Springer 2007
Journal of Business Ethics (2007) 74:303–314
DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9517-y
Stakeholder Capitalism
ABSTRACT. In this article, we will outline the principles of stakeholder capitalism and describe how this view
rejects problematic assumptions in the current narratives
of capitalism. Traditional narratives of capitalism rely
upon the assumptions of competition, limited resources,
and a winner-take-all mentality as fundamental to business and economic activity. These approaches leave little
room for ethical analysis, have a simplistic view of human
beings, and focus on value-capture rather than valuecreation. We argue these assumptions about capitalism are
inadequate and leave four problems in their wake. We
wish to reframe the narrative of capitalism around the
reinforcing concepts of stakeholders coupled with value
creation and trade. If we think about how a society can
sustain a system of voluntary value creation and trade,
then capitalism can once more become a useful concept.
R. Edward Freeman is the Academic Director of the Business
Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics. He is Elis and
Signe Olsson Professor of Business Administration at The
Darden School and heads Darden’s Olsson Center for Applied Ethics, one of the world’s leading academic centers for
the study of ethics. Freeman has written or edited 10 books on
business ethics, environmental management, and strategic
management. His latest book, Environmentalism and the
New Logic of Business, How Firms Can be Profitable
and Leave Our Children a Living Planet, helps executives meet the challenge of being profitable while being environmentally responsible. He has also authored more than 40
Darden case studies. Freeman serves on the advisory board of
University of Virginia Institute for Practical Ethics.
Kirsten Martin is an assistant professor at The Catholic University of America where she teaches management theory and
strategy. Martin received her Ph.D. and MBA from the
University of Virginia’s Darden School of Business and her
B.S. Engineering from the University of Michigan. Martin’s
research focuses on technology, business, and ethics.
Bidhan Parmar is a doctoral student in the Ethics, Entrepreneurship and Strategy program.
R. Edward Freeman
Kirsten Martin
Bidhan Parmar
KEY WORDS: capitalism, stakeholder, ethics, economics, free market
Introduction1
We live in the age of markets. While markets have
been around for thousands of years, we are just
beginning to understand their power for organizing
society and creating value. In the last 200 years
markets have unleashed a tremendous amount of
innovation and progress in the West. The industrial
revolution, the rise of consumerism, and the dawn of
the global marketplace have each in their own way
made life better for millions of people. Many of us
now know comforts, skills, and technologies that
our ancestors could only dream of.
Along side these great strides forward, are a set of
deeply troubling issues. Capitalism and markets have
also notoriously increased the divide between the
rich and the poor, both within and across nations. In
the pursuit of innovation, we have become blind to
some of the harmful consequences of our actions on
others, such as environmental degradation, dominance of less privileged groups, and the inequitable
distribution of opportunities. The seeds of these
deeply troubling issues are beginning to germinate.
Global warming, global financial crises, and global
terrorism threaten to destabilize our world. It is
more imperative than ever to carefully study and
understand the power of markets and capitalism.
In this article, we present five contemporary
narratives of capitalism and show that each privileges
the rights of one group over the others. In addition all five narratives make a set of assumptions
about markets and capitalism that we believe to be
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410852
R. Edward Freeman et al.
304
counterproductive. Each assumes that market participants have naı̈ve self interest, that morality is
separate from (or even antithetical to) prosperity, and
that competition for limited resources (value as a
zero-sum game) is the dominant mode of prosperity.
Our claim is that the great strides forward and the
deeply concerning issues about markets and capitalism are connected to these assumptions. The
majority of current conversations about capitalism
are not about these fundamental assumptions, but
about designing the best enforcement mechanisms.
We have been told that institutions and legal structure can solve the troubling consequences that arise
in a market. Are property rights enforced? Transaction costs reduced? A good market design helps to
foster good behavior on the part of market participants. We agree. Institutional structure and market
design surely go along way in helping markets
thrive. We want to add that the way we talk about
markets and the assumptions we make about value
creation also play a role in creating the outcomes we
want and also those we do not. We show how four
contemporary problems are connected to the way
we talk about capitalism.
In the final section of this article we offer a new
narrative of capitalism, one that builds in morality
and ethics from the foundations, and acknowledges
stakeholders as essential to value creation and trade,
rather than trying to put the rights of one group
beyond discussion. Stakeholder capitalism is a way to
resolve some of the deep tensions within capitalism,
and to better foster the powerful innovations that
can help us all live better.
The narratives of capitalism
In this section, we will examine five contemporary
narratives of capitalism that dominate academic,
political, and practitioner discourse and thinking.
Each of these current narratives falls short in
addressing the concerns of a broad set of stakeholders, and makes a series of assumptions that
perpetuate many of the problems of capitalism. We
fully acknowledge that our discussion does not
represent a complete survey of thought on capitalism. We have chosen these views because they are
most prevalent in modern discourse, and we are
indebted to their authors for furthering our thinking
and that of countless other academics on the subject.
The classic narratives of capitalism – that of labor,
government, investor, managerial, and entrepreneurial – retell the story of value creation and trade
from the perspective of one stakeholder, whose
views become inseparable from and ultimately stand
in for the larger story.
Labor capitalism
Since the revolutionary writings of Marx and Engels,
the term capitalism has been tied to class division:
specifically the self-aggrandizement of the capitalist at
the expense of the proletariat. The division of society
into capitalist and labor has always played a central
role in Marxist writings, from examinations of the
American Civil War to detailed investigations of
pricing. Marxism, and its political derivatives socialism and communism, turn on the dialectic between
the capitalists (or bourgeoisie) who own property and
the means of production and the laborers (or proletariat) who own no property and are obligated to sell
their labor to the bourgeoisie to gain subsistence
(Marx and Engels, 1847). For Marx and Engels, this
labor market is inherently fraught with tension, since
the interests of the capitalist and the laborer are diametrically opposed. Within these competing interests, those of the laborer dominate Marx and Engels’
view of capitalism. Engels points out in the Principles
of Communism, which later became the foundation
for the Communist Manifesto, that:
To say that ‘‘the worker has an interest in the rapid
growth of capital’’ means only this: that the more
speedily the worker augments the wealth of the capitalist, the larger will be the crumbs which fall to him,
the greater will be the number of workers that can
be called into existence, the more can the mass of
slaves dependant upon capital be increased. (Marx and
Engels, 1847)
Ethics and moral language are obscured when
viewed through the Marxist lens. Noted Marx
scholar David McLellan comments on the apparent
paradox in his introduction to Socialism and
Morality,
Morality has been viewed by Marxists as a form of
ideology reflective of class interests and of changing
social patterns. Such a stance ruled out appeal to moral
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410852
Stakeholder Capitalism
principles by Marxism, which was viewed as a science
of society and therefore as indifferent to morality as
was, say the science of biology. On the other hand, the
works of Marxists from Marx himself onwards have
contained bitter condemnations of the injustices of
capitalism, and have been shot through with moral
terms such as ‘alienation’ and ‘exploitation’. (McLellen
and Sayers, 1990)
The Marxist version of capitalism tells a story where
the opposing groups of labor and capital, fight over
the fixed resources of productive assets. Economic
and business activity itself is amoral and the only
inevitable solution for labor is to take control of
those productive assets by force.
