Sociological Theory in Emergent Chicano Perspectives Author(s): Maxine Baca Zinn Source: The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 255-272 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1388707 Accessed: 25-09-2018 17:11 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1388707?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Pacific Sociological Review This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES MAXINE BACA ZINN University of Michigan-Flint The purpose of this article is to identify theoretical themes and the range of sociological writings about Chicanos. The primary c to uncover and to assess the adequacy of explanations in this ra panding body of knowledge. Rather than reviewing works in topic areas, central developments are outlined. An important co of this examination is that both theoretical distortions and theoretical advances in the sociology of Chicanos are reflective of larger trends in the discipline. Despite the increased sociological attention recently devoted to Chicanos, a comprehensive examination of the literature has not been accomplished. The protest literature that began in the sixties challenged the applicability of theoretical and conceptual frameworks and called for the development of alternative frameworks that would be sensitive to the unique sociohistorical reality of Chicanos. While a "coherent framework or perspective on Chicano sociology has yet to be developed" (Mirande, 1978), the application of new sociological perspectives has significantly revised our understanding of Chicanos. Scholars have charted the theoretical progress in related disciplines such as history (Gomez- Quifiones and Arroyo, 1976) and political science (Rocco, 1977); and theoretical assessments of certain specialties in sociology have been attempted. However, there is no theoretical review of the sociology of Chicanos. AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article is adaptedfrom apaperpresentedat the annual meeting of the Western Social Science Association, April 24-26, 1980, Albuquerque, New Mexico. PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 24 No. 2, April 1981 255-272 @ 1981 Pacific Sociological Assn. 255 This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 256 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 THE "CRITICAL" CONTEXT Prior to the 1960s, the sociology of Chicanos or Me Americans often lacked explicitly defined theoretica works. The critical reviews of the literature by Roman Vaca (1970), and Hernandez (1970) revealed that the co sociological portrayal of Chicanos was guided by an im model of cultural inferiority. Romano wrote that the soc portrayal of Chicanos was ideological and inaccurate, t ologists depicted Chicanos as trapped in a traditional cultu hence passive and fatalistic. Vaca systematically catalo cultural determinism that pervaded the literature. In sho critics devoted more attention to ideological problems tha theoretical implications of cultural deficiency models, sin intent was to expose social scientists' misconceptions of C in the past. Nevertheless, the protest literature did have cal import in calling for alternative explanations and in p "a starting point in the historical development of contem Chicano studies research" (Almaguer, 1977: 1). Of the critical reviews, Hernandez' work was the most explic oretical in the exposure of structural functionalism as th explanatory framework in the study of Chicanos. Her vealed that explanations based on abstract and dich value systems of Anglos and Chicanos were ideolog "Mexican American Challenge to a Sacred Cow," Herna posed the ideological consequences of the application of ian structural functionalism to Chicanos. The "sacred c reigning sociological theory, was also under attack from in the discipline (blacks, women, and radicals), who charg traditional sociology was insensitive to the realities of th ticular groups. These developments led to a basic clea sociology: that between "conventional" and "critical" so (Moore, 1973: 67). Despite the diversity of claims in th literature, it contained a unifying theme in that it challe legitimacy of both existing societal practices and valu sociology which justified those practices and values. The Chicano reviews of the literature and subsequent an must be seen in the context of critical developments in t This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 257 pline. For Chicanos the critical climate marked their "entrance" into the discipline. Unlike black sociologists, whose involvement in the discipline had been long-standing and had generated a momentum of its own, Chicanos have only recently begun the process of sociological inquiry and explanation. THE NEED FOR SELECTIVE THEORETICAL APPLICATION Sociology is a pluralistic discipline characterized by n alternative conceptions of theory, explanations, and d is, by different approaches or perspectives (Halfpenny, 1 Different kinds of social phenomena require separate (Warshay, 1975: xiii). Like sociology generally, the soc Chicanos can be carved up in many different ways, from personal to the institutional and societal levels. Analyz different levels and types of social phenomena calls for alt and selected applications of sociological theories. It can be shown that a central theoretical problem in th ology of Chicanos has been the failure to distinguish betw types of social phenomena: social organization and Social organization involves externalized, physical action r occurring among people, while culture refers to the s dispositions that people hold in common or in conflict 1974: 302). The sociology of Chicanos had been both lim distorted by focusing on culture while all but ignoring d levels of social organization, by confusing these phenome by identifying culture as the primary determinant of all Chicano phenomena. Sociological theory should generate knowledge that w "increased understanding of social events" (Turner, 1 Therefore, the adequacy of various theories can be ass determining the extent to which they provide answer planations to question of why: "Why is this process op Why is one structure prevalent and not another? Why do act in certain ways?" (1978: 2). For purposes of this rev oretical developments at macro amd micro levels of analy be considered. This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 258 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 MACROLEVEL EXPLANATIONS OF INEQUALITY Most sociological treatments of Chicanos have attempted in one way or another to deal with issues related to Chicano subordination in American society. As the critical reviews revealed, subordination has often been treated as a consequence of deficiencies inherent in Chicano values and lifestyles. Barrera's (1979) illuminating discussion of Chicano inequality outlines the dimensions as well as pitfalls of deficiency theories. Cultural deficiency theories "find the source of minority inequality in one or more cultural traits of the group in question. The emphasis here is on attitudes and values rather than social structure, although the types of factors are often linked together in the models" (p. 176). Barrera argues against deficiency theories on logical, empirical, and methodological grounds, but in favor of an alter- native theory of racial inequality, that of structural discrimination. This perspective locates the source of inequality in the social structure of society as a whole. Structure "refers to the regular patterns of human interaction in the society. Structures can be either formal, in which case they would be considered institutions as schools, governments or corporations, or informal such as the class structure" (1979: 184). Structural discrimination is the underlying explanatory proposition in the emergent theories on internal colonialism. Colonial theories view Chicanos as a social category subordinated by the workings of a racist society. Inequality is explained in terms of racial domination, control, and exclusion of Chicanos by a complex web of institutional and societal processes. The aplication of colonial theories to Chicanos (Moore, 1973; Barrera et al., 1972; Flores, 1973) reflects rigorous and sophisticated analyses at both institutional and societal levels. Barrera's (1979) recent work on Chicano inequality in the United States represents a major theoretical advance in its synthesis of internal colonialism and Marxist structuralist perspectives. His use of the concept of labor market segmentation based on ascriptive characteristics of race/ethnicity further explains economic causes and context in which Chicano subordination operates. He contends that This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 259 Chicanos have been incorporated into the United States' political economy as subordinate ascriptive class segments and that they have historically been found occupying such a structural position at all class levels [1979: 212]. Undoubtedly, scholars will continue to debate the utility of the model for explaining the contemporary conditions of Chicanos. Still, few would dispute the new understandings that have been gained from the application of colonial theories. Explorations and explanations now acknowledge that domination, control, and conflict have characterized the relationship between Chicanos and American institutions. Conceptualizations of Chicano subordination which are also structural, but not necessarily embedded in the internal colonial framework, have recently appeared in the literature. For example, Shannon's (1975) study of the migration and economic absorption of Mexican-Americans and Negroes to the labor market in a Midwestern city provides evidence refuting the commonly held cultural notion. He found that the community better facilitated the economic absorption of its Anglo than its Negro immigrants from the South or Mexican-Americans from the Midwest; he explained that finding in terms of the social organization of the community: Variables completely beyond the immigrants' control have proba- bly had more to do with what has happened to them than the individual or group characteristics that have so often been hypothesized to be the determinants of