CHAPTER FOUR

HARLEM: DISPLACEMENT, NOT INTEGRATION

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Since 2003, city-backed rezonings have ushered in thousands of new, mostly higher-income and white residents to the historically affordable, black neighborhood of Harlem. On the surface, this might appear to be a positive step towards racial integration. However, the widely held notion that statistically mixed neighborhoods by themselves will end racial discrimination, segregation, and inequality is largely unsupported (Cheshire 2007). The 2003 Frederick Douglass Boulevard and 2009 125th Street Corridor rezonings, in particular, have raised land values and increased real estate speculation, resulting in the displacement of longtime black and Latino residents and businesses. Instead of helping to “integrate” Harlem, the rezonings are expanding the white community on the west side of Manhattan at the expense of the people of color who have lived in and built the community.

The rezonings continue the city’s history, dating back to the 19th century, of pushing black residents out of lower Manhattan and, later, Midtown. Now they are being pushed out of Harlem.
The Frederick Douglass Boulevard rezoning spurred the development of residential towers and renovation of low-rise housing for luxury markets. The City Planning Commission's approval of the Frederick Douglass rezoning did not mention race. The rezoning proposal did not address Harlem's role as a historically and predominantly black neighborhood, nor present the rezoning as a tool for achieving racial integration, nor forecast racial impacts at all. Simply put, the city did not plan for the racially disparate impacts of the rezoning in Harlem. In the 125th Street Rezoning, facing mounting local opposition, city planners did respond to resident concerns of displacement, but even these responses remained race neutral.

The gentrification of Harlem was driven largely by economic factors that ignored and threatened the neighborhood's significance as an African American cultural and economic mecca. However, zoning and housing policies played a powerful role by increasing displacement pressures in this community that had thrived despite decades of city neglect. As a result, Harlem's black population is at its lowest in a century and is continuing to decline, while many remaining black and Latino residents face rising rents, landlord harassment, racist and violent policing, and stagnant incomes. Small black-owned businesses that provide affordable services, hubs for community engagement, and local jobs are also being displaced by residential development and skyrocketing commercial rents. New Harlem residents, most of them white and upper-income, are afforded the benefits

04.B Neighborhood Map:
Central Harlem—Manhattan
Community Board 10
of better amenities and safer streets, living in enclaves largely immune to the challenges facing their neighbors.

The multiple rezoning actions did not reduce segregation but only strengthened its hold.

HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Home to leading black civil rights leaders, clergy, and artists from the Harlem Renaissance to the present, Harlem is recognized around the world as the African American cultural center of New York City and, arguably, the United States. Since the early 20th century, Harlem has been a black residential neighborhood and business district.

In 1910, blacks constituted about 10 percent of central Harlem’s population. By 1930, the beginnings of the great migration from the South and the influx from downtown Manhattan neighborhoods where blacks were less welcome made them a 70 percent majority. Their share of the neighborhood’s population (98 percent) and total numbers (233,000) peaked in 1950 (Roberts 2010).

Today, by some accounts, Harlem is no longer a majority black neighborhood (Roberts 2010). And the reality facing many residents of color is starkly different than that of their (mostly new) white neighbors. Black and Latino residents earn significantly less than white residents in Central Harlem: in 2013, the median income was $82,411 for non-Hispanic whites, more than
twice the median income of black residents ($33,289) and Latinos ($27,804). The area continues to face high rates of poverty amidst the rising cost of living (Furman Center 2014).

Harlem has a widely varied housing stock ranging from low-rise walk-ups to mid-size apartment complexes. There are Mitchell-Lama rental and cooperative buildings and a large stock of public housing. Now, glass condominium and rental towers and large shopping complexes are beginning to shape the Harlem landscape as well, particularly in the Frederick Douglass and 125th Street rezoning areas, where real estate values have skyrocketed in recent decades.

Public planning policies have long threatened the quality of life, residential stability, and community health and cohesion of black Harlemites. In the mid-20th century, urban renewal plans displaced many poor black residents from so-called slum housing in order to create new large-scale housing and commercial development. Redevelopment, however, did not usually benefit those it displaced. Many who lost their homes were not able to relocate locally. Those who were able to secure residence in new public housing were often subject to discrimination and racial steering. Harlem’s public housing developments were majority black and Latino, while white residents secured housing in other neighborhoods with more economic and political resources (Dagen Bloom 2009).

