the University of Birmingham are Leslie Brubaker, Lynne Brydon, Luis Cabrera, Francesca Carnivalli, David Cheetham, John Hick, Heather Marquette, Jean McHale, Stephen Pattision, Nicola Smith, Martin Stringer, Michael Taylor and Simon Yarrow. Thanks must also go to Acumen, particularly to Tristan Palmer, who has been wonderful to work with in all possible ways. The progress of the book has not been easy and a number of delays were experienced. Tristan was understanding and encouraging throughout, and demonstrated a rare trait in current academic publishing: a real interest in the topic. My final thanks are to my family. The past few years have been eventful – hence the delays: I have given birth to a beautiful daughter, Clara, and lost a magical father. Therefore the book is dedicated to my parents, Kit and Gillian, who in their political activism and community engagement set me on the path to global ethics. I can never thank them enough. Final thanks are to Matthew Hilton, my partner, fellow traveller and inspirational thinker. I thank him for his intellectual rigour, critical analysis, imagination and optimism about what can be achieved. viii ABBREVIATIONS ATTAC CEDAW ECHR EIT FGC FGM GHG GNI GRD HUGO IMF IPCC NGO OECD TRIPS UDHR UN UNDP UNESCO UNHCR UNICEF WHO WMD WTO Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et l’Aide aux Citoyens Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women European Court of Human Rights economics in transition female genital cutting female genital mutilation greenhouse gases gross national income Global Resources Dividend Human Genome Organization International Monetary Fund Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change non-governmental organization Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund World Health Organization weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organization ix This page intentionally left blank 1 WHAT IS GLOBAL ETHICS? INTRODUCTION Global ethics is a new term that has emerged over the past few decades. In an exceptionally short time it has become established as a recognized area of study: it has a particular approach to ethical dilemmas and some consider it to be becoming a distinct academic discipline rather than a subset of other disciplines. This dramatic growth means that global ethics is an exciting field to be in because those who enter it are committed to discussing, and more importantly to seeking solutions to, the most pressing contemporary ethical issues. Issues addressed in global ethics include the “war on terror”, rogue states, child labour, torture, scarce resources, trafficking, migration, climate change, global trade, medical tourism, global pandemics, humanitarian intervention and so on; the list goes on and on. Global ethics is not only topical – these are issues we are all concerned about – but also important. How we resolve (or fail to resolve) the dilemmas of global ethics will determine the framework of future global governance. This will shape and limit the possible relationships and opportunities of all global actors; moreover, decisions made now will affect future generations. This is true not only for problems of climate change, where our actions now determine the environment our children and grandchildren will inherit, but also for decisions about what it is acceptable and permissible to do to human beings. For instance, if we collectively decide that it is acceptable to torture or to buy body parts then we are making judgements about what human beings are, and these decisions will limit and shape what is possible or permissible for future human beings. This is relevant not just for those who are tortured or who buy and sell body parts, but for all of us. If such things are permitted, then human beings will become types of beings who have parts that can be bought and sold, or who can have pain and suffering (to the point of death) inflicted on them in certain circumstances. These things matter in terms of how we understand human beings 1 GLOBAL ETHICS now and into the future and are at the heart of creating a world where human beings are treated ethically. Students of global ethics come from many and various backgrounds, including philosophy, politics, public policy, law, theology, international development and sociology. Importantly, students also come from “the field”, from policy-making and governance communities and from activist and NGO communities. In the past ten years, numerous monographs, textbooks and edited collections have been published on themes that fall within the broad field of global ethics, such as human rights, global justice, research ethics and environmental ethics. In short, the field is burgeoning and, in terms of ethics, global ethics is a good place to be. USING THIS BOOK This book will explore the whole sphere of global ethics. It will consider the most pressing global ethical issues facing the contemporary world, from poverty, through terrorism, to climate change. It will map the ethical responses to such dilemmas. It will consider what sorts of global ethics are currently available and being developed and their appropriateness for addressing global dilemmas. It will present and evaluate theoretical and practical approaches and explore the application of these in the light of key dilemmas. Very crudely, the first part of the book sets out the theory necessary to understand and analyse the dilemmas of global ethics. These chapters provide the reader with knowledge of the main moral and political theories that are most useful in approaching these issues; together these theories make up the “ethical toolbox” of global ethics. As we shall discover, global ethics is not the kind of area or discipline where theory can be separated from practice. To address the ethical challenges facing the globe, theory, policy and practice must all combine. Unlike other philosophical approaches, global ethics is neither “top-down” nor “bottom-up”, but regards theory as necessary for successful practice and practice as essential for informing accurate theory. Accordingly, global ethics is both normative and applied and emerges from and influences policy and practice. The connection of theory and practice is fundamental for global ethics, and something we shall explore further later in this chapter. These early chapters are anything but dry and theoretical, ignoring the realities and limitations of real-world practice. Not only are the policy and practical implications of the theories considered throughout, but Chapters 3, 4 and 5 (the most theoretical chapters) are also meditations on the practical cases studies of Chapter 2. The case studies detail some of the facts and figures of three controversial contemporary global issues: female genital cutting (FGC), the buying of body parts and torture. These case studies provide an overview of these practices and introduce 2 W H AT I S G L O B A L E T H I C S ? primary sources, for example quotes from different viewpoints and core documentary evidence. The case studies can be used on their own as useful exercises in exploring these issues, or in conjunction with the early chapters of the book. They are analysed in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively. This is useful in a number of ways. First, it helps in understanding how the theoretical approaches introduced in these chapters play out in practice. Second, it shows how theoretical standpoints colour and shape how the ethical concerns of any issue are seen. Theory is not neutral, but frames what is seen to be ethically important in any given situation; considering how different theories approach such controversial issues shows the importance of understanding theory, not only to make one’s own arguments but also to understand where others are coming from and the claims they are making. Third, it shows how global ethics is actually done and the complexity of negotiating these global issues. Exploring case studies helps one to develop one’s own position and to test it in light of real dilemmas; for instance, a theoretical approach might seem attractive on paper, but once what this would actually mean in terms of a real-world issue is considered, one might change one’s mind. This aspect of case studies is fundamental to global ethics because, unlike much philosophy, global ethics is not an academic endeavour where attempting to win an argument is a kind of philosophical game. Global ethics is concerned with fundamental real-world issues, real injustice, human suffering and global threats, so it cannot be regarded as a mere intellectual exercise; we would worry about the humanity of anyone who treated it as if it were! The second half of the book looks at specific issues or areas of global ethics: issues of global governance and citizenship, poverty and development, war and terrorism, bioethics, environmental ethics and gender justice. Just as the early theory-focused chapters are full of discussion about policy and practice, so the later chapters on these issues show how theoretical approaches can clarify, critique and influence policy and practice. These chapters focus on some key global-ethics concerns: however, they are representative rather than exhaustive of the core concerns of global ethics. In a book of this size it is unavoidable that more has been left out than has been included, and there are numerous equally pressing global ethical issues that could have been the focus of chapters. For example, there could have been far more discussion about fossil-fuel consumption; scarce resources; international criminal activities such as people-trafficking and drug-trafficking; the role of religion and law and the supposed clash of cultures; business ethics, sweatshops and corporate social responsibility; the role of civil society, anti-capitalist and anti-globalization movements; new social movements and single-issue political campaigns; nuclear war and weapons of war. This list could go on. These issues, and no doubt many others, have claims to being “core” issues of global ethics and no doubt there will be arguments as to why these are more pressing than those that have been included. All that can be said in response is that in selecting these issues the aim is to show the range, complexity and connection of global-ethics issues, not to consider all important issues. To do so would 3 GLOBAL ETHICS be impossible given their number, breadth and complexity. Even those issues that are included are considered in very partial and limited ways. Whole books could be written on every chapter and the topic would still not be exhausted. Something similar must be said about the omission of many influential theorists of global ethics and global justice. Some key thinkers and arguments are absent for the same reason, and this is not in any way a comment on their import for the topic or usefulness in exploring the dilemmas of global ethics. This book is an introduction, and therefore merely provides a taste of the issues involved and the theories, policies and practices available to address these issues. It is hoped that the ethical toolbox and the illustrations of how global ethics is done will be just as useful when assessing issues not included in the book as for those included. How you choose to explore these