absorption into the larger society [Shannon, 1975: 15]. Another challenge to the typical mode of analysis may be found in Moore's (1978) study of gangs, drugs, and prisons in the barrios of Los Angeles. These phenomena are viewed in the context of a tripartite model of the urban barrio economy. According to Moore, the model differs from both the common sense and many other sociological writings about the American economy. The model's primary assumption is rooted in the structure of the American economy; there are not enough jobs in the core or This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 260 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 primary structure for all or even for most Americans to attain the vision of normalcy. The model effectively illustrates the economic situation of the urban barrio resident. This is a world of limited opportunities with legitimate jobs generally offering little prospects for lifetime satisfaction. In this respect, the segmented labor market become an essential concept for understanding the structure and context of the Chicano gang, the use and marketing of illegal drugs and stolen merchandise, and the prison involvements of the residents in the Los Angeles Barrios. The works of Moore and Shannon, although substantively different, have a common analytic thread. Both treat Chicano subordination as rooted in institutional and broader societal processes. Structural discrimination perspectives signify important sociological progress because their expanded scope of analysis has enhanced our ability to understand the societal causes of racial inequality. Unlike cultural deficiency theories, which reduce subordination to the level of culture and hence blame Chi- canos themselves for subordination, structural perspectives have begun to shed light on the complex of causes, mechanisms, and consequences of the Chicano experience. New Interpretations of Recurrent Findings Further challenges to the explanatory power of cultural deficiency theories may be found in assorted works which are addressed to the phenomenon of value orientations among Chicanos. The protest literature discussed earlier was severely critical of the notion that the cultural value orientations of Chicanos were ill-suited for modern industrial society (Kluckholn and Strodtbeck, 1961; Madsen, 1964; Rubel, 1966; Heller, 1966) The protest literature was concerned more with denouncing interpretations that blamed Chicanos for their own subordi nation than with empirical or theoretical examinations of valu orientations. In fact, there is consistent empirical support for th position that the value orientations of Chicanos differ from thos of Anglos (Schwartz, 1971; Shannon and Shannon, 1973; Evan This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 261 and Anderson, 1973; Chandler, 1979). However, some recent studies provide new interpretations which argue against the backward and unhealthy subcultural model. For example, Chandler (1979) found substantial differences between the value orientations of Anglos and Mexican-Americans in Lubbock, Texas. While Anglos scored higher on all modernity dimensions, Chandler proposes that such differences may represent adaptations to differing socioeconomic conditions (1979: 158): The types of attitudes that Mexican Americans display in Lubbock and some other communities may simply be a rational means of adjusting to conditions of poverty and discrimination. The word attitude is employed here because some writers have argued that what we have called value orientations may not really be culture at all but represent instead forced adaptations to certain objective conditions. ... Thus, each generation of Mexican Americans or other low income or minority group would discover for itself the futility of planning for the future. Moore (1970b) cites empirical data on value orientations of Chicanos in Los Angeles, San Antonio, and Albuquerque which also demonstrate a strong relationship between reactions to traditional values and the income of individuals. This is similar to Shannon's finding that the Mexican-American and black migrants in a Midwestern city have similar world views which are dramatically different from the world view of Anglo-Americans. According to Moore (1970b: 135), these findings suggest that the minority experience may be at least as significant in affecting values as is the particular cultural heritage. These works are theoretically important because, while they acknowledge different values and attitudes on the part of Chicanos, they also begin to deal with the possible societal sources of such differences. They contribute to our understanding of why values or attitudes may differ. This represents significant soiological progress. A sociology which explains cultural differences in terms of culture is tautological. To say that Chicanos are different because their culture is different ignores causality and explains nothing. The explanation of distinctive patterns on This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 262 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 the part of Chicanos, whether they be traditional, adaptational, or both, should remain the principle goal of our sociologies. Modernization and Chicano Ways of Life One of the assumptions of the cultural deficiency models was that traditional (backward) cultural orientations would give way to modern cultural orientations. Writers identified the family as the source of cultural maintenance and hence as a central cause of deficiency. Treating the family as a holdover of Mexican tradition, such features as male dominance, extended kin group- ings, traditional socialization, and other ethnic manifestations were conceptualized in cultural terms. It was anticipated that they would disappear with increased time in America. The standard sociological position on racial and cultural groups, that "the transition from traditional to modern would take place through the process of acculturation" (Baca Zinn, 1979: 60), was applied to Chicanos. This thinking must be understood in the broader context of the discipline of sociology and its concern with modernization. Indeed, one of the master themes in social science for the past two hun- dred years has been the transformation from "traditional" to "modern." Although differing in terminology and emphasis, practically every major writer on human society has conceptualized this transition in terms of ideal typical dichotomization or at least a continuum between extreme societal forms or indi- vidual traits [Chandler, 1979: 153]. Despite the impressive lineage of the "great dichotomy" (Balan et al., 1973), sociologists all over the world have begun to challenge the "bipolar model of social change" (Gordon 1978: 37), which puts the modern world on one side and the premodern world on the other. Theoretical revisions have stemmed from empirical evidence refuting a linear view of modernization. Such revisions appear to hold the promise of advancing new understandings of Chicanos. For example, the persistence of kinship This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 263 ties in urban centers of the world have been documented (Litwack, 1960, Sussman, 1959, Balan, 1973, Young and Willmott, 1957, Goode, 1963); and new explanations of their sources and instrumental functions in the lives of urban dwellers have been advanced (Bennett and Despres, 1960, Litwack, 1960, Haraven, 1976). Revised perspectives on urban kinship have given rise to the view that the Chicano extended family system is an adaptive system rather than an outmoded institution. Accounts of the Chicano family as a cultural holdover with negative effects on its members are giving way to findings that Chicano kinship networks offer social, emotional, and economic support (Keefe et al., 1979; Wagner and Schaffer, 1980) and assistance with migration and settlement in urban centers of the Midwest (Baca Zinn, 198 1). The persistence of ethnicity is another topic of increasing sociological interest and theoretical modification. Like kinship, ethnicity has been found to be compatible with urban conditions. Recent scholarship has posited that ethnicity may be fostered rather than attenuated by conditions in urban society. Yancey's (1976) important conceptualization posits that ethnicity is best understood not in terms of a transplanted cultural heritage, but in terms of a transplanted cultural heritage, but in terms of the structural conditions of society in general and urbanization in particular (1976: 39): In contrast to the traditional emphasis on the transplanted cultural heritage as the principle antecedent and defining charac- teristic of ethnic groups, we suggest that the development and existence of ethnicity is dependent upon structural conditions affecting American cities and positions of groups in American social structure. This theoretical reformulation should provoke examinations of the societal sources of ethnicity among Chicanos. It should lead to greater understanding of why, and under what specific conditions, Chicano ways of life are distinctive from those of other groups. In addition, it supplies a theoretical rationale for shifting the focus of concern from acculturation to ethnicity. This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 264 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 Reviewing recent social science literature on ethnic groups, Clark et al. (1976: 233) find "a gradual shift of interest from the acculturation concept to that of ethnic identity." The move away from acculturation as the central descriptive and explanatory framework may be seen in various areas of Chicano research. For example, increasing attention is now being devoted to the study of ethnic identity among Chicanos (Rice et al., 1976; Baca Zinn, 1980b; Arce, forthcoming). Recent sociolinguistic studies no longer interpret changes in language loyalty as reflecting accul- turation (Lopez, 1978; Aguirre, 1979). Similarly, studies of changes in Chicano families are contrary to the depiction of changes as a simple substitution of modern patterns for traditional patterns (Ybarra-Soriano, 1977; Baca Zinn, 1980a); they reveal instead that families