Part 1: Introduction 1. Write a background statement of approximately 1–2 pages that includes: a. What you have learned about social change as a social issue. You can look this up or use the attached articles. b. What you have learned about social change as a research problem. You can look this up and use the attached articles for citations please. Support your insights with academic citations from the Learning Resources. c. Describe the gap that your study will address. There is little to no research on the specific proficiencies that are fundamental for principals to be effective special education leaders (Lasky & Karge, 2006; Lynch, 2012; Pazey & Cole, 2013; Cusson, 2010; Roberts & Guerra, 2017). From the gap, create a brief purpose statement that is aligned with the following research question: What is the meaning of social change for College graduate students? This is my purpose statement you can use that and repurpose it on how to be a social change graduate student. The purpose of this qualitative study is to investigate principals perceptions on their knowledge of special education. Part 2: Role of the Researcher • Review your analytic memos, field notes, etc., written during each aspect of the data collection process, and examine your role and experience and how that is shaping your experience (reflexivity). My role is the graduate • • student through the field notes and data collection process it helped me to examine my role as a more effective social change agent. I felt connected to all the scholar of change participants throughout this course. Everyone was part of something very meaningful and impacted my view and passion for what I want to do my dissertation on especially Isaac Benjamin. He wants to create an animated show to inspire children with special needs (Benjamin, 2014). Elaborate more. Describe the roles you are portraying in this research effort (i.e., a graduate student, classmate, interviewer, etc.). I am the graduate student of social change. Identify any ethical issues that could or did arise during the data collection processes (i.e., these could include doing a study within one’s own work environment, conflict of interest, or power differentials). You can make this up. Or you can use the doing a study within one’s own work environment because I am a special education teacher looking for the perceptions of principals on special education. Elaborate more. Part 3: Results During this course, you have coded your two Scholars of Change videos, you have conducted and coded your phone interview, and you have gathered data from the Walden social change website and any other documents or websites you might have included. For this Part 3 of your Major Assignment, you will write up the results of your findings. You will include the following in your write-up: A.Data Sources—briefly describe each data source including location, duration of data collection, how data were recorded, and unusual circumstances. o Two Scholars of Change videos I used the video field notes guide as a source of data collection it was recorded and saved on my computer. I watched the scholar of change video featuring Isaac Benjamin at work about four times to make sure I was able to catch all codes. I used the video field notes guide as a source of data collection it was recorded and saved on my computer. I watched the scholar of change video featuring Christin Topper at home about five times. There was no unusual circumstances for either video. o One phone interview I did my phone interview with a fellow colleague using the interview questions provided by the instructor while I was in my kitchen. I recorded the interview and I downloaded a free app called transcribeme to transcribe my interview to record codes throughout the interview. The only unusual circumstances that came up was a time that I could find to get my home completely quite that worked for my interviewee. o Resources from the Walden social change website B. Instrumentation—briefly describe the type of instrumentation you used for your data collection. I used the Excel video coding document template and video field notes provided by Walden as my source to collect data. a. Who developed each data collection tool and what is the date of publication? b. Where and with which participant group has it been used previously? c. How appropriate is it for current study and include whether modifications will be or were needed? It is appropriate for my current study since I will be collecting data from multiple participants. I will be able to look for the themes and categories throughout the surveys and interviews that I will conduct in my research. C. Data Analysis—based on the data sources in “A.”, provide a detailed analysis to include the following: o Report the process used to move inductively from coded units to larger representations including categories and themes. You will have to research this. o Describe the specific codes, categories, and themes that emerged from the data using quotations as needed to emphasize their importance. 1. 1st cycle—describe, give examples. Q1 What is nature deficit disorder? Who coined this term? Line/Paragraph Response 1st 1st 2nd Memo #1 Cycle Cycle Cycle 3 Nature deficit disorder The problem. is a real social problem in a big city like Hong Kong. Q2 What problem has been identified in Hong Kong? Line/Paragraph Response #1 2 High rise buildings are taking over the natural 1st Cycle 1st 2nd Memo Cycle Cycle What do we know in Hong Kong? green spaces where children usually play and media technology is keeping people indoors and changing the lifestyle of society from active to sedentary. 2. 2nd cycle—describe, give examples/moving from codes to categories. Identify themes—provide examples and illustrate your results with a figure or a chart. Code: According to Ravitch and Carl (2016) coding is a way for data organization, and coding allows for the connection of patterns throughout several data points or sources. Codes are descriptive or inferential labels that are assigned to units of data. Codes help researchers to consolidate information into manageable pieces to engage with logically. Ratvitch and Carl (2016) state that all data can be coded, including transcripts, field notes, archival data, photographs, videos, research memos, and research journals. In short, it’s the label you attach to a phrase or other short sequence of the text you are analyzing. Category: a grouping you impose on the coded segments, in order to reduce the number of different pieces of data in your analysis. Theme: Theme” is the main product of data analysis that yields practical results in the field of study (Krauss, 2005). A higher-level of categorization usually used to identify a major element (perhaps one of four or five) of your entire content analysis of the text(s). The theme is used as an attribute, descriptor, element, and concept. As an implicit topic that organizes a group of repeating ideas, it enables researchers to answer the study question (Saldaña, 2016). It contains codes that have a common point of reference and has a high degree of generality that unifies ideas regarding the subject of inquiry (Buetow, 2010) Notes Research shows that students with special learning needs who feel good about themselves perform better academically than those with low self-concept (Isaac, 2014). Code SND Special needs disorders Jackie Kunderts was Family inspired to study drug addiction as her son got caught up in the cycle of addiction and she discovered this is a nationwide phenomenon that was once a big city problem that now affects small cities too. Text I am interested in making a difference. Social change drew me to Walden. Code Making a Difference Social Change Category Research Theme Perception Research Perception Category Personal Interest Theme Social Change Growth Opportunity Social change Making things better for my students and their families is an important part of what I do and who I am. Making a Difference Personal Interest Social change Buetow, S. (2010). Thematic analysis and its reconceptualization as “saliency analysis”. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy.; 15(2):123-5. Isaac, B. (2014). Benjamin Isaac, EdD student, inspiring children with special needs [Video file]. Krauss S.E. (2005). Research paradigms and meaning making: A primer. The Qualitative Report.; 10(4): 758-770. Ravitch, S. M., & Carl, N. M. (2016). Qualitative research: Bridging the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Saldaña, J. (2016). The coding manual for qualitative researchers (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 3. Part 4: Trustworthiness and Summary D.Trustworthiness—summarize across the different data sources and respond to the following: Using the graphs I provided above you can answer these questions. o What themes are in common? o What sources have different themes? The video and phone interview had different themes. o Explain the trustworthiness of your findings, in terms of: ▪ Credibility ▪ Transferability ▪ Dependability strategies ▪ Confirmability Summary • Based on the results of your analyses, how would you answer the question: “What is the meaning of social change for Walden graduate students?” I provide a link to the page where they talk about social change on the website. https://www.waldenu.edu/about/social-change Self-Reflection—Has your own understanding of you as a positive social change agent changed? Yes Explain your reasoning. According to Walden University I am a Purposeful Participant You are a Purposeful Participant. Your commitment to positive social change probably is strongly connected to your work or school activities and responsibilities. While you may place less importance on being personally involved in social change and may be less likely to donate money or services, you may tend to make greater sacrifices or take larger risks in order to be involved in social change. Elaborate on the reasoning for positive social change. • Based on your review of the three articles on social change, which one is aligned with your interests regarding social change and why? This is the article that is more aligned with my interest because its based on apathy into movement you can look up the article and take citations from it. Thomas, E. F., McGarty, C., & Mavor, K. I. (2009). Transforming “apathy into movement”: The role of prosocial emotions in motivation action for social change. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 13(4), 310–333. Reference: Isaac, B. (2014). Benjamin Isaac, EdD student, inspiring children with special needs [Video file]. Lasky, B., & Karge, B. (2006). Meeting the needs of students with disabilities: Experience and confidence of principals. NASSP Bulletin, 90(1), 19-36. doi: 10.1177/0192636505283950 Education for Information 22 (2004) 63–75 IOS Press 63 Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects Andrew K. Shenton∗ Division of Information and Communication Studies, School of Informatics, Lipman Building, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK Received 14 November 2003 Accepted 6 January 2004 Although many critics are reluctant to accept the trustworthiness of qualitative research, frameworks for ensuring rigour in this form of work have been in existence for many years. Guba’s constructs, in particular, have won considerable favour and form the focus of this paper. Here researchers seek to satisfy four criteria. In addressing credibility, investigators attempt to demonstrate that a true picture of the phenomenon under scrutiny is being presented. To allow transferability, they provide sufficient detail of the context of the fieldwork for a reader to be able to decide whether the prevailing environment is similar to another situation with which he or she is familiar and whether the findings can justifiably be applied to the other setting. The meeting of the dependability criterion is difficult in qualitative work, although researchers should at least strive to enable a future investigator to repeat the study. Finally, to achieve confirmability, researchers must take steps to demonstrate that findings emerge from the data and not their own predispositions. The paper concludes by suggesting that it is the responsibility of research methods teachers to ensure that this or a comparable model for ensuring trustworthiness is followed by students undertaking a qualitative inquiry. Keywords: Qualitative methods, research 1. Introduction The trustworthiness of qualitative research generally is often questioned by positivists, perhaps because their concepts of validity and reliability cannot be addressed in the same way in naturalistic work. Nevertheless, several writers on research methods, notably Silverman [1], have demonstrated how qualitative researchers can incorporate measures that deal with these issues, and investigators such as Pitts [2] have attempted to respond directly to the issues of validity and reliability in their own qualitative studies. Many naturalistic investigators have, however, preferred to use different terminology to distance themselves from the positivist paradigm. One such author is Guba, who proposes four criteria that he believes should be considered ∗ Address for correspondence: 92 Claremont Road, Whitley Bay, Tyne and Wear, NE26 3TU, UK. E-mail: ashenton1@hotmail.com. 0167-8329/04/$17.00  2004 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved 64 A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects by qualitative researchers in pursuit of a trustworthy study [3]. By addressing similar issues, Guba’s constructs correspond to the criteria employed by the positivist investigator: a) b) c) d) credibility (in preference to internal validity); transferability (in preference to external validity/generalisability); dependability (in preference to reliability); confirmability (in preference to objectivity). Although as recently as the mid 1990s Lincoln wrote that the whole area of qualitative inquiry was “still emerging and being defined” [4], Guba’s constructs have been accepted by many. This paper considers the criteria in detail and suggests provisions that the qualitative researcher may employ to meet them. The strategies advocated are based on the experience gained by Shenton when undertaking a qualitative PhD study devoted to the information-seeking behaviour of school-aged children [5]. 2. Credibility One of the key criteria addressed by positivist researchers is that of internal validity, in which they seek to ensure that their study measures or tests what is actually intended. According to Merriam, the qualitative investigator’s equivalent concept, i.e. credibility, deals with the question, “How congruent are the findings with reality?” [6] Lincoln and Guba argue that ensuring credibility is one of most important factors in establishing trustworthiness [7]. The following provisions may be made by researchers to promote confidence that they have accurately recorded the phenomena under scrutiny: a) the adoption of research methods well established both in qualitative investigation in general and in information science in particular. Yin recognises the importance of incorporating “correct operational measures for the concepts being studied” [8]. Thus, the specific procedures employed, such as the line of questioning pursued in the data gathering sessions and the methods of data analysis, should be derived, where possible, from those that have been successfully utilised in previous comparable projects. In terms of investigation of information-seeking behaviour, the work of Dervin has proved particularly influential in this regard. In their study of the information needs of Seattle’s residents, Dervin et al. initially invited participants to reflect on situations “where you needed help. . . where you didn’t understand something. . . where you needed to decide what to do. . . or, where you were worried about something” [9]. Dervin’s respondents then described in detail a particular instance within one of these categories. Similar strategies have been used subsequently by Chen and Hernon [10], Poston-Anderson and Edwards [11] and Shenton [12] amongst others; A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects 65 b) the development of an early familiarity with the culture of participating organisations before the first data collection dialogues take place. This may be achieved via consultation of appropriate documents and preliminary visits to the organisations themselves. Lincoln and Guba [13] and Erlandson et al. [14] are among the many who recommend “prolonged engagement” between the investigator and the participants in order both for the former to gain an adequate understanding of an organisation and to establish a relationship of trust between the parties. The danger emerges, however, that if too many demands are made on staff, gatekeepers responsible for allowing the researcher access to the organisation may be deterred from cooperating. The investigator may also react with some suspicion to the notion of prolonged engagement in view of the undesirable side effects that have been noted by Lincoln and Guba [15] and Silverman [16]. The former draw particular attention to the way in which investigators may become so immersed in the culture under scrutiny that their professional judgements are influenced; c) random sampling of individuals to serve as informants. Although much qualitative research involves the use of purposive sampling, a random approach may negate charges of researcher bias in the selection of participants. As Preece notes, random sampling also helps to ensure that any “unknown influences” are distributed evenly within the sample [17]. Furthermore, it may be that a random method is particularly appropriate to the nature of the investigation. The work may, for example, take the form of a “collective case study” of the type described by Stake, in that multiple voices, exhibiting characteristics of similarity, dissimilarity, redundancy and variety, are sought in order to gain greater knowledge of a wider group [18], such as a more general population, rather than simply the individual informants who are contributing data. This form of research is also recognised by Hamel, Dufour and Fortin, who dub it a “macroscopic” case study, and emphasise the importance of appropriate selection tactics if the investigator is to be confident that informants are typical of members of a broader, “selected society” [19]. According to Bouma and Atkinson, “A random sampling procedure provides the greatest assurance that those selected are a representative sample of the larger group” [20]. A significant disadvantage of random method, however, stems from the fact that, since the researcher has no control over the choice of informants, it is possible that quiet, uncooperative or inarticulate individuals may be selected; d) triangulation. Triangulation may involve the use of different methods, especially observation, focus groups and individual interviews, which form the major data collection strategies for much qualitative research. Whilst focus groups and individual interviews suffer from some common methodological shortcomings since both are interviews of a kind, their distinct characteristics also result in individual strengths. According to Guba [21] and Brewer and Hunter [22], the use of different methods in concert compensates for their individual limitations and exploits their respective benefits. Where possible, 66 A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects supporting data may be obtained from documents to provide a background to and help explain the attitudes and behaviour of those in the group under scrutiny, as well as to verify particular details that participants have supplied. Opportunities should also be seized to examine any documents referred to by informants during the actual interviews or focus groups where these can shed more light on the behaviour of the people in question. Another form of triangulation may involve the use of a wide range of informants. This is one way of triangulating via data sources. Here individual viewpoints and experiences can be verified against others and, ultimately, a rich picture of the attitudes, needs or behaviour of those under scrutiny may be constructed based on the contributions of a range of people. Van Maanen urges the exploitation of opportunities “to check out bits of information across informants” [23]. Such corroboration may, for example, take the form of comparing the needs and information-seeking action described by one individual with those of others in a comparable position. In addition, the investigator may draw informants from both users of an information service and the professionals who deliver it. Even in a user study, where the thrust of the work is likely to lie in analysing the ideas and experiences of users themselves, data provided by those responsible for the management and delivery of the service under scrutiny may well prove invaluable in order to check that supplied by the users, to help explain their attitudes and behaviour and to enhance the contextual data relating to the fieldwork site(s). Just as triangulation via data sources can involve the use of a diversity of informants, a range of documents may also be employed as source material. For example, documents created corporately by each participating organisation may be examined, as well as those relating to the organisation but produced externally. Further data dealing with the wider context in which the organisation is operating may be elicited from official publications. Where appropriate, site triangulation may be achieved by the participation of informants within several organisations so as to reduce the effect on the study of particular local factors peculiar to one institution. Where similar results emerge at different sites, findings may have greater credibility in the eyes of the reader. The sampling of a range of people in different organisations may be employed to provide the diversity that underpins Dervin’s concept of “circling reality”, which she defines as “the necessity of obtaining a variety of perspectives in order to get a better, more stable view of ‘reality’ based on a wide spectrum of observations from a wide base of points in time-space” [24]; e) tactics to help ensure honesty in informants when contributing data. In particular, each person who is approached should be given opportunities to refuse to participate in the project so as to ensure that the data collection sessions involve only those who are genuinely willing to take part and prepared to offer data freely. Participants should be encouraged to be frank from the outset of each session, with the researcher aiming to establish a rapport in the opening A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects f) g) h) i) 67 moments and indicating that there are no right answers to the questions that will be asked. Where appropriate, the independent status of the researcher should also be emphasised. Participants can, therefore, contribute ideas and talk of their experiences without fear of losing credibility in the eyes of managers of the organisation. It should be made clear to participants that they have the right to withdraw from the study at any point, and they should not even be required to disclose an explanation to the investigator. In many instances, such an unconditional right for subjects to