different aspects of the book will depend on your reasons for using the book. If you have a primary interest in one of the global dilemmas, for example contemporary conflict and terrorism, you may wish to focus on Chapter 8 as an introduction to these topics. In addition, you will find the case study on torture useful in thinking about what is acceptable in contemporary conflict. You many also wish to dip in and out of other chapters; something that becomes clear as soon as you begin to examine these global dilemmas in any depth is that it is very difficult to separate one issue in global ethics from others. For instance, other sections that will be useful regarding conflict are found in Chapter 7, where there is a discussion of humanitarian aid and conflict, Chapter 10, where the increasing competition over resources is predicted to become a cause of conflict, and Chapter 11, where rape in war is discussed. You will also wish to explore Chapters 3, 4 and 5 if you are interested in how to understand the rights and wrongs of contemporary conflict, and Chapter 5 will be particularly useful because the case study of torture is analysed using the rights framework set out in that chapter. WHY GLOBAL ETHICS NOW? Global ethics is a new and distinctive area of study, so the question is: why now? After all, ethics, understood as an attempt to answer the question “How ought we to live?”, goes back to Plato and the earliest philosophy. Likewise, as we shall see, some of the distinctive political approaches of global ethics, such as the cosmopolitan approach, which sees all people in some sense as citizens of the world, also go back to the Greeks. Given this, it would seem that global ethics is continuous with previous moral and political thinking. This is certainly true; but it is also true that there are new ethical dilemmas that arise in the context of globalization. Globalization, and the political, technological and social changes and advances that accompany it, raise new dilemmas, and global ethics is a response to these. For 4 W H AT I S G L O B A L E T H I C S ? instance, pre-globalization ethical issues could primarily be regarded as local issues. In answering Plato’s question “How ought we to live?”, we would have been most likely to consider our duties to those known to us: those in our immediate family and community. There would be some duties beyond this and some institutional duties: to rulers (e.g. the king or lord of the manor, which might include taxes, labour and to bear arms); and to religious or cultural bodies (e.g. the Church and her representatives, tribal elders and sacred places). These institutions would also have duties to individuals and to those in the wider network or association, perhaps to a tribe, to a region, to a nation or even to an empire. Yet, before full knowledge of the globe and its people, and the processes of globalization that have made global knowledge and global duties possible, a global ethic would have been nonsensical. This is true, at least, in terms of policy and practice if not in theory. Theoretically there were, of course, candidates for ethics that were believed to be applicable to all, for instance all religious ethics. But recognizing the universal applicability of an ethic is not the same as believing that all ethical approaches should take the globe as the proper scope of ethics. The key claim here is that globalization – the increasing interdependence of global society economically, socially, culturally and politically – has created truly global dilemmas that require global solutions. Global ethics, then, is the response to these new dilemmas. This approach is clearly correct in many ways. No one would deny the phenomenal growth in “global” ethical issues: issues that cannot be addressed within individual nation states or single jurisdictions. Into this “set” of global issues we can place all the topics we shall consider in this book: those of global governance and citizenship, poverty and development, war and terrorism, bioethics, environmental ethics and gender justice. A GLOBAL ETHIC? Global ethics is not attempting to promote a “global ethic”. It is not advocating a particular way of life with a single set of rules, nor is it the promotion of a single principle, set of principles or set of values. Global ethics does not have a solution that people can accept and sign up to; it does not require “moral conversion”. Some do wish to establish such a global ethic. For instance, Hans Küng, in his 1993 “Declaration Toward a Global Ethic”, presents a list of principles that he believes are shared by all religions (Box 1.1). In these shared values he asserts there is a basis for a global ethic: “a minimal fundamental consensus concerning binding values, irrevocable standards, and fundamental moral attitudes” (1993b). There have been many criticisms of this ethic, not least that it fails to consider those who are non-religious. In addition, it makes controversial and contested 5 GLOBAL ETHICS Box 1.1 Küng’s four “irrevocable directives”, which constitute the basis of his global ethic • • • • Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life. Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order. Commitment to a culture of tolerance and life of truthfulness. Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women. claims, for example that all religions support the equality of men and women. Yet even if it were uncontested that all religions did support such principles, this would not be sufficient on its own to recommend it as a global ethic; that would depend on whether the claims were justified and according to the various criteria of global ethics. There are a number of such solutions – global ethics – some of which we shall consider in the course of the book. Arguably, human rights is such an ethic (to which you sign up or not); as are liberal views that prioritize autonomy over other values. Global ethics explores and utilizes these views to address practice and policy issues, but it does not at the outset support one over another. This said, although there is not one ethic that global ethics promotes, there is an emerging global-ethics approach. Global ethics does not just consider ethical issues that happen to stretch beyond borders, or any issue with international dimensions; rather, it has a fundamental commitment to including global concerns in all ethical reasoning and decision-making. Ethical exploration that addresses international dilemmas or issues that cross borders is not necessarily global ethics. What matters is not just the consideration of global issues, but how these issues are approached and the methodology, ethical framework and assumptions adopted. Increasingly those who work in this field share very broad but identifiable premises and concerns. For instance, one might be concerned about an international issue, such as terrorism or global disease threats, but not have a global-ethics approach. Thus one might prioritize the interests of one group: a ruling party, a nation or a privileged group (e.g. a profession or a demographic cohort, such as an ethnic group or a wealthy group). If one group is prioritized over another and there is a bias towards this group and the rights and interests of others are ignored, then a global approach has not been adopted. Thus while there is no global ethic that is being promoted, there are a number of very broad conditions that characterize global ethics. This affects the types of theories global ethicists can adopt. For example, as we shall see in Chapter 3, it is unlikely that a global ethicist can consistently sustain a relativist position, or, as discussed in Chapter 4, a realist position. There are three characteristics or elements that can be traced, and together these broadly define the global-ethics approach: (i) its frame is global; (ii) it is multidisciplinary; (iii) it combines theory and practice 6 W H AT I S G L O B A L E T H I C S ? Box 1.2 Characteristics of global ethics • Global in scope • Multidisciplinary • Combines theory and practice (Box 1.2). This said, global ethics is a broad school, and while there are traceable traits, they cover an exceptionally large range of positions and commitments. GLOBAL SCOPE The first distinctive feature of specifically global ethics is that the area of ethical concern is always the globe, and the rights and interests of all are significant. Thus when any ethical dilemma is considered, the needs of all must be recognized even if they cannot all be addressed in the response. The global scope of applied ethics is not something new to global ethics and it is at the heart of many of the arguments we shall consider in this book, arguments that were put forward before the phrase “global ethics” was coined. However, while applied ethics can be global in scope, there are many examples where in fact it is biased and limited either by specific concerns – for instance, national or professional interests (as for many professional ethics) – or because it prioritizes the needs of one group – a geographical group or a particular group (such as an ethnic group, or simply a wealthy or powerful group) – over those who are vulnerable. There are two ways in which the “global in scope” criterion is evident in global ethics: it necessitates a global frame and it requires that the actions and obligations of individuals, associations and institutions are taken into account. The global frame For global ethics the frame within which decision-making occurs must be global: the ethical locus is “the globe”. In any ethical analysis it is the globe that constitutes the sphere of concern and thus the needs and perspectives of all global actors are relevant. This does not mean that all global ethicists are cosmopolitan, a theory we shall discuss in detail in Chapter 4. Many global ethicists are cosmopolitan, but some deny cosmopolitanism, while others are “weak” cosmopolitans. Moreover, even those who 7 GLOBAL ETHICS aim for full global justice and equality will promote partial solutions despite regarding them as insufficient in the long term. For example, they might endorse supporting nation states that strengthen human rights or promote ethical practice, even though these measures will only partially improve the situation and possibly only for some actors rather than all. However, such solutions, such as nationally enforcing respect for human rights or attaining laws about trafficking or child labour, can be seen as steps towards proper global respect for persons and global justice. In this way the global frame remains in place, in that the aim is that these partial and piecemeal measures will gradually contribute to establishing truly global methods. The global methodology, then, is practical and accepts that impartial and imperfect solutions might be steps on the way to global justice. Yet no matter what theory, policy or practice is ultimately recommended, the global needs of all are factored into the analysis: the frame for ethical analysis is the globe. In this way global ethics foregrounds the global scope of morality and insists that the rights and interests of those not directly the focus of discussion are not forgotten. This does not mean that it is always possible to meet the needs of all or necessarily