can be "modern and ethnic at the same time" (Baca Zinn, 1980a: 59). While these nonlinear perspectives on social life and moderni- zation have only begun to be cautiously explored, it can be perdicted that they will provide new understanding of Chicano ways of life. MICROLEVEL PERSPECTIVES OF CHICANOS In the past two decades there has been increased sociol interest in social interaction occurring in concrete situat Microlevel perspectives have generated important bod sociological theory. The development of these theories ha marked by shifts in sociological emphasis. The traditional vi society as a structural order existing independently members has been abandoned in favor of viewing social r as a creative process (Kotarba, 1980: 82). Distinct branch microtheory have emerged (symbolic interactionism, d aturgy, ethnomethodology, phenomenology). Despite the tinguishing characteristics, they are alike "in that each human beings as creating or constructing their own social r in interactions with others" (Morris, 1975: 168). The study of Chicanos has benefited from the rise of these theories" (Gouldner, 1970), which are variously termed "inte This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 265 tive theories" (Paloma, 1979), "creative theories" (Morris, 1975), and "sociologies of everyday life"(Douglas, 1980) because of their commitment to understanding all forms of knowledge, including commonsense, everyday knowledge. One form of everyday knowledge used by Chicanos in an urban community health clinic is the subject of a study by Hayes-Bautista (1976), who sought to discover how patients formulate recipes or rules for the construction of their social worlds. This study in the sociology of lay knowledge seeks to conceptualize the "everyday rules" by which a patient makes choices about which practitioners should be consulted. .... A lay person must often choose a practitioner from among competing coteries of specialists, without having recourse to their specialized knowledge in order to classify them. The patient must develop her own typology of specialists, utilizing her own criteria .... In the course of her interaction with a practitioner, the patient discovers that the practitioner is competent in her perception to handle some aspects and inadequate to handle others, thereby presenting her with a particular constellation of competencies and inadequacies. ... She must decide which offers the competencies most needed and the inadequacies most tolerable. . .. In order to secure the competencies she feels necessary, the patient may utilize a number of practitioners either sequentially or simultaneously, thereby functioning as an assembler of her own health care team [ 1976: 156] Another study conducted by Hayes-Bautista (1976) further reveals that Chicano patients can actively influence their social circumstances by modifying that treatment they perceive as inappropriate. He found that patients relied on convincing tactics (the demand, the disclosure, the suggestion, and the leading question) to bring concerns to physicians' attention. They resorted to countering tactics such as arguing, and they engaged in various sorts of bargaining with their physicians (1976: 237). This analysis shows how a sample of Chicanos perceived a category of situations and how they constructed their actions in such a way that they modified those situations. The study of concrete situations can offer a much needed corrective to the sociological notion that cultural values are This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 266 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 primary determinants of Chicano patterns of action. The overreliance on culture as an explanatory framework is the theme of an article by Ramos entitled, "Am I Who They Say I Am?" (1979b). Ramos contends that Chicanos cannot be understood by assuming that "we handle our practical affairs solely in terms of cultural characteristics attributed to us" (1979b: 52). It is best to try to understand Chicanos in terms of the practical circumstances of daily life. Ramos, in two separate works, shows that Mexican-American behavior is not simply the result of persons following the norms of their culture as specified by the normative explanations adopted by most social scientists. First, he offers a "case in point" (1973) as a refutation of the cultural model of the Mexican-American family. This ethnomethodological study of a poor family reveals that Mexican-American behavior can best be explained as "the result of the interpretive work Mexican Americans do in coping with the practical circumstances of their everyday lives. That is, Mexican Americans use background knowledge or common sense understandings of social structure to cope with the proble- matic situations encountered in everyday life" (1973: 918). In another work, Ramos (1979) examines the way two Mexican-Americans families construct strategies to manage their daily lives. "They call their strategies movidas." While most researchers of Chicanos have not made movidas a topic of sociological interest, or have even acknowledged their existence, Ramos' study reveals the promise of ethnomethodology for generating new understandings of Chicano behavior. This promise is best illustrated in the following passage: I once observed an encounter between an elementary school principal and Jose Perez, the father of a fourth grade student. Mr. Perez had been called to the school to discuss a broken window, which his son allegedly had broken. As I watched Mr. Perez talk with the principal, it occurred to me that he appeared to be both nervous and stupid. He spoke with broken English and acted as though he did not understand the situation very well. Mr. Perez seemed to have stepped right off the pages of a sociological text. . . He conformed to the typification of a Mexican-American This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 267 who speaks little English, and who can only deal with people in informal situations. But I know differently. Mr. Perez was capable of speaking standard English, and he was able to deal with formal situations. I had seen him interact competently with a city councilman on a previous occasion. Puzzled, I asked him later why he had presented himself in such a demeaning way. Here is what he said: Oh, I was pulling a movida (strategy). You know I came on like a dumb Mexican, all lost and confused. You know what that guy thinks of us most of the time. Besides, had I come on straight, he might have held me responsible for the window Freddy broke. I am not about to pay for a window my boy broke by accident. They out to provide a bigger play area so that kids don't break a window every time they throw a ball [1979a: 141-142; italics added]. Such an application of interpretive theory is but one indication of the sociological potential for refuting the past sociological distortions and, more importantly, for providing alternative theoretical interpretations of Chicano behavior. Further study of concrete situational interaction among Chicanos will bring about a long-needed change. The examination of meaning and the collective construction of social situations will allow sociology to consider Chicanos as subjects as well as objects and thus to reaffirm their humannness that past sociology has negated. CHICANO SOCIOLOGY The foregoing discussions of the state of theory in the s of Chicanos confirms that much work is require development of explanatory frameworks at both mac micro levels of analysis. Mirande (1978) noted the theoretical developments in the study of Chicanos and cal Chicano sociology which would be a new paradigm in t sciences. The tentative paradigm offered by Mirande spec rejects "existing paradigms and world views" (1978: 307). W is true that traditional sociology has not applied well to C some clarifications are in order. This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 268 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / APRIL 1981 What most needs to be clarified is the difference between theories and paradigms. Theories are not paradigms, but components of far broader paradigms (Ritzer, 1975: 158). Ritzer advances the following definition: A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they would be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answer obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or sub-community) from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, methods, and instruments that exist within it [p. 156]. It is clear that we must work toward the development of a Chicano paradigm that can incorporate theories now being developed in the discipline. Mirande treats colonial theory as an integral component of a Chicano paradigm, but ignores the potential contributions of other theories. It must be emphasized that the study of Chicanos will require the adoption of multiple theoretical perspectives. Because Chicano social worlds exist at different levels, multiple theoretical perspectives must be brought to bear on the analysis of those social worlds. Colonial theories explain Chicano subordination and its operation at institutional and societal levels. Micro theories, on the other hand, can explain processes involved in coping with oppression on a day-to-day level. Because reality is constructed within specific structural contexts, analyses of different levels of social organization are needed if we are to achieve comprehensive understandings of the Chicano experience. Our selective application of macro theories of social structure and micro theories of interaction will enable us to see the interaction between the lives of Chicanos and the history a operation of society, or what C. Wright Mills termed " sociological imagination" (1961). As Mills asserted, dealing w the three great questions of structure, history, and persona requires the use of the sociological imagination in order to "able to see wholes when only pieces appear, the meaning of lit This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Zinn / EMERGENT CHICANO PERSPECTIVES 269 acts for big events and processes, and the force of social structure on the individual ." It requires a sociology that fully avails itself of history and the comparative method, and a psychology that sees people as social and historical actors (Anderson and Gibson, 1978: 395). 