withdraw may be a requirement that must be accepted by the researcher when seeking approval for the work; iterative questioning. In addition to the “preventative” strategies outlined above, specific ploys may be incorporated to uncover deliberate lies. These might include the use of probes to elicit detailed data and iterative questioning, in which the researcher returns to matters previously raised by an informant and extracts related data through rephrased questions. In both cases, where contradictions emerge, falsehoods can be detected and the researcher may decide to discard the suspect data. An alternative approach and one that provides greater transparency lies in drawing attention, within the final research report, to the discrepancies and offering possible explanations; negative case analysis, as recommended by commentators such as Lincoln and Guba [25], Miles and Huberman [26] and Silverman [27]. One form of negative case analysis may see the researcher refining a hypothesis until it addresses all cases within the data. If the study includes the production of typologies, on completing the initial categories the investigator may revisit the data in order to confirm that these constructs do indeed account for all instances of the phenomenon involved, even if some of the types embrace only one instance; frequent debriefing sessions between the researcher and his or her superiors, such as a project director or steering group. Through discussion, the vision of the investigator may be widened as others bring to bear their experiences and perceptions. Such collaborative sessions can be used by the researcher to discuss alternative approaches, and others who are responsible for the work in a more supervisory capacity may draw attention to flaws in the proposed course of action. The meetings also provide a sounding board for the investigator to test his or her developing ideas and interpretations, and probing from others may help the researcher to recognise his or her own biases and preferences; peer scrutiny of the research project. Opportunities for scrutiny of the project by colleagues, peers and academics should be welcomed, as should feedback offered to the researcher at any presentations (e.g. at conferences) that are made over the duration of the project. The fresh perspective that such individuals may be able to bring may allow them to challenge assumptions made by the investigator, whose closeness to the project frequently inhibits his or her ability to view it with real detachment. Questions and observations may well enable the researcher to refine his or her methods, develop a greater explanation of the research design and strengthen his or her arguments in the light of the comments made; 68 A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects j) the researcher’s “reflective commentary”. In addition to the outside scrutiny discussed above, the investigator should seek to evaluate the project, again as it develops. This may be done through a reflective commentary, part of which may be devoted to the effectiveness of the techniques that have been employed. The reflective commentary may also be used to record the researcher’s initial impressions of each data collection session, patterns appearing to emerge in the data collected and theories generated. The commentary can play a key role in what Guba and Lincoln term “progressive subjectivity”, or the monitoring of the researcher’s own developing constructions, which the writers consider critical in establishing credibility [28]. Ultimately, the section of the commentary dealing with emerging patterns and theories should inform that part of the research report that addresses the project’s results, and any discussion in the report of the effectiveness of the study maybe based on the investigator’s methods analysis within the reflective commentary; k) background, qualifications and experience of the investigator. According to Patton, the credibility of the researcher is especially important in qualitative research as it is the person who is the major instrument of data collection and analysis [29]. Alkin, Daillak and White go so far as to suggest that a scrutineer’s trust in the researcher is of equal importance to the adequacy of the procedures themselves [30]. The nature of the biographical information that should be supplied in the research report is a matter of debate. Maykut and Morehouse recommend including any personal and professional information relevant to the phenomenon under study [31], and Patton adds that arrangements by which the investigator is funded should also be addressed [32]. Any approvals given to the project by those providing access to the organisation and individual participants should also be made explicit; l) member checks, which Guba and Lincoln consider the single most important provision that can be made to bolster a study’s credibility [33]. Checks relating to the accuracy of the data may take place “on the spot” in the course, and at the end, of the data collection dialogues. Informants may also be asked to read any transcripts of dialogues in which they have participated. Here the emphasis should be on whether the informants consider that their words match what they actually intended, since, if a tape recorder has been used, the articulations themselves should at least have been accurately captured. Another element of member checking should involve verification of the investigator’s emerging theories and inferences as these were formed during the dialogues. This strategy has been employed by Pitts [34] and is recommended by Brewer and Hunter [35] and Miles and Huberman [36]. Where appropriate, participants may be asked if they can offer reasons for particular patterns observed by the researcher. The importance of developing such a formative understanding is recognised by Van Maanen, who writes that A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects 69 “analysis and verification. . . is something one brings forth with them from the field, not something which can be attended to later, after the data are collected. When making sense of field data, one cannot simply accumulate information without regard to what each bit of information represents in terms of its possible contextual meanings” [37]; m) thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Detailed description in this area can be an important provision for promoting credibility as it helps to convey the actual situations that have been investigated and, to an extent, the contexts that surround them. Without this insight, it is difficult for the reader of the final account to determine the extent to which the overall findings “ring true”. Moreover, if the researcher employs a reporting system in which he or she defines a series of types within a typology and illustrates these types using real qualitative episodes, the inclusion of the latter enables the reader to assess how far the defined types truly embrace the actual situations; n) examination of previous research findings to assess the degree to which the project’s results are congruent with those of past studies. Silverman considers that the ability of the researcher to relate his or her findings to an existing body of knowledge is a key criterion for evaluating works of qualitative inquiry [38]. In this respect, reports of previous studies staged in the same or a similar organisation and addressing comparable issues may be invaluable sources. 3. Transferability Merriam writes that external validity “is concerned with the extent to which the findings of one study can be applied to other situations” [39]. In positivist work, the concern often lies in demonstrating that the results of the work at hand can be applied to a wider population. Since the findings of a qualitative project are specific to a small number of particular environments and individuals, it is impossible to demonstrate that the findings and conclusions are applicable to other situations and populations. Erlandson et al. note that many naturalistic inquirers believe that, in practice, even conventional generalisability is never possible as all observations are defined by the specific contexts in which they occur [40]. A contrasting view is offered by Stake [41] and Denscombe [42], who suggest that, although each case may be unique, it is also an example within a broader group and, as a result, the prospect of transferability should not be immediately rejected. Nevertheless, such an approach can be pursued only with caution since, as Gomm, Hammersley and Foster recognise, it appears to belittle the importance of the contextual factors which impinge on the case [43]. Bassey proposes that, if practitioners believe their situations to be similar to that described in the study, they may relate the findings to their own positions [44]. Lincoln and Guba [45] and Firestone [46] are among those who present a similar argument, and suggest that it is the responsibility of the investigator to ensure that sufficient contextual information about the fieldwork sites is provided to enable the 70 A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects reader to make such a transfer. They maintain that, since the researcher knows only the “sending context”, he or she cannot make transferability inferences. In recent years such a stance has found favour with many qualitative researchers. After perusing the description within the research report of the context in which the work was undertaken, readers must determine how far they can be confident in transferring to other situations the results and conclusions presented. It is also important that sufficient thick description of the phenomenon under investigation is provided to allow readers to have a proper understanding of it, thereby enabling them to compare the instances of the phenomenon described in the research report with those that they have seen emerge in their situations. Authors disagree on the nature and extent of background information that should be offered but few would dispute the need for “a full description of all the contextual factors impinging on the inquiry”, as recommended by Guba [47]. Nevertheless, the situation is complicated by the possibility, noted by Firestone, that factors considered by the researcher to be unimportant, and consequently unaddressed in the research report, may be critical in the eyes of a reader [48]. Many investigators stop short of the course of action advocated by Denscombe that the researcher should demonstrate how, in terms of the contextual data, the case study location(s) compare(s) with other environments [49]. This reluctance is based on the fact that the process would demand a considerable knowledge of the “receiving contexts” of other organisations, and the researcher is in no position to comment on what Merriam calls the “typicality” of the environment(s) in which the fieldwork took place [50]. The work of Cole and Gardner [51], Marchionini and Teague [52] and Pitts [53] highlights the importance of the researcher’s conveying to the reader the boundaries of the study. This additional information must be considered before any attempts at transference are made. Thus information on the following issues should be given at the outset: a) b) c) d) e) f) the number of organisations taking part in the study and where they are based; any restrictions in the type of people who contributed data; the number of participants involved in the fieldwork; the data collection methods that were employed; the number and length of the data collection sessions; the time period over which the data was collected. It is easy for researchers to develop a preoccupation with transferability. Ultimately, the results of a