Government capitalism
Born in the same year of Marx’s death, economist
John Maynard Keynes was concerned with the
vagaries of the labor market, specifically, the stability
in national unemployment rates. In his acclaimed
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,
Keynes traced the connections between unemployment, consumption, and investment (Stewart, 1999).
Keynes’ revolutionary shift of economic thought
from a micro view (pricing and cost mechanisms) to
a macro view (national income and employment)
has had tremendous policy implications for political
economists and theoretical implications for business
academics (Romano and Leiman, 1970). To the
requisite institutions of capitalism, he added the idea
that capitalism could and should be managed by the
government.
For Keynes, the world was far too complex for
individuals to bring about the necessary changes for a
good society. Since Keynes believed that a government that heavily regulated economic affairs could
attain optimal levels of wealth and employment, we
credit him with the creation of government capitalism
where the government and its rights dominate the
needs of all other stakeholders in the narrative of
capitalism.
Although Keynesian economics has become less
popular in the post-cold war period, Keynes’ deeper
view of capitalism still holds strong among liberals
and academics. It is explicit in Keynes’ views that
capitalism without interventions by the government
would lead society astray from ‘ideal values’. In fact,
305
capitalism, according to Keynes, fosters a counterproductive love of money:
The love of money as a possession – as distinguished
from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments
and realities of life—will be recognized for what it is a
somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semicriminal, semi-pathological propensities which one
hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental
disease (Hoover, 2003).
The metaphor in this narrative is of a garden, that
capitalism left to its own devices would produce
chaos and despotism through a love of money. The
government is seen as the gardener, who by his skill,
knowledge, and wise management keeps the productive powers of capitalism at bay, and creates a
utopia by enacting policies that keep growth and
weeds in balance.
Keynes’ view of utopia and ideal values were
heavily influenced by the moral philosopher, G. E.
Moore. Both viewed certain mental states as morally
good in and of themselves. It was these states that
Keynes hoped to foster in the American public
through his economic policies. A closer look at these
mental states shows ‘‘Keynes’ belief in the rationality
of ends and the homogeneity of values;’’ in short
there was a finite moral answer for Keynes, which he
believed everyone should attain (Skidelsky 1995).
Ethics in this view becomes about one person’s
interpretation of the good that is made to stand for
everyone and thus becomes unattainable in a diverse
and changing world. Furthermore, ethics is imposed
by government through the amoral tool of economic policies – to regulate a system that is seen as
actively leading society astray from the good.
Keynes view of capitalism is conflicted – the
system can do good, but this requires government
intervention:
I think that capitalism, wisely managed, can probably
be made more efficient for attaining economic ends
than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in
itself it is in many ways extremely objectionable. Our
problem is to work out a social organization which
shall be as efficient as possible without offending our
notions of a satisfactory way of life (Romano and
Leiman, 1970).
The concept of the welfare state is a later descendant
of Keynes’ vision of capitalism. Today many echo
306
R. Edward Freeman et al.
Keynes’ distrust of capitalism and reassure their faith
in the government to solve the problem created by
the market.
Investor capitalism
In direct opposition to many of Keynes’ conclusions,
Milton Friedman advocates a return to laissez-faire
economic policies and a reliance on the market
mechanisms to achieve ‘‘fair’’ distributions. Economic freedom – the ability to buy and sell without
interference from the government – becomes central
to Friedman’s vision. It is important to note, that
Friedman believes in economic freedom for particular groups, namely shareholders. To facilitate this
view, Friedman limits the role and rights of the
government in his narrative about how capitalism
should function. In Friedman’s view government’s
role should be relegated to eliminating monopolies,
reforming the tax laws in favor of corporations, and
maintaining civil law and order.
As Friedman shifts focus away from government
and its regulation of capital, he focuses the limelight
on a new dominant group: investors. In fact the
whole of commercial business activity has one specific purpose: ‘‘to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits, so as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages
in free and open competition, without deception or
fraud (Friedman, 1962).’’ This goal is the investor’s
goal and is assumed to be in competition with
alternative stakeholders’ goals. In Friedman’s view
shareholders who are better off will continue to
invest in the market and produce better results for
all. Friedman and those who give priority to the
concerns of investors above and beyond the concerns of other stakeholders, subscribe to investor
capitalism.
Friedman’s writings suggest that he views the
inner workings of capitalism as amoral. His analysis
and description of capitalism is given in monetary
terms and in the language of economics, a grammar
that avoids ‘non-factual’ value distinctions (Romano
and Leiman 1970). Nevertheless, ethics and morality
play a large role in justifying Friedman’s claims about
the importance of free enterprise and actions against
a centrally mandated economy:
The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce,
be it in the hands of a monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. The preservation of
freedom requires the elimination of such concentration of power to the fullest possible extent and the
dispersal and distribution of whatever power cannot be
eliminated… (Friedman, 1962).
Friedman offers us a story of capitalism, where values
and ethics do not enter into the heart of how we
create value and trade it with each other. In his view,
ethics is a side constraint, since managers are expected
to refrain from fraud and deception. For Friedman,
the purpose of the capitalist system is to increase
wealth for the investor. In fact, any consideration
outside that goal – for example, consideration of the
welfare of customers, concern for the community, or
charity – is seen as in competition with investor needs
and diverting resources away from the primary goal.
Friedman goes so far as to say that ‘‘social responsibility’’ is a tax on the investor and that such considerations take money out of the hands of the primary
stakeholder. Investor capitalism sees the investor as
the primary engine for economic growth; any
obstacles to the investor’s concerns become obstacles
to capitalism’s ability to create wealth.
Managerial capitalism
For scholars studying capitalism and the corporation,
the owner of the private property is in control.