The city’s massive investments in parks and other infrastructure under Robert Moses largely excluded Harlem, with less than a quarter of investments made above 100th Street. Later, during the city’s fiscal crisis of the
1970s, disinvestment led thousands of landlords to abandon their properties; the city became the owner by default and did a poor job improving conditions. For decades, absent sufficient city investment and facing high rates of poverty, black Harlem residents built up their community with locally owned businesses and community organizations (Gill 2011).

This successful community-led investment helped lay the groundwork for private real estate-led development in the 1990s and early 2000s, which once again put Harlem’s black residents at risk. In the 1970s, the city owned two-thirds of Harlem’s developable property; many properties were sold at auction to speculative developers, sometimes as large, consolidated parcels (Gill 2011, 411). The city’s goal was to sell off publicly owned land in order to spur development (Gorrild et al. 2008). While these parcels could have been used to subsidize much-needed low-income housing, the city instead cut back on collaborations with community-based non-profit groups. As city (and federal) policy shifted the focus of affordable housing development to middle-income housing, those non-profits that could secure partnerships with the city followed suit (Little 2002). Also during this period, the federal and state governments cut capital and operating funds for public housing. Thus, market-rate housing development took off while the low- and moderate-income housing stock aged and dwindled. In the late 1990s, local elected officials and business leaders helped launch a federally backed economic development program known as the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone (UMEZ), which brought large-scale commercial redevelopment and multinational retail corporations to Harlem’s

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04.E HarlemUSA commercial development.

In 1998, the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone brought some of the first multinational chain stores to 125th Street. Photo: Sylvia Morse, 2016
historic 125th Street (Hyra 2008). The commercial corridor, once known for black-owned specialty shops and street vendors, began to look like "some alter ego of a middle-American mall" (Hyra 2008; Little 2002).

By the early 2000s, the pressures of gentrification had intensified and there was a growing awareness of the plans being advanced by the city and developers. In the summer of 2002, residents organized rallies and town halls and formed a community-led housing task force to push public officials to address rising housing costs. Despite vocal public engagement on the issue of displacement, the city remained focused on enhancing real estate opportunities and subsidizing upper-middle and high-income housing. The city then embarked on the first large-scale rezoning of Harlem since the 1961 Zoning Resolution—the Frederick Douglass Boulevard Rezoning.

THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS BOULEVARD REZONING

In 2003, the Department of City Planning (DCP) proposed to rezone 44 blocks of Central Harlem to promote residential and commercial growth. Citing Harlem's growing population and new development, much of which was out of scale with the surrounding townhouses and small apartment buildings, DCP's stated goals were to "address Harlem's growing need for new housing" and expand commercial uses for this "growing community." DCP's approach included residential upzonings on the avenues and main streets, while introducing contextual zones on the mid-blocks to promote conformity with the existing low-rise housing. The rezoning aimed to increase ground-floor retail with new commercial overlays on the high-traffic 116th Street. Ultimately, the plan increased the residential capacity of the rezoning area's 44 blocks by 50 percent, or 6,713,744 square feet.

The rezoning supported real estate market trends, benefitting property owners and speculative investors without including protections for tenants.

- Community District 10
- 125th Street
- Rezoning Area
- Marcus Garvey Park
- East Harlem
- Central Harlem
- West Harlem
- St. Nicholas Park
- Central Park
- Upzoned Residential
- Upzoned Commercial
- Downzoned Residential (Contextual)

New York City Department of City Planning, December 2015.
This growth, however, would not affect all parts of the community uniformly. The population growth analysis and related rezoning proposal presented by DCP did not include income or racial data to address demographic shifts and types of housing needs. The rezoning supported real estate market trends, benefiting property owners and speculative investors without including protections for tenants.

In the context of the city's hot residential market, owners of low-density housing and commercial buildings in upzoned areas would have incentives to sell their properties as development sites for new residential buildings. Luxury development on these sites and on vacant lots would also increase land values and rents in surrounding blocks. The contextual downzoning to "preserve [side streets] blockfronts" would limit denser residential development in those areas, but it put tenants at risk by protecting the rising property values of townhouses (Rich 2003). Harlem had low rates of black homeownership, and many residents rented small units or single rooms in structures built as one- and two-family homes (Feltz 2008). Absent significant affordable housing preservation programs, both the upzoning and downzoning components of this plan threatened low- and moderate-income renters.