to give them equal weight – as discussed above, the best possible solutions may be less than perfect – but it does mean that the needs of all must be visible. The commitment of global ethicists to the global scope of ethics is perhaps most obvious in the growth of discussion of cosmopolitan political theories, which consider the globe the proper unit of ethical concern (discussed in Chapter 4) and in debates about the validity of universalism (discussed in Chapter 3). Key global-ethics thinkers who have been in part responsible for this rethinking include: Charles Beitz, Gillian Brock, Allen Buchanan, Simon Caney, Nigel Dower, Carol Gould, David Held, Stan van Hooft, Alison Jaggar, Charles Jones, David Miller, Darrel Moellendorf, Martha Nussbaum, Susan Moller Okin, Thomas Pogge, Amartya Sen, Henry Shue and Iris Marion Young. Individuals, associations and institutions Global ethics is also concerned with all global actors: with the rights, interests and duties of individuals, nations, institutions and associations. Some global ethicists focus on the duties of one group or another, and different duties in different arguments. For example, Pogge and Moellendorf both focus on institutions, but they also have things to say about how individuals relate to institutions and associations and the duties of individuals. To consider all global actors is to reject the traditional divide in political theory that has classified “ethics” as distinct from “justice”, with “ethics” concerned with individual obligations and “justice” with the obligations of institutions. Not only does global ethics not adopt this distinction, but it believes that to address global 8 W H AT I S G L O B A L E T H I C S ? dilemmas practically action is required at all levels, and that therefore the duties of individuals, associations and institutions are all relevant to global ethics. As Dower puts it: Individuals have active responsibilities, responsibilities in practice not merely in theory, towards people in other parts of the world. These include duties of giving aid and opposing practices which undermine well-being, but also, perhaps even more significantly, duties not to be beneficiaries of economic processes which either exploit the poor elsewhere or damage the environment. Likewise states can be seen as having in practice responsibility for human beings everywhere, and responsibility not to continue practices which either damage the environment elsewhere or contribute to negative global impacts on the environment. (2007: 7–8) How these duties can be constructed and what they are will be discussed in detail in relation to the different dilemmas of global ethics but, in short, just as the rights and interests of all must be considered in analysing any dilemma, so all actors must be considered in the solution. Again this builds on earlier ethicists’ work. For example, when discussing ethical responses to famine, which we shall return to in Chapter 7, Onora O’Neill insists that if we are to address famine we need to consider institutional and individual injustices and coercions and the duties of both. A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH The criterion of global scope, which requires that the rights and interests of all are considered and the duties of all actors are necessary to the solution, also leads to the need for a multidisciplinary approach. If global ethicists are going to engage with contemporary dilemmas, then they need to understand the actors with whom they are concerned. This requires more than a moral or political philosophical analysis. It requires expertise from across the spectrum: from economists, lawyers, development experts and sociologists, as well as from the practitioner arenas of activists and policy-makers. If we take seriously the global frame of ethics then the need for multidisciplinary expertise is obvious. Accordingly, global ethics is fundamentally multidisciplinary. This claim is substantial in that the commitment to multidisciplinarity is not merely contingent on the types of issues global ethics addresses; rather, it is methodological. It is a belief that not only is it pragmatic to approach global ethics taking account of the insights of different disciplines, but also this is the only effective way to do global ethics. Global ethics, then, is inherently multidisciplinary, connecting moral and 9 GLOBAL ETHICS political philosophy with other disciplines such as political science, international relations, law, religious studies, medical ethics and sociology. This methodological distinction again distinguishes global ethics from other forms of applied ethics, which may have come to be multidisciplinary by accident but are not necessarily committed to seeking out relevant information from these other disciplines. INTERRELATION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE The third distinctive constituent of global ethics is the insistence that theory and practice are interrelated. Global ethics connects academic debates with the realworld work of policy-makers, practitioners and activists, combining the analysis of practical case studies with rigorous theoretical examination. Theory and practice are regarded as fundamentally interconnected and are both necessary parts of the same pursuit rather than separable endeavours to be conducted in separate spheres and disciplines. The interrelatedness of theory and practice is seen clearly in leading contemporary global-ethics thinkers, such as Pogge, Moellendorf and Caney. These thinkers not only immerse themselves in political theory and empirical analysis but also actively seek to influence practice and policy. For example, Pogge has long engaged with the injustice caused by the current global intellectual property regime and put forward proposals that are intended to combat some of the injustices of the patent system: something we shall discuss in Chapter 9. The aim of global ethics – as we shall forcefully come to see as we move through the key dilemmas of global ethics in this book – is to affect practice. Its aim is not to come up with consistent and beautiful theories of justice and ethics, but rather to influence policy and practice, to contribute to creating global relations that are more just and reducing and eradicating global injustice and suffering. In sum, global ethics adopts a comprehensive approach that takes the globe as its ethical locus; it is fundamentally multidisciplinary; and it is based on the premise that theory is necessary for successful practice and practice necessary for accurate theory. Thus global ethics is at once theoretical and applied, and both emerges from and influences policy and practice. THE GLOBAL-ETHICS COMMITMENT Taken together these three elements define the emerging discipline of global ethics. Accordingly, global ethics is able to span both micro and macro issues and 10 W H AT I S G L O B A L E T H I C S ? link questions about individual goodness and justice to political questions about governance. Furthermore, while global ethics does not endorse a single global ethic, its three identifiable characteristics of being global in scope, multidisciplinary and connecting theory and practice do suggest a broad commitment to justice. Because global ethics is not biased towards any interest group it results in a general bias towards the poor and vulnerable: arguably where the bias of all ethics should be. By considering the needs of all, global ethics brings to the fore the needs of the worst off and highlights the often desperate plight of those who are disadvantaged, economically, socially, politically and culturally. This ethical bias towards the poor, oppressed and underprivileged is a result of taking seriously the needs of all and, as we shall see in Chapter 3, emerges from any moral theory. Arguably, such a bias should be evident in all ethics because it results from any attempt to remove injustice. Global ethics attempts to avoid co-option by interest groups by insisting on a global frame. Thus global ethicists have a commitment to making a difference in terms of affecting policy and also in terms of their individual actions and commitments. The topics that global ethics addresses cannot be dismissed as just theoretical issues; they require us to act. Again, this is not new. For instance, Peter Singer (whom we shall discuss in Chapters 7 and 10) speaks about the philosopher’s duty to act to address famine. Global ethics is a call to action, to action that is effective and informed by robust theory: a call to make the world a more just place. This is summed up by Singer, who was doing global ethics before the term was thought of: Discussion, though, is not enough. What is the point of relating philosophy to public (and personal) affairs if we do not take our conclusions seriously? In this instance, taking our conclusions seriously means acting upon them. The philosopher will not find it any easier than anyone else to alter his attitudes and way of life to the extent that, if I am right, is involved in doing everything that we ought to be doing. At the very least, though, we can make a start. The philosopher who does so will have to sacrifice some of the benefits of the consumer society, but he can find compensation in the satisfaction of a way of life in which theory and practice, if not yet in harmony, are at least coming together. (1972: 242–3) Global ethics requires action from you! 11 GLOBAL ETHICS FURTHER READING • Commers, R., W. Vandekerckhove & A. Verlinden (eds). Ethics in an Era of Globalisation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). • • • • Dower, N. World Ethics: The New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). Eade, J. & D. O’Byrne (eds). Global Ethics and Civil Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). Pogge, T. & K. Horton. Global Ethics: Seminal Essays (Saint Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2008). Pogge, T. & D. Moellendorf. Global Justice: Seminal Essays (Saint Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2008). 