Keynes, Marx, and Friedman assume that the
investor (or stockholder) is the owner of the means
of production and has responsibility and control over
its use. Managerial capitalism, on the other hand,
clearly differentiates the managers of the organization from the investors and other stakeholders. Berle
and Means in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property see traditional economic theory as inadequate in handling the newly differentiated roles between ownership and control of assets (Berle and
Means, 1932). For Berle and Means, we are now
dealing with distinct functions: ownership on the
one side, control on the other. This control tends to
move further and further away from ownership and
ultimately to lie in the hands of the management
itself, a management capable of perpetuating its own
position. These distinct functions of ownership and
Stakeholder Capitalism
control now lay in the hands of opposing groups
with competing interests.
Similarly, Marris in The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’ Capitalism positions managers as separate and
distinct from all other stakeholders including investors
(Marris, 1964). Managers, as those who both control
and have responsibility for the corporation, are the
dominant group of interest for this view of modern
capitalism. This line of scholarship is continued
through the literature on agency theory where owners
of corporations are seen as property holders of the
organization and managers are the agents of those
stockholders. Managers have a contractual or fiduciary
duty to shareholder interests above and beyond any
other relationship in managing the shareholder’s
property (the organization in this case). Continuing
within this narrative, agency theory positions the
managers’ interests to be in competition with other
stakeholders.
Managerial capitalism’s view on business ethics is
more complicated. As Berle and Means state, ‘‘Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can
stand against the paramount interests of the community (Berle and Means, 1932).’’ While acknowledging
the community interests as an important consideration
to the functioning of the firm, the authors also believe
it to be essential for the ‘‘control’’ (or management) of
the corporation to develop into a purely neutral
technocracy. Similar to Friedman, the process of
business is considered amoral with a reconciliation to
morality or community interests required.
Marris continues by stating that directors or managers who pay attention to competing social interests
to the detriment of profits may be popular. However,
he also believes managers to have growth and productivity as primary goals and constraints for their
actions. Marris’ view of morality and motivation
outlines the financial motivations of managers in their
role as controllers of the corporation. Marris does,
however, find the rules of the game to be open and
flexible giving managers the opportunity to pursue
alternative goals than those which are financial.
Entrepreneurial capitalism
The entrepreneur is missing from many of the views
of capitalism outlined above. Yet, the entrepreneur
becomes an important stakeholder to ignore as she
307
epitomizes the role of value creation in the capitalistic
system. Within modern theory, economists such as
Schumpeter (1942), Kirzner (1979), and more recently Baumol (1990) emphasize the role of the
entrepreneur within capitalism and epitomize what
we are calling entrepreneurial capitalism. For these authors, the entrepreneur functions as the dominant
player within the capitalist system. So dominant is the
entrepreneur that she is the lifeblood of capitalism
and ‘‘thoroughly and profoundly shapes and determines economic phenomenon (Kirzner, 1985).’’
Schumpeter (1942) argues that the entrepreneur is
in the process of creative destruction – necessitating the
destruction of the current market to introduce a new
market. In doing so, Schumpeter posits the entrepreneur in opposition to the status quo interests of
other stakeholders and in competition over resources. Others, within this same narrative, do not
take such a view. Kirzner allows for the entrepreneur
to be a part of creative discovery and focuses on a more
positive vision of capitalism within the ‘‘Austrian’’
tradition of modern economic thought. Such a
narration of capitalism leaves open the possibility of a
strong role for business ethics. However, such a role
is not explicitly stated within these scholars.
Each author differentiates the entrepreneur and
singles her out from capitalists, property owners,
managers, and laborers. Entrepreneurs for these
economists are decidedly different – and each has
their own interpretation of that difference. One
piece that is common to all, however, is the
importance of the role of the entrepreneur in the
capitalist system as the agitator who leads all others
out of the status quo.
Problems with the traditional narratives
All five narratives make a similar set of assumptions
about markets and capitalism that we believe to be
counterproductive. Each narrative assumes that
market participants have a naı̈ve version of selfinterest (that one’s self-interest is not connected to,
or doesn’t take into account the self-interests of
others), that morality is separate from (or even
antithetical to) economic prosperity, and that competition for limited resources (value as a zero-sum
game) is the dominant mode of prosperity. These
three assumptions combine to create four problems
308
R. Edward Freeman et al.
with the traditional models of capitalism that manifest within theory and practice: the problems of
competition, business ethics, the dominant group,
and of business in a liberal democracy.
The problem of competition
By pitting individuals against one another within the
survival-of-the-fittest atmosphere, narrators within
the traditional approach to capitalism foster the notion of competition as a prerequisite to capitalist
society. Competition is necessary, it is argued, due to
the many individuals fighting over the same resources. Other individuals are seen as a threat to
survival rather than as potential partners for value
creation, and capitalists are left with the problem of
resolving competitor demands and threats.
The focus on competition rather than cooperation is mistaken on two counts. First, focusing on
how to beat stakeholders and retain power in any
relationship leaves out those many instances where
collaboration is necessary to survive. For many
entrepreneurial ventures, strong collaborating
relationships are necessary to create sustainable
organizations. According to Sarasvathy (2001),
entrepreneurs rely on non-competitive stakeholder
relationships to navigate the perils of extreme
uncertainty and to bolster their legitimacy. Those
creating markets for future goods and services (Shane
and Venkataraman, 2000) simply cannot miss valuecreating relationships to create a sustainable competitive advantage. While entrepreneurs are the
lifeblood of capitalism, the traditional story of capitalism does not tell their story of collaboration and
mutually beneficial relationships for survival.
Second, we do find those instances with limited
resources and minimal growth in the form of some
commodity markets. According to traditional strategic thinking, this situation leads to intense rivalry
and should be avoided. However, value-creation can
emerge from joint resolution of issues rather than in
determining a single winner. Using imagination to
create sustainable collaborative relationships can lead
managers to be more effective within even highly
competitive markets. Large gains in prosperity
throughout history are associated more with mutually beneficial trade (which creates value) than with
dominance (which tries to capture value).
The modern descendant of this focus on competition rather than cooperation is exemplified in
the much used Porter’s Five Forces analysis of
industries (Porter, 1985). While strategists were
focusing on the bargaining power of organizations
versus their customer and suppliers, managers were
realizing that a good relationship with their supply
chain partners could be a competitive advantage.