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Ybarra-Soriano, L. 1977 Conjugal Role Relationships in the Chicano Family. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. Young, M. and P. Willmott 1957 Family and Kinship in East London. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Maxine Baca Zinn is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan-Flint, where she teaches courses on sex stratification, race and ethnic relations, the family and American institutions. Her publications on family roles, kinship, ethnicity and gender among Chicanos reflect her primary research interests. Her article "Field Research in Minority Communities: Ethical, Methodologi- cal, and Political Observations by an Insider," appeared in Social Problems, December 1979. This content downloaded from 132.174.255.86 on Tue, 25 Sep 2018 17:11:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Meaning of Race in Psychology and How to Change It A Methodological Perspective Janet E. Helms, Maryam Jernigan, and Jackquelyn Mascher Boston College The primary purpose of this article was to offer a methodological critique in support of arguments that racial categories should be replaced as explanatory constructs in psychological research and theory. To accomplish this goal, the authors (a) summarized arguments for why racial categories should be replaced; (b) used principles of the scientific method to show that racial categories lack conceptual meaning; (c) identified common errors in researchers’ measurement, statistical analyses, and interpretation of racial categories as independent variables; and (d) used hierarchical regression analysis to illustrate a strategy for replacing racial categories in research designs with conceptual variables. Implications for changing the study of race in psychology are discussed. R ace has no consensual theoretical or scientific meaning in psychology, although it is frequently used in psychological theory, research, and practice as if it has obvious meaning (cf. Yee, Fairchild, Weizmann, & Wyatt, 1993; Zuberi, 2001). Some psychologists contend that race refers to biological characteristics of individuals as reflected in their physical appearance (e.g., Rowe, 2002), some argue that it is a pseudonym for impoverished backgrounds (Eisenman, 1995), whereas others assert that race is a social construction that maintains a sociopolitical hierarchy in U.S. American society (e.g., American Psychological Association, 2003; Helms, 1994). In fact, because race lacks precise meaning, various psychologists have long challenged the scientific merit of studying or using race as an explanatory construct in psychological theory, research, and, by implication, practice (Phinney, 1996; Yee et al., 1993). In fact, according to Yee (1983), the Council of Representatives of the American Psychological Association passed a resolution more than two decades ago opposing the use of the concept of race to explain human behavior. This resolution was deemed necessary because of society’s continued reification of folk definitions of race in spite of considerable substantive advice to the contrary offered by nonpsychological professional and scientific organizations. The rationale for the original resolution was elaborated on in the “Guidelines on Multicultural Education, Training, Research, Practice, and Organizational Change for Psychologists” (American Psy- January 2005 ● American Psychologist Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association 0003-066X/05/$12.00 Vol. 60, No. 1, 27–36 DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.60.1.27 chological Association, 2003). Yet neither the original resolution nor the recently adopted “Guidelines” appear to have had much effect on the study or conceptualization of race in psychology. Instead, psychologists have ignored the fact that race itself has no shared conceptual definition by tacitly agreeing to use factitious racial categories (e.g., Black and White) as independent or predictor variables in their theories and research designs as if the categories convey whatever conceptual meaning of race the researcher intends. Equating race with racial categories gives scientific legitimacy to the conceptually meaningless construct of race, thereby perpetuating racial stereotypes and associated problems in society. Moreover, it permits the discipline of psychology to function as an “objective” science even though it has granted a conceptually meaningless concept (i.e., race) so central a role in its theory, research, and practice (Fairchild, 1991; Zuberi, 2001). A common theme, albeit implicit, in the previously cited critiques of the manner in which race has been investigated in psychology has been that racial categories ought to be replaced as independent variables in psychological theory and research. The following four strategies for accomplishing the recommended replacement can be summarized from the race-focused critiques of current methodological practices in psychology: 1. Substitute the concepts of ethnicity, ethnic group, or ethnic identity for race or racial group (Betancourt & López, 1993; Phinney, 1996; Yee, 1983). By concepts, advocates of this approach mean specification of factors such as values, customs, or traditions rather than merely substituting alternative labels for race or racial group. Rationales offered in support of this recommendation include (a) improving psychological research designs and theories by shifting psychologists’ focus away from group-level factors to “individualistic traits” (Yee, 1983, p. 21), (b) Janet E. Helms, Maryam Jernigan, and Jackquelyn Mascher, Institute for the Study and Promotion of Race and Culture and Department of Counseling, Developmental, and Educational Psychology, Boston College. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Janet E. Helms, Department of Counseling, Developmental, and Educational Psychology, Boston College, 318 Campion Hall, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. E-mail: helmsja@bc.edu 27 Janet E. Helms encouraging researchers to study race as a social construction rather than a biological entity (American Psychological Association, 2003), and (c) illuminating cultural phenomena underlying human behavior (Betancourt & López, 1993; Phinney, 1996). 2. Avoid using racial categories in research designs without a clear conceptual reason for doing so (Dole, 1995; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). The rationale for this recommendation is that because racial categories encompass such a wide array of unspecified attributes, it is too tempting to “fall into the trap of ‘explaining’ [racial category] differences [on the dependent variable]” by means of racial categories instead of identifying the variables associated with racial categories (e.g., exposure to discrimination, in-group bias) that relate to or affect the dependent variables in research designs (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991, pp. 175–176; Phinney, 1996). 3. Replace racial categories as independent variables with independent variables derived from racial categorization (RC) theories. Unlike users of racial categories as independent variables, RC theorists do not contend that they are studying race per se. RC theorists define constructs based on people’s experiences of categorizing or being categorized into one mutually exclusive group rather than another. Thus, this perspective advocates substituting conceptually meaningful RC constructs for racial categories. Many theories exist whose constructs could be used to realize this strategy. These include, but are not limited to, social category theory (e.g., Allport, 1954), stereotype threat theory (Steele, 1997), racism theories (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999), and racial identity theories (Cross, 1978; Helms, 1995). 4. Use statistical analyses of theory-derived variables to determine whether some of the myriad of constructs 28 potentially encompassed by racial categories or derived from RC theories can be used to replace racial categories. Although this strategy is not well known, it potentially subsumes the others. Also, perhaps because it has been used primarily to test specific hypotheses in a small number of studies, the broader applications of the strategy have not yet been recognized (Ellis & Ryan, 2003; Manly et al., 1998; Ong & Phinney, 2002; Osborne, 2001). A logical inference from these critiques is that use of racial categories as if they are precise measures of some genuine psychological theoretical construct accords scientific legitimacy to what are essentially racial stereotypes that psychologists share with the larger society and the professional environments in which the psychologists function. Many psychologists (e.g., Helms, 1992; Hilliard, 1984; Yee, 1983), focusing primarily on the domain of intellectual testing, have attempted to alert psychologists to the illogic and potential harm to society of using racial stereotypes as if they are legitimate scientific constructs (i.e., independent variables). It is not clear why psychology as a discipline has resisted the multiple calls to stop reifying racial categories in its theory and research, and, therefore, its implicit racial theories. Perhaps the resistance has occurred because although the rationales for the four replacement strategies have been well reasoned, their focus has been on persuading psychologists of the logic of replacing racial categories rather than on elucidating the methodological limitations of using racial categories as independent variables that make their replacement necessary. Therefore, our primary goal in the present article is to offer a methodological critique of the use of racial categories as independent variables in psychological theory and research. We intend our perspective to be supportive of the calls for replacement previously described. To accomplish our goal, we (a) use principles of the scientific method to compare use of psychological constructs as independent variables with use of racial categories