RESIDENTS RAISE THE ISSUE OF DISPLACEMENT

In the months leading up to the Frederick Douglass Boulevard rezoning, residents expressed their concerns about rising housing costs and limited availability. Sharon Wilson, a long-time Harlem resident and city employee, for instance, told reporters in 2002 that, "remaining in the community seems impossible [...] Generally, one-bedroom rentals that once would have been considered high at $500 now go for $1,300 to $1,500 [per month]." In the year before the rezoning, unlawful evictions and pressure on rent-stabilized tenants were on the rise. As resident organizer Nellie Bailey told The Village Voice, "We have seen a sharp increase in people losing their apartments due to landlord harassment for problems other than non-payment [...] Money is in the air and everybody wants to get on the gentrification bandwagon" (Little 2002).

Affordable housing development was not a strong component of the plan. The DCP objectives for the rezoning included "foster[ing] new opportunities for residential development" accessible across income ranges, but did not name income-targeted housing as an outcome in many public documents related to the rezoning. The plan did include height and bulk
bonuses for projects that utilized the optional Quality Housing program to set aside income-targeted housing units, but voluntary affordable housing programs have historically created few affordable units, especially absent additional subsidy (Madar 2015; Dulchin, Gates and Williams 2014).

The city did not include a robust affordable housing program even though residents were clearly demanding it in the public review process that preceded the rezoning. Residents expressed concerns about the lack of low-income housing programs in public meetings with multiple city agencies, some of them unrelated to the rezoning. The city’s position, as one reporter put it, was that “it’s not worth sinking low-income subsidies into a community where housing can easily sell at market rate” with the right zoning incentives (Little 2002). A representative of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) told the reporter, “In a world of finite resources, government is intended to spur a private market where it is not working on its own.” HPD is not responsible for zoning, but does shape city housing policies and programs that play a central role in supporting public and private housing investment. In Harlem, HPD contended that there was a more – than – adequate supply of low-income housing that was not threatened by emerging real estate interests (Little 2002).

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Despite growing concern at the time of the rezoning around gentrification and the need for affordable housing, the plan drew little political opposition. Residents did not organize against the plan in great numbers, and as a result, political representatives did not push back on the plan. The community board unanimously supported the rezoning. The CPC unanimously approved the plan at a public hearing absent public comment.6
Given the widespread concerns with affordable housing and displacement that were expressed at other forums at the time of the rezoning, why did the plan receive such a muted public response? Many residents may not have been aware of the plan: the DCP under Bloomberg primarily disseminated zoning information through community boards, which have limited reach and disproportionate engagement from older residents and homeowners. This rezoning was among the earliest of the Bloomberg administration’s nearly 140 rezonings and many may not have been familiar with the complex land use review process or the plan’s potential impacts. Another reason could be the solid support for the rezoning by the Harlem political establishment.

THE IMPACT OF THE REZONING: NEW UPScale DEVELOPMENT AND LESS AFFORDABLE HOUSING

The Frederick Douglass rezoning substantially increased the residential and commercial development capacity in a low-income black neighborhood already struggling with rising housing costs and displacement. Simultaneously, the rezoning failed to include strong provisions for the creation and preservation of low- and middle-income housing. The rezoning resulted in the displacement of residents and also began to reshape the commercial landscape, community networks, and cultural life of geographic Harlem.

After the rezoning, "development took off," according to a report by The Real Deal magazine. New upscale housing, hotel, and commercial construction was initially concentrated along the newly upzoned Frederick Douglass Boulevard, with every investment inviting another. A representative of the Harlem office of the Corcoran real estate group said, "We think it's an absolutely great location, primarily because we are in a development corridor" (Strozier 2015).

By 2009, there were "probably 15 or 20 new condo or co-op buildings that [had] popped up between 110th and 125th along Frederick Douglass Boulevard in the past six or seven years," according to a Harlem-based realtor (Arieff 2009). By 2012, according to an account in The New York Times, "when condos hit the market, they go quickly, with the average price for a one-bedroom at about a half-million dollars" (Gregory 2012).