Using Porter’s Five Forces analysis would lead one
to assume that a single, strong relationship with a
stakeholder would be detrimental as that stakeholder
would hold too much power over the firm. In fact,
all of the work within the automobile industry in
the past two decades in reducing suppliers and
creating long-term sustainable relationships would
be considered to be to the detriment of each of
manufacturers. This analysis relies on the assumption
that firms and individuals are in competition with
each other.
The problem of business ethics
If, as is assumed in the current narrative of capitalism,
individuals are in a constant survival mode with
value being ‘taken’ rather than ‘created,’ ethics is
assumed to have a limited (and even detrimental)
role in capitalism. We are faced with a continual
‘‘Ethics Crisis’’ as we have mistakenly taught managers that business within capitalism is by its very
nature amoral. Individuals are in competition with
others for limited resources and societal rules are
assumed to be of limited value. The traditional
models of capitalism needlessly separate capitalism
from ethics by making the foundations of capitalism
competition and autonomy. This Separation Fallacy
is described by Freeman (1994):
The discourse of business and the discourse of ethics
can be separated so that sentences like, ‘‘x is a business
decision’’ have no moral content, and ‘x is a moral
decision’ have no business content.
The problem of business ethics is that ethics is left
out from the story of capitalism. Rather than
acknowledging the moral dimensions of every decisions – whether in business or not – academics and
practitioners have created a separate sphere of norms,
rules, and morals and named it capitalism where
competition and winning dictate the rules of the game.
Stakeholder Capitalism
Ironically, the arguments against acknowledging
values or morality within a survival of the fittest
narrative of capitalism ignores the fact that moral
concepts, such as relationships, mutually beneficial
agreements, teams, trust, honesty, and care are
necessary in those instances when survival of the
individual, group, or organization is at stake. As
Daniel Dennett (1995) illustrates, evolutionary theory or jungle metaphors do not negate ethics and
morality in and of themselves. Mutually beneficial
agreements (versus opportunism), group focus (versus individualism), and empathy (versus narcissism)
foster surviving and thriving.
The Separation Fallacy is evidenced by the phrase
‘‘It’s just business’’ which runs rampant within
society and seeps into the business ethics literature.
We see the dominance of investor rights, the
diminishment of good, moral decisions at the sight
of any profit-taking, and the very question if we
should consider value-systems when assessing a
business decision, leader, or organization. Business
ethicists reinforce this separation of moral and capitalist rules with the constant question of if and how
to reintegrate the two and the assumption that
capitalism is based on competition.
In doing so, this approach guides managers to
ignore the ethical implications of their decisions.
This, however, does not make their decisions
amoral; rather it causes managers to ‘‘do ethics badly
(Wicks and Freeman, 1996).’’ Business ethicists are
left to add ethics back into the story of capitalism.
The problem of the dominant group
This competitive framing of capitalism leads to debates over who is the ‘‘dominant’’ group in a market
– the ideas of competition tumble over to those
intimately involved in the organization. The focus is
on the conflicting needs and demands of labor,
government, investors, and managers in the hopes of
resolving the ‘inherent’ conflicts. As such, one group
must dominate in order to win the conflict and
thereby prioritizing the demands. The ensuing
relationships are ‘‘fraught with tension’’ (Freeman
et al., 2006).
The problem of the dominant group is that there
must be one group whose rights trump the rights of
others. The wishful thinking behind this view goes
309
something like, ‘‘if only we were all to just follow
the right leading group and align our interests with
theirs, the ills of capitalism would be solved, and we
would become more prosperous.’’
For Keynes, the government’s rights and responsibilities supersede all others. For Marx, the laborers
rights have been ignored for too long. Berle and
Means’ major contribution was in securing separate
rights for management. Friedman’s focus on investor
rights diminished the role of all other stakeholders
including government. After securing dominant
rights, each narrative positions the organization in
existence to serve the needs of the corresponding
dominant group. Not only must the goals of the
dominant group become the goal of the organization,
but all organizational decisions must then take into
account the rights of this dominant group.
These narratives do not simply ignore other
stakeholders. Rather, each narrative presumes that
by focusing on the interests and rights of their
dominant group, all other stakeholders will benefit.
Friedman is particularly pointed when he argues that
in allowing investors to prosper, all others will
benefit as a result. We see many benefits in meeting
the needs of a dominant group in these narratives
including:
• The economy is prevented ‘‘from falling into
a rut and precludes those who constitute the
economy from falling into lethargy’’ (Baumol).
• Society is lead toward ideal values (Keynes).
• All other stakeholders see better results
(Friedman).
• Economic growth rises (Friedman and
Schumpeter).
• Income justly distributed to other stakeholders (Berle and Means).
• Alternative, nonproductive interests kept in
balance (Marx, Berle and Means).
Such a paternalistic treatment of stakeholders
acknowledges stakeholders existence and need to
thrive yet subsumes stakeholders’ interests to those of
the dominant group.
Each of these views improperly focuses on one
group to the detriment of all others. We may
encounter specific instances where the needs of one
310
R. Edward Freeman et al.
group – e.g. the investor – trumps those of others.
However, by entering into every decision with this
type of a priori prioritization leads academics and
practitioners to make decisions that can hurt the
long-term value creation of the company.
In practice, placing stakeholders in opposition to
one another leads to a focus on winning and losing as
opposed to working together. Situations are analyzed with an either/or mentality since requirements
of the different groups are assumed to be in opposition.
The problem of business in a liberal democracy
When we create the problems of competition,
business ethics, and dominant groups, we also generate corresponding roles for government to fix
these problems. This Problem of Business in a Liberal Democracy is a problem of creating a larger,
more intrusive government in a system that is
founded on a liberal democracy.
The state has three primary roles in support of the
problems created above. First, the government resolves conflicts between stakeholders. With winners,
losers, and limited resources (The Problem of
Competition) comes the role of the referee to resolve those conflicts. Rather than allowing organizations and individuals to create their own
relationships, the state becomes the place to resolve
conflicting, because individuals ‘‘cannot be trusted
to find solutions that will benefit society.’’
Second, the state legislates morality of capitalism.
Amoral capitalists (The Problem of Business Ethics)
necessitates the legislation of morality on business,
organizations, and individuals. This is most commonly seen through the legal system, were they
boundaries of propriety are laid out, clear as night
and day. It is assumed that individuals and organizations are allowed to move freely and within moral
norms within the bounds set by legislators.
Third, the state redistributes resources. When one
group is assumed to dominate all others in the
acquisition of resources (The Problem of the
Dominant Group), the government is called upon to
redistribute those resources when they become too
unbalanced. One group is assumed to be constantly
taking from all others; and the government is in
existence to protect these disadvantaged groups and
redistribute the resources through a tax code.