12 2 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS Global ethics is an academic forum for philosophical debate that is not separate from the real world. Rather, it is fundamentally about practice: about how to make the world more just and overcome exploitation and injustice. Global ethics cannot, therefore, be done in a vacuum or an academic ivory tower but must be connected with real-world injustice. Accordingly, global ethicists must think about not just the consistency of their arguments but also the impact of what they say and do to actual people and policy. To this end, and to ensure we think about practice and the implications of our theorizing even in the theoretical section of the book, case studies will be used. There are three case studies – on FGC, the buying of body parts and torture – which will be used to illustrate the theories and arguments that are put forward in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Introducing case studies in these chapters shows how the theory and practice interconnect and how important theoretical tools are to addressing real-world practices of injustice. The case studies are intended to be returned to time and time again as you progress through the book and develop your knowledge of global ethics. They can be used in different ways and in conjunction with different chapters. You might find it useful to look at them first – before you have learnt the theories of global ethics – simply to get an initial and untutored reaction. While you will not be able to answer all the questions that follow until you have progressed further, nor understand the moral theories referred to in the questions, you will have a first response that you will find exceptionally useful in working out how you feel about an issue. It may also be useful to return to the case studies when you work through chapters that address related concerns: the torture case study when you look at war in Chapter 8; the body part case study when you look at bioethics in Chapter 9; and the female genital cutting (FGC) case study when you consider gender justice in Chapter 11. Finally, you may also wish to return to the case studies when you have completed the book in order to see how much your views have changed 13 GLOBAL ETHICS and how you have progressed and developed your thinking and expertise in global ethics. These three cases were chosen because they are timely and particularly useful for understanding the complexity of global-ethics arguments. Undoubtedly, there could have been many more; we could have considered problems of aid in conflict zones, drug trials in the developing world, wearing of the “veil”, ethical shopping and sweatshops, and the patenting of drugs. Developing these as test cases along the lines of the three following case studies could be a useful exercise in seeing the connections between different areas of injustice in global ethics. These topics are nonetheless developed and discussed in various chapters of this volume. Other topics that are discussed and which could be worked up into global-ethics case studies are: existing and proposed structures of global governance (Chapter 6); aid in conflict zones and fair-trade initiatives (Chapter 7); military intervention in a foreign conflict or crisis on humanitarian grounds (Chapter 8); drug trials in the developing world and the patenting of drugs (Chapter 9); richer nations’ industrial pollution and its environmental impact on poorer ones (Chapter 10); and rape in war and forced marriages (Chapter 11). 14 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS CASE STUDY FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING “Female genital mutilation” (FGM), “female circumcision”, “female genital cutting” (FGC) and “clitoridectomy” are all phrases that refer to procedures that involve the partial or total removal of the external female genitalia for non-medical reasons. The term we use is not value neutral: the label “FGM” is used by those critical of the procedure (“mutilation” being a wholly negative term); female circumcision is used by those who support or are at least more tolerant of the practice. The term “female genital cutting”, or FGC, comes somewhere in the middle of these. Just as the terminology is not value neutral, it is hard to get neutral facts and information on this practice (like many ethically concerning practices that are addressed in global ethics). The World Health Organization (WHO) distinguishes four types of this procedure: • partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or the prepuce (clitoridectomy); • partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (excision); • narrowing of the vaginal orifice by creating a covering seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris (infibulation); • all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for example pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization. FGC is usually carried out on girls under fifteen and the WHO estimates that 100–140 million girls and women have undergone one of the first three forms of this procedure and that around 3 million girls are at risk of such a procedure. Instances of FGC have been reported worldwide: however, it most commonly occurs in western, eastern and north-eastern regions of Africa, parts of Asia and the Middle East and in immigrant communities from these locations elsewhere. In Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Republic of Sudan (formerly northern Sudan) the practice is almost universal and Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia and Mauritania all have rates of over 70 per cent. FGC is a traumatic procedure (usually girls are pinned down and it is often carried out in medically unsafe environments and with unsafe equipment, which leads to infection). Long-term documented health risks include pain, lack of sexual feeling, ongoing infections and psychological trauma. In addition, FGC increases risks in childbirth (e.g. post-partum haemorrhaging) and even increases the likelihood of death of newborn babies immediately after birth. For these reasons FGC is opposed by many international organizations including the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Educational, Scientific 15 GLOBAL ETHICS and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHR) and the Economic Commission for Africa. Despite such critiques, FGC continues to be practised and supported by some groups. Many reasons are given for support of the practice, including health, culture and religion, but it is likely that the most significant factor in whether or not a girl undergoes the practice is ethnicity. In places where it is widely practised, it is likely to be supported by both men and women, and those who depart from the practice face social ostracism and condemnation. In such groups, FGC appears to be socially demanded and regarded as socially beneficial and important for a girl coming of age and being prepared for marriage. Thus many girls are proud to undergo the procedure because it signals their transformation to womanhood and without it they may be unable to find a husband; therefore it has implications for economic security. In such groups, FGC is regarded as protecting and preserving a woman’s virginity (premarriage) and modesty and proper behaviour (post-marriage) as well as being linked to cleanliness and ideals of feminine beauty. Religious reasons are also given by those who practise FGC, although there is no definitive support for this practice from religious texts, and religious leaders differ in their approach. Moreover, the practice Box 2.1 Hannah Koroma, Sierra Leone “I was genitally mutilated at the age of ten. I was told by my late grandmother that they were taking me down to the river to perform a certain ceremony, and afterwards I would be given a lot of food to eat. As an innocent child, I was led like a sheep to be slaughtered. Once I entered the secret bush, I was taken to a very dark room and undressed. I was blindfolded and stripped naked. I was then carried by two strong women to the site for the operation. I was forced to lie flat on my back by four strong women, two holding tight to each leg. Another woman sat on my chest to prevent my upper body from moving. A piece of cloth was forced in my mouth to stop me screaming. I was then shaved. When the operation began, I put up a big fight. The pain was terrible and unbearable. During this fight, I was badly cut and lost blood. All those who took part in the operation were half-drunk with alcohol. Others were dancing and singing, and worst of all, had stripped naked. I was genitally mutilated with a blunt penknife. After the operation, no one was allowed to aid me to walk. The stuff they put on my wound stank and was painful. These were terrible times for me. Each time I wanted to urinate, I was forced to stand upright. The urine would spread over the wound and would cause fresh pain all over again. Sometimes I had to force myself not to urinate for fear of the terrible pain. I was not given any anaesthetic in the operation to reduce my pain, nor any antibiotics to fight against infection. Afterwards, I haemorrhaged and became anaemic. This was attributed to witchcraft. I suffered for a long time from acute vaginal infections.” (Amnesty International 1997) 16 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS Box 2.2 Voices in favour of female genital cutting “The abolition of female genital cutting will ‘destroy the tribal system’.’’ (Kenyatta [President of Kenya] 1938) “We are circumcised and insist on circumcising our daughters so that there is no mixing between male and female. An uncircumcised woman is put to shame by her husband, who calls her ‘you with the clitoris’. People say she is like a man. Her organ would prick the man.” An Egyptian mother (in Assad 1980) “Circumcision makes women clean, promotes virginity and chastity and guards young girls from sexual frustration by deadening their sexual appetite.” Mrs Njeri, a Kenyan elder (in Katumba 1990) is found among Christians, Jews and Muslims but in no case is it seen as required by all adherents of the religion in question in different cultures (Boxes 2.1, 2.2). This case study is discussed in Chapter 3. In addition the following questions may be useful in helping to explore this case study. QUESTIONS 1. What are the key ethical issues raised by FGC? Do these change depending on whether one adopts utilitarian, deontological or virtue theories (as outlined in Chapter 3)? 2. Do you think FGC should ever be permitted? On what grounds and in what circumstances? 3. Are some forms of FGC acceptable and others not? If so, what are the reasons? 4. Whose views are important in working out what is ethical? For instance, is it the girls who will undergo the procedures, the groups they come from, medical experts, human-rights activists or others? 5. How can the norms and values of different cultures be respected and human rights protected? 17 GLOBAL ETHICS FURTHER READING • Amnesty International. “What is Female Genital Mutilation?”(1997). www.amnesty.org/en/library/ info/ACT77/006/1997 (accessed May 2011). • Assaad, M. B. “Female Circumcision in Egypt: Social Implications, Current Research and Prospects for Change”. Studies in Family Planning 11 (1980): 3–16. • Bowman, K. “Bridging the Gap in the Hopes of Ending Female Genital Cutting”. Santa Clara Journal of International Law 3 (2004): 132–63. • Kenyatta, J. Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Kikuyu (London: Secker & Warburg, 1938). • UN Women. “Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement”. www.unifem. org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=110 (accessed May 2011). 