These new developments were outside of the price range of the average Harlem resident, and the new units were not marketed to them.
The Livmor, for instance, a luxury condominium on Frederick Douglass Boulevard built after the rezoning, offered:

one-, two- and three-bedroom apartments from 808 to 2,100 square feet and priced from the mid $400,000s to $1.1 million or $1.2 million, some with private roof terraces. Amenities [...] include a yoga studio, a media room with projection TV, a children’s play space and a kitchen for catered events (Arieff 2009).

A real estate executive managing the sales explains their marketing approach and target demographic, and confirms that the rezoned area is essentially an extension of the Upper West Side:

I consider the Franklin (sic) Douglass Boulevard corridor to be an extension of the Upper West Side at this point [...] Many years ago, some people said you couldn’t go above 68th Street, and now it is even above 125th Street. [Buyers at the Livmor are] people who are perhaps priced out of the Upper West Side. It is like any emerging neighborhood [...] People have been moving to these various areas because of the attraction of the size of the apartments and the affordability of the product” (Arieff 2009).
Another Harlem realtor echoed this viewpoint, saying, “Any buyer that comes up here is going to spend much less than in other parts of the city and get more, and these luxury buildings are attracting a wider audience” (emphasis added) (Arieff 2009). In other words, new residential development explicitly targeted higher income households moving into the neighborhood, rather than creating new rental or homeownership opportunities for Harlem’s longtime, mostly black residents even as they called for the preservation and development of low- and moderate-income housing.

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Existing low-rise apartment buildings, many of them rent-stabilized, and townhouses were redeveloped for the new upscale market as well, particularly in the contextual downzoning area. A growing luxury market for historic townhouses, bolstered by zoning that preserves the low density neighborhood character, would lead to the conversion of much of this housing to single-family owner-occupied housing for higher-income households (Maurasse 2006, 102).

Almost 10 years after the rezoning, more than 1,100 housing units were created in the rezoning area, mostly along Frederick Douglass Boulevard. A small fraction of these are affordable or income-targeted (Slatin 2012). Within the rezoning area, median monthly gross rent increased by 58 percent, as compared to a 16 percent increase for all of Manhattan (Goldberg 2015).
RESIDENTIAL DISPLACEMENT
AND DISPARATE RACIAL IMPACTS

When the rezoning took place in 2003, Harlem was already experiencing gentrification pressures, which weighed most heavily on the neighborhood’s black and Latino residents. Since then, housing costs and displacement pressures have escalated dramatically. By 2004, Central Harlem had among the city’s highest rates of residential displacement and homeless shelter entry. Townhouses that were once subdivided to create multiple rental units were increasingly sold for occupancy as single-family homes. A 2006 survey found that 58.2 percent of Harlem residents knew someone who was forced to move from their home because of rising rents (Maurasse 2006, 81, 102). And, while the city currently has no mechanism to track displacement due to rent increases or landlord harassment, US Census data gives a sense of the demographic shifts in neighborhood. From 2000 to 2013, in the Frederick Douglass Boulevard rezoning area, the total population increased by 18 percent; the white population increased 455 percent while the black population declined by 5 percent, and the Latino population declined by 13 percent (Goldberg 2015).

Many residents expressed the concern that low- and middle-income African Americans were being pushed out. One Harlem tenant organizer told The Washington Post: “Things have gotten a little out of hand, yes, they have […] So many people endured the bad times and can’t afford the good.”

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According to long-time Harlem business owner Melba Wilson:

Change isn’t always bad, but I don’t want it to become a place where the original people are no longer welcome here, that they can no longer afford to be in a place that they built (Gregory 2012).

The displacement of black residents is evident in daily life on the streets of the neighborhood and in the numbers. According to American Community Survey and census data, from 2000 to 2010, “Central Harlem’s population [grew] more than in any other decade since the 1940s, [...] but its black population [...] is smaller than at any time since the 1920s” (Roberts 2010). In 2008, about one-fifth of Harlem’s white residents had entered their Harlem residence within the last year, whereas just 7 percent of black households had recently moved in (Roberts 2010). Bernard Moore, a black Harlem resident, succinctly captured the multiple ways new development shut out many moderate income and black residents. First, he told a Reuters reporter, new construction produced few local jobs because projects use outside and non-union crews. Second, residential development drives up rents and land values. “The cost of rent is so high,” he said, “even churches are selling their buildings to prospective apartment buildings that are out of reach for most black folks” (Trotta 2006).

*Percentages represent the percent change in number of residents within a demographic between 2000 and 2013.