Ironically, these roles for the state are self-perpetuating. When government is assigned roles to
solve problems that, as is argued in this paper, were
never systemic problems, we are left with a solution
in search of a problem and a solution that begets
more problems. As government fulfills its role, the
consequences are a continuation of a problem rather
than a solution:
• If we set up rules governing morality of
individuals and organizations, we absolve
those agents of their responsibility to conduct business within community norms.
That is now the government’s job. Individuals and organizations within a capitalist society are expected to behave poorly and
without a personal value-system as long as
they stay within the moral code as legislated
– Keynes noted that capitalism without government intervention, would lead society astray from ideal values. As Berle and Means
state, the role of the organization is ‘‘balancing a variety of claims by various groups in
the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of
public policy rather than private cupidity
(Berle and Means, 1932).’’
• If we rely upon the state to redistribute
wealth, they will inevitably make a mistake
and create a further need to re-redistribute
wealth. Milton Friedman warns, ‘‘In fiscal
policy as in monetary policy, all political
considerations aside, we simply do not know
enough to be able to use deliberate changes
in taxation or expenditures as a sensitive stabilizing mechanism. In the process of trying
to do so, we almost surely make matters
worse (Romano and Leiman, 1970).’’
• If we rely upon the state to solve stakeholder
conflicts, individuals and organizations never
develop the imagination required to create
different, mutually beneficial relationships. In
addition, the parties are not expected to
learn how to resolve issues themselves when
the court system was created for such a purpose.
Stakeholder Capitalism
Further, the legislative system is gamed by individuals and organizations and manipulated to their
advantage. As evidenced by the proliferation of civil
court cases, lobbying for favorable legislation, and
industry writing their own regulations (later enforced by the state), businesses have not allowed the
government to be the dictator of capitalism. However, businesses involvement with government also
enlarges and perpetuates the role of government.
Collusion and civil law suits become a strategic tool.
This view of government leaves out a role for the
state as a part of value creation. Rather than solving
disputes and reallocating resources, the state could be
a player in the capitalist system in knocking down
barriers to value creation and trade. However, as it
stands, the government is too busy solving problems
that need not exist.
Stakeholder capitalism
We wish to offer a new vision of capitalism – stakeholder capitalism – founded on libertarian and pragmatist lines. Stakeholder capitalism is not based solely
on private property, self-interest, competition, and
free markets – such a view requires constant justification based on achieving good outcomes or avoiding authoritarian alternatives. We argue that we do
not need to justify capitalistic systems based on the
outcome or the alternatives – the principles of capitalism are worthy goals in and of themselves. Rather
stakeholder capitalism is ‘‘based on freedom, rights,
and the creation by consent of positive obligations.’’
First, adults have freedom to do what they want
including making voluntary agreements that are
sustainable over time. Rather than focusing on
individuals in competition over limited resources as
in traditional narratives of capitalism, stakeholder
capitalism focuses on individuals voluntarily working
together to create sustainable relationships in the
pursuit of value creation.
Second, individuals have rights protecting them in
those agreements. One group’s rights do not prima
facie dominate the narrative of capitalism. Rather,
each stakeholder should be protected within their
voluntary agreements. Finally, those individuals can
decide to cooperate and obligate themselves to others
through those voluntary agreements. These obliga-
311
tions can take the form of formal written contracts or
social contracts with assumed responsibilities. The
relationships are sustainable when these obligations
and responsibilities are upheld.
We offer six principles that together build a
framework for our value creation and trade that
infuses ethics at the foundations, respects the complexity of human beings, fosters innovation, and can
help us move beyond the problems outlined above.
Principles of stakeholder capitalism
1. The Principle of Stakeholder Cooperation – ‘‘Value can
be created, traded, and sustained because stakeholders
can jointly satisfy their needs and desires by making
voluntary agreements with each other that for the most
part are kept.’’
Rather than assume that we are all first and foremost
self-interested and out to maximize our own benefit,
this principle highlights the social nature of value
creation. Value, any value is a social phenomenon.
We must create value in a context, with the help of
others and with others who value what we create.
This principle acknowledges that business activity is
explicitly social and uses that to enhance the process
of value creation.
2. The Principle of Stakeholder Engagement – To
successfully create, trade and sustain value, a business
must engage its stakeholders.’’ Almost every business
transaction involves: customers, suppliers, communities,
employees, and financiers. Other stakeholders, such as
media, additional civil society representatives, NGOs,
etc. are often affected or can affect value creation.’’
Rather than argue over whose rights trump whose,
this principle acknowledges that a large cast of stakeholders are necessary to sustain value creation. As often as possible the needs of multiple stakeholders must
be met. There may be specific situations in which
privileging the rights of one group can benefit others
in the long-term, but this is not clear prima facie, and
must be decided upon by the effected parties.
3. The Principle of Stakeholder Responsibility – Value can be
created, traded, and sustained because parties to an
agreement are willing to accept responsibility for the
consequences of their actions. When third parties are
312
R. Edward Freeman et al.
harmed, they must be compensated, or a new agreement
must be negotiated with all of those parties who are
affected.’’
This principle rejects the view that business is amoral
or even immoral. If business is a social process, then
morality is at its center. Scandals and selfish behavior
are a breach of the trust and transparency that is the
normal for business to flourish. Being proactive
about effects on others, rather than waiting for
government recourse, will help managers build
stakeholder trust and loyalty which will help create
more sustainable business.
4. The Principle of Complexity – Value can be created,
traded, and sustained because human beings are complex psychological creatures capable of acting from
many different values and points of view.’’ Individuals
are socially situated and their values are connected to
their social context.
This principle rejects the cardboard view of human nature at the heart of the current narratives of
capitalism. People are complex, the act for a
variety of reasons. There actions benefit themselves
and others, and people usually take that into account. It is also important to note, that since we
are complex we are able to differentiate consequences based on who is being affected. It is part
of human nature to care more about consequences
that affect those we are close to, than those that
affect others. That is another reason why the
Principle of Stakeholder Responsibility is important. It helps to balance our natural tendency to
discriminate and reminds us that despite our differences and separation we still can have profound
effects on each other.
Based on these principles, capitalism becomes
‘‘the voluntary associations of fair, responsible,
cooperation, consenting, and complex adults’’ and
does not include competition or self-interest as
foundational assumptions.