18 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS CASE STUDY BUYING AND SELLING BODY PARTS Attaining accurate facts and figures regarding the black and grey market in body parts is exceptionally difficult. Nonetheless, it is clear that the market is growing rapidly and that it is global. More people are selling their body parts to people from across the globe; body parts that are bought and sold include kidneys, eggs, sperm, blood and plasma (Boxes 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). This market is sometimes illegal, for example the harvesting of body parts from unsuspecting donors or the sale of parts in countries where such sale is illegal; sometimes it is completely legal, for example the selling of eggs in the US; and sometimes it is “grey”, for example practices of infertility clinics in the Mediterranean where “all expenses paid holidays” also provide opportunities for egg-selling. The illegal side of the organ trade and its links with organized crime have put the topic firmly in the public domain and it is a common topic for television, films and discussion as well as an issue for policy-makers. Just as with the case study of FGC, the language is important: terms like “donor” are often used even when what is really being described is a “sale”, for instance in the term “paid donation” (a contradiction in terms). Despite the difficulties, some figures are available. For instance, a 2003 Punjab government inquiry estimated that nearly 3500 people from Sargodha had sold their kidneys through the 1990s to buyers from around the world. In 2006 the BBC conducted an undercover investigation that suggested that China was routinely selling organs of prisoners on death row: under the pretence of seeking a liver for his sick father, the journalist reported that “one hospital said it could provide a liver at a cost of Box 2.3 The effects on donors of legal “paid kidney donation” Egypt • 78 per cent reported deterioration in health status. • 78 per cent spent the money within five months of their donation. India • 86 per cent reported deterioration in health status. • 96 per cent sold their kidneys to pay off debts and 75 per cent were still in debt at the time of the survey. Iran • 58 per cent reported negative effects on their health status. • 65 per cent failed to get out of debt. (From Shimazono 2007) 19 GLOBAL ETHICS £50,000 (US$94,400), with the chief surgeon confirming an executed prisoner could be the donor”. Whatever else it may be, the market in body parts is hugely lucrative, particularly for medical merchants and middlemen who broker deals between buyers and sellers. For instance, a 2004 WHO report (Nullis-Kapp 2004) reports medical brokers charging between US$100,000 and US$200,000 to organize a transplant while paying the “donors” as little as US$1000. Those who support organ sale argue that it is a win–win situation. The buyers win because they are able to access an organ or other body part that they greatly desire and Box 2.4 Voices of kidney vendors and purchasers “We are worse than prostitutes because we have sold something we can never get back.” A kidney seller (in Scheper-Hughes 2003b) Mohammed, aged twenty-five, was a casual labourer in Delhi (sending money home to Gujarat). His kidneys were taken by force: “He said, he was approached by a bearded man as he waited at the early-morning labor market by the Old Delhi train station. The man offered him an unusually generous deal: one and a half months work painting, for 150 rupees a day, with free food and lodging. “He was driven four or five hours away, to a secluded bungalow, surrounded by trees, where he was placed in a room with four other young men, under the watch of two armed guards. ‘When I asked why I had been locked inside, the guards slapped me and said they would shoot me if I asked any more questions,’ Mohammed said, lying in his hospital bed, wrapped in an orange blanket, clenching his teeth and shutting his eyes in pain. He said the men were given food to cook for themselves and periodically nurses would come to take blood samples from them. “One by one they were taken away for surgery. ‘They told us not to speak to each other or we would pay with our lives,’ he said. ‘I was the last one to be taken.’” Mohammed, from Gurgaon, India (in Gentleman 2008) “Avraham, a retired lawyer in Jerusalem, explained why he went through considerable expense and danger to travel to Eastern Europe to purchase a kidney from a rural worker rather than wait in line for a cadaver organ in Israel: ‘Why should I have to wait years for a kidney from someone who was in a car accident, pinned under the car for many hours, then in miserable condition in the intensive care unit for days and only then, after all that trauma, have that same organ put inside me? That organ is not going to be any good! Or, even worse, I could get the organ of an elderly person, or an alcoholic, or a person who died of a stroke. It’s far better to get a kidney from a healthy person who can also benefit from the money I can afford to pay.’” Avraham, an Israeli buyer (in Scheper-Hughes 2003a) 20 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS which is either necessary for their survival (e.g. in kidney sale) or essential to meeting an important need (e.g. for sperm or eggs). The vendors win in that they are paid significant amounts of money that otherwise would be unattainable. They can then use this money to make significant differences to their own and their family’s situations. But the claim that vendors always win is not borne out by the evidence (see Box 2.4). In other areas the data are more mixed. For instance, in egg sale it seems that at least some vendors do benefit. The market in eggs and embryos is growing fast because it is increasingly older women who seek to reproduce. As with organ sale, this is a global market, and eggs from younger women are preferred because they are more likely to lead to successful outcomes. To meet this demand for eggs, clinics across the US and Europe buy eggs from “donors”; as with kidneys, “buyers” are more advantaged (socioeconomically, as well as in terms of nationality and ethnicity) and “donors” are from poorer, less privileged demographic groups. For example, clinics in southern Europe (particularly Spain, Greece and Cyprus) purchase eggs from eastern European women to serve the reproductive wishes of western European women from countries where egg-selling is prohibited (Box 2.5). These “donors” go to Spain for a few weeks for a “paid holiday”, have their eggs harvested and return to eastern Europe with enough to live on for six months or more. Eggs are also purchased from Spanish students and US clinics routinely advertise in US college newspapers, offering up to US$100,000, depending on how far the donor has the desirable characteristics of education, health, race, physical traits and beauty. Box 2.5 Svetlana, an egg-seller’s story “Svetlana has a big family secret: she sold her eggs for US dollars. Svetlana did not tell her husband what she was doing because she knew he would be furious. Nor did she tell her mother or her two young children … “Desperate for money after the birth of her second child, Svetlana had applied for work in the canteen of one of Kiev’s growing number of fertility clinics that charge infertile women from Britain thousands of pounds for help in getting them pregnant. Svetlana didn’t get the job, but was told that if she needed cash she could sell her eggs. She was told that the process was straightforward and that she would be given US$300 – more if she was a good donor and produced lots of eggs. For Svetlana, like a growing number of Eastern European women, it was too good an opportunity to pass up. Since the birth of her second child she had been surviving on less than US$15 a month. She turned out to be an excellent donor. By the time of her fifth donation, her ovaries, stimulated by the injection of a hormone, produced a batch of 40 healthy eggs. This is four times more eggs than a woman undergoing IVF treatment would produce. The medical staff gave Svetlana an extra US$200 as a reward.” (Barnett & Smith 2006) 21 GLOBAL ETHICS We have little data on the long-term effects of egg harvesting, particularly on the fertility of the women whose eggs are harvested. However, at least some egg-sellers, especially those who repeatedly sell their eggs, go through unnecessary hormonal stimulation and uncomfortable procedures. Harvesting eggs is not a straightforward matter like collecting sperm. It can be a lengthy, painful and potentially dangerous procedure involving the injection of a powerful drug known as follicle stimulating hormone. Medical experts believe 1 per cent of women undergoing this can suffer serious side effects known as ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome that in extreme cases can prove fatal. Donna Dickenson reports a number of worrying aspects of this global trade in her book Body Shopping: [T]he Eastern European and Mediterranean egg-selling clinics routinely extract three or four times the quantity of eggs that would be taken in a wellrun clinic. Women are actually given a productivity bonus if they produce high numbers of ova. In one Kiev clinic, for example, women are offered a basic fee of only $300, but given a bonus of $200 if they produce as many as forty eggs. Doses of follicle-stimulating hormone at more than twice the recommended maximum level are routinely used to produce these bumper crops. But the human female is programmed by nature to produce only one or at most two eggs per cycle. (2008: 6) This said, for most women the process does not seem to be particularly harmful in the short term. This case study is discussed in Chapter 4. In addition the following questions may be useful in helping to explore this case study. QUESTIONS 1. What are the key ethical issues raised by the sale of body parts? Do these change depending on whether you adopt utilitarian, deontological or virtue theories (as outlined in Chapter 3)? 2. Do you think that the sale of body parts should ever be permitted? On what grounds? 3. Should all body parts be treated the same? For instance, hair, blood, organs, eggs, whole bodies? 4. Does it matter what the body parts are being used for? For instance, is it different if they will be used for life-saving treatment? 22 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS 5. If you think the sale of body parts might be permissible in some instances, how would you ensure that exploitation does not occur? 6. Should the laws about which body parts can be sold, if any, apply globally? FURTHER READING • Barnett, A. & H. Smith. “Cruel Cost of the Human Egg Trade”. The Observer (30 April 2006). www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/apr/30/health.healthandwellbeing (accessed May 2011). • BBC. “Organ Sales ‘Thriving’ in China” (2006). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/5386720.stm (accessed May 2011). • Dickenson, D. Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood (Oxford: One World, 2008). • Gentleman, A. “Poor Donors Duped by Organ-Transplant Racket in India”. New York Times (29 January 2008). www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/29/asia/kidney.php (accessed May 2011). • Khan, A. A. “Pakistan’s Kidney Donor Crisis” (2004). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_ asia/4092325.stm (accessed May 2011). • Nullis-Kapp, C. “Organ Trafficking and Transplantation Pose New Challenges”. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 82(9) (2004): 639–718. www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/82/9/ feature0904/en/index.html (accessed May 2011). • Scheper-Hughes, N. “Keeping an Eye on the Global Traffic in Human Organs. Lancet 361 (2003): 1647. • Scheper-Hughes, N. “Commentary: A Beastly Trade in ‘Parts’. The Organ Market is Dehumanizing the World’s Poor”. Los Angeles Times (29 July 2003). http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/ access/377365761.