as independent variables, (b) identify common errors of interpretation in measuring and analyzing racial categories, and (c) illustrate a procedure for replacing racial categories with conceptual constructs (i.e., Replacement Strategy 4). To identify common interpretational errors, we examined studies cited in the PsycINFO database (http://www .apa.org/psycinfo/) over a short period of time. For the most part, we use scores on intellectual tests as our dependent/criterion variables in our discussion because (a) racial categories are frequently used as independent variables in this line of research and (b) the methodological principles developed in research on intellectual testing often become the standards for other lines of psychological scientific inquiry (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999; Zuberi, 2001). Demonstrating the fallacy of using racial categories as independent variables should have broader implications for changing the meaning of race in psychology. January 2005 ● American Psychologist est. The theories and related constructs might come from any of several philosophical orientations represented in psychological literature including biological, environmental, or intrapsychic. At Step 3, the researchers’ selected construct is conceptualized as an independent variable, which is operationally defined (Step 4) by means of procedures consistent with the chosen theory, such as manipulation (i.e., experimental conditions) or measurement (e.g., test scores) of some phenomena. Once the independent variable has been so defined, hypotheses can be formulated that relate it to the phenomena that served as the catalysts for theoretical explication (i.e., dependent or outcome variables). Specification of dependent/outcome variables occurs by means of an analogous theory-driven developmental process (not shown). Depression Maryam Jernigan Racial Categories as Independent Variables It does not seem to be obvious why it is desirable to replace racial categories as independent variables in research designs. Therefore, we use principles from the scientific method to show that racial categories lack conceptual meaning relative to other psychological constructs. Race reportedly is as emotionally laden a topic among psychologists as it is among the lay public more generally (Scarr, 1988; Yee et al., 1993; Zuckerman, 1990), which makes it difficult to have an objective discussion about needed changes in psychology’s study and conceptualization of race. In an attempt to avoid stimulating resistance to the idea of changing the manner in which racial categories are conceptualized in research designs, we (a) summarize the general principles for defining an independent variable according to the scientific method as it is practiced in psychology, (b) illustrate the principles using a neutral but familiar construct (i.e., depression), (c) illustrate the principles using a RC construct (i.e., stereotype threat), and (d) explain why racial categories do not conform to these principles, whereas depression, stereotype threat, and, by implication, analogous constructs do. General Principles Table 1 illustrates the steps in defining an independent variable as outlined by Cacioppo, Semin, and Berntson (2004). In Step 1, psychologists observe psychological phenomena (e.g., attitudes, behaviors) whose existence or functioning they would like to explain. In Step 2, they develop or locate a theory whose hypothetical constructs potentially explain the psychological phenomena of interJanuary 2005 ● American Psychologist Table 1 illustrates the principles with depression as the psychological phenomenon. At Step 1, the researcher observes a number of symptoms (e.g., sadness, loss of appetite), which are verifiable by the individuals themselves as well as outside observers. Depending on the researcher’s philosophical assumptions about the causes of psychological phenomena, he or she may choose theories focused on different aspects of these symptoms. For example, theorists who believe in biological bases of behavior may use theories that attribute the symptoms to biological mechanisms such as deficits in serotonin, whereas intrapsychic theorists might attribute them to characteristics of individuals such as negative cognitions, and environmental theorists might view social support as relevant. On the basis of these hypothetical constructs, the researchers develop measures or manipulations (i.e., independent variables) that reflect their conceptualization of the mechanisms that cause depression. These independent variables, in turn, are used to test hypotheses about whether depression, as conceptualized, is related to dependent variables, as conceptualized by the relevant theory of depression. Racial Categories Table 1 uses the steps of the scientific process for defining independent variables to show the breakdown in the process when racial categories are used as independent variables. The breakdown occurs because racial categories function as the all-encompassing theoretical explanation of observed behavior (Step 2) as well as the independent variable (Step 3). No explicit conceptual framework guides the procedures by which research participants are assigned to one category rather than another (Step 4). Instead, the researchers’ implicit beliefs about the meaning of race (e.g., physical appearance, self-designation) serve as the operational definitions of racial categories and, consequently, the independent variable is also amorphous. Thus, theorists who endorse biological bases of behavior infer biology from racial categories, environmentalists infer context from the same racial categories, as do intrapsychic theorists with respect to individual processes. A variable that means everything means nothing. 29 Jackquelyn Mascher Racial categories, used as independent variables, are not based on theory and do not involve purposeful manipulation or measurement of research participants’ behaviors or attributes. As a consequence, researchers infer causation from between-groups differences on the dependent variable according to their preferred implicit philosophical orientation. Thus, if between-groups differences on intellectual test scores are found in a study, biologically focused theorists interpret them as evidence of genetic causation, environmentally focused theorists interpret them as evidence of contextual causation, intrapsychic theorists interpret them as evidence of the quality of functioning of individual processes, and so forth. In other words, when betweengroups differences in the phenomena that the researcher chooses to study occur, it is because the groups were somehow different. This type of circular reasoning is the converse of how explanatory constructs typically are developed according to the scientific method as it is supposed to be used in psychology (Cacioppo et al., 2004). RC Constructs Table 1 summarizes the process of developing RC constructs as independent variables (i.e., Replacement Strategy 3). The general premise of this approach is that phenomena of interest to psychologists occur because of differences in conditions of racial socialization or experiences. Explanatory theories, constructs, and independent variables in RC theories evolve out of observable psychological phenomena related to RC (e.g., racism, group cohesion). In this perspective, RC-focused independent variables may be used to explain dependent variables or phenomena (e.g., test scores) that have no obvious racial attributes. For example, Steele (1997) developed the theory of stereotype threat to explain the lower performance of Black 30 test takers relative to White test takers on tests of intellectual abilities. Steele’s original theoretical formulation was that lower performance was attributable to research participants’ attempts to avoid performing on the tests in a manner that would confirm society’s negative stereotypes about the intellectual abilities of people who society categorizes as Black. He used both threat versus nonthreat experimental conditions (i.e., categorical variables) and Black and White college students as his independent variables. Analog test scores were his dependent variables. Subsequent researchers have shown that stereotype threat may also be measured, rather than or in addition to being manipulated, using measures developed for that purpose (e.g., Ployhart, Ziegert, & McFarland, 2003). Nevertheless, Steele (1997) (a) observed a phenomenon in need of explanation, test scores (Step 1); (b) developed a theory-based explanation of it, fear of confirming negative stereotypes (Step 2); (c) defined an independent variable consistent with the conceptual rationale, stereotype threat (Step 3); and (d) specified procedures for studying threat, experimental manipulations of participants’ perceptions of tests (Step 4). Therefore, when differences between or within groups occurred under different conditions of threat, it was reasonable for the researchers to infer that stereotype threat caused the differences. How Conceptual Independent Variables Differ From Racial Categories In sum, racial categories should not be used to explain psychological phenomena because the categories have no conceptual meaning. Assignment of research participants to a racial category reveals something about the researchers’ beliefs about race but nothing about the behaviors or attributes of the research participants. Nor does such assignment mean that persons in one category have more or less race than those in another category. Therefore, when racial categories are used as independent variables, racial attributes are being inferred from the researcher’s underlying beliefs about the nature of race even though racial categories cannot accurately reflect such beliefs. In contrast, conceptually based psychological constructs may be measured or manipulated and, in some cases, both operations are possible. Depression, for example, may be operationally defined as a continuous variable (e.g., scores on an inventory assessing depressed thinking) or a categorical variable based on raters’ judgments (e.g., depressed thoughts vs. not depressed thoughts). Membership in the depressed category means that the