Leo Goldberg, based on U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2013 data.
MORE REZONINGS AND REDEVELOPMENT PLANS, AND COMMUNITY RESISTANCE

The 2003 Frederick Douglass Boulevard rezoning spurred new development in Central Harlem. DCP ushered in additional rezonings to further expand development. There was no hint that DCP took into account the disparate racial impacts of the 2003 rezoning in formulating subsequent actions.

In addition to the Frederick Douglass Boulevard, 125th Street, and Special Manhattanville District rezonings discussed here, rezoning actions in East Harlem and West Harlem also introduced new development to the area.

In 2006, Columbia University announced plans to develop 17 acres of educational, residential, commercial, and hotel uses in West Harlem, neighboring the Frederick Douglass Boulevard rezoning area (Williams 2006). The plan would displace hundreds of residents and businesses through the use of eminent domain and other property deals. Residents and advocates resisted the expansion of this wealthy private institution, which had a checkered history of community engagement and collaboration. Community organizers again emphasized the ongoing problem of residential displacement and the need for low-income affordable housing. In 2007, following deals that aimed to expand income-targeted housing provisions and community access, the city approved the Special Manhattanville District for the Columbia University Expansion Plan (Moynihan 2007). At the same time, the CPC approved a 197-a plan for Manhattanville, which the city recognizes only as advisory and has no duty to implement despite formal adoption. The 197-a plan did, however, provide a cover of community support for the city-backed plan, just as in Greenpoint and Williamsburg (see Chapter Three).

Columbia’s expansion, in tandem with the 2003 rezoning and zoning and housing policy that incentivized real estate development, coincided with the continued harassment and displacement of tenants (Moss 2015). For instance, tenants at 3333 Broadway, a large affordable housing complex that saw an influx of Columbia students and other new residents paying market rents, sued management for withholding services from tenants with rental subsidies (Del Signore 2008; Morgenson 2008). Resident and housing voucher recipient Ray Anthony, whose rent went up from $470 per month in 1998 to $3,700 in 2009, told the press that he had seen:

100 black and Latino families [move] out since the new management took over. “We are the low-income people,” he said, “white people got no problem paying the rent.” (Keshner 2009).
04.J Harlem Area
Rezonings under
the Bloomberg
Administration.

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New York City Department of City Planning. NYC GIS Zoning Features, December 2015.
Next came another large-scale rezoning plan that rocked the neighborhood: the 125th Street Corridor rezoning. In 2007, DCP proposed to rezone the historic commercial and cultural center of Harlem and adjacent streets “from river to river” for high-rise residential and new commercial use. The community was organized, well versed in zoning policy, and facing ever more dire challenges to maintaining housing and community. Resident activists brought hundreds of residents to public meetings and published responses to claims from public officials on the rezoning proposal. Activist Nellie Bailey, for instance, wrote a clarification of the city’s affordable housing claims, explaining that:

approximately 3,858 luxury units are projected for development in the 24 blocks footprint that expands from 2nd Avenue to Broadway between 124th and 127th Streets. Despite [local City Council Member Inez] Dickens’ false assertion that 46% of these units are being “income-targeted” only 5%, or 200 units are for families earning below $30,000” (Bailey 2008).

This plan, like the Frederick Douglass Boulevard rezoning, only included voluntary incentives for affordable housing, which developers could choose not to employ. The plan was designed to capitalize on and maximize real estate interest, which was already squeezing out black and Latino residents. The announcement of the rezoning alone increased that speculation. As local State Assemblyman Keith Wright, a proponent of the plan, said:

Folks want to build higher right now [...] You have some rather large vacant lots that are being held onto by private developers, and they’re just waiting for the proposed rezoning (Brown 2007).

Residents again warned public officials that the upzoning would cause the direct and indirect displacement of small black-owned businesses, including 125th Street’s famed street vendors, as well as residents. Many residents and community groups made it known that they wanted to be involved in the planning of their community, but the city did not offer seats at the decision-making table. Despite City Planning’s claim that the plan reflected more than four years of community meetings, many residents and business owners stated that they had no meaningful input in the plan. Instead, they saw the city’s planning process as mere “social engineering” (Williams 2008). Many of the most active critics of the plan stated that the city’s representation of its community engagement efforts was overblown. This was the experience of historian and Harlem activist Michael Adams:
The city ignored his suggestion to include preservation in the rezoning plan and to landmark historic buildings that were important in the Harlem Renaissance and civil rights struggles. After it invited him to a planning meeting once, Adams said he never heard from the city again. He did notice that his name is listed on the Department of City Planning’s website as one of the “stakeholders, property owners, residents and elected officials” who held more than 150 meetings to discuss and refine the plan (Feltz 2008).