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Jul+29%2C+2003&au thor=Nancy+Scheper-Hughes&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&edition=&startpage=B.15&desc=Com mentary%3B+A+Beastly+Trade+in+%27Parts%27%3B+The+organ+market+is+dehumanizing +the+world%27s+poor (accessed May 2011). • Shimazono, Y. “The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available Information”. Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 85 (2007): 960. www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370/en/ (accessed May 2011). 23 GLOBAL ETHICS CASE STUDY TORTURE From the mid-eighteenth century, torture has been generally regarded as unacceptable. The use of torture by the Nazi regime was seen as contravening shared international norms. The global prohibition on torture is stated clearly in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The article was supplemented in 1975 by the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Box 2.6). Box 2.6 The UDHR’s definition of torture “[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.” The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment reiterates this definition. The convention against torture is one of the most successful of the UN’s conventions and is ratified by over 130 countries. However, the absoluteness of the prohibition of torture, which seems to be an instance of global agreement, has come into question in the post-9/11 era. In the events following 9/11 it has become clear that not only is torture still routinely practised in “rogue states”, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, but also by the US and UK who release (rendition) prisoners to countries, including Egypt, Jordon and Morocco, for the purpose of torture. More damaging still, given the power and prominence of the US, instances of systematic torture by US military personnel have come to light. Table 2.1 details the current systematic practice of torture by both UK and US soldiers in Iraq compiled first-hand by Phil Shiner and his colleagues at Public Interest Lawyers in the course of providing evidence to defend those who have suffered such abuse. They have recorded 2193 allegations in total, including 26 cases of detainees being dragged along the ground, 92 allegations of kicking, 77 of punching, 162 of beatings with pistols/rifles/rifle butts/fists/feet/helmets, 20 of being placed in humiliating positions, 36 to forced exposures to porn, 39 of forced nakedness/forced exposure of genitalia and 68 of water deprivation (see Table 2.1). 24 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS Table 2.1 Unlawful abuse by agents of the state in SE Iraq Techniques UK US Hooding: 1 or 2 sandbags 9 9 Hooding: old cement bags 9 With plastic blindfold 9 9 Silence 9 9 Prolonged solitary confinement (with no daylight) 9 9 Forced nakedness 9 9 “No talking” restrictions 9 TECHNIQUES ON SENSORY DEPRIVATION 9 9 Duct-taping of mouths TECHNIQUES ON DEBILITY Food and water deprivation, including restricted diet 9 9 Sleep deprivation 9 9 Stress techniques Ski position 9 Prolonged standing with arms lifted 9 9 Prolonged kneeling 9 9 Prolonged sitting in required posture 9 9 Water bottles on arms 9 9 Squatting 9 9 Running 9 9 Water bottles on arms 9 9 Prolonged exposure to sun 9 9 Forced exertion Temperature manipulation (cold and hot) 9 Soaking clothes in water Dousing with cold water 9 9 Detention in unbearably hot locations (containers, buildings with no ventilation, etc.) 9 9 Withholding of warmth items 9 9 9 Use of air-conditioning systems (induced hypothermia) Sensory bombardment 9 Loud music 9 Flashing (“strobe”) lights Loud CD pornography 9 Loud radios 9 Constant light 9 9 9 Videos of terrorist acts 9 9 Forced nakedness (in front of women) 9 9 Forced soiling 9 9 CD pornography 9 Forced watching of pornographic material 9 Masturbation by soldiers 9 Prolonged and direct shouting SEXUAL ACTS Forced masturbation in front of soldiers 9 9 25 GLOBAL ETHICS Techniques UK US SEXUAL ACTS (CONTINUED) Forced simulated masturbation 9 Forced oral sex 9 Simulated anal sex 9 Sexual taunts from women 9 9 9 9 Sexual acts between men and women soldiers 9 Prolonged attachment to cell bars while naked Forced humiliating positions 9 9 Women’s underwear on heads 9 9 9 Paraded handcuffed and naked Urinating on detainees (including hooded heads) 9 9 Soldiers’ urine offered instead of water 9 9 Detainees’ own urine offered instead of water 9 9 Penetration of anus with objects including broomstick, etc. 9 Pretended rape/torture/abuse of family members in close proximity 9 Smearing of (real) menstrual blood 9 9 Pubic hair ripped out Observed on toilet 9 9 9 Simulation of dog on leash 9 Forced to watch real/feigned sex Being touched in humiliating ways (in front of women) 9 9 Pinching/tweaking of nipples 9 9 Touching to genitalia 9 9 References to suspected homosexuality of detainee 9 9 Taunts regarding bringing mother/daughter for sex 9 9 Ridden like horses Humiliating medical examinations (sometimes repeated excessively, sometimes invasive) 9 9 9 “Lap dances” from female interrogators ABUSE Soft punching 9 9 Forced to sit on hot surfaces 9 9 Flexi-cuffing (too tightly) 9 9 Flexi-cuffing to rear 9 9 Beatings with pistols/rifles/rifle butts 9 9 Slapping 9 9 Punching 9 9 Kicking 9 9 Kick boxing 9 Kneeing 9 9 9 Pressing face into ground with boots Death threats 9 9 Threats of reprisals (especially to family members) 9 9 Threats of rape 9 9 Denial of access to open air 9 9 No exercise 9 9 Minimal/no access to toilets 9 9 26 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS Techniques UK US ABUSE (CONTINUED) 9 Force-fed baseball bat “Clean beating” 9 9 Excessive restraint positions (restricting breathing, etc.) 9 9 Mock executions 9 Simulated mutilations (knife) 9 Threatened multiple burning 9 RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL HUMILIATION Deprived of prayer 9 Not being able to be clean to pray (especially during Ramadan) 9 9 9 Throwing Qur’an in toilet in front of detainee 9 Spitting in food rations 9 Taunting at prayer 9 Forced to eat pork 9 9 Forced to drink alcohol Flushing with toilet water 9 9 Role plays (“birthday parties”, forced cleaning of cell, etc.) OTHERS Military dogs 9 9 9 Drip feed of comfort items Verbal violence 9 9 Orders screamed 9 9 Rifles aimed 9 9 Short shackling 9 Forced howling like dog 9 Use of pepper spray 9 Forced injections 9 Electric shocks 9 Forced shaving/cutting of hair 9 Indelible marking of body 9 Hung from doors, etc. 9 9 Forced IV fluids to induce soiling Forced violence between detainees 9 Source: Public Interest Lawyers (www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk), interviews with torture victims, April 2003– December 2008. ABU GHRAIB The most famous abuse of prisoners by US personnel occurred in Abu Ghraib in 2003 under the command of General Janis Karpinski. The story was broken by the New Yorker from an army report not meant for public release. The report detailed a list of practices including beatings, waterboarding (repeated near drowning in cold water), sexual intimidation (including sodomizing with a chemical light and perhaps 27 GLOBAL ETHICS a broomstick, forced masturbation) and terrorizing with dogs. This torture caused public outrage, not least because of the vividness of the photos and video evidence (Box 2.7). Box 2.7 Torture at Abu Ghraib “The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.” (Hersh 2004) Box 2.8 Philo Ikonya’s story In February 2009, Philo Ikonya (author and currently president of the Kenyan chapter of the PEN International Writers Association and a candidate in the 2007 election) was arrested at a small demonstration outside the Kenyan parliament. She was bundled into a car with a male friend, and beaten. In her words: “‘This can’t be happening to me’, I thought. I told him: ‘I’ve never ever been hit by a man – stop it!’ But he hit me again and I yelled: ‘Are you going to stop when you break my jaw? What do you want? What have we done?’ … But he kept on hitting us, repeating ‘Now the cameras are not here …’. I thought he was going to finish us between here and the cells – because that’s what he was really saying. “When we got to the police station my lip was swollen and my clothes were torn. He pulled out the young man and slapped him and dragged him upstairs. I was left there. Then some of his colleagues put me in a cell. “There are horrible things going on in the cells. Every few minutes they were throwing in someone else. The few women that came in were speechless because of previous torture or harassment. One was pregnant. She couldn’t talk because women police officers had tortured her upstairs – they had threatened to put pepper in her private parts, even when she told them she was pregnant. And they beat her badly.” (Ikonya 2009) 28 CASE STUDIES FOR GLOBAL ETHICS The case study is discussed in Chapter 5. In addition the following questions may be useful in helping to explore this case study. QUESTIONS 1. What are the key ethical issues raised by torture? Do these change depending on whether you adopt utilitarian, deontological or virtue theories (as outlined in Chapter 3)? 2. Are there circumstances where you think torture might be justified? If so, then on what grounds and in what circumstances? 3. Is it justifiable to violate individual human rights to ensure public security? 4. The table of torture techniques was collated as part of an ongoing legal investigation by Public Interest Lawyers. How much do you think global ethicists should work with lawyers and other professionals? In other words, do you accept the multidisciplinary criteria of global ethics? If so, what does this entail? 5. Can global ethicists be “objective” or “neutral”? More importantly, should they be? FURTHER READING • Hersh, S. M. “Torture at Abu Ghraib: American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far Up does the Responsibility Go?” New Yorker (10 May 2004). www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_ fact? (accessed May 2011). • Ikonya, P. “There Are No Cameras Here” (2009). www.irct.org/what-is-torture/voices-of-torturevictims/there-are-no-cameras-here.aspx (accessed May 2011). • International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims. www.irct.org/what-is-torture/voices-oftorture-victims.aspx (accessed May 2011). • Miller, S. “Is Torture Ever Morally Justified?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2005): 179–92. • Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). “Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” (1975). www2.ohchr.org/english/law/declarationcat.htm (accessed May 2011). • Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” (1984). www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm (accessed May 2011). • Public Interest Lawyers. www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk (accessed May 2011). • United Nations. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (1948). www.un.org/en/documents/ udhr (accessed May 2011). 