person manifests more of the attributes that typify depressed people according to some conceptual model. In a similar manner, membership in the stereotype-threat condition (i.e., category), for example, rather than the nonthreat condition means that the person has been exposed to manipulations intended to arouse fear of confirming negative racial stereotypes. Consequently, if psychologists’ intentions are to uncover the psychological aspects of individuals that racial categories mask, then they should make greater use of RC constructs and variables in their research designs because January 2005 ● American Psychologist Table 1 Summary of General Steps in the Scientific Method for Developing Independent Variables as Applied to Depression, Racial Categories, and Racial Categorization Constructs Step 1: Catalyst psychological phenomenon Step 2: Formulation of theory Step 3: Independent variable defined Step 4: Operational definition Defining psychological phenomena Behaviors Attitudes Processes Biological Environmental Intrapsychic Experimental manipulations Measurement Depression as the psychological phenomenon Symptoms (e.g., sadness, loss of appetite) Biological Serotonin deficits Measured serotonin Environmental Intrapsychic Negative cognition Social support Frequency of negative thoughts Racial categories as the psychological phenomenon Nonspecific Categories Categories (e.g., Black, White, Asian) Self-description Researcher observation Archival data Combination procedures Racial categorization constructs as the psychological phenomenon Low test scores In-group bias Resilience Stereotype threat Racial identity Racism theory Stereotype threat conditions Racial identity attitudes Level of racism they are amenable to manipulation, measurement, and interpretation. If their intentions are merely to describe racial-category differences on a myriad of dependent variables, then they should be advised that they are engaging in an enterprise with little scientific value. Identifying Common Misinterpretations of Racial Categories The perspective that psychologists wrongly infer racial causation from racial categories, as they are used in their research designs, is not new, as it has been frequently argued by proponents of the four replacement strategies previously described. So, we attempted to discover whether there were common misconceptions about the measurement and statistical analysis of racial categories that fueled contemporary researchers’ ostensible resistance to replacing them as independent variables. Toward this goal, we conducted a relatively informal abbreviated search of the PsycINFO database, which covered the time span from January 1, 2004 to June 2, 2004. We used the search terms race, study, and variables because we wanted to identify empirical studies quickly. Hence, the results of our search are not comprehensive but hopefully provide a reasonable sampling of the manner(s) in which contemporary psycholJanuary 2005 ● American Psychologist Experimental manipulations Scores on a scale ogy researchers use racial categories in their research designs. Our search returned a total of 112 citations. One was in a language that none of us comprehended and so it was excluded from further consideration. Another 11 could not be located during the time period available. Thus, we manually reviewed 100 documents and identified 38 that were usable empirical studies of racial variables. The smallness of our sample should not be problematic because 73% of them used racial categories as independent variables, predictors, covariates, or as controls for race. The remainder used them to describe sample composition. We discuss general issues derived from our review to avoid the appearance of blaming any single researcher for what historically have been standard research practices where the study of race is concerned. Measurement and Analysis of Racial Categories Our noncomprehensive examination of measurement and research design texts suggests that their authors do not give proper attention to the unique aspects of measuring and analyzing racial categories as independent variables, predictors, covariates, and so forth. Most of the texts treated racial categories (or pseudonyms for them) as if they were conceptually meaningful measures of independent vari31 ables but did not consider the unique interpretational and analytic issues that use of racial categories as independent variables evokes. Therefore, we discuss some improprieties in measurement of racial categories and interpretation of results of statistical analyses involving them that we discovered in our database search. It is convenient when discussing these issues to use regression and correlation terminology primarily because doing so emphasizes the points that (a) use of racial categories as independent variables always implies a betweengroups comparison, (b) racial categories can be no more than conceptually vacuous correlates of other variables no matter what statistics the researcher uses to analyze them, and (c) “all statistical analyses (e.g., analysis of variance, t test, R, Rc) are correlational.” This latter point means, in part, that effect sizes “analogous to r2 [that is, percentage of variability in participants’ dependent variable scores that is predicted by racial categories] can be computed in all parametric analyses” (Thompson, 2002, p. 68; also see Thompson, 2000, for a discussion of multivariate analyses as correlational). Racial Categories as Measures Measurement is the quantification of attributes (Nunnally, 1967). Perhaps we disposed of the misperception that racial categories represent attributes in our earlier discussion of the process of defining independent variables. However, researchers assume that because they can assign numbers to racial categories and these numbers appear to relate to or affect other variables, they have measured some underlying racial attribute of research participants. Here we attempt to show why this assumption is not true by discussing some common misinterpretations of racial categories as quantified independent variables. We discuss measurement and interpretational issues together because it was difficult to separate them. Nonreporting Virtually none of the researchers described the procedures used (i.e., operational definitions) to create racial categories in their Methods sections. Moreover, except for occasional table notes in results sections, researchers either did not report or wrongly reported how they quantified racial categories. Without information about the researchers’ coding system, independent researchers are unable to interpret their results. Thus, the omissions meant that the researchers’ implicit racial theories could not be challenged. Racial Attributions Inferring from table notes, one sees that researchers sometimes used dummy coding to quantify racial categories used as independent variables. However, many researchers interpreted their dummy-coded variables to be measures of racial characteristics of participants rather than the regression equivalent of comparing the mean scores of racial categories using analyses of variance (ANOVAs) or t tests. Typically, when dummy coding is used, the researcher develops a dichotomous variable or set of variables to represent racial categories in the study by labeling mem32 bers of the focal group (e.g., Blacks) with ones and members of the standard or comparison group (e.g., Whites) with zeros. However, either category may be assigned either number without changing the nature of the interpretation of the results. In other words, the numbers themselves convey no conceptual meaning. Yet researchers often indicated that they had dummy coded only one racial category (e.g., “We dummy coded Latinos”) even though there were several racial categories in their study and it would have been impossible for them to analyze only one group using dummy codes because the phrase implies a comparison between means. Even though the mean scores of the identified racial group must have been contrasted against the average scores of other groups in the study, the researchers often used the dummy-coded variable to make implicit racial-category inferences about only the group of interest to the researcher. For example, the researcher might report, “Latinos had low self-esteem,” thereby, attributing a negative trait to them rather than “Latinos had lower average levels of self-esteem than Whites.” In a correlation/regression analysis, a positive sign for the regression coefficient indicates that the group coded with ones (e.g., Blacks) had a higher mean score on the dependent measure (e.g., intellectual test scores), and a negative sign means that the comparison group had a higher mean score on the dependent measure. Sometimes researchers interpreted the dummy-coded variables as continuous variables reflecting the racial or ethnic traits of the focal group as opposed to the groups’ mean differences on the dependent measure. This error was reflected in statements, such as “Being Latino was related to lower selfesteem” as opposed to “The group classified as Latino had lower average self-esteem scores than the group classified as Whites.” Attributing Racial Meaning Perhaps because racial categories were often the only independent variable in their studies, researchers typically went beyond merely using them to describe differences. Instead, on the basis of significant between-groups differences, they often drew connections between variables that were not even measured in their studies (e.g., “Previous studies have found that Blacks are academically disengaged”), thereby, seemingly reinforcing preexisting stereotypes. In sum, because racial categories are so imprecisely defined but are so easily quantified, researchers attribute more meaning to them than is merited (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). Equating the quantification of racial categories with measurement of an intended underlying racial construct leads to perpetuating the myth that race or ethnicity has been measured and, therefore, may be used interpretatively. Research Design and Statistical Analyses of Racial Categories Many methodologists and researchers appear