5. The Principle of Continuous Creation – ‘‘Business as an
institution is a source of the creation of value. Cooperating with stakeholders and motivated by values,
businesspeople continuously create new sources of
value.’’
Self-interest is not the only source of innovation or
progress. Working with others and for others can be
a stronger motivation to enhance the pace of progress.
6. The Principle of Emergent Competition – ‘‘Competition
emerges from a relatively free society so that stakeholders have options.’’ ‘‘Competition is an emergent property rather than a necessary assumption to
capitalism.’’
This principle also highlights the ways in which our
assumption of competition can affect our behavior.
Not every interaction is a zero-sum game and not
every interaction has a win-win solution. We should
do our best to look for the win-win before jumping
to other sub-optimal solutions.
Finally, these principles and the stakeholder capitalism view do not claim to be a panacea. There will
always be a small minority who are focused on their
own self-interest at the expense of others. Our claim
is that we should set the bar for capitalism at the best
we can achieve not limit it by trying to only avoid
the worst. Talking about capitalism this way can
foster behavior along these lines. Those that choose
to exploit the trust of their stakeholders for their
own gain, are doing so at their own peril.
We are not claiming that by adopting these principles we will remove conflict from capitalism and that
from then on things will be easy. In some ways
explicitly dealing with stakeholders is harder than
ignoring them. Participants in the value creation
process will have to have a thick skin, patience, and be
comfortable with conflict and change. These things
are not easy. But creating value necessitates them.
They provide the opportunity for real leadership.
Conclusion
In the social sciences, the way we talk affects what
we see and how we live. The theories we create and
the stories we tell become self-fulfilling prophecies.
We argue that the same process is at work in our
discussions of capitalism. The current narratives of
capitalism assume naı̈ve self interest, the separation of
business and morality, and that valuable resources are
limited. These assumptions form the core of four
problems that we currently face: the problem of
competition, business ethics, dominant groups, and
of business in a liberal democracy. If we are to
overcome these problems we will have to change the
Stakeholder Capitalism
way we talk about business as well as the way we
actually conduct it. The stories we tell and the
assumptions we make about business effects how
business is actually carried out. By making these
assumptions explicit and optional rather than implicit and mandatory, we hope that we can move a
step closer to overcoming the deeply troubling issues
that surface in our current practice of value creation.
Business should be about the best that we can
create together, rather than about avoiding the
worst. If we critically embrace a new set of
assumptions about how value is created, the practice
of business will soon follow. We do not have to
sacrifice the great strides forward to solve some of
the deeply troubling issues with capitalism. We need
to think critically, acknowledge the social nature of
value creation, and work with an insatiable passion
to create value for our stakeholders.
Notes
1
Some of the ideas in this paper appear earlier in:
Freeman (2000), Freeman and Philips (2002), and Freeman et al. (2006). We are grateful to the editors and
publishers for their permission to recast some of the
ideas in these papers here.
References
Baumol, W.: 1990, ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’, The Journal of Political
Economy, 98(5), Part 1. (Oct.), 893–921.
Berle, A. and G. Means: 1932, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc, New
York).
Dennett, D.: 1995, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (Simon &
Schuster, New York).
Freeman, R. E.: 1994, ‘The Politics of Stakeholder
Theory’, Business Ethics Quarterly 4(4), 409–422.
Freeman, R. E.: 2000, ‘Business Ethics at the Millennium’, Business Ethics Quarterly 10(1), 169–180.
Freeman, R. E., K. Martin and B. Parmar: 2006, ‘Ethics
and Capitalism’, In M. Epstein and K. Hanson (eds.),
The Accountable Corporation, Volume 2: Business Ethics
(Praeger, Westport, CT), pp. 193–208.
Freeman, R. E. and R. Philips: 2002, ‘Stakeholder
Theory: A Libertarian Defense’, Business Ethics Quarterly 12(3), 331–350.
313
Friedman, M.: 1962, Capitalism and Freedom (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Hoover, K. R.: 2003, Economics as Ideology (Rowman and
Littlefield, Lantham, MD).
Kirzner, I. M.;: 1985, Discovery and the Capitalist Process
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Kirzner, I.: 1979, Perception, Opportunity, and Profit: Studies
in the Theory of Entrepreneurship (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago).
Marris, R.: 1964, The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’
Capitalism (Free Press, Glencoe, IL).
Marx, K. and F. Engels: 2007, The Principles of Communism [electronic version], accessed June 19, 2007,
from Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org)
1993, 1999, (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1847/11/prin-com.htm).
Marx, K. and F. Engels: 2007, Wage and Labor Capital
[electronic version], accessed June 19, 2007, from
Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 1993,
1999, (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/
1847/wage-labour/index.htm).
Marx, K. and F. Engels: 2007, The Communist Manifesto
[the electronic version], accessed June 19, 2007, from
Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxist.org) 1993,
1999 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/
1848/Communist-manifesto/index.htm).
McLellan, D. and S. Sayers (eds.): 1990, Socialism and
Morality (The Macmillan Press LTD, London).
Porter, M.: 1985, Competitive Advantage (The Free Press,
NY).
Romano, R. and M. Leiman: 1970, Views on Capitalism
(Glencoe Press, Beverly Hills, CA).
Sarasvathy, S.: 2001, ‘Causation and Effectuation: Toward a Theoretical Shift from Economic Inevitability
to Entrepreneurial Contingency’, Academy of Management Review 26(2), 243–288.
Schumpeter, J.: 1942, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
(Harper Brothers Press, New York).
Shane, S. and S. Venkataraman: 2000, ‘The Promise of
Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research’, Academy of
Management Review 25(1), 217–226.
Skidelsky, R.: 1995, ‘The Role of Ethics in Keynes’
Economics’, In S. Brittain and A. Hamilton (eds.),
Market Capitalism and Moral Values (Edward Elgar
Publishing, Brookfield).
Stewart, M.: 1999, Keynes and After (Penguin Press,
London).
Wicks, A. and Freeman R. Edward. 1998: ‘Organization
Studies and the New Pragmatism: Positivism, AntiPositivism, and the Scarch for Ethics’, Organization
Science, 9(2), (Mar – Apr.), 123–140.
314
R. Edward Freeman et al.
R. Edward Freeman and Bidhan Parmar
The Darden School of Business Administration,
The University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, VA, U.S.A.
E-mail: freemane@darden.virginia.edu
E-mail: Parmarb07@darden.virginia.edu
Kirsten Martin
The Catholic University of America,
Washington, DC, U.S.A.