29 3 MORAL THEORY FOR GLOBAL ETHICS INTRODUCTION In order to address the practical issues of global ethics – from climate change, through trafficking and terrorism, to the expansion of the global market to include body parts – we need a methodology. It is not enough to simply say “these are bad practices and something should be done”; we need to say in what ways they are bad and give a reasoned account. As well as analysing the problems, because of the global-ethics commitment to connecting theory and practice and influencing the “real world”, we also need to think about ways to improve the situation on the ground. The next three chapters will provide the “toolbox” of global ethics, which will give you the means to approach any dilemma in global ethics. The toolbox will be made up of elements of moral, political and rights-based theories, which will be introduced in turn over the next three chapters. Together these will be sufficient for you to know how to approach any issue. But the toolbox is not “one size fits all”. Everyone’s approach is different, and what goes into your toolbox and in what order is up to you. You need to choose the moral, political and rights approaches that you believe are most accurate and most effective. You will need to have reasons for your choices and be able to defend your global-ethics position. Then using the tools you have learnt you will be able to do global ethics. This chapter will broadly introduce the basics of some key moral theories. Essentially there are three main approaches – consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory – which prioritize different values and use different methodologies to determine the right and best solutions. Sometimes the conclusions they come to are vastly different but not infrequently, especially when addressing the most pressing problems of global ethics, they come to similar conclusions. You are likely to favour one of these more than others, and this will be the foundation of your global-ethics approach. That said, remember, first, that on many global-ethics issues, all ethical 30 MORAL THEORY FOR GLOBAL ETHICS theories will broadly agree; and, second, there are versions of each of these basic theories that overlap with the others. Accordingly, there is no need to assume that favouring one approach means excluding all the aspects of the others (being a rights theorist or a consequentialist does not preclude you from valuing virtues and employing them in your approach, for example). However, you do need to think about your reasons for favouring one particular standpoint over another, or for adopting a more “pluralistic” view that draws on elements of more than one established view; and you must ensure that your argument for doing so is robust and well reasoned. Before we look at these three theories we need to begin by exploring a key underlying issue in global ethics: the seemingly eternal debate between moral universalists and moral relativists. Universalism takes there to be at least some moral values and standards that hold independently of any particular cultural, political or historical context. The relativist denies this claim, and says that moral norms and practices always arise from, and are understandable only within, certain contexts. This chapter will outline the arguments between universalists and relativists in order to show that all global ethics presupposes some form of universalism. To illustrate how important these abstract arguments are in practice, we shall use the case study of FGC from Chapter 2 to explore the different positions. CAN WE MAKE GLOBAL CLAIMS? The first questions the global ethicist comes up against are whether or not human beings share moral values, and whether morality differs in different places or times. These really are the foundational questions of global ethics: if you do not believe that at least some values are shared globally, or at least that moral frameworks are globally comprehensible and intelligible to those from different backgrounds, then global ethics will be not only difficult to formulate but also meaningless. This is a topic we shall return to time and again. For instance, the appeal to human rights assumes a shared understating of what is valuable about human beings and some kind of common humanity, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Likewise, universalism is assumed in all areas of global governance; for instance, international law relies on some common understandings of justice. Accordingly, in the specific practical issues of global ethics covered in later chapters, from poverty, through war, bioethics and the environment to women’s rights, the claim to universal standards is overt. So, for example, codes and guidelines about how to protect medical research subjects are deemed universal, as are rules about protection of prisoners of war and prohibitions on torture. The universalist claim that there is some shared moral framework does not require that in practice it is universally implemented. As we explore the practical issues of 31 GLOBAL ETHICS global ethics, we will come to see that one of the problems with global ethics is that practices on the ground do not always reflect the standards set out in global governance rules and codes. But it is important to note that failures in practice do not necessarily show the presence of “different values”; they may merely show a failure or difference in implementation. For example, as the case study of torture shows (Chapter 2, pp. 24–9; returned to in Chapters 5 and 8), the fact that torture happens does not necessarily show that torturers hold radically different moral values or cannot understand the legitimacy of prohibitions on torture; it may show only that they believe torture is justified in certain instances, and to justify these instances they may even appeal to common values. We shall explore all these issues in detail as we address the topical concerns of global ethics. At this stage, the point to bear in mind is that a lack of consistency in practices does not by itself show moral relativism to be true and universalism to be defeated. With that proviso, we shall now look at the universalist and relativist positions more closely. GLOBAL ETHICS, UNIVERSALISM AND RELATIVISM As already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, relativists believe that morality is different in different times and places and applied to different individuals and groups in different contexts, and importantly that morality can be understood only from within the group. By contrast, universalists – including all global ethicists – believe that some moral values at least are shared and that moral discourse is meaningful in the global context. Types of universalism Accordingly, all the candidates for “a global ethic” adopt universalist approaches. To have any “global” element implies that there is a global understanding of at least some values, even if these are implemented differently. So even a weak “global ethics” that applies in non-uniform ways is not relative, because it assumes that there is a shared vocabulary and understanding of the values (and the practices that protect those values, such as laws and rights). This is obviously true for strong forms of a global ethic – such as divine-command ethics, which deems actions good by virtue of God’s willing or permitting them – or any strong set of moral principles or norms according to which global moral judgements should be made (e.g. doctrines of human rights), but it is also true for weaker forms that seek minimum levels of rights or well-being or that argue for gradual convergence in international codes and practices. If any of these global aspects figure positively in an account of moral 32 MORAL THEORY FOR GLOBAL ETHICS values and standards, then that account is not relativist, because it assumes, at the very least, the possibility of global communication about values. However, simply not being relative does not mean that a strong universalism is being invoked; there are many weak forms of universalism that accept that there is a shared language of values but that do not endorse global duties. Many such theories will be explored in this book, for instance, whether or not there are duties to the distant poor. But first let us explore relativism in more detail, because even though it is in a way irrelevant to the global-ethics debate – simply because if relativism were true, “global” would be incompatible with “ethics” – it is a prominent debate in moral and political theory, and relativist arguments are often used to criticize global-ethics approaches. Cultural relativism All forms of non-universalism deny that there are any moral values that are shared by, or apply to, all human beings regardless of context. One way of strongly opposing moral universalism outright is to adopt some form of moral scepticism: to question the validity of any of our moral beliefs; or to deny that we can know that a moral judgement is correct or incorrect; or, on some accounts, that it can be rationally justified or unjustified. Most prominent among the opponents of universalism and most relevant for our purposes are cultural relativists, and it is their view that we shall focus on. Cultural relativists are not necessarily committed to this kind of scepticism about moral value and moral thinking per se, but they do hold that morality is something that is always and only relative to particular cultures, unlike universalists. Cultural relativism is particularly important for global ethics because it is often presented as undermining global ethics. Cultural relativists hold that values are culturally dependent: in other words, that values – including moral values – are nothing more than the customs and norms of a particular society. A key argument often given to support the cultural-relativist argument is the argument from difference, developed by J. L. Mackie (1977). The argument from difference claims that moral diversity across times and places shows that there is no shared morality, and thus concludes that there is no one “objective” moral value or set of values in the world independent of those endorsed by particular societies or communities: that the simple fact that there are different moral practices in different places and times is thought to prove that morality is culturally dependent. A frequently used example in textbooks to illustrate how this works is taken from Herodotus’ Histories (440 bce; see Box 3.1). Cultural relativists use examples of difference, here between the Greeks and the Callatians, to argue that there are no universal truths or shared values. Many examples of moral difference can be found in the contemporary context, some of which we shall discuss in the course of this book, for example, regarding the status of women, 33 GLOBAL ETHICS Box 3.1 The Greeks and the Callatians “When Darius was King of Persia, he summoned the Greeks who happened to be present at his court, and asked them what it would take to eat the dead bodies of their fathers. They replied that they would not do it for any money in the world. Later, in the presence of the Greeks and through an interpreter (so that they could understand what was said), he asked some of the tribe called Callatiae, who do in fact eat their parents’ dead bodies, what it would take to burn them. They uttered a cry of horror and forbade him to mention such a dreadful thing.” (Herodotus, Histories 3.38) duties to the poor and the conduct of war. On all these issues people disagree; for instance, some believe that torture is never acceptable and others that it is justified in some circumstances. Cultural relativists argue that the very fact that people disagree about moral issues precludes the possibility of universal moral truth or globally shared values. From this they conclude that morality is nothing more than the practices and views of a particular culture. Essentially, then, moral views are a matter of cultural chance: opinions, norms and customs that vary from one culture to another. Notice that if, as this view holds, values are just cultural norms and practices, then they cannot be compared or judged because there is no universal standard by which to do so. If we buy the cultural-relativist picture, then, morality is simply a matter of following the norms of the culture you happen to be born into. No norms are better or worse, right or wrong; they are simply the attitudes or the evolved preferences of a particular group. Box 3.2 The argument from difference 1. Culture X holds that action (a) is morally impermissible and culture Y that action (a) is morally permissible.