qualitative study must be understood within the context of the particular characteristics of the organisation or organisations and, perhaps, geographical area in which the fieldwork was carried out. In order to assess the extent to which findings may be true of people in other settings, similar projects employing the same methods but conducted in different environments could well be of great value. As Kuhlthau [54] and Gomm, Hammersley and Foster [55] recognise, however, it is rare for such complementary work to be undertaken. Nevertheless, the accumulation of findings from studies staged in different settings might enable a more inclusive, A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects 71 overall picture to be gained. A similar point is made by Gross, in relation to her work on imposed queries in school libraries. She writes of the “multiple environments” in which the phenomenon of her interest takes place and believes her study to provide a “baseline understanding” with which the results of subsequent work should be compared [56]. As Borgman [57] and Pitts [58] have acknowledged, understanding of a phenomenon is gained gradually, through several studies, rather than one major project conducted in isolation. Even when different investigations offer results that are not entirely consistent with one another, this does not, of course, necessarily imply that one or more is untrustworthy. It may be that they simply reflect multiple realities, and, if an appreciation can be gained of the reasons behind the variations, this understanding may prove as useful to the reader as the results actually reported. Such an attitude is consistent with what Dervin considers should be key principles within information-seeking research, namely: “To posit. . . every contradiction, every inconsistency, every diversity not as an error or extraneous but as fodder for contextual analysis. To ask and re-ask what accounts for this difference or this similarity and to anchor possible answers in time-space conceptualizings” [59]. It should thus be questioned whether the notion of producing truly transferable results from a single study is a realistic aim or whether it disregards the importance of context which forms such a key factor in qualitative research. 4. Dependability In addressing the issue of reliability, the positivist employs techniques to show that, if the work were repeated, in the same context, with the same methods and with the same participants, similar results would be obtained. However, as Fidel [60] and Marshall and Rossman [61] note, the changing nature of the phenomena scrutinised by qualitative researchers renders such provisions problematic in their work. Florio-Ruane highlights how the investigator’s observations are tied to the situation of the study, arguing that the “published descriptions are static and frozen in the ‘ethnographic present’ ” [62]. Lincoln and Guba stress the close ties between credibility and dependability, arguing that, in practice, a demonstration of the former goes some distance in ensuring the latter [63]. This may be achieved through the use of “overlapping methods”, such as the focus group and individual interview. In order to address the dependability issue more directly, the processes within the study should be reported in detail, thereby enabling a future researcher to repeat the work, if not necessarily to gain the same results. Thus, the research design may be viewed as a “prototype model”. Such in-depth coverage also allows the reader to assess the extent to which proper research practices have been followed. So as to enable readers of the research report to develop a thorough understanding of the methods and their effectiveness, the text should include sections devoted to a) the research design and its implementation, describing what was planned and executed on a strategic level; 72 A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects b) the operational detail of data gathering, addressing the minutiae of what was done in the field; c) reflective appraisal of the project, evaluating the effectiveness of the process of inquiry undertaken. 5. Confirmability Patton associates objectivity in science with the use of instruments that are not dependent on human skill and perception. He recognises, however, the difficulty of ensuring real objectivity, since, as even tests and questionnaires are designed by humans, the intrusion of the researcher’s biases is inevitable [64]. The concept of confirmability is the qualitative investigator’s comparable concern to objectivity. Here steps must be taken to help ensure as far as possible that the work’s findings are the result of the experiences and ideas of the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher. The role of triangulation in promoting such confirmability must again be emphasised, in this context to reduce the effect of investigator bias. Miles and Huberman consider that a key criterion for confirmability is the extent to which the researcher admits his or her own predispositions [65]. To this end, beliefs underpinning decisions made and methods adopted should be acknowledged within the research report, the reasons for favouring one approach when others could have been taken explained and weaknesses in the techniques actually employed admitted. In terms of results, preliminary theories that ultimately were not borne out by the data should also be discussed. Much of the content in relation to these areas may be derived from the ongoing “reflective commentary”. Once more, detailed methodological description enables the reader to determine how far the data and constructs emerging from it may be accepted. Critical to this process is the “audit trail”, which allows any observer to trace the course of the research step-by-step via the decisions made and procedures described. The “audit trail” may be represented diagrammatically. Two such diagrams may be constructed. One may take a data-oriented approach, showing how the data eventually leading to the formation of recommendations was gathered and processed during the course of the study. This is what is typically understood by the term, “audit trail”. In addition, however, the manner in which the concepts inherent in the research question gave rise to the work to follow may be tracked. This more theoretical “audit trail”, which should be understood in terms of the whole of the duration of the project, may be depicted in a second diagram. 6. Summary and conclusion Over the last twenty years, much has been achieved by advocates of qualitative inquiry in demonstrating the rigour and trustworthiness of their favoured form of A.K. Shenton / Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects 73 Provisions that may be Made by a Qualitative Researcher Wishing to Address Guba’s Four Criteria for Trustworthiness Quality criterion Possible provision made by researcher Credibility Adoption of appropriate, well recognised research methods Development of early familiarity with culture of participating organisations Random sampling of individuals serving as informants Triangulation via use of different methods, different types of informants and different sites Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants Iterative questioning in data collection dialogues Negative case analysis Debriefing sessions between researcher and superiors Peer scrutiny of project Use of “reflective commentary” Description of background, qualifications and experience of the researcher Member checks of data collected and interpretations/theories formed Thick description of phenomenon under scrutiny Examination of previous research to frame findings Transferability Provision of background data to establish context of study and detailed description of phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made Dependability Employment of “overlapping methods” In-depth methodological description to allow study to be repeated Confirmability Triangulation to reduce effect of investigator bias Admission of researcher’s beliefs and assumptions Recognition of shortcomings in study’s methods and their potential effects In-depth methodological description to allow integrity of research results to be scrutinised Use of diagrams to demonstrate “audit trail” research. Nevertheless, criticisms of work of this kind continue to be made by positivists. This paper has addressed four criteria that may be addressed by qualitative researchers wishing to present a convincing case that their work is academically sound. A range of strategies that may be adopted by investigators in response to these issues has been highlighted. These are summarised in the chart below: The challenge for those involved in teaching courses in research methods lies in ensuring that those contemplating undertaking qualitative research are not only aware of the criticisms typically made by its detractors but they are also cognisant of the provisions which can be made to address matters such as credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Prospective researchers can then assess the extent to which they are able to apply these generic strategies to their particular investigation. References [1] [2] D. 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Kuhlthau, Investigating patterns in information seeking: concepts in context, in: Exploring the contexts of information behaviour, T.D. Wilson and D.K. Allen, eds, London: Taylor Graham, 1999, pp. 10–20. R. Gomm, M. Hammersley and P. Foster, op. cit. M.R. Gross, Imposed queries in the school library media center: a descriptive study, Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, 1998. C.L. Borgman, The user’s mental model of an information retrieval system: an experiment on a prototype online catalog, International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 24 (1986), 47–64. J.M. Pitts, op. cit. B. Dervin, Given a context by any other name: methodological tools for taming the unruly beast, in: Information seeking in context, P. Vakkari, R. Savolainen and B. Dervin, eds, London: Taylor Graham, 1997, pp. 13–38. R. Fidel, Qualitative methods in information retrieval research, Library and Information Science Research 15 (1993), 219–247. C. Marshall and G.B. Rossman, Designing qualitative research, 3rd ed. Newbury Park: Sage, 1999. S. Florio-Ruane, Conversation and narrative in collaborative research, in: Stories lives tell: narrative and dialogue in education, C. Witherell and N. Noddings, eds, New York: Teachers College Press, 1991, pp. 234–256. Y.S. Lincoln and E.G. Guba, op. cit. M.Q. Patton, op. cit. M.B. Miles and A.M. Huberman, op. cit. Transforming “Apathy Into Movement”:The Role of Prosocial Emotions in Motivating Action for Social Change Emma F. Thomas The Australian National University, Canberra Craig McGarty Murdoch University, Perth, Australia Kenneth I. Mavor The Australian National University, Canberra This article explores the synergies between recent developments in the social identity of helping, and advantaged groups’ prosocial emotion. The authors review the literature on the potential of guilt, sympathy, and outrage to transform advantaged groups’ apathy into positive action. They place this research into a novel framework by exploring the ways these emotions shape group processes to produce action strategies that emphasize either social cohesion or social change. These prosocial emotions have a critical but underrecognized role in creating contexts of in-group inclusion or exclusion, shaping normative content and meaning, and informing group interests. Furthermore, these distinctions provide a useful way of differentiating commonly discussed emotions. The authors conclude that the most “effective” emotion will