Activists also challenged the claims of community support for the plan that came primarily from representatives of business and cultural institutions that would receive funding or bonuses related to the plan. The city needed the backing of institutions that support African American history and art, but did not address or attempt to mitigate the displacement, financial burden, and stress that residents experienced as a result of residential and business loss and its impact on black cultural institutions. As Michael Henry Adams put it, “If the only Black presence in Harlem is a memory in the form of museums and place names, to hell with that” (Feltz 2008).

Feeling their recommendations were being ignored by the city, Harlem activists protested and held community meetings that brought out thousands, made public comments at meetings, and launched lawsuits (Amzallag 2008).

04.K The trendy Aloft Hotel opened on Frederick Douglass Boulevard and 123rd Street in 2011, following the 125th Street Corridor rezoning.

Photo: Sylvia Morse, 2016
In a protest against the 125th Street rezoning organized by the Coalition to Save Harlem on April 12, 2008, residents formed a human chain from "river to river," along the proposed rezoning area.

04. M Vera Wilson, the owner of House of Seafood restaurant, faced eviction due to speculation around the rezoning of 125th St.

04. N Typical existing retail on 125th Street.

Photo: Sylvia Morse, 2016

Outside of formal organizing, the topic took over the daily and emotional lives of many residents. In 2008 at the time of the rezoning, The New York Times reported that:

apprehension about gentrification has become a constant, and is now a common theme at Sunday church services and a standard topic of conversation in barber shops and beauty salons, on street corners, in bars, at public housing community rooms and among the doormen of the neighborhood’s new condominium buildings (Williams 2008).

Human service organizations reported a growing number of incidences of “insomnia and hypertension related to fears about losing [ones] home” (Williams 2008).

Small businesses that provide affordable services and often serve as cultural landmarks are also being evicted by new development facilitated by the rezoning. Harlem has been a thriving center of long-time black-owned and African immigrant businesses, including street vendors, that serve community interests and price-points, while providing local employment. Since the rezonings, many local businesses were directly displaced by new development or driven out by rising rents.
“This gentrification is affecting us mentally,” said Kaaw Sow, a representative of a Senegalese business association, describing the impact of rising costs on the local economy and community to a reporter. As New African magazine reported, “[Sow] says the arrival of wealthy whites has pushed rents in the area up and led the landlord who owns the Association’s storefront offices to raise the rent from $1,300 per month to close to $6,000 dollars.” (Goffe 2014).

In place of these businesses there are now multi-national chain stores and high-end boutiques. The New York Times described the transformation in 2012: “Now, along today’s [Frederick Douglass] boulevard sit an organic products store, a sushi restaurant and a yoga studio with toddler and tween classes” (Gregory 2012). New African magazine highlighted the racial impact of this change, including the cultural tourism and nostalgia that characterizes some of the new businesses:

It’s clear Harlem is no longer a local black people’s haven. It is, instead, a hotspot for high income hipsters attracted by the neighborhood’s high quality architecture and by the easy commute to New York City’s commercial and business districts downtown. Harlem is a hotspot, too, for interlopers eager to experience the urban, uptown African-American experience close up and in person” (Goffe 2014).

Today, Harlem residents and advocates continue to fight to preserve affordable housing and black-owned businesses. However, the impact of the city’s rezonings is clear: the population of Central Harlem, the area most affected by rezonings, grew 9 percent in a decade, while its black population fell 12 percent and white population ballooned by more than 400 percent. The disparate racial impacts of development spurred by the rezoning are shown clearly in the numbers, but also in the words of longtime black residents who have watched their family, friends, and neighbors pushed out of the black community they built in the midst of discrimination and service cutbacks by the city, all the while fearing for the loss of their own homes. As Michael Henry Adams said, “I’m not suggesting that Harlem will cease to exist once people are gone [...] it will be a different place. It will be a diminished place that is not as rich a contributor to American culture and history and heritage” (Feltz 2008).