* 2. Therefore, cultures have demonstrably different moral codes. 3. Thus, from 2, judgements about the moral rightness or wrongness of (a) are expressions of conventions and norms that vary between cultures. 4. So, from 3, action (a) cannot be judged either morally right or morally wrong from an objective, universal, non-culturally contextual perspective. 5. Therefore there is no objective or universal moral truth. *Action (a) could be any action about which cultures disagree. If it helps to understand the argument, substitute examples for action (a), such as abortion, slavery, conspicuous consumption, torture, adultery, pornography, debt, lying, bribery or masturbation. 34 MORAL THEORY FOR GLOBAL ETHICS The cultural-relativist argument has been popular and many consider that it has great advantages, not least its tolerance. It proffers respect for cultural difference and permits (as equally valid) the different moral practices of different cultures. Thus those who adopt cultural-relativist positions do not appear to be open to charges of moral imperialism or moral neocolonialism (charges that are often levelled at universalist positions and will be discussed in Chapter 5 with regard to critiques of human rights and Chapter 7 with regard to development). This wish not to condemn the morals of other groups and people is one that resonates with contemporary Western cultural norms. For instance, consider how often the phrase “You are entitled to your opinion!” is heard in politics and public debate, and the parallel assumption that “You can only speak about something if you have experienced it!” Now let us look at some of the problems with the relativist position and the argument from difference. First, consider any of the candidate actions given for (a) in the argument from difference (Box 3.2). How is a judgement such as “torture is morally impermissible” consistent with the claim that there is no objective or universal moral truth? Put differently, in making this statement, what would the cultural and moral relativist who thinks torture is morally impermissible actually be saying to someone whose culture’s moral values permit torture? As a relativist, she could not consistently be trying to persuade them by appeal to some value or thought they both share that torture is wrong, because the key principle of the relativist’s argument from difference is that there are at least some values that are not cross-culturally shared. So, when faced with such fundamental disagreement, it appears that the consistent relativist must back off and accept that her anti-torture judgement holds for some cultures (her own) but not others. Alternatively, then, she could be saying that her anti-torture values are superior to those of her opponent’s culture. But this is cultural–moral imperialism writ large! It is resonant of the thoroughly relativist-minded empire builders who justified imposing their own values on other “inferior” cultures on the grounds that they were “civilizing” them. As a result, then, relativists who take this approach become, in practice, universalists who promote their own values as universally correct at the expense of all others, which undermines the claims of cultural respect that underpin the position in the first place. These are serious difficulties for relativism as an approach to global ethical issues. On one hand, simply to back off from moral arguments in the face of moral disagreement would not be doing global ethics; on the other hand, moral or cultural imperialism is not what global ethics should be about. An added problem here seems to be that accepting difference as a fact about the way the world is, and tolerating some such differences, does not commit us to believing that there are no objective moral truths. You can, for example, recognize that there are many different cultures and belief systems in the world, and tolerate their existence, without having to say that their culture and practices are morally acceptable or immune from your moral criticism. So the statement “Everyone is 35 GLOBAL ETHICS entitled to express their opinions” need not suggest that an opposite opinion is “just as true as our own” or that “all opinions are equally valid”. Consider also that, in practice, many countries have laws that prohibit the expression of certain opinions thought to incite racial and religious hatred and violence. Likewise, a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel and Switzerland, have laws prohibiting Holocaust denial. These instances clearly show that as societies we do not practically endorse the talk-show mantra “all opinions are equally valid”, but rather the view that some opinions are pernicious and dangerous and should not be propagated. So, once we begin to interrogate the cultural-relativist claims a little it becomes difficult to maintain the simple view that difference shows the absence of objective values or basic shared values. This is not to say that, because we agree that some views or practices are wrong, for example racism or murder, we should automatically jump to a universalist view and ignore difference. But robust cultural relativism does not seem plausible on reflection, especially when we consider the current level of global integration that suggests some form of collective global culture. With a little thought, then, it seems that the cultural-relativist view – particularly with its alleged attraction of supporting tolerance – is not quite as attractive as it first appears. For a global ethicist to hold a cultural-relativist view is profoundly problematic because it dramatically limits what we can say about the rightness and wrongness of attitudes and practices. And given that ethics is fundamentally about promoting better states of affairs, this is profoundly debilitating. For a cultural relativist, values are not connected to “truth”, to what is right or wrong, better or worse: there is thus so much less to debate because there is no question of truth or right at stake. Clearly a global ethicist could not hold this position, because in this framework ethics is never global but is always bound to a particular culture. In essence, what cultural relativism allows is a collection of different cultures with different moral codes that all exist separately. There is no universal standard, or vantage point, from which these moral stances can be judged, argued about or considered. Therefore, important moral differences cannot be discussed and different positions reasoned for because there are no shared moral grounds from which to do this. Rather, this strong construction of moral diversity imposes silence regarding moral matters that does not permit even cross-cultural, never mind global, discussion. If this were accepted there would be little role for ethicists and none for global ethicists. If we think that there are global dilemmas where discussion across cultures is necessary and meaningful, we must reject cultural relativism. Ironically, if cultural relativism were true, then any statement of it appears to be false because it would be a universal claim! 36 MORAL THEORY FOR GLOBAL ETHICS Arguments for universalism Luckily for the global ethicist, there are many arguments against the cultural-relativist position (Box 3.3) and, as we have already begun to see, the argument from difference can be challenged. Quite simply, the fact that cultures or groups of persons have different opinions does not necessarily mean that therefore there is no objective moral truth or universally shared values. The first solution would be to say that either the Greeks are right and the Callatians wrong or vice versa. In discussing Herodotus’ example, James Rachels (2007) adds a further example – that of “flat-earthers” – to illustrate this. He points out that in some times and places people have believed that the earth is flat, and that there may still be societies that still do. In our society we believe that the earth is round. Therefore there are different possible views about the nature of the earth. However, the fact that there is disagreement about the shape of the earth and some people believe that the earth is flat is not a reason to suggest that there is no true or correct view. Indeed, to suggest such a conclusion is ludicrous. Rather, we think that those who believe that the earth is flat are wrong and misguided. We could add a further very contemporary example of the current argument between creationists and evolutionists. Here again we have an instance of different cultures endorsing different views: the cultures here being ones of religious belief rather than location. Again, the fact that there is a difference in itself is not sufficient to conclude that there is no truth of the matter, or that both are “right” if considered from inside the cultures. Again, the response of both groups is to think that the other side is wrong. And, again, many countries in Europe think that it is so important that the “truth” is taught that publicly funded schools are required to teach evolutionary theory as part of the curriculum (e.g. the National Curriculum for England, Wales and Northern Ireland requires that fossil records are taught as evidence of evolution at Key Stage 4). By contrast, in some states of the US both creationism and evolution are taught and presented as rival theories or viewpoints; indeed, some schools in the US require that “intelligent design” is taught. However, again, just because in one part of the world there is no consensus on which of these theories is true it does not mean that there is no truth about the matter; in other words disagreement does not mean that both theories are wrong. In all these cases – the Greeks and the Callatians, the flat-earthers, and the creationists and evolutionists – it is false to claim that just because there are differences in views, substantive conclusions cannot be drawn about the nature of morality. In fact, in all the cases, most obviously the flat-earth case, it is clear that one side could be correct. Therefore the simple fact of cultural difference does not prove that there is no moral truth or no objective moral values. Of course, to deny that the argument from difference succeeds is not the same as establishing that there are universal or shared val...
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