depend on the context of the inequality but that outrage seems particularly likely to productively shape group processes and social change outcomes. Keywords: I emotion; social identity; helping/prosocial behavior; group processes; morality n 1938, Carl Jung wrote, “There can be no transforming of darkness into light and of apathy into movement without emotion” (p. 32). In this sentence, Jung celebrates the profound role that emotion plays in directing and shaping human behavior. Although individual emotion has long been a mainstay of clinical, personality, and social psychological research (e.g., the work of Ekman et al., 1987; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Scheff, 1990; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001, to name a few), the advent of intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Smith, 1993) signaled increasing interest in the contribution that group-based emotion can add to the study of social phenomena, including prejudice and discrimination (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Smith, 1993), social harmony and reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006), and social and political action (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; van Zomeren, Spears, Leach, & Fischer, 2004; see earlier contributions from relative deprivation theory, Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002, for a review). This article concentrates on a specific aspect implied in the Jung quote above: the power of emotion to transform “apathy into movement.” More specifically, this article explores the transformation of an advantaged group’s apathy into movement to promote greater social equality. Following Leach, Snider, and Iyer (2002), we define advantaged groups as those “secure in their position, due to their greater size or control over resources” (p. 137). Thus, the scope of this article is defined by, first, a focus on group emotion and, second, a focus on emotions that advantaged group members experience in relation to other people’s deprivation. We argue that it is in this situation of relative advantage that the power Authors’ Note: The research has been supported in part by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant No. DP0770731. The authors wish to thank Galen Bodenhausen and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Please address correspondence to Emma F. Thomas, Regulatory Institutions Network, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia; e-mail: emma.thomas@anu.edu.au. PSPR, Vol. 13 No. 4, November 2009 310-333 DOI: 10.1177/1088868309343290 © 2009 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. 310 Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   311 of emotion to transform apathy to action is most profound—what Nietzsche (quoted in Leach et al., 2002) called “poisoning the consciences of the fortunate” (p. 136). Accordingly, this article explores the various emotional reactions that advantaged groups can have to the disadvantage of others and the potential for these discrete emotions to motivate efforts to achieve greater social equality. We draw on recent developments in the social identity literature that outline the ways that social group memberships shape prosocial behavior (e.g., helping and solidarity; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006) to provide a framework for understanding the various prosocial effects of group emotion. Taking a social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), we explore the ways that social identities and emotion can, in combination, profoundly inform perceivers about the social context and shape their reaction to it. We argue that such an approach can help to differentiate oftenconfused emotion labels (e.g., sympathy and empathy) but also provide a useful way to distinguish between different prosocial strategies (e.g., tokenism, helping, solidarity, cooperation). We begin our analysis by outlining the developme­ nts in the social identity literature that detail the underlying group processes responsible for producing prosocial outcomes. In particular, Reicher et al. (2006) have argued that there are three interrelated group properties that are implicated in prosocial behavior. We then go on to explore the ways that emotion may theoretically shape these three prosocial group processes. In the next section, we move on to discuss the possibility that prosocial emotions might usefully be further classified on the basis of the sorts of social strategies they promote. We draw on Wright and Lubensky’s (2008) distinction between social cohesion and social change strategies. On the basis of these arguments, the main sections of this article are underpinned by a framework that uses Reicher et al.’s (2006) three categories to explore group processes and emotion and Wright and Lubensky’s (2008) two strategies to delineate prosocial emotion outcomes. In particular, we provide an analysis of the three prosocial emotions (guilt, sympathy, and outrage; Montada & Schneider, 1989), structured in terms of the etiology of the emotion; its implications for group processes (as relates to Reicher et al.’s, 2006, insights); and the sorts of social strategy outcomes likely to emerge (social cohesion or social change; Wright & Lubensky, 2008). We conclude with a discussion of implications for existing research but also the implications for people seeking to mobilize advantaged group members in support of positive social change. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND GROUP EMOTION: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR What sorts of identity processes underpin prosocial behavior? Let us note at the outset that we are using the general term prosocial to cover a number of separate behaviors including helping behavior, altruism, cooperation, and solidarity (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). These prosocial strategies will be differentiated throughout the article—indeed, it is one of the key purposes of the article—but at this point, let us generalize across them and explore the psychological underpinnings that are generally understood to motivate an advantaged group to help, assist, and otherwise take action on behalf of members of another disadvantaged group. The social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) suggests that there are three core processes that underpin prosocial group behavior: category inclusion, category norms, and category interests. Reicher et al. (2006) crystallized these three elements into their social identity model of helping (see also Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005). The first, category inclusion, is a cognitive perceptual process that relates to the location of (inter)group boundaries. A wealth of evidence now supports the assertion, derived from the social identity perspective, that people will take action to support in-group members and that this can manifest in intergroup helping (Levine & Thompson, 2004; Reicher et al., 2006), political solidarity (Subašic´, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), cooperation between groups (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), and even bystander emergency intervention (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). In Reicher et al.’s (2006) social identity model of helping, the first element relates to the need for a meaningful superordinate categorization to be available, such that advantaged and disadvantaged can be included in a common in-group. In a similar vein, Subašic´ et al.’s (2008) recent model of political solidarity emphasizes a shared identity meaning with the minority group (and not the authority) as underpinning support for, and solidarity with, a disadvantaged minority. The second element, category norms, relates to the rhetorical meaning associated with the group, as evidenced by the group norms. When an identity is salient, people will behave in line with group norms that prescribe 312   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW appropriate and normative forms of action (Jetten, McAuliffe, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2006; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Reicher et al. (2006) argue that the group norms must promote helping. Their analysis of documents used to mobilize support of Bulgarian Jews during World War II demonstrated the ways that the category norms for the Bulgarian identity prescribed support for a persecuted people. The final element, category interests, relates to the strategic concerns that accompany helping behavior. In particular, Reicher et al. (2006) suggest that helping is more likely to come about when in-group interests (e.g., maintenance of a positive in-group identity) are served by helping. Thus, in the WWII era documents, identity concerns were represented such that the Bulgarian ingroup would be threatened by not helping. Other research has shown that group members can engage in helping behavior to strategically improve the group’s stereotype (Hopkins et al., 2007) and/or restore a threatened identity (van Leeuwen, 2007). Overall, Reicher and colleagues argue that effective categories will be those that are able to include everyone whom one is seeking to mobilize (category inclusion) but also those categories that have the resources to render normative the actions one is advocating (category norms) and represent the strategic reasons for doing so (category interests). However, the social identity approach also emphasizes the fluid, dynamic, and constructed nature of social identity (Onorato & Turner, 2004). Other work by Reicher, Haslam, and colleagues (e.g., Reicher, 1996, 2004; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) has highlighted the ways that social identities are contested by group members, yielding a continual process of identity construction, reconstruction, and transformation through consensus (see also Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). Put another way, the category inclusion, category norms, and category interest elements discussed by Reicher and colleagues are also dynamic, contestable, changeable, and fundamentally shaped through processes of argumentation and consensualization among group members (Reicher et al., 2006). Building on these insights, in this article we explore the ways that emotions can powerfully shape the social identity processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006) and others (Hopkins et al., 2007; Levine et al., 2005; Subašic´ et al., 2008; van Leeuwen, 2007). We argue that exploring the synergies between group emotion, and the sorts of identity processes outlined above would contribute much to our understanding of prosocial group behavior. For group emotion to contribute usefully to our understanding of the dynamic processes of identity construction, reconstruction, and transformation, it is necessary to have a dynamic theory of group emotion. Indeed, the existing literature on social identity and group emotion suggests that the causal relationships between the two are likely to be bidirectional, dynamic, and complex (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Smith & Mackie, 2006). Consistent with these points, Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007) have emphasized the role of anticipation, reevaluation, and reconstruction in the emotion process, whereas Smith and Mackie (2006) have discussed the ways that group members can, over time, disengage with groups that elicit negative group emotions. Let us briefly discuss this literature, toward further clarifying the dynamic causal properties of social identity and group emotion. On one hand, group emotion is often theoretically understood as stemming from the straightforward appr­ aisal process elaborated in intergroup emotion theory, where appraisal based on a group (social) self leads to group emotion, which leads to group action (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). Similarly, in the recently articulated social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), these authors causally place a salient social identity before the experience of emotional reactions to injustice (group emotion). Figure 1a depicts the simple causal model where a salient social identity leads to congruent group emotions, which then shape particular action strategies. This is group-based emotion, as it is traditionally defined and understood (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), where social identities are (partially) enacted through an emotion pathway (van Zomeren et al., 2008). On the other hand, we argue that it is also useful to explore the ways that emotions can equally give rise to social group memberships and/or inform group norms. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that social identities can be actively created by group members based on shared cognition (where shared cognition refers to shared knowledge structures; Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007). In a similar vein, Peters and Kashima (2007) have described the ways that the social sharing of emotion can create links among people and foster a shared understanding of the world. This shared understanding can be used to coordinate social interaction within a group but also action between groups (Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007; Smith et al., 2007). Figure 1b depicts this simple causal model where emotion can form the basis for an effective social category, which then motivates social action. Given that we propose that group formation can stem from emotional experience, it seems likely that perception is personalized, or individuated, in this context (which is different from how group emotion is traditionally defined and Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   313 1a: salient social self (social identity) gives rise to group emotion. Social Identity Group Emotion Social Action 1b: recognition of shared emotion precipitates group formation. (Individual) Emotion Social Identity Social Action Figure 1 A dynamic causal model of social identity and group emotion. NOTE: In everyday social interaction, the two processes would be interactive. understood; Iyer & Leach, 2008). That is, the emotion is initially experienced at an individual level, but the recognition that others share the emotion forms the basis for group formation (see Peters & Kashima, 2007). We further articulate some of the implications of this causal order below where we consider how group emotion might shape the processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006). Thus, on the basis of the available literature, both causal orderings seem likely and plausible in the everyday social context of group emotion and identity. Consistent with these points, Kessler and Hollbach (2005) emphasized the bidirectionality of causal links between emotion and identification. Elsewhere (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), we have argued that these elements are best seen as part of a dynamic system of interrelations, where causal ordering will vary over time and depending on social context. In particular, we argued that a shared group membership can give rise to, or facilitate, the experience of group emotion and other action-relevant beliefs (as in Figure 1a; see Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2008), as may be the case in established, historical social groups, but that, similarly, those emotional experiences can also trigger psychological group formation and subsequently become encapsulated in “what it means” to be a group member (Turner, 1991), as may be the case of incipient, emergent social groups (Figure 1b). Such ideas are also broadly consistent with recent developments exploring the role of individuality within the group, which have emphasized the ways that individuality can shape emergent groups (as in Figure 1b) and groups shape individuals (as in Figure 1a) (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). Thus, incorporating these different causal orderings is consistent with the dynamic, iterative, transformational, and constructed nature of social identity described above. Given these points, what are the ways that group emotion can contribute to our understanding of the three interrelated processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006)? We argue that the experience of emotion can fundamentally inform the perceiver about the social context by (a) providing a basis on which to categorize in-group members or out-group members based on whether the emotion is shared or not; (b) informing the content, and relational meaning, of the identity; and (c) shaping the ways that group members take strategic action. These are the three general processes considered most important in the work outlined above on social identity and helping (Reicher et al., 2006). Let us consider each of these points in more detail. Category Inclusion With regard to the first component, category inclusion, we argue that advantaged groups’ emotions have the potential to shape and restructure (inter)group boundaries. For example, experiencing feelings of fear in relation to another person is unlikely to lead to a categorization of that person as an in-group member; the very fact that someone elicits a fearful reaction is indicative of a different worldview and antagonistic relationship (Bar-Tal, 2001; Turner, 2005). Conversely, experiencing the same emotion is more likely to give rise to a perception of the other person as an in-group member (see Peters & Kashima’s, 2007, work on emotion sharing; Swaab et al., 2007). Extending on this point, we argue that some emotions have the potential to traverse ostensible intergroup boundaries. Because emotions can assist in creating a shared worldview and uniting previously separate groups in coordinated social action (Peters & Kashima, 2007), then it follows that emotions that can be experienced by both the advantaged and the disadvantaged are likely to be more successful at motivating genuine attempts to create intergroup equality and cooperation. Category Norms Emotions can also inform group members about the reasons for, and context of, disadvantage and, in doing so, can powerfully shape normative considerations (the second component). For example, group guilt is understood to be accompanied by appraisals of ingroup responsibility (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). To the extent that perceptions of in-group responsibility become embodied in the group membership (in relation to the disadvantage suffered by the other group), then this emotion is likely to inform norms for specific sorts of action. The idea that an emotional reaction can inform relational meaning, or normative content, of an identity is contained in the arguments of Stürmer, Simon, and Klandermans (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, in press). 314   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW These authors argue that anger plays a powerful role in politicizing a social identity, transforming the identity such that it is more ready for social action. Thus, to the extent that anger becomes normatively engaged with the identity, this will engender particular sorts of normative action (usually surrounding political action). There also is converging evidence that it may be fruitful to explore emotions as normative processes themselves (Smith et al., 2007; Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, in press; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). In other words, it is possible that the emotion overall will shape group memberships both directly (by shaping behavior norms) and indirectly (by shaping emotion norms). Category Interests Finally, related to the points above, emotions will shape the sorts of strategies that group members prefer (category interests), in particular depending on where the emotion implies that blame lies (one of the key appraisal components; Lazarus, 1991). Emotions will also inform the perceiver about the (group) self-relevant strategic dimensions to the inequality. For example, as we will argue below, moral outrage is likely to make strategic representations concerning the need to restore a moral status quo, whereas empathy is likely to represent category interests based on a perceived interchangeability between self and other. Nadler and Liviatan (2006) have also explored the ways in which emotions themselves can be deployed tactically, to aid in promoting intergroup cooperation, reconciliation, or conflict. Thus, it seems that, just as groups can be strategic about their behavior in the helping context (Hopkins et al., 2007; Reicher et al., 2006; van Leeuwen, 2007), it can be beneficial for both the intergroup relationship and the disadvantaged group in particular if they can be equally tactical about the ways they express themselves. Overall, then, we argue that incorporating an understanding of group emotion has much to contribute to our understanding of the dynamic social identity processes and prosocial behavior outlined by Reicher and colleagues. We acknowledge, though, that we are far from the first to make such points; indeed, it was similar arguments concerning the potential for emotion to usefully capture and differentiate group processes that motivated E. R. Smith, Mackie, and colleagues (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie et al., 2004; Smith, 1993; Smith & Ho, 2002) to develop intergroup emotion theory in the first place. Rather, our concern is that group emotion is sometimes explored in rather static ways. Thus, our point is to reenergize a focus on the ways in which emotions can shape and reshape group boundaries and transform subjective group memberships, to promote either action or apathy. We pursue these points with regard to prosocial emotion and behavior. THE PROSOCIAL EMOTIONS Appraisal theory, on which intergroup emotion theory is based, makes it clear that emotional reactions are premised on a basic process of appraising, or evaluating, features in the environment. For something to be appraised, it must first be observed (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However, Leach et al. (2002) have explored the ways that members of advantaged groups can go to great lengths to either minimize or completely ignore their own privilege. Only when the advantage is recognized, with the associated emotion, is the potential for promoting social equality greatest (Leach et al., 2002). It is also clear that not all feelings of relative advantage will produce a reaction designed to overcome the inequality and promote action to bring about positive social change. For example, disdain is unlikely to motivate positive prosocial behavior (Leach et al., 2002). Given the broad range of emotions that can be experienced in situations of relative advantage, Leach and colleagues (Leach et al., 2002), drawing on work by Montada and Schneider (1989), differentiated four appraisal dimensions on which feelings of relative advantage might be differentiated: the extent to which the advantaged are focused on themselves (self) or on the disadvantaged (other); the perceived legitimacy of the privilege; the perceived stability of the advantage; and the degree of perceived control that the advantaged have over their position. Overall, the emotion that is experienced in the face of relative advantage is a function of the