E-mail: martink@cua.edu
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Rev. Confirming Pages
Milton Friedman
When I hear businessmen speak eloquently about the “social responsibilities of business
in a free-enterprise system,” I am reminded of the wonderful line about the Frenchman
who discovered at the age of 70 that he had been speaking prose all his life. The businessmen believe that they are defending free enterprise when they declaim that business is
not concerned “merely” with profit but also with promoting desirable “social” ends; that
business has a “social conscience” and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing
employment, eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the
catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers. In fact they are—or would be if they
or anyone else took them seriously—preaching pure and unadulterated socialism. Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been
undermining the basis of a free society these past decades.
The discussions of the “social responsibilities of business” are notable for their analytical looseness and lack of rigor. What does it mean to say that “business” has responsibilities? Only people have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person and in this
sense may have artificial responsibilities, but “business” as a whole cannot be said to have
responsibilities, even in this vague sense. The first step toward clarity in examining the
doctrine of the social responsibility of business is to ask precisely what it implies for whom.
Presumably, the individuals who are to be responsible are businessmen, which means
individual proprietors or corporate executives. Most of the discussion of social responsibility is directed at corporations, so in what follows I shall mostly neglect the individual
proprietors and speak of corporate executives.
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of
the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the society, both
those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. Of course, in some cases
his employers may have a different objective. A group of persons might establish a corporation for an eleemosynary purpose—for example, a hospital or a school. The manager of
such a corporation will not have money profit as his objective but the rendering of certain
services.
In either case, the key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate executive, the manager
is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation or establish the eleemosynary
institution, and his primary responsibility is to them.
Appendix A
The Social Responsibility of Business Is
to Increase Its Profits
Source: Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” New York Times
Magazine, September 13, 1970.
211
ghi24697_app_211-227.indd 211
2/8/11 8:20 PM
Confirming Pages
Needless to say, this does not mean that it is easy to judge how well he is performing his
task. But at least the criterion of performance is straightforward, and the persons among
whom a voluntary contractual arrangement exists are clearly defined.
Of course, the corporate executive is also a person in his own right. As a person, he may
have many other responsibilities that he recognizes or assumes voluntarily—to his family,
his conscience, his feelings of charity, his church, his clubs, his city, his country. He may
feel impelled by these responsibilities to devote part of his income to causes he regards as
worthy, to refuse to work for particular corporations, even to leave his job, for example, to
join his country’s armed forces. If we wish, we may refer to some of these responsibilities
as “social responsibilities.” But in these respects he is acting as a principal, not an agent; he
is spending his own money or time or energy, not the money of his employers or the time
or energy he has contracted to devote to their purposes. If these are “social responsibilities,” they are the social responsibilities of individuals, not business.
What does it mean to say that the corporate executive has a “social responsibility” in
his capacity as businessman? If this statement is not pure rhetoric, it must mean that he
is to act in some way that is not in the interest of his employers. For example, that he is to
refrain from increasing the price of the product in order to contribute to the social objective of preventing inflation, even though a price increase would be in the best interests
of the corporation. Or that he is to make expenditures on reducing pollution beyond the
amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or that is required by law in order to
contribute to the social objective of improving the environment. Or that, at the expense of
corporate profits, he is to hire “hardcore” unemployed instead of better qualified available
workmen to contribute to the social objective of reducing poverty.
In each of these cases, the corporate executive would be spending someone else’s
money for a general social interest. Insofar as his actions in accord with his “social responsibility” reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions
raise the price to customers, he is spending the customers’ money. Insofar as his actions
lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.
The stockholders or the customers or the employees could separately spend their own
money on the particular action if they wished to do so. The executive is exercising a distinct
“social responsibility,” rather than serving as an agent of the stockholders or the customers
or the employees, only if he spends the money in a different way than they would have
spent it.
But if he does this, he is in effect imposing taxes, on the one hand, and deciding how the
tax proceeds shall be spent, on the other.
This process raises political questions on two levels: principle and consequences. On
the level of political principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds
are governmental functions. We have established elaborate constitutional, parliamentary
and judicial provisions to control these functions, to assure that taxes are imposed so far as
possible in accordance with the preferences and desires of the public—after all, “taxation
without representation” was one of the battle cries of the American Revolution. We have a
system of checks and balances to separate the legislative function of imposing taxes and
enacting expenditures from the executive function of collecting taxes and administering
expenditure programs and from the judicial function of mediating disputes and interpreting the law.
Here the businessman—self-selected or appointed directly or indirectly by stockholders—
is to be simultaneously legislator, executive and jurist. He is to decide whom to tax by how
much and for what purpose, and he is to spend the proceeds—all this guided only by general exhortations from on high to restrain inflation, improve the environment, fight poverty
and so on and on.
The whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by the
stockholders is that the executive is an agent serving the interests of his principal. This
justification disappears when the corporate executive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for “social” purposes. He becomes in effect a public employee, a civil servant, even
though he remains in name an employee of a private enterprise. On grounds of political
principle, it is intolerable that such civil servants—insofar as their actions in the name of
social responsibility are real and not just window-dressing—should be selected as they are
now. If they are to be civil servants, then they must be elected through a political process.
If they are to impose taxes and make expenditures to foster “social” objectives, then political machinery must be set up to make the assessment of taxes and to determine through a
political process the objectives to be served.
This is the basic reason why the doctrine of “social responsibility” involves the acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the
appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses.
On the grounds of consequences, can the corporate executive in fact discharge his
alleged “social responsibilities”? On the one hand, suppose he could get away with spending the stockholders’ or customers’ or employees’ money. How is he to know how to spend
it? He is told that he must contribute to fighting inflation. How is he to know what action
of his will contribute to that end? He is presumably an expert in running his company—in
212
• Business Ethics Now
ghi24697_app_211-227.indd 212
01/02/11 3:12 PM
Confirming Pages
producing a product or selling it or financing it. But nothing about his selection makes him
an expert on inflation. Will his holding down the price of his product reduce inflationary
pressure? Or, by leaving more spending power in the hands of his customers, simply divert
it elsewhere? Or, by forcing him to produce less because of the lower price, will it simply
contribute to shortages? Even if he could answer these questions, how much cost is he justified in imposing on his stockholders, customers and employees for this social purpose?
What is his appropriate share and what is the appropriate share of others?
And, whether he wants to or not, can he get away with spending his stockholders’, customers’ or employees’ money? Will not the stockholders fire him? (Either the present ones
or those who take over when his actions in the name of social responsibility have reduced
the corporation’s profits and the price of its stock.) His customers and his employees can
desert him for other producers and employers less scrupulous in exercising their social
responsibilities.