to conflate racial categories, as used in research designs, with race as January 2005 ● American Psychologist nonscientists use it. For both groups, confusion about the etiology of racial categories in society appears to underlie their misinterpretation of racial categories, although the confusion is manifested differently. Methodologists Many methodologists appear to believe that racial categories, used as independent variables, reflect innate attributes of research participants. Consequently, they provide nonsensical advice for analyzing them in which the methodologists’ racial beliefs are obliquely embedded. Two examples may illustrate this point. Example 1. In their discussion of best practices for analyzing moderators and mediators, Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004) advised that a “given variable may function as a mediator or moderator, depending on the theory being tested” (p. 116), but they consider race to be a “group variable [that] is naturally occurring [italics added]” (p. 117), meaning that researchers who say that they are studying race do not have to conform to the same standards of rigor in their research designs as are required for interpretation of other categorical or categorized variables. It is difficult to imagine a psychological theory that would account for the natural occurrence of racial categories, but it is the case that racial categories, as used by psychologists, are not naturally occurring. If they were, researchers would not have been able to assign and reassign research participants to racial categories according to the researchers’ sample size needs. Note that Asian Americans, for example, may be concomitantly “honorary Whites” and “not Whites” in the same study (Liang, Li, & Kim, 2004, p. 112). Each of the not-Whites racial groups (i.e., categories) is susceptible to being collapsed into a single amorphous “minority group” or buried in a White group to compensate for their small numbers in any given study. Example 2. In his discussion of use of hierarchical linear models to analyze longitudinal data, Weinfurt (2000) described race (i.e., racial categories) as “intact groups” (p. 339). He defined intact groups as “[those that] exist outside of the research context, over which the researcher has no control” (p. 356). Typically, in research designs, intact implies that group members share experiences, attributes, or conditions (e.g., intact classrooms). In intellectual testing, the typical large-scale racial-group comparison study involves thousands of participants. For example, Pennock-Román (1993, Table 4, p. 22) reported the following sample sizes for citizens who took the SAT and GRE: Asian Americans (N ⫽ 1,983), Blacks (N ⫽ 2,614), Mexican Americans (N ⫽ 511), and non-Hispanic Whites (N ⫽ 47,756). It is not plausible that the test takers within each of the categories shared enough experiences or attributes to render them intact. When groups are intact, the researchers’ analytic procedures are supposed to compensate for attributes of the preexisting groups in some manner (e.g., analysis of covariance [ANCOVA]). Use of ANCOVA, for example, is intended to statistically match individuals in the two groups on some preexisting or concurrent attribute (e.g., English proficiency) other than the independent variable (e.g., steJanuary 2005 ● American Psychologist reotype-threat intervention) that might bias the study’s outcome through its effect on the dependent variable (e.g., intellectual test scores). Yet because racial categories are not intact groups, researchers should not use analytic strategies intended to compensate for their intactness. Also, because racial categories do not measure shared (as opposed to researcherinferred) attributes of research participants, they should not be analyzed as covariates themselves because it is not clear what constructs the researcher is compensating for. In our overview of current practices, it appeared that researchers often engaged in both practices. Researchers’ Confusion Researchers’ implicit theories about the meanings of racial categories are also evident in their statistical analyses. When racial categories function as independent variables in analyses, they have the property that they always signify between-groups comparisons. This aspect may be obscured because of (a) researcher’s racial beliefs, (b) procedures conducted on measures or samples during preliminary analyses, (c) attempts to control for race, and (d) use of multivariate analyses. Researcher beliefs. Researchers often hypothesize that a correlate of racial categories (e.g., poverty) explains Behavior X (e.g., minorities and poor people do X). But to test their hypotheses, they study the main effects of racial categories created by the researcher (e.g., minority group vs. White group) or socioeconomic status on a dependent measure without regard to whether poverty levels and racial categories are related in their designs. Significant findings related to either variable are then interpreted as an effect due to race or ethnicity. Preliminary operations. Sometimes researchers conduct preliminary analyses on their independent measures to determine whether the scores of racial categories differ on them and either discard or alter their measures if differences are found. By doing so, the researchers are actually treating racial categories as the primary measure of the independent variable in their design, when instead the discarded or unaltered variable should serve in this role because it can potentially replace conceptually meaningless racial categories in subsequent analyses (cf. Replacement Strategy 2). Controlling for race. A fairly common strategy for validating test scores in research on intellectual testing is to analyze relationships between scores on intellectual tests, used as independent variables, and some criterion variable (e.g., academic performance), while disregarding previously discovered or known racial-group differences on the test score independent variable. Researchers often refer to this strategy as controlling or adjusting for race or, alternatively, testing moderators (cf. Frazier et al., 2004). However, when between-groups racial differences on test scores used as dependent variables exist, then using the test scores as independent variables in other studies or with other variables, without investigating conceptually based alternative explanations for such differences, begs the question of what the racial categories mean with respect to 33 test scores. Not providing an empirically supported reason for why the racial categories differ merely allows researchers to infer proof of whatever stereotypic interpretation of the test score differences that they desire. Multivariate analyses. A full discussion of the role of racial categories in the various types of multivariate analyses (e.g., canonical correlation, hierarchical linear models) is beyond the scope of this article. However, the critical factor here is that even in these models, racial categories still represent between-groups fixed effects just as they do when simpler analytic strategies (e.g., t tests, ANOVAs) are used. Fixed refers to the fact that their numerical values are set by the researcher rather than defined on the basis of participants’ behaviors or attributes. Between-groups signifies that the means of dummy coded racial categories (i.e., aggregated data) on the dependent variables are compared just as they are in simpler analyses. When researchers use longitudinal designs, for example, they collect multiple measures of the dependent measure(s) over occasions, but the coded nature of racial categories (e.g., Blacks ⫽ 1, Whites ⫽ 0) does not change. Also, their status as nonconceptual nonexperimental variables does not change (Weinfurt, 2000). Therefore, when racial categories are used as a group-level variable to predict individuals’ patterns of change over time (e.g., growth curves), a positive regression coefficient indicates that the mean of the dependent measures, averaged across occasions, of the group coded with ones is higher than the comparison group. In sum, regardless of how racial categories are quantified and analyzed, they cannot be more than they are, place holders for conceptual constructs. All of the psychological research, in which racial categories have been compared on some dependent measures, provides evidence of a variety of variables associated or not associated with racial categories. Yet these associations reveal nothing about the racial characteristics of research participants because racial categories are conceptually void. Implementing Replacement Strategy 4 Replacement Strategy 4 offers a methodology for implementing the other three strategies, thereby potentially replacing racial categories in psychological theory and research with conceptually meaningful constructs. The strategy permits researchers to address the questions of whether conceptually based independent variables representing ethnicity or cultural factors (Strategy 1), associated with racial categories (Strategy 2), or derived from RC theories (Strategy 3) replace racial categories as predictors of dependent measures (Strategy 4). Another label for replace is mediate. Description and Example Use of the strategy requires four components: (a) an independent variable, intended to replace racial categories, developed according to principles of the scientific method (see Table 1); (b) a dependent variable of interest (e.g., test scores); (c) hypotheses, derived from the same theory as 34 the independent variable, describing how the independent variable is expected to relate to or affect the dependent variable; and (d) racial categories to be replaced. We use hierarchical multiple regression (HMR) analysis to describe the test of conceptual independent variables as mediators of ostensible relationships between racial categories and dependent variables as did Osborne (2001), Ong and Phinney (2002), and Ellis and Ryan (2003). Manly et al. (1998) used ANCOVA, but multiple regression analysis would have yielded identical results assuming its assumptions were met (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Researchers, intending