structure of the intergroup relations, along the four dimensions (see also Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). In this work (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989) and in that on interpersonal emotion (Feather, 2006; Lazarus, 1991), there are understood to be three primary prosocial emotions implicated in a desire to help another: guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage. The first goal of this article is to provide a review of what is known about each of these emotions in motivating positive group-level action. That is, what role does each of these play in turning apathy into social action on behalf of another group? We also expand the analysis of these three prosocial emotions to include two additional, related emotions that can also be associated with prosocial outcomes: empathy and (self-focused) anger. Thus, we argue that there are three general categories of prosocial emotion: guilt; sympathy and Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   315 empathy; and anger and outrage. Leach et al. (2002) provided an overview of these emotions; however, the subsequent proliferation of research on these emotions makes an updated review timely. As suggested, a second goal of this article is to explore the ways that these same prosocial emotions might shape and restructure intergroup boundaries, to produce different prosocial strategies to reduce inequality. Advantaged groups can use a range of social strategies to “help” or provide assistance to the disadvantaged; however, not all of these are premised on a genuine desire to change the status quo (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Wright & Lubensky, 2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Indeed, Wright and Lubensky (2008; see also Wright, Kiu, Semenya, & Comeau, 2008) explored the differences between the collective action and prejudice reduction literatures, arguing that the two traditions have resulted in antithetical approaches to the question of addressing social inequality. Wright and Lubensky (2008) broadly differentiate the strategies preferred by the two literatures thus: “The prejudice reduction approach focuses on themes of intergroup harmony and social cohesion. . . . The collective action perspective speaks in terms of equality across groups, not harmony between groups, and focuses on social justice” (p. 306). We draw broadly on this critical distinction between approaches that attempt to address inequalities by creating social cohesion and those strategies that attempt to address inequalities by achieving social justice and social change. In this article, we are particularly interested in those social strategies that are likely to bring about a change in the social status of historically (or incidentally) disadvantaged groups. From our perspective, genuine social change is about redressing social inequality at a group level; thus, we are less interested in those approaches that might elevate individuals of disadvantaged groups (as in tokenism) but without changing the status of the group as a whole. Thus, we consider the ways in which the three categories of prosocial emotion act to (re)structure group boundaries and shape group processes and the different forms of prosocial strategies (broadly, social cohesion or social change) that may result. Emotion that is shared with others can create a shared understanding of the world (Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007). Accordingly, our key argument throughout is that the most effective emotion (to mirror Reicher et al.’s, 2006, discussion of effective categories) is likely to be one that (a) can be shared by both the advantaged and disadvantaged, (b) will direct normative forms of social and political action, and (c) strategically recognizes the expertise and experience of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In other words, if the goal is genuine social cooperation toward positive social change, rather than top-down paternalistic assistance (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006), it may be more fruitful to explore emotions that both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups can experience. In exploring this proposition, we propose new ways of conceptualizing the differences between two sets of often-confused emotions at a group level: sympathy and empathy; outrage and anger. Given these two goals, in what follows we will first provide a review of the relevant literature relating to group-based emotions: guilt, sympathy and empathy, and anger and moral outrage, respectively. For each of these emotions, we will then consider the ways that the emotion might affect group boundaries, and the relational meaning of the social identities. We then conclude by exploring the sorts of prosocial strategies that group emotions seem likely to promote. Our overall analysis of each of these emotions can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts each of the prosocial emotions that are the focus in this article, the ways that they shape group processes, and the specific sorts of social strategies likely to emerge. It also organizes each emotion under the Wright and Lubensky (2008) social cohesion or social change framework. GUILT Etiology Broadly, guilt arises from internalized values about right and wrong (Lazarus, 1991). At an individual appraisal level, it centers around actions (or imagined actions) that we regard as morally reprehensible and the appraisal pattern is characterized by a moral transgression, for which there is blame to the self (Lazarus, 1991). Group-level guilt has been shown to be similar in nature to individual-level guilt; however, the self that has committed the transgression is a social self (see Turner et al., 1994). Consistent with a group-level perspective of guilt, there is good evidence that people can feel guilt based on their social group memberships (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Doosje et al. (1998, Study 1) used minimal groups to show that it is possible to induce guilt in people even though their personal self was not responsible for the harm inflicted on another. There is a large literature on the experience of guilt, in particular “White guilt,” in relation to the historical mistreatment and continuing inequality in the context of the White American treatment of African Americans (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer et al., 2004; Swim & Miller, 1999), the Dutch colonial treatment of Indonesians (Doosje et al., 1998; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2004), and the White 316   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW SOCIAL COHESION GUILT SOCIAL CHANGE (SELF-FOCUSED) ANGER Advantaged group Tokenism Disadvantaged group Advantaged group Regulation Disadvantaged group SYMPATHY Advantaged group OUTRAGE Paternalism System, government,or third party Disadvantaged group Social and political action EMPATHY Advantaged Disadvantaged group group Cooperation Figure 2 Disadvantaged group Advantaged group Solidarity The prosocial emotions and group processes as a function of social cohesion or social change strategies. Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   317 Australian mistreatment of Indigenous Australians (Branscombe et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2006; McGarty & Bliuc, 2004; McGarty et al., 2005; Pedersen, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004). Furthermore, there is related research on the atrocities committed against Jewish people during the Second World War (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004, 2005), the American and British occupation of Iraq (Iyer et al., 2007), and gender inequality between men and women (Branscombe, 1998; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004; Schmitt, Ellemers, & Branscombe, 2003). What of cases where the group is not responsible for the disadvantage of another group? People in developed nations could hardly be held responsible for the disadvantage experienced by people in developing nations, yet members of developed countries often report feeling guilty about their advantage. Hoffman (1976) coined the term existential guilt to describe the emotional experience of feeling guilty about mere, unearned advantages that one group has over another (see also Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Müller, & Müller-Fohrbrodt, 2000). Consistent with individual-level appraisal notions of guilt, the experience of group-based guilt is characterized by three interrelated properties (Branscombe et al., 2002; Iyer et al., 2004; McGarty et al., 2005). First, the person must self-categorize as a member of a group that has caused harm to another group. Second, the focus of attention of guilt is on the self rather than the disadvantaged, that is, guilt will be experienced when the inequality is in-group focused and seen to be illegitimate (Harth et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2002). Finally, guilt motivates either avoidance or narrow attempts at restitution, mainly to assuage the advantaged group’s own aversive state. Indeed, like personal guilt, there are at least three ways that individuals can avoid the experience of group-based guilt: They can minimize the harm that was done to the other group, question the appropriateness of guilt, and engage in argument about the cost of apology (McGarty et al., 2005). Group Processes and Outcomes Given the etiology of guilt, it is likely that guilt will maintain group boundaries between the disadvantaged and advantaged, that is, because it is not possible for the disadvantaged to feel guilt in relation to their own circumstances, guilt will effectively maintain an intergroup context. The intergroup relationship associated with guilt is depicted in Figure 2. The figure shows guilt maintaining strong intergroup boundaries, but where the advantaged group maintain their privileged status in society (i.e., at the top). Thus, as far as the framework provided by existing social identity models of helping and solidarity (Reicher et al., 2006), guilt is missing one of the key components (category inclusion) that is most likely to promote effortful attempts to create genuine social change. This implies that the positive prosocial outcomes associated with guilt can be seen as an outcome of normative considerations, vis-à-vis what is appropriate and consistent with the salient identity, or of strategic ones. Indeed, Berndsen and Manstead (2007) have argued that, rather than being an antecedent appraisal to guilt, responsibility may actually be an outcome of the experience of guilt. To the extent that this guilt, and accompanying acceptance of responsibility, becomes associated with the advantaged group membership, this is likely to lead to forms of assistance motivated by group normative prescriptions related to “doing the right thing” rather than genuine desires to achieve social equality. Thus, we argue that guilt will be ill-equipped to challenge the existing social structure, and assistance will inevitably flow in a top-down fashion (Figure 2). Consistent with this analysis, group-based guilt has been shown to be a useful, although limited, emotion in motivating attempts to overcome intergroup inequality or bring about collective action. Iyer et al. (2003) showed that guilt associated with the unearned advantages experienced by European Americans compared with African Americans predicted the abstract goal of compensation but not affirmative action policies. Similarly, McGarty et al. (2005) showed that guilt predicted apology to Indigenous Australians for historical mistreatment. Finally, Leach et al. (2006) showed that guilt is associated