This facet of “social responsibility” doctrine is brought into sharp relief when the doctrine is used to justify wage restraint by trade unions. The conflict of interest is naked and
clear when union officials are asked to subordinate the interest of their members to some
more general purpose. If the union officials try to enforce wage restraint, the consequence
is likely to be wildcat strikes, rank-and-file revolts and the emergence of strong competitors for their jobs. We thus have the ironic phenomenon that union leaders—at least in the
U.S.—have objected to Government interference with the market far more consistently and
courageously than have business leaders.
The difficulty of exercising “social responsibility” illustrates, of course, the great virtue
of private competitive enterprise—it forces people to be responsible for their own actions
and makes it difficult for them to “exploit” other people for either selfish or unselfish purposes. They can do good—but only at their own expense.
Many a reader who has followed the argument this far may be tempted to remonstrate
that it is all well and good to speak of Government’s having the responsibility to impose
taxes and determine expenditures for such “social” purposes as controlling pollution or
training the hard-core unemployed, but that the problems are too urgent to wait on the
slow course of political processes, that the exercise of social responsibility by businessmen
is a quicker and surer way to solve pressing current problems.
Aside from the question of fact—I share Adam Smith’s skepticism about the benefits that
can be expected from “those who affected to trade for the public good”—this argument
must be rejected on the grounds of principle. What this amounts to is an assertion that
those who favor the taxes and expenditures in question have failed to persuade a majority
of their fellow citizens to be of like mind and that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic
procedures what they cannot attain by democratic procedures. In a free society, it is hard
for “evil” people to do “evil,” especially since one man’s good is another’s evil.
I have, for simplicity, concentrated on the special case of the corporate executive, except
only for the brief digression on trade unions. But precisely the same argument applies to
the newer phenomenon of calling upon stockholders to require corporations to exercise
social responsibility (the recent G.M. crusade, for example). In most of these cases, what
is in effect involved is some stockholders trying to get other stockholders (or customers or
employees) to contribute against their will to “social” causes favored by activists. Insofar
as they succeed, they are again imposing taxes and spending the proceeds.
The situation of the individual proprietor is somewhat different. If he acts to reduce the
returns of his enterprise in order to exercise his “social responsibility,” he is spending his
own money, not someone else’s. If he wishes to spend his money on such purposes, that
is his right and I cannot see that there is any objection to his doing so. In the process, he,
too, may impose costs on employees and customers. However, because he is far less likely
than a large corporation or union to have monopolistic power, any such side effects will
tend to be minor.
Of course, in practice the doctrine of social responsibility is frequently a cloak for actions
that are justified on other grounds rather than a reason for those actions.
To illustrate, it may well be in the long-run interest of a corporation that is a major
employer in a small community to devote resources to providing amenities to that community or to improving its government. That may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and sabotage or have other
worthwhile effects. Or it may be that, given the laws about the deductibility of corporate
charitable contributions, the stockholders can contribute more to charities they favor by
having the corporation make the gift than by doing it themselves, since they can in that way
contribute an amount that would otherwise have been paid as corporate taxes.
In each of these—and many similar—cases, there is a strong temptation to rationalize
these actions as an exercise of “social responsibility.” In the present climate of opinion, with
its widespread aversion to “capitalism,” “profits,” the “soulless corporation” and so on, this
is one way for a corporation to generate goodwill as a by-product of expenditures that are
entirely justified in its own self-interest.
It would be inconsistent of me to call on corporate executives to refrain from this hypocritical window-dressing because it harms the foundation of a free society. That would be to
Appendix A
ghi24697_app_211-227.indd 213
•
213
01/02/11 3:12 PM
Confirming Pages
call on them to exercise a “social responsibility”! If our institutions, and the attitudes of the
public make it in their self-interest to cloak their actions in this way, I cannot summon much
indignation to denounce them. At the same time, I can express admiration for those individual proprietors or owners of closely held corporations or stockholders of more broadly
held corporations who disdain such tactics as approaching fraud.
Whether blameworthy or not, the use of the cloak of social responsibility, and the nonsense spoken in its name by influential and prestigious businessmen, does clearly harm the
foundations of a free society. I have been impressed time and again by the schizophrenic
character of many businessmen. They are capable of being extremely far-sighted and clearheaded in matters that are internal to their businesses. They are incredibly short-sighted
and muddle-headed in matters that are outside their businesses but affect the possible
survival of business in general. This short-sightedness is strikingly exemplified in the calls
from many businessmen for wage and price guidelines or controls or income policies.
There is nothing that could do more in a brief period to destroy a market system and
replace it by a centrally controlled system than effective governmental control of prices
and wages.
The short-sightedness is also exemplified in speeches by businessmen on social responsibility. This may gain them kudos in the short run. But it helps to strengthen the already too
prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed and
controlled by external forces. Once this view is adopted, the external forces that curb the
market will not be the social consciences, however highly developed, of the pontificating
executives; it will be the iron fist of Government bureaucrats. Here, as with price and wage
controls, businessmen seem to me to reveal a suicidal impulse.
The political principle that underlies the market mechanism is unanimity. In an ideal free
market resting on private property, no individual can coerce any other, all cooperation is
voluntary, all parties to such cooperation benefit or they need not participate. There are not
values, no “social” responsibilities in any sense other than the shared values and responsibilities of individuals. Society is a collection of individuals and of the various groups they
voluntarily form.
The political principle that underlies the political mechanism is conformity. The individual must serve a more general social interest—whether that be determined by a church or
a dictator or a majority. The individual may have a vote and say in what is to be done, but if
he is overruled, he must conform. It is appropriate for some to require others to contribute
to a general social purpose whether they wish to or not.
Unfortunately, unanimity is not always feasible. There are some respects in which conformity appears unavoidable, so I do not see how one can avoid the use of the political
mechanism altogether.
But the doctrine of “social responsibility” taken seriously would extend the scope of
the political mechanism to every human activity. It does not differ in philosophy from the
most explicitly collective doctrine. It differs only by professing to believe that collectivist
ends can be attained without collectivist means. That is why, in my book Capitalism and
Freedom, I have called it a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” in a free society, and have
said that in such a society, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without
deception or fraud.”
214
• Business Ethics Now
ghi24697_app_211-227.indd 214
01/02/11 3:12 PM
Purchase answer to see full
attachment