to use more complex statistical analyses (e.g., multilevel regression analyses), may think of this procedure as a preliminary analysis to determine whether scores on the conceptual independent variable permit them to eliminate racial categories as a grouplevel variable in their analyses. If not, then they must still be cautious about attributing conceptual meaning to the group effect as opposed to merely describing it. The proposed HMR analysis consists of three steps: (a) entry in the first step of the conceptual variable(s) that is intended to represent the explanatory construct in the research design, (b) entry of the racial-categories variable(s) in the second step to determine the amount of variance it predicts or describes beyond what is explained by the conceptual variable, and (c) determination of whether the effect size and significance level of the racialcategory variable(s) suggests that its relation to the dependent variable appears to be meaningful, that is, adds importantly to the prediction of scores on the dependent variable beyond what is explained by the conceptual independent variable(s). Of the three studies of intellectual testing that fortuitously used the strategy, Ellis and Ryan’s (2003) report of their descriptive data (e.g., means, standard deviations) was most complete (Table 1, p. 2615), which permitted us to replicate their Phase 2 findings (Table 3, p. 2617) within rounding error. For their conceptual variable in Step 1 of their hierarchical regression analysis, they entered the variable of ineffective test-taking strategies (ITT). It explained 20% of the variability among test scores, their dependent variable. In Step 2, the researchers entered the dummy coded variable for racial categories (Black ⫽ 1, White ⫽ 0). It described an additional 11% of the variance in test scores. Using the principle that all parametric analyses are correlational, which was previously articulated (Thompson, 2002), researchers can convert percentages of variance explained (e.g., r2) to d (i.e., the number of standard deviations that separate the mean scores of two groups). Thus, Ellis and Ryan’s (2003) conceptual variable (ITT) explained the equivalent of one standard deviation (i.e., d ⫽ 1.00) of difference between the mean scores of their Black and White participants, which is the prototypical standardized mean difference between test scores of Black and White test takers (Sackett, Hardison, & Cullen, 2001). Yet racial categories continued to describe almost one standard deviation (d ⫽ 0.70) of separation after ITT was statistically removed. January 2005 ● American Psychologist Interpretation The results of the replacement analysis in this example suggest that the conceptual independent variable (i.e., ITT) explained as much variance in intellectual test scores as is typically described by racial categories when Black and White test takers are compared (Sackett et al., 2001). Yet the results also suggest that the researchers should continue to conceptualize and search for additional conceptual factors, perhaps more explicit RC variables, to account for the additional sizable variance that was still described by comparing racial categories. Nevertheless, Ellis and Ryan’s (2003) findings with respect to ITT, their conceptual variable, may be reasonably interpreted as a “cause” of participants’ behaviors (i.e., test scores), whereas the portion due to racial categories should not be interpreted as explanatory. Development of interventions intended to change participants’ ITT might be a reasonable outcome of their findings, but no intervention logically follows from racial category differences. Conclusion and Implications Psychologists have expressed a variety of beliefs about what race is or is not, which we chose not to reiterate in any great detail here because these suppositions are essentially irrelevant to what psychologists do with respect to research practices. Psychologists’ beliefs about race, for the most part, have not been subjected to empirical investigation using the scientific method as it is supposedly practiced in psychology. Instead, regardless of their theoretical orientations (e.g., biological, environmental, intrapsychic), psychologists have knowingly continued to use and interpret essentially the same single, flawed, atheoretical operational definitions of race (i.e., factitious racial categories) as if racial categories constitute both theoretical constructs and measures of immutable racial characteristics of research participants, when, in fact, they do neither. In lay society, imputing behavior to a person solely on the basis of the person’s ascribed racial category is called racial profiling. It is a practice that increasingly is being recognized as unjust. Yet in psychology, entire content areas (e.g., high-stakes testing) rest on the belief that it is acceptable to use membership in arbitrary racial categories to explain individuals’ behaviors (e.g., test performance). A harmful consequence to society of this practice is that scores on intellectual tests, for example, are used to make decisions about selection and placement even though it is known that the test scores differentially favor or disfavor test takers assigned to one racial category rather than another. Such usage strengthens racial stereotyping. We proposed the basics of a strategy by which psychologists can begin to redress the wrongs caused by racial profiling as it has been condoned in psychology. 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Zuberi, T. (2001). Thicker than blood: How racial statistics lie? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Zuckerman, M. (1990). Some dubious premises in research and theory on racial differences. American Psychologist, 45, 1297–1303. January 2005 ● American Psychologist bs_bs_banner The Politics of Everyday Life: Mexican Hoosiers and Ethnic Belonging at the Crossroads of America SUJEY VEGA Arizona State University Abstract As state-based legislative measures continue to target undocumented immigrants in an all too familiar politics of belonging, the narratives of immigrants themselves remain marginalized. The following argues for the recuperation of voices elided by popular discourse and provides a space to explore the manifestations of belonging for Mexican residents. This type of belonging, what I am terming ethnic belonging, reconciles U.S. nationalism with ethnic solidarity and transnational networks. Ethnic belonging specifically refers to the uncoordinated ways individuals articulate an ethnic sense of belonging that can later impact community activism. I suggest that personal interaction in the workplace, in the classroom, and even at sporting events lay the foundational consciousness of ethnic belonging that critique dominant narratives of exclusion. Importantly, this project highlights the experiences of Mexicans in a small Midwestern town; thus, illustrating how collective resistance through ethnic belonging is critical for contemporary immigrants who settle in “new,” and perhaps unwelcoming, communities. [Mexican – Indiana – migration – belonging – ethnicity]. The language of unity functions as an instrument of survival. Silvio Torres-Saillant 1998 T outed as the decade with the highest percentage of foreign-born residents since the United States began its national census, the years between 2000 and 2010 also signaled an onslaught of politicized aggression against immigrants and their children.1 Since 2010, state-based legislative acts continue to target Latinos in a politics of belonging that presumes extralegal existence and attacks ethnic identity. Responding to this era of immigrant and ethnic antagonism, Latino communities throughout the United States utilize a “language of unity” to defend their legitimate belonging. For instance, immediately following the introduction of H.R. 4437, or The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, Latinos united and mobilized into the record-breaking protest rallies of 2006.2 More recently, localized movements against state-based legislations in Arizona, Alabama, Indiana and elsewhere organize against otherwise divisive laws. Indeed, even “dreamers,” or undocumented youth fighting to stay in the country where they have been raised, illicit a “language of unity” as they seek solidarity with supporters and politicians who can vote to halt the injustices of deportation. Though wrapped within the language of incorporation, belonging operates as an City & Society, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 196–217, ISSN 0893-0465, eISSN 1548-744X. © 2012 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-744X.2012.01075.x. The Politics of Everyday Life “instrument of survival” for Latinos that remains critical of national hegemony. Operating through transnational ethnic ties, Latinos defy expectations of a singular national allegiance and embody a direct challenge to notions of people in stasis (Levitt 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Even if grounded by socioeconomic conditions or immigration status, Latinos maintain transnational networks and ethnic affiliations that reconfigure their U.S. belonging. Asked to prove their “worthiness,” Latinos carefully navigate a drive to gain the very real material benefits of national belonging with a commitment to maintain transnational ethnic differences (Ramos-Zayas 2006). As the battle between exclusion and inclusion continues to play out in legislative and political arenas, Latinos utilize their ethnic difference to establish solidarity and assert new ways of belonging (Castañeda 2006). In the past, In the past, political debates on immigration pitted U.S. Latinos and immigrant populations against one another. Under expectation of total political debates on assimilation, some Latinos distanced themselves from the immigrant experience to highlight their American citizenship (Vila 2000). In con- immigration pitted trast, the current immigrant backlash has resulted in a critical rise in U.S. Latinos and co-ethnic solidarity. Whether as family members, neighbors, or friends, the experience of undocumented immigrants has become pa...
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