with the abstract goal of compensation but not at all associated with specific political actions designed to redress injustice. Other work has shown only very weak links with action designed to overcome inequality (Harth et al., 2008) or no links at all with collective action (Iyer et al., 2007). Thus, consistent with our arguments above, it seems that guilt promotes apology and compensation to the injured party (symbolic attempts to reduce inequality) but does not form a platform for ongoing opposition to inequality (Iyer et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2006). Iyer and colleagues have argued that because of its conceptual self-focus, guilt will motivate often relatively empty reparations in an attempt to stave off the unpleasant and aversive feelings that accompany guilt. Similarly, Leach et al. (2006) have argued that its “dejected phenomenology and low action potential” (p. 1233) make it a weak motivator of specific political actions. In an interesting twist on these ideas, Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt et al., 2004; Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008) showed that the relationship between collective guilt and taking action on behalf of a disadvantaged group, in this case women, was mediated by the 318   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW difficulty associated with making reparations. It was found that, if the cost of making reparations was either too easy or too difficult, then levels of group-based guilt were low. That is, only when reparations are achievable but moderate would levels of collective guilt be sufficient to promote action. Consistent with these findings, recent work by Berndsen and McGarty (in press) found perceived difficulty of making reparations for historical harm and that this relationship was mediated by the experience of group-based guilt. When reparations were seen as impossible, group-based guilt levels were low. This speaks to the idea that actions must be sufficiently, but not substantially, effortful to alleviate guilt. In so much as guilt can be understood to motivate action only under very specific circumstances (that is, when the required action is moderately effortful), these findings also provide further insight into the work of Iyer, Leach, and colleagues, who have found that guilt is associated with the abstract goal of compensation (arguably a moderate response to social inequality) and/or no action at all (if the context of the inequality is such that change is too difficult). Overall, then, guilt seems to be associated with a social cohesion approach, in general, and tokenism, as outlined by Wright and colleagues (Wright et al., 1990), more specifically. Because guilt maintains group boundaries and the advantaged group generally has greater control over resources, any prosocial outcomes may be largely symbolic (Iyer et al., 2004) and may even serve to entrench the subordination of the disadvantaged (as per Wright & Lubensky, 2008; Wright & Taylor, 1998), while simultaneously relieving the consciences of the advantaged. SYMPATHY Etiology Sympathy has been defined as “heightened awareness of another’s plight as something to be alleviated” (Wispé, 1986, p. 314). For Lazarus (1991), the core relational theme for sympathy (or compassion, as he prefers to call what we would term sympathy) involves “being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help” (p. 289). Its appraisal pattern is characterized by a lack of self-involvement and an absence of blame for the plight (either to ourselves or to the victim; Weiner, 1995). Similarly, Feather’s work on the structural model of deservingness (Feather, 2006; Feather & Nairn, 2005) suggests that sympathy will occur when another person has suffered an undeserved outcome (characterized by a positive action and a negative outcome). Its key motivating action tendency is to attempt to help the disadvantaged and mitigate their suffering (Lazarus, 1991). Consistent with this, sympathy has been implicated in both interpersonal (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1988; Betancourt, 1990; Dovidio, Schroeder, & Allen, 1990) and intergroup prosocial behavior (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003).1 More recent work by Batson and colleagues (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson et al., 1997) increasingly blurs the interpersonal-intergroup boundaries by exploring the effect of group memberships on sympathy and willingness to help. At a group level, sympathy is conceptually understood to have an other-focus in that it is based in a recognition of the plight of the disadvantaged rather than the person’s own distress at the situation, and it will arise where there is an illegitimate but stable disadvantage over which the victim has little control (Leach et al., 2002). Harth et al. (2008) experimentally manipulated the structural conditions described by Leach et al. (2002) and showed that sympathy was indeed incre­ ased by a focus on the suffering group and an illegitimate inequality. Group Processes and Outcomes Given that sympathy is premised on an “other” focus (that is, the suffering of the other group) but it is still not possible for the disadvantaged themselves to share in feelings of sympathy (such feelings would, instead, be akin to self-pity), it is likely that sympathy will also maintain group boundaries between the disadvantaged and advantaged. The intergroup relationship that is associated with sympathy is depicted in Figure 2, where sympathy actively maintains group boundaries but also the group status hierarchy (advantaged group stays at the top, disadvantaged group stays at the bottom). Thus, as far as the framework provided by social identity processes outlined above (Reicher et al., 2006), sympathy is also missing one of the key components (category inclusion) that is most likely to promote concerted attempts to create genuine social change. This suggests that the positive prosocial outcomes associated with sympathy can be seen as an outcome of normative considerations vis-à-vis what is appropriate and consistent with the salient identity. The experience of sympathy does not imply responsibility for the disadvantage in the ways that guilt does; rather, sympathy simply recognizes that the disadvantage exists, that it is illegitimate, and that the disadvantaged were not themselves responsible for their plight (Feather & Nairn, 2005; Leach et al., 2002). As such, it is likely that where there are strong feelings of sympathy and this becomes contextually embedded in a salient identity, this will motivate a range of attempts to help. Consistent with these points, Harth et al. (2008, Study 3) showed that Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   319 group-based sympathy predicted support for equal opportunity for an artificially created group, whereas Iyer et al. (2003) showed that sympathetic emotion motivates broad and concerted attempts to help disadvantaged Black Americans. Indeed, Iyer et al. (2003; see also Iyer et al., 2004) have argued that the attentional other-focus on the disadvantaged makes sympathy a powerful motivator of prosocial behavior. Recent work by Tarrant et al. (in press) has shown the utility of directly invoking a sympathy in-group emotion norm on prosocial behaviors. Note that their research actually refers to empathy, but given that their definition is more consistent with our conceptualization of sympathy (see Note 1 and our arguments below), we will review it briefly here. In particular, Tarrant et al. showed that invoking a sympathy group norm by informing participants that in-group members “typically respond to the experiences of other people with high levels of compassion, tenderness and sympathy” actively invoked feelings of sympathy among in-group members and improved overall attitudes toward the ostensible out-group. Tarrant et al.’s research, in particular combined with other evidence surrounding the utility of outrage norms and prosocial behavior (Thomas & McGarty, 2009), provides one clear instantiation of emotion norms to positively influence what Reicher et al. (2006) would term the rhetorical meaning associated with group memberships. Despite the evidence that sympathy can promote fruitful outcomes if it becomes contextually embedded in an identity (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003), or if a group emotion norm for sympathy is prescribed (Tarrant et al., in press), it is likely that sympathy may also have some limits in terms of its ability to motivate genuine attempts to achieve greater social equality. Specifically, given that there is still structural differentiation between groups (Figure 2), the assistance may neglect to recognize the role and expertise of the disadvantaged group members they are seeking to help (a recognition that would take place with genuine cooperation). In their political solidarity model of tripolar intergroup power relations, Subašic´ et al. (2008) argue that sympathy is likely to be an outcome where the majority group has shared identity meaning with both the (disadvantaged) minority group and the authority. Under these conditions, the advantaged group has little intention of challenging the authority (perhaps because they meet other tactical majority group needs) but will maintain feelings of sympathy for the disadvantaged group. Put another way, they “feel sorry for them” but are simultaneously committed to maintaining the status quo. Consistent with these points, in the international development context, Thomas (2005) showed that there were high levels of sympathy in relation to the disadvantage suffered by people in developing nations, but this was a poor predictor of actual social and political action (see also Schmitt et al., 2000). Furthermore, because sympathy does not allocate blame for the inequality (Leach et al., 2002), it is illequipped to direct group behavior in productive ways. That is, cooperative social action to achieve equality across groups involves directed, tactical behavior that sympathy is unlikely to motivate. Given this overall picture, we argue that sympathy is generally likely to be associated with a social cohesion approach (Wright & Lubensky, 2008) and, in some contexts, more specifically associated with top-down, paternalistic forms of helping (as opposed to genuine cooperative efforts to achieve social equality; see Figure 2). Nadler (2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006) has described the ways that high status groups can use intergroup helping as a method of maintaining social inequality. Nadler (2002) distinguishes between autonomy-oriented help, which is focused on providing recipients with tools to solve their own problems and implies that the disadvantaged are effective agents in overcoming their situation, and dependency-oriented help, which provides recipients with the full solution and implies that the disadvantaged are unable and incapable of contributing toward solving their own problems. It is significant that Nadler suggests that high status groups are more likely to provide dependency-oriented help when the disadvantage is illegitimate, which, according to Leach et al. (2002), is one of the antecedents of group sympathy. Overall, Nadler’s (2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006) analysis highlights the complexities involved in intergroup helping, in particular where those in-group boundaries are maintained (as with sympathy) and are strongly meaningful to the groups involved. EMPATHY Etiology Sympathy and empathy are easy to confuse. Conceptually differentiating sympathy from empathy and compassi...
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